BMC PATROL SNMP Agent before 3.2.07 allows local users to create arbitrary world-writeable files as root by specifying the target file as the second argument to the snmpmagt program.

mcmnm in BMC Patrol allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted libmcmclnx.so file in the current working directory, because it is setuid root and the RPATH variable begins with the .: substring.

An issue was discovered in BMC Patrol Agent 9.0.10i. Weak execution permissions on the PatrolAgent SUID binary could allow an attacker with "patrol" privileges to elevate his/her privileges to the ones of the "root" user by specially crafting a shared library .so file that will be loaded during execution.

BMC PATROL Agent before 3.2.07 allows local users to gain root privileges via a symlink attack on a temporary file.

An issue was discovered in BMC PATROL Agent through 11.3.01. It was found that the PatrolCli application can allow for lateral movement and escalation of privilege inside a Windows Active Directory environment. It was found that by default the PatrolCli / PATROL Agent application only verifies if the password provided for the given username is correct; it does not verify the permissions of the user on the network. This means if you have PATROL Agent installed on a high value target (domain controller), you can use a low privileged domain user to authenticate with PatrolCli and then connect to the domain controller and run commands as SYSTEM. This means any user on a domain can escalate to domain admin through PATROL Agent. NOTE: the vendor disputes this because they believe it is adequate to prevent this escalation by means of a custom, non-default configuration