Ubiquiti UniFi Devices Use of AES-CBC Allows Key Recovery and Unauthorized Device Control
Ubiquiti UniFi Network Controller prior to 5.10.12 (excluding 5.6.42), UAP FW prior to 4.0.6, UAP-AC, UAP-AC v2, and UAP-AC Outdoor FW prior to 3.8.17, USW FW prior to 4.0.6, USG FW prior to 4.4.34 uses AES-CBC encryption for device-to-controller communication, which contains cryptographic weaknesses that allow attackers to recover encryption keys from captured traffic. Attackers with adjacent network access can capture sufficient encrypted traffic and exploit AES-CBC mode vulnerabilities to derive the encryption keys, enabling unauthorized control and management of network devices.
Ubiquiti UniFi Devices Use of AES-CBC Allows Key Recovery and Unauthorized Device Control
Ubiquiti UniFi Network Controller prior to 5.10.12 (excluding 5.6.42), UAP FW prior to 4.0.6, UAP-AC, UAP-AC v2, and UAP-AC Outdoor FW prior to 3.8.17, USW FW prior to 4.0.6, USG FW prior to 4.4.34 uses AES-CBC encryption for device-to-controller communication, which contains cryptographic weaknesses that allow attackers to recover encryption keys from captured traffic. Attackers with adjacent network access can capture sufficient encrypted traffic and exploit AES-CBC mode vulnerabilities to derive the encryption keys, enabling unauthorized control and management of network devices.
Ubiquiti UniFi Network Controller prior to 5.10.12 (excluding 5.6.42), UAP FW prior to 4.0.6, UAP-AC, UAP-AC v2, and UAP-AC Outdoor FW prior to 3.8.17, USW FW prior to 4.0.6, USG FW prior to 4.4.34 uses AES-CBC encryption for device-to-controller communication, which contains cryptographic weaknesses that allow attackers to recover encryption keys from captured traffic. Attackers with adjacent network access can capture sufficient encrypted traffic and exploit AES-CBC mode vulnerabilities to derive the encryption keys, enabling unauthorized control and management of network devices.
Known To Be Used In Ransomware Campaigns?-Not Available
KEV Added-Not Available
KEV Action Due Date-Not Available
Z-Wave devices from Sierra Designs (circa 2013) and Silicon Labs (using S0 security) may use a known, shared network key of all zeros, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof Z-Wave traffic.