Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers)

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard or ARP inspection can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers and LLC/SNAP headers.

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length and Ethernet to Wifi frame conversion (and optionally VLAN0 headers).

The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. This behavior occurs because the specifications do not require an access point to purge its transmit queue before removing a client's pairwise encryption key.

IP-in-IP protocol specifies IP Encapsulation within IP standard (RFC 2003, STD 1) that decapsulate and route IP-in-IP traffic is vulnerable to spoofing, access-control bypass and other unexpected behavior due to the lack of validation to verify network packets before decapsulation and routing.