Backdoor Functionality via USB Drive in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
A USB backdoor feature can be triggered by attaching a USB drive that contains specially crafted "salia.ini" files. The .ini file can contain several "commands" that could be exploited by an attacker to export or modify the device configuration, enable an SSH backdoor or perform other administrative actions. Ultimately, this backdoor also allows arbitrary execution of OS commands.
Backdoor Functionality via USB Drive in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
A USB backdoor feature can be triggered by attaching a USB drive that contains specially crafted "salia.ini" files. The .ini file can contain several "commands" that could be exploited by an attacker to export or modify the device configuration, enable an SSH backdoor or perform other administrative actions. Ultimately, this backdoor also allows arbitrary execution of OS commands.
A USB backdoor feature can be triggered by attaching a USB drive that contains specially crafted "salia.ini" files. The .ini file can contain several "commands" that could be exploited by an attacker to export or modify the device configuration, enable an SSH backdoor or perform other administrative actions. Ultimately, this backdoor also allows arbitrary execution of OS commands.
Known To Be Used In Ransomware Campaigns?-Not Available
KEV Added-Not Available
KEV Action Due Date-Not Available
A vulnerability has been identified in SINEC Traffic Analyzer (6GK8822-1BG01-0BA0) (All versions < V1.2). The affected web server is allowing HTTP methods like PUT and Delete. This could allow an attacker to modify unauthorized files.