A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in a GraphQL service component shared by Altium Enterprise Server and Altium 365. An authenticated user can submit a request whose input is treated as a URL by the server and used to issue an outbound HTTP GET request without URL validation or destination filtering. The response body is then returned to the user. This allows an authenticated attacker to reach internal services and metadata endpoints that would not otherwise be accessible from the public network, and to retrieve their contents. The impact is information disclosure and internal infrastructure reconnaissance; the request primitive is limited to HTTP GET with no custom headers. Altium Enterprise Server is fixed in 8.1.1; the issue has been remediated in Altium 365 at the service level.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server ComparisonService due to missing filename sanitization in the Gerber file upload APIs. A regular authenticated workspace user can supply a crafted filename in the multipart Content-Disposition header to escape the intended temporary upload directory and write arbitrary files to any location on the server filesystem. Because content-controlled files can be written to web-accessible directories, this can be escalated to remote code execution in the context of the service account. It can also be used to overwrite application binaries or configuration files, leading to service takeover or denial of service.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Viewer StorageController due to improper handling of file path route parameters. On on-premise deployments that use local filesystem storage, a regular authenticated user can supply a URL-encoded absolute path (such as an encoded drive letter) in a Viewer storage API request, causing the configured storage root to be discarded and allowing arbitrary files to be read from the server filesystem. Because the readable files include the server's master configuration, which stores database credentials, signing key locations, certificate passwords, and OAuth secrets, exploitation can lead to disclosure of all server secrets and full compromise of the server and its data. Cloud deployments are not affected, as they use object storage and do not enable this component.

A hard-coded cryptographic key is used by Altium Enterprise Server to sign file download URLs in the Vault service. Because the key is identical across all installations, an unauthenticated network attacker who can reach the server can forge valid download signatures and retrieve files from the Vault storage area without any authentication, session, or credentials. A separate path traversal vulnerability in the same download endpoint allows the configured storage root to be escaped, enabling reads of arbitrary files on the server filesystem. Combined, these issues allow an unauthenticated attacker to obtain sensitive server configuration and key material, which can lead to full server compromise. The vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2026-9152 to enumerate and bulk-download stored content. Altium 365 cloud deployments are not impacted in practice, as file storage uses object storage rather than the local filesystem.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Vault Service UploadController due to improper validation of a user-controlled path component in image upload requests. An authenticated user can supply a crafted absolute path so that the configured storage root is discarded, allowing arbitrary files to be written to any location on the server filesystem writable by the service account. Because content-controlled files can be written to web-accessible directories, or used to overwrite application binaries or configuration files, this can be escalated to remote code execution, service takeover, or denial of service. Altium 365 cloud deployments are not affected, as the affected endpoint is not reachable and the cloud storage architecture mitigates the file-write primitive.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Collaboration Service due to improper handling of user-supplied filenames in the MCAD and Simulation file download flows. A regular authenticated user can submit a collaboration message containing a crafted filename, which is later used to construct the download path on the server without validation, allowing arbitrary files to be read from the server filesystem. Because the readable files include the server's master configuration, which stores credentials for privileged accounts, exploitation can lead to authenticating as a system administrator and gaining full control of the server. Altium 365 cloud deployments are not affected.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Git Service component shared by Altium Enterprise Server and Altium 365. The service accepts a sequence of post-clone file-manipulation operations that use user-supplied paths without validation, allowing an authenticated user with basic git access to move arbitrary files outside the intended repository area. This file-move primitive can be used to place attacker-controlled script content into directories where it is later executed by the service, resulting in remote code execution under the Git Service account. On multi-tenant Altium 365 deployments, this could have allowed access to data belonging to other tenants on the same infrastructure node. Altium Enterprise Server is fixed in 8.1.1; the issue has been remediated in Altium 365 at the service level.

changedetection.io is a free open source web page change detection tool. Prior to 0.54.7, the `jq:` and `jqraw:` include filter expressions allow use of the jq `env` builtin, which reads all process environment variables and stores them as the watch snapshot. An authenticated user (or unauthenticated user when no password is set, the default) can leak sensitive environment variables including `SALTED_PASS`, `PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL`, `HTTP_PROXY`, and any secrets passed as env vars to the container. Version 0.54.7 patches the issue.

Flare is a Next.js-based, self-hostable file sharing platform that integrates with screenshot tools. Prior to 1.7.3, an authenticated path traversal vulnerability in /api/avatars/[filename] allows any logged-in user to read arbitrary files from within the application container. The filename URL parameter is passed to path.join() without sanitization, and getFileStream() performs no path validation, enabling %2F-encoded ../ sequences to escape the uploads/avatars/ directory and read any file accessible to the nextjs process under /app/. Authentication is enforced by Next.js middleware. However, on instances with open registration enabled (the default), any attacker can self-register and immediately exploit this. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.3.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions prior to 3.5.4 contain a logic vulnerability in the /api/file/globalCopyFiles endpoint. The function allows authenticated users to copy files from any location on the server's filesystem into the application's workspace without proper path validation. The vulnerability exists in the api/file.go source code. The function globalCopyFiles accepts a list of source paths (srcs) from the JSON request body. While the code checks if the source file exists using filelock.IsExist(src), it fails to validate whether the source path resides within the authorized workspace directory. Version 3.5.4 patches the issue.