A flaw was found in Keycloak. An authenticated attacker can perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by manipulating the `client_session_host` parameter during refresh token requests. This occurs when a Keycloak client is configured to use the `backchannel.logout.url` with the `application.session.host` placeholder. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to make HTTP requests from the Keycloak server’s network context, potentially probing internal networks or internal APIs, leading to information disclosure.

EspoCRM is an open source customer relationship management application. In versions 9.3.3 and below, the POST /api/v1/Attachment/fromImageUrl endpoint is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via a DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) condition. Host validation uses dns_get_record() but the actual HTTP request resolves hostnames through curl's internal resolver (gethostbyname()), allowing the two lookups to return different IP addresses for the same hostname. A secondary issue exists where an empty DNS result (due to DNS failure, IPv6-only domains, or non-existent hostnames) causes the validation to implicitly allow the host without further checks. An authenticated attacker with default attachment creation access can exploit this gap to bypass internal IP restrictions and scan internal network ports, confirm the existence of internal hosts, and interact with internal HTTP-based services, though data extraction from binary protocol services and remote code execution are not possible through this endpoint. This issue has been fixed in version 9.3.4.

A vulnerability was discovered in GitLab starting with version 12. GitLab was vulnerable to a blind SSRF attack since requests to shared address space were not blocked.

Mattermost versions 9.5.x <= 9.5.8 fail to include the metadata endpoints of Oracle Cloud and Alibaba in the SSRF denylist, which allows an attacker to possibly cause an SSRF if Mattermost was deployed in Oracle Cloud or Alibaba.

External service lookups for a number of protocols were vulnerable to a time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) weakness, involving the JDK DNS cache. Attackers that were timing DNS cache expiry correctly were able to inject configuration that would bypass existing network deny-lists. Attackers could exploit this weakness to discover the existence of restricted network infrastructure and service availability. Improvements were made to include deny-lists not only during the check of the provided connection data, but also during use. No publicly available exploits are known.