In spring AMQP versions 1.0.0 to 2.4.16 and 3.0.0 to 3.0.9 , allowed list patterns for deserializable class names were added to Spring AMQP, allowing users to lock down deserialization of data in messages from untrusted sources; however by default, when no allowed list was provided, all classes could be deserialized. Specifically, an application is vulnerable if * the SimpleMessageConverter or SerializerMessageConverter is used * the user does not configure allowed list patterns * untrusted message originators gain permissions to write messages to the RabbitMQ broker to send malicious content
JsonPulsarHeaderMapper matched type headers against trusted packages using a prefix check, meaning that trusting any package implicitly trusted all of its subpackages. Additionally, an empty trusted-packages configuration fell back to trusting all packages rather than applying a safe default allow-list. Affected versions: Spring for Apache Pulsar 2.0.0 through 2.0.5; 1.2.0 through 1.2.17; 1.1.0 through 1.1.17.
In an untrusted JMS environment, org.springframework.jms.support.converter.MappingJackson2MessageConverter and org.springframework.jms.support.converter.JacksonJsonMessageConverter allow arbitrary class instantiation, which can lead to unauthorized actions via gadget class deserialization. Affected versions: Spring Framework 7.0.0 through 7.0.7; 6.2.0 through 6.2.18; 6.1.0 through 6.1.27; 5.3.0 through 5.3.48.
Spring for GraphQL applications are vulnerable to Unsafe Deserialization when processing paginated GraphQL queries. An attacker can craft a malicious GraphQL request that can lead to Remote Code Execution when the application exposes a paginated (Connection) field and the classpath contains specific classes that can be leveraged during deserialization. Affected versions: Spring for GraphQL 2.0.0 through 2.0.3; 1.4.0 through 1.4.5; 1.3.0 through 1.3.8.
In Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.9 and earlier and versions 2.9.10 and earlier, a possible deserialization attack vector existed, but only if unusual configuration was applied. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: * The user does notĀ configure an ErrorHandlingDeserializer for the key and/or value of the record * The user explicitly sets container properties checkDeserExWhenKeyNull and/or checkDeserExWhenValueNull container properties to true. * The user allows untrusted sources to publish to a Kafka topic By default, these properties are false, and the container only attempts to deserialize the headers if an ErrorHandlingDeserializer is configured. The ErrorHandlingDeserializer prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record.
JsonKafkaHeaderMapper and the deprecated DefaultKafkaHeaderMapper matched type headers against trusted packages using a prefix check, meaning that trusting any package implicitly trusted all of its subpackages. Combined with Jackson's default bean deserialization, a producer could supply crafted header values that caused the consumer to deserialize arbitrary JDK types. Affected versions: Spring for Apache Kafka 4.0.0 through 4.0.5; 3.3.0 through 3.3.15; 3.2.0 through 3.2.13; 2.9.0 through 2.9.13; 2.8.0 through 2.8.11.