Zed, a code editor, has an extension installer allows tar/gzip downloads. Prior to version 0.224.4, the tar extractor (`async_tar::Archive::unpack`) creates symlinks from the archive without validation, and the path guard (`writeable_path_from_extension`) only performs lexical prefix checks without resolving symlinks. An attacker can ship a tar that first creates a symlink inside the extension workdir pointing outside (e.g., `escape -> /`), then writes files through the symlink, causing writes to arbitrary host paths. This escapes the extension sandbox and enables code execution. Version 0.224.4 patches the issue.

Zed is a code editor. Prior to 0.229.0, Zed's terminal tool permission system can be bypassed by prepending environment variable assignments to allowlisted commands, hijacking program behavior (e.g., PAGER) to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.229.0.

In the LibreOffice 7-1 series in versions prior to 7.1.2, and in the 7-0 series in versions prior to 7.0.5, the denylist can be circumvented by manipulating the link so it doesn't match the denylist but results in ShellExecute attempting to launch an executable type.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command injection vulnerability in the auto-approve execute feature that allows attackers to bypass allowlist/denylist enforcement by nesting command substitutions inside parameter expansion defaults. The command parser in parse-command.ts replaces parameter expansions with opaque placeholders before extracting command substitutions, causing the containsDangerousSubstitution guard to miss nested payloads, which are then auto-approved based on the outer allowlisted command prefix and executed by the shell via execa, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.10 do not include the Python standard library modules _posixsubprocess, site, and atexit in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist (fickle.py). Because these modules are absent from the denylist, fickling's check_safety() function returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings for pickle payloads that invoke dangerous functions including _posixsubprocess.fork_exec (C-level process spawner capable of executing arbitrary binaries), site.execsitecustomize (executes arbitrary site customization code), and atexit._run_exitfuncs (triggers all registered exit handler callbacks). The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate; a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. This shares the same root cause as CVE-2026-22607 (cProfile), CVE-2025-67748 (pty), and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types). OvertlyBadEvals does not flag these modules because they are standard library imports. UnsafeImports does not flag them because they are not in the denylist. The UnusedVariables heuristic is defeated by the SETITEMS opcode pattern.

ByteDance DeerFlow versions prior to commit 92c7a20 contain a sandbox escape vulnerability in bash tool handling that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the host system by bypassing regex-based validation using shell features such as directory changes and relative paths. Attackers can exploit the incomplete shell semantics modeling to read and modify files outside the sandbox boundary and achieve arbitrary command execution through subprocess invocation with shell interpretation enabled.

SvelteKit is a web development framework. The SvelteKit framework offers developers an option to create simple REST APIs. This is done by defining a `+server.js` file, containing endpoint handlers for different HTTP methods. SvelteKit provides out-of-the-box cross-site request forgery (CSRF) protection to its users. While the implementation does a sufficient job in mitigating common CSRF attacks, prior to version 1.15.1, the protection can be bypassed by simply specifying a different `Content-Type` header value. If abused, this issue will allow malicious requests to be submitted from third-party domains, which can allow execution of operations within the context of the victim's session, and in extreme scenarios can lead to unauthorized access to users’ accounts. SvelteKit 1.15.1 updates the `is_form_content_type` function call in the CSRF protection logic to include `text/plain`. As additional hardening of the CSRF protection mechanism against potential method overrides, SvelteKit 1.15.1 is now performing validation on `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE` methods as well. This latter hardening is only needed to protect users who have put in some sort of `?_method= override` feature themselves in their `handle` hook, so that the request that resolve sees could be `PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` when the browser issues a `POST` request.