In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, client terminated DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) queries are not accounted properly by Unbound resulting in low-cost inflation of the waiting number of replies for already in-flight resolution queries. This results in degradation of resolution service for new clients for already in-flight queries. A malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability by issuing DoQ queries for query names that need resolution and proceeding on immediately terminating the query by one of STOP_SENDING/RESET_STREAM/CONNECTION_CLOSE QUIC frames. Those terminated DoQ queries are not properly counted for and keep inflating the number of waiting replies for in-flight queries. When the maximum is reached, it results in silent query drops for new clients needing resolution for already in-flight queries. This vulnerability needs Unbound to be compiled with DoQ support ('--with-libngtcp2') and the 'quic-port' to be configured for the listening interfaces. Additionally, a malicious actor needs access to multiple source IPs to bypass the by-default configured 'wait-limit' option.

Postfix before 3.8.16, 3.9 before 3.9.10, and 3.10 before 3.10.9 sometimes allows a buffer over-read and process crash via an enhanced status code that lacks text after the third number.

Tor before 0.4.9.7 has an out-of-bounds read by one byte via a malformed BEGIN cell, aka TROVE-2026-007.

UltraVNC repeater through 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one error in the Base64 decode helper used for HTTP Basic authentication. In repeater/webgui/webutils.c:817, the wi_uudecode() function checks whether the input length exceeds the output buffer with a strict greater-than comparison (>), while the correct check should be greater-than-or-equal (>=). When strlen(authdata) equals sizeof(decode), the decoded output length (approximately 3/4 of input) does not overflow the buffer in current practice because the outer HTTP request bounds constrain the Authorization header. However, the defective check leaves a latent off-by-one condition that could become exploitable if the buffering constraints change. The current risk is limited to a one-byte write at the boundary of a 1024-byte stack buffer under constrained conditions.

A weakness has been identified in osrg GoBGP up to 4.3.0. This impacts the function DecodeFromBytes of the file pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go. Executing a manipulation of the argument data[1] can lead to off-by-one. The attack may be launched remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is said to be difficult. This patch is called 67c059413470df64bc20801c46f64058e88f800f. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue.

Rsync versions before 3.4.3 contain an off-by-one out-of-bounds stack write vulnerability in the establish_proxy_connection() function in socket.c that allows network attackers to corrupt stack memory by sending a malformed HTTP proxy response. Attackers can exploit this by positioning themselves between the client and proxy or controlling the proxy server to send a response line of 1023 or more bytes without a newline terminator, causing a null byte to be written to an out-of-bounds stack address when the RSYNC_PROXY environment variable is set.