Portainer 1.24.1 and earlier is affected by incorrect access control that may lead to remote arbitrary code execution. The restriction checks for bind mounts are applied only on the client-side and not the server-side, which can lead to spawning a container with bind mount. Once such a container is spawned, it can be leveraged to break out of the container leading to complete Docker host machine takeover.

Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33., Portainer proxies requests to Kubernetes clusters through a middleware layer (kubeClientMiddleware) that validates the requesting user's token before forwarding traffic to the cluster. When security.RetrieveTokenData returned an error, the middleware wrote an HTTP 403 response but was missing a return statement — execution continued into the handler with a nil tokenData value. The Kubernetes endpoints sit behind Portainer's outer AuthenticatedAccess bouncer, so an attacker requires a valid Portainer session. However, a user whose secondary token validation fails in kubeClientMiddleware — for example a user without permission to access a given Kubernetes endpoint — would have their request forwarded to the cluster anyway, bypassing the authorization check. The same defect was present in both the CE and EE codebases. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8.

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to your services. Prior to 2.4.0, the OIDC token endpoint rejects an authorization code only when both the client ID is wrong and the code is expired. This allows cross-client code exchange and expired code reuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.0.

Plex Media Server (PMS) through 1.42.2.10156 allows retrieval of a permanent access token via a /myplex/account call with a transient access token.

Multiple WSO2 products have been identified as vulnerable to perform user impersonatoin using JIT provisioning. In order for this vulnerability to have any impact on your deployment, following conditions must be met: * An IDP configured for federated authentication and JIT provisioning enabled with the "Prompt for username, password and consent" option. * A service provider that uses the above IDP for federated authentication and has the "Assert identity using mapped local subject identifier" flag enabled. Attacker should have: * A fresh valid user account in the federated IDP that has not been used earlier. * Knowledge of the username of a valid user in the local IDP. When all preconditions are met, a malicious actor could use JIT provisioning flow to perform user impersonation.