Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0597, Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time, so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions during omni-completion. The existing g:pythoncomplete_allow_import mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the attacker-controlled code is not a harvested import/from statement. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0597.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0316, a command injection vulnerability in Vim's netbeans interface allows a malicious netbeans server to execute arbitrary Ex commands when Vim connects to it, via unsanitized strings in the defineAnnoType and specialKeys protocol messages. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0316.

The shellescape function in Vim 7.0 through 7.2, including 7.2a.10, allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via the "!" (exclamation point) shell metacharacter in (1) the filename of a ZIP archive and possibly (2) the filename of the first file in a ZIP archive, which is not properly handled by zip.vim in the VIM ZIP plugin (zipPlugin.vim) v.11 through v.21, as demonstrated by the zipplugin and zipplugin.v2 test cases. NOTE: this issue reportedly exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2712. NOTE: this issue has the same root cause as CVE-2008-3074. NOTE: due to the complexity of the associated disclosures and the incomplete information related to them, there may be inaccuracies in this CVE description and in external mappings to this identifier.

src/configure.in in Vim 5.0 through 7.1, when used for a build with Python support, does not ensure that the Makefile-conf temporary file has the intended ownership and permissions, which allows local users to execute arbitrary code by modifying this file during a time window, or by creating it ahead of time with permissions that prevent its modification by configure.