7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.34 through 26.00 contain a heap memory disclosure via SquashFS fragment offset integer overflow on 32-bit builds. 32-bit integer overflow in the SquashFS ReadBlock function allows an attacker-controlled node.Offset value to bypass the fragment bounds check, causing memcpy to read heap memory preceding the cache buffer into the extracted file. The vulnerability is exploitable only on 32-bit builds of 7-Zip where size_t is 32 bits, allowing the addition offsetInBlock + blockSize to wrap modulo 2³². On 64-bit builds the addition is promoted to 64 bits and the check correctly rejects the input. Version 26.01 patches the issue.

7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.34 through 26.00 contain an off-by-one heap out-of-bounds read in the WIM (Windows Imaging) archive handler's security descriptor lookup. In CHandler::GetSecurity (CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp), the per-image SecurOffsets table holds numEntries + 1 cumulative offsets, but the check securityId >= SecurOffsets.Size() admits securityId == numEntries, and the function then reads SecurOffsets[securityId + 1], fetching one UInt32 past the end of the heap-allocated CRecordVector (which performs no bounds checking on operator[]). The securityId is attacker-controlled at offset +0xC of any directory entry in WIM metadata, and the handler is registered for .wim, .swm, .esd, and .ppkg and enabled by default in stock 7z.dll; the OOB triggers zero-click in the GUI because 7zFM.exe's ListView calls GetRawProp(kpidNtSecure) for every item during listing (ASan-confirmed), and is also reachable via CLI listing with 7zz l -slt. Impact is limited to denial of service under hardened allocators and minor information disclosure, since the OOB value is only consumed arithmetically as a length and is not surfaced to the attacker; there is no write primitive.

7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.21 through 26.00 contain an off-by-one out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the ParseDepedencyExpression function of the UEFI firmware image parser(CPP/7zip/Archive/UefiHandler.cpp). The function validates an attacker-controlled opcode byte using > instead of >= against the element count of the 10-entry kExpressionCommands static array, allowing an opcode value of 10 to read one pointer slot (8 bytes on x64) past the end of the array in .rodata. The out-of-bounds value is then dereferenced as a const char * and passed through strlen and memcpy into the archive's Characts property, which may cause either a denial of service (access violation when the adjacent bytes do not form a valid readable pointer) or a minor information disclosure of an adjacent .rdata string literal into archive metadata. The vulnerability is reached automatically during IInArchive::Open() via the call path OpenFv/OpenCapsule → ParseVolume → ParseSections when processing a SECTION_DXE_DEPEX (0x13) or SECTION_PEI_DEPEX (0x1B) section whose first body byte is 0x0A, and the UEFI handler is enabled by default in stock 7z.dll with signature-based detection for both UEFIc and UEFIf formats. The outcome (crash vs. silent leak) is deterministic per build but linker-layout dependent, with no write primitive and no disclosure of heap data, secrets, or ASLR base addresses. Version 26.01 fixes the issue.

7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.18 through 26.00 contain an uninitialized heap read in the SquashFS archive handler caused by a sparsely populated index array. In the SquashFS handler, _blockToNode is allocated with capacity for every metadata block but populated only when an inode crosses a block boundary, so a crafted image with few inodes spanning many blocks leaves most slots holding raw heap contents (the underlying allocator does not zero-initialize POD storage). When OpenDir looks up an attacker-influenced blockIndex (derived from the RootInode superblock field), it reads two of these uninitialized slots and passes them as the left/right bounds of a binary search over _nodesPos, which dereferences the midpoint without bounds checking; if the resulting value happens to match the search key, the returned index is used to read a full node struct from _nodes whose fields feed further directory parsing, forming a chained OOB read primitive that is heap-layout-dependent and not reliably triggerable. The SquashFS handler is enabled by default in stock 7z.dll and the issue triggers during Open() with no interaction beyond opening the file; impact is denial of service from wild-pointer dereference and potential heap information disclosure, with no write primitive. Version 26.01 fixes the issue.

7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.18 through 26.00 contain a heap out-of-bounds read in 7-Zip Ar handler BSD SYMDEF parser. A 4-byte heap out-of-bounds read exists in the Unix ar archive parser in 7-Zip. When parsing a BSD-style __.SYMDEF symbol table, the ParseLibSymbols function reads a 32-bit namesSize field via Get32 at a position that can equal the buffer size, reading 4 bytes past the end of the heap allocation. This reads uninitialized heap data under the default allocator. Version 26.01 patches the issue.

Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in unpack_response (session.c) in libplctag from 2.0 through 2.6.3 allows Overread Buffers via network.

Out of bounds read in GPU in Google Chrome on Linux prior to 148.0.7778.168 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)

Out of bounds read in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted Chrome Extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium)

Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in unpack_response (conn.c) in libplctag from 2.0 through 2.6.3 allows Overread Buffers via network.