Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.77 and 9.9.1-alpha.1, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a publicly-known Parse Application ID can submit a single HTTP request whose client SDK version field contains adversarial input that triggers polynomial backtracking in a request-header parser. The parsing runs before session authentication and before rate limiting on every /parse/* request, so the request consumes seconds to minutes of synchronous CPU on a Node.js worker before any access control evaluates it. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate a worker; a single large request via the body-field variant can pin a worker for minutes. Production deployments running the default configuration are affected. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.77 and 9.9.1-alpha.1.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.55 and 9.6.0-alpha.44, an attacker can send an unauthenticated HTTP request with a deeply nested query containing logical operators to permanently hang the Parse Server process. The server becomes completely unresponsive and must be manually restarted. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-32944. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.55 and 9.6.0-alpha.44.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.58 and 9.6.0-alpha.52, an unauthenticated attacker can cause denial of service by sending authentication requests with arbitrary, unconfigured provider names. The server executes a database query for each unconfigured provider before rejecting the request, and since no database index exists for unconfigured providers, each request triggers a full collection scan on the user database. This can be parallelized to saturate database resources. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.58 and 9.6.0-alpha.52.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to 9.6.0-alpha.21 and 8.6.45, an unauthenticated attacker can crash the Parse Server process by sending a single request with deeply nested query condition operators. This terminates the server and denies service to all connected clients. Starting in version 9.6.0-alpha.21 and 8.6.45, a depth limit for query condition operator nesting has been added via the `requestComplexity.queryDepth` server option. The option is disabled by default to avoid a breaking change. To mitigate, upgrade and set the option to a value appropriate for your app. No known workarounds are available.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior 9.5.2-alpha.2 and 8.6.15, an unauthenticated attacker can exhaust Parse Server resources (CPU, memory, database connections) through crafted queries that exploit the lack of complexity limits in the REST and GraphQL APIs. All Parse Server deployments using the REST or GraphQL API are affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.5.2-alpha.2 and 8.6.15.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.68 and 9.7.0-alpha.12, the GraphQL query complexity validator can be exploited to cause a denial-of-service by sending a crafted query with binary fan-out fragment spreads. A single unauthenticated request can block the Node.js event loop for seconds, denying service to all concurrent users. This only affects deployments that have enabled the requestComplexity.graphQLDepth or requestComplexity.graphQLFields configuration options. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.68 and 9.7.0-alpha.12.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via CPU exhaustion during WebSocket fragment reassembly. The size guard 'Elixir.Bandit.WebSocket.Connection':oversize_message?/2 called from handle_frame/3 in lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex appends each non-final continuation frame to a left-nested iolist and then re-measures the entire accumulated buffer with IO.iodata_length/1 on every frame. Because the buffer grows by one element per frame and is fully re-traversed each time, reassembly work is quadratic (O(n^2)) in the number of continuation frames. The max_fragmented_message_size limit (default 8 MB) bounds total bytes but not frame count, and each frame can carry as little as one payload byte, so an attacker can send millions of tiny continuation frames using modest bandwidth to pin a CPU core for minutes to hours. Many concurrent connections can starve the whole server of CPU, denying service to legitimate users. The WebSocket read timeout does not help, because it is an idle timeout evaluated between reads and cannot preempt the synchronous reassembly work spent inside a single callback. This issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.12.1.

Pathway through 0.31.1, fixed in commit d09722e, document store applies a caller-supplied glob pattern to indexed document paths using a hand-written recursive matcher that branches two ways on each ** token without memoization, giving exponential worst-case complexity. The filepath_globpattern value is taken from the body of the unauthenticated HTTP endpoints /v1/retrieve, /v1/inputs and /v2/answer and compiled into a filter evaluated once per indexed document, with no length or **-count limit. A remote unauthenticated attacker can submit a short pattern containing many ** tokens to consume CPU for tens of seconds per request, and a small number of requests denies service.

Immutable.js provides many Persistent Immutable data structures. Prior to 4.3.9 and 5.1.8, Immutable.Map and Immutable.Set keep keys that share the same 32-bit hash in a HashCollisionNode collision bucket that is scanned linearly, allowing an attacker who controls keys inserted into a Map, such as through Immutable.Map(obj), Immutable.fromJS(obj), state.merge(userObject), or mergeDeep, to craft many colliding keys and degrade insertion and lookup to consume disproportionate CPU. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.9 and 5.1.8.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in elixir-mint hpax allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via unbounded HPACK integer decoding. hpax decodes HPACK variable-length integers with no upper bound on the decoded value or the number of continuation octets. 'Elixir.HPAX.Types':decode_remaining_integer/3 accumulates the integer as int + (value <<< m), shifting by 7 more bits for each continuation octet and stopping only on a terminating octet or truncated input, never because the integer grew too large. Because BEAM integers are arbitrary precision, a run of N continuation octets builds an O(N)-bit bignum and re-adds into an ever-larger bignum on each step, so the total decoding cost is superlinear (about O(N^2)). An unauthenticated attacker who can send an HTTP/2 header block to a server using this decoder (reached through the 'Elixir.HPAX':decode/2 entry point) can supply a small header block that forces a large, attacker-controlled amount of CPU (and transient memory), a denial-of-service amplification. This issue affects hpax from 0.1.1 before 1.0.4.

py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Prior to 1.1.3, PackInfo._read() in archiveinfo.py used an O(n^2) cumulative sum pattern for attacker-controlled numstreams values parsed from archive headers, allowing a crafted .7z archive to cause excessive CPU consumption during SevenZipFile.init() before extraction. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.3.

Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Plug's nested-parameter decoder allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 (and Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2) parse query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies. When a key contains many bracketed segments such as a[a][a][a]=1, the decoder walks the brackets and, for each of the N levels, performs a map operation keyed on an ever-growing binary prefix of the key, hashing the full byte range at each step. The total decode cost is therefore quadratic in the number of nesting levels. With the default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED body limit of 1,000,000 bytes, a single request can carry roughly 333,000 nesting levels and saturate a BEAM scheduler for minutes. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate all schedulers and render a Plug-based server unresponsive. No authentication or knowledge of application routes is required. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/conn/query.ex and program routines Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4, Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2, Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6, Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2. This issue affects plug from 1.15.0 before 1.15.5, 1.16.4, 1.17.2, 1.18.3, and 1.19.3.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Apache Thrift Node.js bindings. This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue.

React Router is a router for React. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.17.0, the manifest endpoint could be accessed via unauthenticated targeted requests that would put heavy load on the server and slow down response times. This issue is a follow up to CVE-2026-42342, and does not does not impact React Router applications using Declarative Mode (<BrowserRouter>) or Data Mode (createBrowserRouter/<RouterProvider>). This issue has been fixed in version 7.18.0.

Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.3.0, Mistune is vulnerable to a CPU exhaustion DoS due to superlinear (approximately O(n²)) behavior in parse_link_text. When parsing Markdown containing many consecutive [ characters, parse_link_text repeatedly scans the input using a regex search inside a loop. Each iteration re-scans a large portion of the remaining string, resulting in quadratic-time behavior. An attacker-controlled Markdown input can therefore trigger excessive CPU usage with a very small payload. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.3.0.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via quadratic fragment-name uniqueness validation. 'Elixir.Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames':run/2 iterates over all fragments and for each one calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, &(&1.name == name)) — a full linear scan of the fragment list. The result is O(N²) comparisons per document, where N is the number of fragment definitions supplied by the caller. Because input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query body, N is fully attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60,000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this single validation phase. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required. This issue affects absinthe: from 1.2.0 before 1.10.2.

shell-quote prior to 1.8.5 finalizes parsed tokens in parse() using Array.prototype.concat as a reduce accumulator, which reallocates and copies the entire growing array on every iteration. As a result parse() runs in O(n^2) time relative to the number of input tokens. An attacker who can supply an attacker-controlled string to any code path that calls parse() (no shell metacharacters are required; plain space-separated words suffice) can block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for an extended period with a small input, resulting in a denial of service. There is no code execution or data disclosure; impact is to availability only. Fixed in 1.8.5.