jupyter-server CORS origin validation bypass via unanchored regex in allow_origin_pat
Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.
A flaw was found in Jupyter Server. The Origin header validation, which uses Python's `re.match()` function, does not correctly validate incoming origins against allowed patterns. This allows a remote attacker to bypass Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) restrictions by crafting a malicious domain that partially matches a trusted one. Consequently, the attacker can make unauthorized cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site, potentially leading to sensitive information disclosure or other unauthorized actions.
RHSA-2026:43038: Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2
Configurations
Workarounds
Administrators should review and update the `allow_origin_pat` configuration in Jupyter Server to use a more precise regular expression. Ensure the pattern explicitly anchors to the end of the string (e.g., by adding `$` to the end of the regex) to prevent partial domain matches. After modifying the configuration, the Jupyter Server service must be restarted for the changes to take effect.