Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Problem Types
| Type | CWE ID | Description |
|---|
| CWE | CWE-639 | CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key |
| CWE | CWE-862 | CWE-862: Missing Authorization |
| CWE | CWE-863 | CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization |
Type: CWE
Description: CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Type: CWE
Description: CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Type: CWE
Description: CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Metrics
| Version | Base score | Base severity | Vector |
|---|
| 3.1 | 9.1 | CRITICAL | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L |
Version: 3.1
Base score: 9.1
Base severity: CRITICAL
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L