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CWE-1242:Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
Weakness ID:1242
Version:v4.17
Weakness Name:Inclusion of Undocumented Features or Chicken Bits
Vulnerability Mapping:Allowed
Abstraction:Base
Structure:Simple
Status:Incomplete
Likelihood of Exploit:
DetailsContent HistoryObserved CVE ExamplesReports
▼Description

The device includes chicken bits or undocumented features that can create entry points for unauthorized actors.

▼Extended Description

A common design practice is to use undocumented bits on a device that can be used to disable certain functional security features. These bits are commonly referred to as "chicken bits". They can facilitate quick identification and isolation of faulty components, features that negatively affect performance, or features that do not provide the required controllability for debug and test. Another way to achieve this is through implementation of undocumented features. An attacker might exploit these interfaces for unauthorized access.

▼Alternate Terms
▼Relationships
Relevant to the view"Research Concepts - (1000)"
NatureMappingTypeIDName
▼Memberships
NatureMappingTypeIDName
▼Tags
NatureMappingTypeIDName
▼Relevant To View
▼Background Detail

▼Common Consequences
ScopeLikelihoodImpactNote
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailabilityAccess ControlN/AModify MemoryRead MemoryExecute Unauthorized Code or CommandsGain Privileges or Assume IdentityBypass Protection Mechanism
N/A
Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control
Likelihood: N/A
Impact: Modify Memory, Read Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism
Note:
N/A
▼Potential Mitigations
Phase:Architecture and Design, Implementation
Mitigation ID:
Strategy:
Effectiveness: High
Description:

The implementation of chicken bits in a released product is highly discouraged. If implemented at all, ensure that they are disabled in production devices. All interfaces to a device should be documented.

Note:

▼Modes Of Introduction
Phase: Architecture and Design
Note:

N/A

Phase: Implementation
Note:

N/A

Phase: Documentation
Note:

N/A

▼Applicable Platforms
Languages
Class: Not Language-Specific(Undetermined Prevalence)
Technology
Class: Not Technology-Specific(Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: ICS/OT(Undetermined Prevalence)
Operating System
Class: Not OS-Specific(Undetermined Prevalence)
Architecture
Class: Not Architecture-Specific(Undetermined Prevalence)
▼Demonstrative Examples
Example 1

Consider a device that comes with various security measures, such as secure boot. The secure-boot process performs firmware-integrity verification at boot time, and this code is stored in a separate SPI-flash device. However, this code contains undocumented "special access features" intended to be used only for performing failure analysis and intended to only be unlocked by the device designer.

Language: ( code)
N/A

Language: Other(Bad code)
Attackers dump the code from the device and then perform reverse engineering to analyze the code. The undocumented, special-access features are identified, and attackers can activate them by sending specific commands via UART before secure-boot phase completes. Using these hidden features, attackers can perform reads and writes to memory via the UART interface. At runtime, the attackers can also execute arbitrary code and dump the entire memory contents.

Language: ( code)
N/A

Remove all chicken bits and hidden features that are exposed to attackers. Add authorization schemes that rely on cryptographic primitives to access any features that the manufacturer does not want to expose. Clearly document all interfaces.

▼Observed Examples
ReferenceDescription
▼Affected Resources
    ▼Functional Areas
      ▼Weakness Ordinalities
      OrdinalityDescription
      ▼Detection Methods
      ▼Vulnerability Mapping Notes
      Usage:Allowed
      Reason:Acceptable-Use
      Rationale:

      This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

      Comments:

      Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

      Suggestions:
      ▼Notes
      ▼Taxonomy Mappings
      Taxonomy NameEntry IDFitEntry Name
      ISA/IEC 62443Part 4-1N/AReq SD-4
      ISA/IEC 62443Part 4-1N/AReq SVV-3
      ISA/IEC 62443Part 4-2N/AReq CR 2.12
      Taxonomy Name: ISA/IEC 62443
      Entry ID: Part 4-1
      Fit: N/A
      Entry Name: Req SD-4
      Taxonomy Name: ISA/IEC 62443
      Entry ID: Part 4-1
      Fit: N/A
      Entry Name: Req SVV-3
      Taxonomy Name: ISA/IEC 62443
      Entry ID: Part 4-2
      Fit: N/A
      Entry Name: Req CR 2.12
      ▼Related Attack Patterns
      IDName
      CAPEC-212
      Functionality Misuse
      CAPEC-36
      Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
      ID: CAPEC-212
      Name: Functionality Misuse
      ID: CAPEC-36
      Name: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
      ▼References
      Reference ID: REF-1071
      Title: Doors of Durin: The Veiled Gate to Siemens S7 Silicon
      Author: Ali Abbasi, Tobias Scharnowski, Thorsten Holz
      Section:
      Publication:
      Publisher:
      Edition:
      URL:https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Wednesday/eu-19-Abbasi-Doors-Of-Durin-The-Veiled-Gate-To-Siemens-S7-Silicon.pdf
      URL Date:
      Day:N/A
      Month:N/A
      Year:N/A
      Reference ID: REF-1072
      Title: Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip
      Author: Sergei Skorobogatov, Christopher Woods
      Section:
      Publication:
      Publisher:
      Edition:
      URL:https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/Silicon_scan_draft.pdf
      URL Date:
      Day:N/A
      Month:N/A
      Year:N/A
      Reference ID: REF-1073
      Title: God Mode Unlocked: Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs
      Author: Chris Domas
      Section:
      Publication:
      Publisher:
      Edition:
      URL:https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Domas-God-Mode-Unlocked-Hardware-Backdoors-In-x86-CPUs.pdf
      URL Date:
      Day:N/A
      Month:N/A
      Year:N/A
      Reference ID: REF-1074
      Title: Hardware Backdooring is Practical
      Author: Jonathan Brossard
      Section:
      Publication:
      Publisher:
      Edition:
      URL:https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Brossard/BH_US_12_Brossard_Backdoor_Hacking_Slides.pdf
      URL Date:
      Day:N/A
      Month:N/A
      Year:N/A
      Reference ID: REF-1075
      Title: Security, Reliability, and Backdoors
      Author: Sergei Skorabogatov
      Section:
      Publication:
      Publisher:
      Edition:
      URL:https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/SG_talk_SRB.pdf
      URL Date:
      Day:N/A
      Month:N/A
      Year:N/A
      Details not found