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NVD Vulnerability Details :
CVE-2026-43299
Analyzed
More InfoOfficial Page
Source-416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
View Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) details
Published At-08 May, 2026 | 14:16
Updated At-15 May, 2026 | 14:13

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not ASSERT() when the fs flips RO inside btrfs_repair_io_failure() [BUG] There is a bug report that when btrfs hits ENOSPC error in a critical path, btrfs flips RO (this part is expected, although the ENOSPC bug still needs to be addressed). The problem is after the RO flip, if there is a read repair pending, we can hit the ASSERT() inside btrfs_repair_io_failure() like the following: BTRFS info (device vdc): relocating block group 30408704 flags metadata|raid1 ------------[ cut here ]------------ BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28) WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3235 at __btrfs_free_extent.isra.0+0x453/0xfd0, CPU#1: btrfs/383844 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass [...] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS info (device vdc state EA): 2 enospc errors during balance BTRFS info (device vdc state EA): balance: ended with status: -30 BTRFS error (device vdc state EA): parent transid verify failed on logical 30556160 mirror 2 wanted 8 found 6 BTRFS error (device vdc state EA): bdev /dev/nvme0n1 errs: wr 0, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 10, gen 0 [...] assertion failed: !(fs_info->sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/bio.c:938 ------------[ cut here ]------------ assertion failed: !(fs_info->sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/bio.c:938 kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/bio.c:938! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 868 Comm: kworker/u8:13 Tainted: G W N 6.19.0-rc6+ #4788 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: btrfs-endio simple_end_io_work RIP: 0010:btrfs_repair_io_failure.cold+0xb2/0x120 RSP: 0000:ffffc90001d2bcf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8305cf42 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: ffffffff837fa988 R10: ffffffff8327a9e0 R11: 6f69747265737361 R12: ffff88813018d310 R13: ffff888168b8a000 R14: ffffc90001d2bd90 R15: ffff88810a169000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e752c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 ------------[ cut here ]------------ [CAUSE] The cause of -ENOSPC error during the test case btrfs/124 is still unknown, although it's known that we still have cases where metadata can be over-committed but can not be fulfilled correctly, thus if we hit such ENOSPC error inside a critical path, we have no choice but abort the current transaction. This will mark the fs read-only. The problem is inside the btrfs_repair_io_failure() path that we require the fs not to be mount read-only. This is normally fine, but if we are doing a read-repair meanwhile the fs flips RO due to a critical error, we can enter btrfs_repair_io_failure() with super block set to read-only, thus triggering the above crash. [FIX] Just replace the ASSERT() with a proper return if the fs is already read-only.

CISA Catalog
Date AddedDue DateVulnerability NameRequired Action
N/A
Date Added: N/A
Due Date: N/A
Vulnerability Name: N/A
Required Action: N/A
Metrics
TypeVersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Primary3.15.5MEDIUM
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Type: Primary
Version: 3.1
Base score: 5.5
Base severity: MEDIUM
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CPE Matches

Linux Kernel Organization, Inc
linux
>>linux_kernel>>Versions from 3.13(inclusive) to 6.19.6(exclusive)
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Weaknesses
CWE IDTypeSource
NVD-CWE-noinfoPrimarynvd@nist.gov
CWE ID: NVD-CWE-noinfo
Type: Primary
Source: nvd@nist.gov
Evaluator Description

Evaluator Impact

Evaluator Solution

Vendor Statements

References
HyperlinkSourceResource
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ceaad6cd6e7fa5f73b0b2796a2e85d75d37e9f3416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6df18c001e3dcebc08482d0adeacd0cfea08593416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Hyperlink: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ceaad6cd6e7fa5f73b0b2796a2e85d75d37e9f3
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Resource:
Patch
Hyperlink: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6df18c001e3dcebc08482d0adeacd0cfea08593
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Resource:
Patch
Change History
0Changes found

Details not found