An exploitable vulnerability exists in the verified boot protection of the Das U-Boot from version 2013.07-rc1 to 2014.07-rc2. The affected versions lack proper FIT signature enforcement, which allows an attacker to bypass U-Boot's verified boot and execute an unsigned kernel, embedded in a legacy image format. To trigger this vulnerability, a local attacker needs to be able to supply the image to boot.

Das U-Boot is a device bootloader that can read its configuration from an AES encrypted file. For devices utilizing this environment encryption mode, U-Boot's use of a zero initialization vector may allow attacks against the underlying cryptographic implementation and allow an attacker to decrypt the data. Das U-Boot's AES-CBC encryption feature uses a zero (0) initialization vector. This allows an attacker to perform dictionary attacks on encrypted data produced by Das U-Boot to learn information about the encrypted data.

ChainKey Java Code Protection allows attackers to decompile Java class files via a Java class loader with a modified defineClass method that saves the bytecode to a file before it is passed to the JVM.