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Vulnerability Details :

CVE-2021-21382

Summary
Assigner-GitHub_M
Assigner Org ID-a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa
Published At-11 Jun, 2021 | 20:50
Updated At-03 Aug, 2024 | 18:09
Rejected At-
Credits

Unsafe loopback forwarding interface in Restund

Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the `status` interface of restund is enabled and is listening on `127.0.0.1`.The `status` interface allows users to issue administrative commands to `restund` like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` to `127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}}` when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, 'any' addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the `status` module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on `127.0.0.0/8` that you do not want to have exposed. The `turn` module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you don't want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal.

Vendors
-
Not available
Products
-
Metrics (CVSS)
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Weaknesses
Attack Patterns
Solution/Workaround
References
HyperlinkResource Type
EPSS History
Score
Latest Score
-
N/A
No data available for selected date range
Percentile
Latest Percentile
-
N/A
No data available for selected date range
Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC)
▼Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
cve.org
Assigner:GitHub_M
Assigner Org ID:a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa
Published At:11 Jun, 2021 | 20:50
Updated At:03 Aug, 2024 | 18:09
Rejected At:
▼CVE Numbering Authority (CNA)
Unsafe loopback forwarding interface in Restund

Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the `status` interface of restund is enabled and is listening on `127.0.0.1`.The `status` interface allows users to issue administrative commands to `restund` like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` to `127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}}` when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, 'any' addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the `status` module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on `127.0.0.0/8` that you do not want to have exposed. The `turn` module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you don't want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal.

Affected Products
Vendor
wireapp
Product
restund
Versions
Affected
  • < 0.4.15
Problem Types
TypeCWE IDDescription
CWECWE-668CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Type: CWE
CWE ID: CWE-668
Description: CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Metrics
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
3.18.6HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Version: 3.1
Base score: 8.6
Base severity: HIGH
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Metrics Other Info
Impacts
CAPEC IDDescription
Solutions

Configurations

Workarounds

Exploits

Credits

Timeline
EventDate
Replaced By

Rejected Reason

References
HyperlinkResource
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
x_refsource_MISC
https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
x_refsource_MISC
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
x_refsource_MISC
https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
Resource:
x_refsource_CONFIRM
Hyperlink: https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
Hyperlink: https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
▼Authorized Data Publishers (ADP)
CVE Program Container
Affected Products
Metrics
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Metrics Other Info
Impacts
CAPEC IDDescription
Solutions

Configurations

Workarounds

Exploits

Credits

Timeline
EventDate
Replaced By

Rejected Reason

References
HyperlinkResource
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
x_refsource_CONFIRM
x_transferred
https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
Resource:
x_refsource_CONFIRM
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Hyperlink: https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else
Resource:
x_refsource_MISC
x_transferred
Information is not available yet
▼National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
nvd.nist.gov
Source:security-advisories@github.com
Published At:11 Jun, 2021 | 21:15
Updated At:21 Oct, 2022 | 22:44

Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the `status` interface of restund is enabled and is listening on `127.0.0.1`.The `status` interface allows users to issue administrative commands to `restund` like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` to `127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}}` when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, 'any' addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the `status` module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on `127.0.0.0/8` that you do not want to have exposed. The `turn` module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you don't want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal.

CISA Catalog
Date AddedDue DateVulnerability NameRequired Action
N/A
Date Added: N/A
Due Date: N/A
Vulnerability Name: N/A
Required Action: N/A
Metrics
TypeVersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Primary3.19.6CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Secondary3.18.6HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary2.05.5MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N
Type: Primary
Version: 3.1
Base score: 9.6
Base severity: CRITICAL
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Type: Secondary
Version: 3.1
Base score: 8.6
Base severity: HIGH
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Type: Primary
Version: 2.0
Base score: 5.5
Base severity: MEDIUM
Vector:
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N
CPE Matches

wire
wire
>>restund>>Versions before 0.4.15(exclusive)
cpe:2.3:a:wire:restund:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Weaknesses
CWE IDTypeSource
CWE-862Primarynvd@nist.gov
CWE-668Secondarysecurity-advisories@github.com
CWE ID: CWE-862
Type: Primary
Source: nvd@nist.gov
CWE ID: CWE-668
Type: Secondary
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Evaluator Description

Evaluator Impact

Evaluator Solution

Vendor Statements

References
HyperlinkSourceResource
https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.htmlsecurity-advisories@github.com
Vendor Advisory
https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7psecurity-advisories@github.com
Not Applicable
https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43security-advisories@github.com
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7security-advisories@github.com
Exploit
Patch
Third Party Advisory
https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2xsecurity-advisories@github.com
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732security-advisories@github.com
Third Party Advisory
Exploit
https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-elsesecurity-advisories@github.com
Not Applicable
Hyperlink: https://docs.wire.com/understand/restund.html
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Vendor Advisory
Hyperlink: https://github.com/coturn/coturn/security/advisories/GHSA-6g6j-r9rf-cm7p
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Not Applicable
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/pull/7
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Exploit
Patch
Third Party Advisory
Hyperlink: https://github.com/wireapp/restund/security/advisories/GHSA-96j5-w9jq-pv2x
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Exploit
Third Party Advisory
Hyperlink: https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0732
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Third Party Advisory
Exploit
Hyperlink: https://www.rtcsec.com/post/2021/01/details-about-cve-2020-26262-bypass-of-coturns-default-access-control-protection/#further-concerns-what-else
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Resource:
Not Applicable

Change History

0
Information is not available yet

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