In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-debug: don't call __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() under free_entries_lock __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock under port->lock. Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it. Trimmed-down lockdep splat: The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110 debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230 dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8 geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54 handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30 gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148 do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68 arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 ____do_softirq+0x18/0x24 ... -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc console_flush_all+0x344/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 register_console+0x230/0x38c uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494 qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 really_probe+0x148/0x280 __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8 __device_attach+0xe4/0x140 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0 device_add+0x538/0x668 of_device_add+0x44/0x50 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8 of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304 of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4 devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 ... -> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(free_entries_lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(free_entries_lock); lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234 check_noncircular+0x78/0xac __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 consol ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: qcom: uefisecapp: Fix deadlock in qcuefi_acquire() If the __qcuefi pointer is not set, then in the original code, we would hold onto the lock. That means that if we tried to set it later, then it would cause a deadlock. Drop the lock on the error path. That's what all the callers are expecting.

A vulnerability was found due to missing lock for IOPOLL flaw in io_cqring_event_overflow() in io_uring.c in Linux Kernel. This flaw allows a local attacker with user privilege to trigger a Denial of Service threat.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach In __device_attach function, The lock holding logic is as follows: ... __device_attach device_lock(dev) // get lock dev async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); // func async_schedule_node async_schedule_node_domain(func) entry = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async_entry), GFP_ATOMIC); /* when fail or work limit, sync to execute func, but __device_attach_async_helper will get lock dev as well, which will lead to A-A deadlock. */ if (!entry || atomic_read(&entry_count) > MAX_WORK) { func; else queue_work_node(node, system_unbound_wq, &entry->work) device_unlock(dev) As shown above, when it is allowed to do async probes, because of out of memory or work limit, async work is not allowed, to do sync execute instead. it will lead to A-A deadlock because of __device_attach_async_helper getting lock dev. To fix the deadlock, move the async_schedule_dev outside device_lock, as we can see, in async_schedule_node_domain, the parameter of queue_work_node is system_unbound_wq, so it can accept concurrent operations. which will also not change the code logic, and will not lead to deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: tty: serial: Fix deadlock in sa1100_set_termios() There is a deadlock in sa1100_set_termios(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | sa1100_enable_ms() sa1100_set_termios() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | sa1100_timeout() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold sport->port.lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need sport->port.lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, sa1100_set_termios() will block forever. This patch moves del_timer_sync() before spin_lock_irqsave() in order to prevent the deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-raid456, md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with reshape For raid456, if reshape is still in progress, then IO across reshape position will wait for reshape to make progress. However, for dm-raid, in following cases reshape will never make progress hence IO will hang: 1) the array is read-only; 2) MD_RECOVERY_WAIT is set; 3) MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set; After commit c467e97f079f ("md/raid6: use valid sector values to determine if an I/O should wait on the reshape") fix the problem that IO across reshape position doesn't wait for reshape, the dm-raid test shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang: [root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/979/stack [<0>] wait_woken+0x7d/0x90 [<0>] raid5_make_request+0x929/0x1d70 [raid456] [<0>] md_handle_request+0xc2/0x3b0 [md_mod] [<0>] raid_map+0x2c/0x50 [dm_raid] [<0>] __map_bio+0x251/0x380 [dm_mod] [<0>] dm_submit_bio+0x1f0/0x760 [dm_mod] [<0>] __submit_bio+0xc2/0x1c0 [<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x17f/0x450 [<0>] submit_bio_noacct+0x2bc/0x780 [<0>] submit_bio+0x70/0xc0 [<0>] mpage_readahead+0x169/0x1f0 [<0>] blkdev_readahead+0x18/0x30 [<0>] read_pages+0x7c/0x3b0 [<0>] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ab/0x280 [<0>] force_page_cache_ra+0x9e/0x130 [<0>] page_cache_sync_ra+0x3b/0x110 [<0>] filemap_get_pages+0x143/0xa30 [<0>] filemap_read+0xdc/0x4b0 [<0>] blkdev_read_iter+0x75/0x200 [<0>] vfs_read+0x272/0x460 [<0>] ksys_read+0x7a/0x170 [<0>] __x64_sys_read+0x1c/0x30 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 This is because reshape can't make progress. For md/raid, the problem doesn't exist because register new sync_thread doesn't rely on the IO to be done any more: 1) If array is read-only, it can switch to read-write by ioctl/sysfs; 2) md/raid never set MD_RECOVERY_WAIT; 3) If MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set, mddev_suspend() doesn't hold 'reconfig_mutex', hence it can be cleared and reshape can continue by sysfs api 'sync_action'. However, I'm not sure yet how to avoid the problem in dm-raid yet. This patch on the one hand make sure raid_message() can't change sync_thread() through raid_message() after presuspend(), on the other hand detect the above 3 cases before wait for IO do be done in dm_suspend(), and let dm-raid requeue those IO.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: fix deadlock in create_pinctrl() when handling -EPROBE_DEFER In create_pinctrl(), pinctrl_maps_mutex is acquired before calling add_setting(). If add_setting() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, create_pinctrl() calls pinctrl_free(). However, pinctrl_free() attempts to acquire pinctrl_maps_mutex, which is already held by create_pinctrl(), leading to a potential deadlock. This patch resolves the issue by releasing pinctrl_maps_mutex before calling pinctrl_free(), preventing the deadlock. This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: IDLETIMER: Fix for possible ABBA deadlock Deletion of the last rule referencing a given idletimer may happen at the same time as a read of its file in sysfs: | ====================================================== | WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected | 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted | ------------------------------------------------------ | iptables/3303 is trying to acquire lock: | ffff8881057e04b8 (kn->active#48){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x20 | | but task is already holding lock: | ffffffffa0249068 (list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: idletimer_tg_destroy_v] | | which lock already depends on the new lock. A simple reproducer is: | #!/bin/bash | | while true; do | iptables -A INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | iptables -D INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | done & | while true; do | cat /sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/testme >/dev/null | done Avoid this by freeing list_mutex right after deleting the element from the list, then continuing with the teardown.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix potential deadlock on __exfat_get_dentry_set When accessing a file with more entries than ES_MAX_ENTRY_NUM, the bh-array is allocated in __exfat_get_entry_set. The problem is that the bh-array is allocated with GFP_KERNEL. It does not make sense. In the following cases, a deadlock for sbi->s_lock between the two processes may occur. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- kswapd balance_pgdat lock(fs_reclaim) exfat_iterate lock(&sbi->s_lock) exfat_readdir exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry exfat_get_dentry_set __exfat_get_dentry_set kmalloc_array ... lock(fs_reclaim) ... evict exfat_evict_inode lock(&sbi->s_lock) To fix this, let's allocate bh-array with GFP_NOFS.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: do not create EA inode under buffer lock ext4_xattr_set_entry() creates new EA inodes while holding buffer lock on the external xattr block. This is problematic as it nests all the allocation locking (which acquires locks on other buffers) under the buffer lock. This can even deadlock when the filesystem is corrupted and e.g. quota file is setup to contain xattr block as data block. Move the allocation of EA inode out of ext4_xattr_set_entry() into the callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will trigger following softlockup: kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976] CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30 Call Trace: <TASK> md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0 raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10] md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020 md_thread+0xa7/0x170 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 And the detailed process is as follows: md_do_sync j = mddev->resync_min while (j < max_sectors) sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &skipped) if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &sync_blocks)) // md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0 return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe; // sectors = 0; j += sectors; // j never change Root cause is that commit 301867b1c168 ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") return early from md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks. Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from md_bitmap_get_counter"(), as it used to be. Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the case that bitmap size doesn't match array size still need to be fixed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock between concurrent dio writes when low on free data space When reserving data space for a direct IO write we can end up deadlocking if we have multiple tasks attempting a write to the same file range, there are multiple extents covered by that file range, we are low on available space for data and the writes don't expand the inode's i_size. The deadlock can happen like this: 1) We have a file with an i_size of 1M, at offset 0 it has an extent with a size of 128K and at offset 128K it has another extent also with a size of 128K; 2) Task A does a direct IO write against file range [0, 256K), and because the write is within the i_size boundary, it takes the inode's lock (VFS level) in shared mode; 3) Task A locks the file range [0, 256K) at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), and then gets the extent map for the extent covering the range [0, 128K). At btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), it creates an ordered extent for that file range ([0, 128K)); 4) Before returning from btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), it unlocks the file range [0, 256K); 5) Task A executes btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() again, this time for the file range [128K, 256K), and locks the file range [128K, 256K); 6) Task B starts a direct IO write against file range [0, 256K) as well. It also locks the inode in shared mode, as it's within the i_size limit, and then tries to lock file range [0, 256K). It is able to lock the subrange [0, 128K) but then blocks waiting for the range [128K, 256K), as it is currently locked by task A; 7) Task A enters btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write() and tries to reserve data space. Because we are low on available free space, it triggers the async data reclaim task, and waits for it to reserve data space; 8) The async reclaim task decides to wait for all existing ordered extents to complete (through btrfs_wait_ordered_roots()). It finds the ordered extent previously created by task A for the file range [0, 128K) and waits for it to complete; 9) The ordered extent for the file range [0, 128K) can not complete because it blocks at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() when trying to lock the file range [0, 128K). This results in a deadlock, because: - task B is holding the file range [0, 128K) locked, waiting for the range [128K, 256K) to be unlocked by task A; - task A is holding the file range [128K, 256K) locked and it's waiting for the async data reclaim task to satisfy its space reservation request; - the async data reclaim task is waiting for ordered extent [0, 128K) to complete, but the ordered extent can not complete because the file range [0, 128K) is currently locked by task B, which is waiting on task A to unlock file range [128K, 256K) and task A waiting on the async data reclaim task. This results in a deadlock between 4 task: task A, task B, the async data reclaim task and the task doing ordered extent completion (a work queue task). This type of deadlock can sporadically be triggered by the test case generic/300 from fstests, and results in a stack trace like the following: [12084.033689] INFO: task kworker/u16:7:123749 blocked for more than 241 seconds. [12084.034877] Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-btrfs-next-115 #1 [12084.035562] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [12084.036548] task:kworker/u16:7 state:D stack: 0 pid:123749 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [12084.036554] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [12084.036599] Call Trace: [12084.036601] <TASK> [12084.036606] __schedule+0x3cb/0xed0 [12084.036616] schedule+0x4e/0xb0 [12084.036620] btrfs_start_ordered_extent+0x109/0x1c0 [btrfs] [12084.036651] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0xc0/0xc0 [12084.036659] btrfs_run_ordered_extent_work+0x1a/0x30 [btrfs] [12084.036688] btrfs_work_helper+0xf8/0x400 [btrfs] [12084.0367 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: VMCI: Use threaded irqs instead of tasklets The vmci_dispatch_dgs() tasklet function calls vmci_read_data() which uses wait_event() resulting in invalid sleep in an atomic context (and therefore potentially in a deadlock). Use threaded irqs to fix this issue and completely remove usage of tasklets. [ 20.264639] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_guest.c:145 [ 20.264643] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 762, name: vmtoolsd [ 20.264645] preempt_count: 101, expected: 0 [ 20.264646] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 20.264647] 1 lock held by vmtoolsd/762: [ 20.264648] #0: ffff0000874ae440 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: vsock_connect+0x60/0x330 [vsock] [ 20.264658] Preemption disabled at: [ 20.264659] [<ffff80000151d7d8>] vmci_send_datagram+0x44/0xa0 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264665] CPU: 0 PID: 762 Comm: vmtoolsd Not tainted 5.19.0-0.rc8.20220727git39c3c396f813.60.fc37.aarch64 #1 [ 20.264667] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VBSA/VBSA, BIOS VEFI 12/31/2020 [ 20.264668] Call trace: [ 20.264669] dump_backtrace+0xc4/0x130 [ 20.264672] show_stack+0x24/0x80 [ 20.264673] dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xb4 [ 20.264676] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 20.264677] __might_resched+0x1a0/0x280 [ 20.264679] __might_sleep+0x58/0x90 [ 20.264681] vmci_read_data+0x74/0x120 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264683] vmci_dispatch_dgs+0x64/0x204 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264686] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x13c/0x150 [ 20.264688] tasklet_action+0x40/0x50 [ 20.264689] __do_softirq+0x23c/0x6b4 [ 20.264690] __irq_exit_rcu+0x104/0x214 [ 20.264691] irq_exit_rcu+0x1c/0x50 [ 20.264693] el1_interrupt+0x38/0x6c [ 20.264695] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 [ 20.264696] el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c [ 20.264697] preempt_count_sub+0xa4/0xe0 [ 20.264698] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x64/0xb0 [ 20.264701] vmci_send_datagram+0x7c/0xa0 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264703] vmci_datagram_dispatch+0x84/0x100 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264706] vmci_datagram_send+0x2c/0x40 [vmw_vmci] [ 20.264709] vmci_transport_send_control_pkt+0xb8/0x120 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport] [ 20.264711] vmci_transport_connect+0x40/0x7c [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport] [ 20.264713] vsock_connect+0x278/0x330 [vsock] [ 20.264715] __sys_connect_file+0x8c/0xc0 [ 20.264718] __sys_connect+0x84/0xb4 [ 20.264720] __arm64_sys_connect+0x2c/0x3c [ 20.264721] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100 [ 20.264723] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x68/0x124 [ 20.264724] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x4c [ 20.264725] el0_svc+0x60/0x180 [ 20.264726] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x11c/0x150 [ 20.264728] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: loop: implement ->free_disk Ensure that the lo_device which is stored in the gendisk private data is valid until the gendisk is freed. Currently the loop driver uses a lot of effort to make sure a device is not freed when it is still in use, but to to fix a potential deadlock this will be relaxed a bit soon.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Fix SCSI I/O completion and abort handler deadlock During stress I/O tests with 500+ vports, hard LOCKUP call traces are observed. CPU A: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x192 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32 lpfc_handle_fcp_err+0x4c6 lpfc_fcp_io_cmd_wqe_cmpl+0x964 lpfc_sli4_fp_handle_cqe+0x266 __lpfc_sli4_process_cq+0x105 __lpfc_sli4_hba_process_cq+0x3c lpfc_cq_poll_hdler+0x16 irq_poll_softirq+0x76 __softirqentry_text_start+0xe4 irq_exit+0xf7 do_IRQ+0x7f CPU B: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x5b _raw_spin_lock+0x1c lpfc_abort_handler+0x13e scmd_eh_abort_handler+0x85 process_one_work+0x1a7 worker_thread+0x30 kthread+0x112 ret_from_fork+0x1f Diagram of lockup: CPUA CPUB ---- ---- lpfc_cmd->buf_lock phba->hbalock lpfc_cmd->buf_lock phba->hbalock Fix by reordering the taking of the lpfc_cmd->buf_lock and phba->hbalock in lpfc_abort_handler routine so that it tries to take the lpfc_cmd->buf_lock first before phba->hbalock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: get rid of warning on transaction commit when using flushoncommit When using the flushoncommit mount option, during almost every transaction commit we trigger a warning from __writeback_inodes_sb_nr(): $ cat fs/fs-writeback.c: (...) static void __writeback_inodes_sb_nr(struct super_block *sb, ... { (...) WARN_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&sb->s_umount)); (...) } (...) The trace produced in dmesg looks like the following: [947.473890] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 930 at fs/fs-writeback.c:2610 __writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3 [947.481623] Modules linked in: nfsd nls_cp437 cifs asn1_decoder cifs_arc4 fscache cifs_md4 ipmi_ssif [947.489571] CPU: 5 PID: 930 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 95.16.3-srb-asrock-00001-g36437ad63879 #186 [947.497969] RIP: 0010:__writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3 [947.502097] Code: 24 10 4c 89 44 24 18 c6 (...) [947.519760] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000777e10 EFLAGS: 00010246 [947.523818] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000963300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [947.529765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000fa51 RDI: ffffc90000777e50 [947.535740] RBP: ffff888101628a90 R08: ffff888100955800 R09: ffff888100956000 [947.541701] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888100963488 [947.547645] R13: ffff888100963000 R14: ffff888112fb7200 R15: ffff888100963460 [947.553621] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88841fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [947.560537] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [947.565122] CR2: 0000000008be50c4 CR3: 000000000220c000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [947.571072] Call Trace: [947.572354] <TASK> [947.573266] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1f1/0x998 [947.576785] ? start_transaction+0x3ab/0x44e [947.579867] ? schedule_timeout+0x8a/0xdd [947.582716] transaction_kthread+0xe9/0x156 [947.585721] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0x407/0x407 [947.590104] kthread+0x131/0x139 [947.592168] ? set_kthread_struct+0x32/0x32 [947.595174] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [947.597561] </TASK> [947.598553] ---[ end trace 644721052755541c ]--- This is because we started using writeback_inodes_sb() to flush delalloc when committing a transaction (when using -o flushoncommit), in order to avoid deadlocks with filesystem freeze operations. This change was made by commit ce8ea7cc6eb313 ("btrfs: don't call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in flushoncommit"). After that change we started producing that warning, and every now and then a user reports this since the warning happens too often, it spams dmesg/syslog, and a user is unsure if this reflects any problem that might compromise the filesystem's reliability. We can not just lock the sb->s_umount semaphore before calling writeback_inodes_sb(), because that would at least deadlock with filesystem freezing, since at fs/super.c:freeze_super() sync_filesystem() is called while we are holding that semaphore in write mode, and that can trigger a transaction commit, resulting in a deadlock. It would also trigger the same type of deadlock in the unmount path. Possibly, it could also introduce some other locking dependencies that lockdep would report. To fix this call try_to_writeback_inodes_sb() instead of writeback_inodes_sb(), because that will try to read lock sb->s_umount and then will only call writeback_inodes_sb() if it was able to lock it. This is fine because the cases where it can't read lock sb->s_umount are during a filesystem unmount or during a filesystem freeze - in those cases sb->s_umount is write locked and sync_filesystem() is called, which calls writeback_inodes_sb(). In other words, in all cases where we can't take a read lock on sb->s_umount, writeback is already being triggered elsewhere. An alternative would be to call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() with a number of pages different from LONG_MAX, for example matching the number of delalloc bytes we currently have, in ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bcache: avoid journal no-space deadlock by reserving 1 journal bucket The journal no-space deadlock was reported time to time. Such deadlock can happen in the following situation. When all journal buckets are fully filled by active jset with heavy write I/O load, the cache set registration (after a reboot) will load all active jsets and inserting them into the btree again (which is called journal replay). If a journaled bkey is inserted into a btree node and results btree node split, new journal request might be triggered. For example, the btree grows one more level after the node split, then the root node record in cache device super block will be upgrade by bch_journal_meta() from bch_btree_set_root(). But there is no space in journal buckets, the journal replay has to wait for new journal bucket to be reclaimed after at least one journal bucket replayed. This is one example that how the journal no-space deadlock happens. The solution to avoid the deadlock is to reserve 1 journal bucket in run time, and only permit the reserved journal bucket to be used during cache set registration procedure for things like journal replay. Then the journal space will never be fully filled, there is no chance for journal no-space deadlock to happen anymore. This patch adds a new member "bool do_reserve" in struct journal, it is inititalized to 0 (false) when struct journal is allocated, and set to 1 (true) by bch_journal_space_reserve() when all initialization done in run_cache_set(). In the run time when journal_reclaim() tries to allocate a new journal bucket, free_journal_buckets() is called to check whether there are enough free journal buckets to use. If there is only 1 free journal bucket and journal->do_reserve is 1 (true), the last bucket is reserved and free_journal_buckets() will return 0 to indicate no free journal bucket. Then journal_reclaim() will give up, and try next time to see whetheer there is free journal bucket to allocate. By this method, there is always 1 jouranl bucket reserved in run time. During the cache set registration, journal->do_reserve is 0 (false), so the reserved journal bucket can be used to avoid the no-space deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Fix nfs_netfs_issue_read() xarray locking for writeback interrupt The loop inside nfs_netfs_issue_read() currently does not disable interrupts while iterating through pages in the xarray to submit for NFS read. This is not safe though since after taking xa_lock, another page in the mapping could be processed for writeback inside an interrupt, and deadlock can occur. The fix is simple and clean if we use xa_for_each_range(), which handles the iteration with RCU while reducing code complexity. The problem is easily reproduced with the following test: mount -o vers=3,fsc 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt/nfs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin bs=4096 count=1 echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin of=/dev/null umount /mnt/nfs On the console with a lockdep-enabled kernel a message similar to the following will be seen: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.7.0-lockdbg+ #10 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. test5/1708 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffff888127baa598 (&xa->xa_lock#4){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x144/0x380 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0xa0 __folio_end_writeback+0x17e/0x5c0 folio_end_writeback+0x93/0x1b0 iomap_finish_ioend+0xeb/0x6a0 blk_update_request+0x204/0x7f0 blk_mq_end_request+0x30/0x1c0 blk_complete_reqs+0x7e/0xa0 __do_softirq+0x113/0x544 __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_call_function_single+0x6f/0x90 asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20 default_idle+0x9/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x40 start_secondary+0x19d/0x1c0 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b irq event stamp: 176891 hardirqs last enabled at (176891): [<ffffffffa67a0be4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (176890): [<ffffffffa67a0899>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x79/0xa0 softirqs last enabled at (176646): [<ffffffffa515d91e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 softirqs last disabled at (176633): [<ffffffffa515d91e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xa->xa_lock#4); <Interrupt> lock(&xa->xa_lock#4); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by test5/1708: #0: ffff888127baa498 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#22){++++}-{4:4}, at: nfs_start_io_read+0x28/0x90 [nfs] #1: ffff888127baa650 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xa4/0x280 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 1708 Comm: test5 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.7.0-lockdbg+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 mark_lock+0xb3f/0xd20 __lock_acquire+0x77b/0x3360 _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80 nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs] netfs_begin_read+0x77f/0x980 [netfs] nfs_netfs_readahead+0x45/0x60 [nfs] nfs_readahead+0x323/0x5a0 [nfs] read_pages+0xf3/0x5c0 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1c8/0x280 filemap_get_pages+0x38c/0xae0 filemap_read+0x206/0x5e0 nfs_file_read+0xb7/0x140 [nfs] vfs_read+0x2a9/0x460 ksys_read+0xb7/0x140

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix deadlock in smb2_find_smb_tcon() Unlock cifs_tcp_ses_lock before calling cifs_put_smb_ses() to avoid such deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Fix deadlock on DSI device attach error DSI device attach to DSI host will be done with host device's lock held. Un-registering host in "device attach" error path (ex: probe retry) will result in deadlock with below call trace and non operational DSI display. Startup Call trace: [ 35.043036] rt_mutex_slowlock.constprop.21+0x184/0x1b8 [ 35.043048] mutex_lock_nested+0x7c/0xc8 [ 35.043060] device_del+0x4c/0x3e8 [ 35.043075] device_unregister+0x20/0x40 [ 35.043082] mipi_dsi_remove_device_fn+0x18/0x28 [ 35.043093] device_for_each_child+0x68/0xb0 [ 35.043105] mipi_dsi_host_unregister+0x40/0x90 [ 35.043115] vc4_dsi_host_attach+0xf0/0x120 [vc4] [ 35.043199] mipi_dsi_attach+0x30/0x48 [ 35.043209] tc358762_probe+0x128/0x164 [tc358762] [ 35.043225] mipi_dsi_drv_probe+0x28/0x38 [ 35.043234] really_probe+0xc0/0x318 [ 35.043244] __driver_probe_device+0x80/0xe8 [ 35.043254] driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x118 [ 35.043263] __device_attach_driver+0x98/0xe8 [ 35.043273] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd8 [ 35.043281] __device_attach+0xf0/0x150 [ 35.043290] device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 [ 35.043300] bus_probe_device+0xa4/0xb0 [ 35.043308] deferred_probe_work_func+0xa0/0xe0 [ 35.043318] process_one_work+0x254/0x700 [ 35.043330] worker_thread+0x4c/0x448 [ 35.043339] kthread+0x19c/0x1a8 [ 35.043348] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Shutdown Call trace: [ 365.565417] Call trace: [ 365.565423] __switch_to+0x148/0x200 [ 365.565452] __schedule+0x340/0x9c8 [ 365.565467] schedule+0x48/0x110 [ 365.565479] schedule_timeout+0x3b0/0x448 [ 365.565496] wait_for_completion+0xac/0x138 [ 365.565509] __flush_work+0x218/0x4e0 [ 365.565523] flush_work+0x1c/0x28 [ 365.565536] wait_for_device_probe+0x68/0x158 [ 365.565550] device_shutdown+0x24/0x348 [ 365.565561] kernel_restart_prepare+0x40/0x50 [ 365.565578] kernel_restart+0x20/0x70 [ 365.565591] __do_sys_reboot+0x10c/0x220 [ 365.565605] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x38 [ 365.565619] invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x110 [ 365.565634] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xfc/0x120 [ 365.565648] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90 [ 365.565661] el0_svc+0x4c/0xf0 [ 365.565671] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8 [ 365.565682] el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback() There is a deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | _set_timer() rtw_surveydone_event_callback()| mod_timer() spin_lock_bh() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | rtw_scan_timeout_handler() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_bh() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold pmlmepriv->lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need pmlmepriv->lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, rtw_surveydone_event_callback() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_bh(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. What`s more, we change spin_lock_bh() in rtw_scan_timeout_handler() to spin_lock_irq(). Otherwise, spin_lock_bh() will also cause deadlock() in timer handler.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: staging: rtl8192u: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_beacons_stop() There is a deadlock in ieee80211_beacons_stop(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | ieee80211_send_beacon() ieee80211_beacons_stop() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | ieee80211_send_beacon_cb() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold ieee->beacon_lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need ieee->beacon_lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, ieee80211_beacons_stop() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irqsave(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Add missing cpus_read_lock() to cgroup_attach_task_all() syzbot is hitting percpu_rwsem_assert_held(&cpu_hotplug_lock) warning at cpuset_attach() [1], for commit 4f7e7236435ca0ab ("cgroup: Fix threadgroup_rwsem <-> cpus_read_lock() deadlock") missed that cpuset_attach() is also called from cgroup_attach_task_all(). Add cpus_read_lock() like what cgroup_procs_write_start() does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/core: Fix a nested dead lock as part of ODP flow Fix a nested dead lock as part of ODP flow by using mmput_async(). From the below call trace [1] can see that calling mmput() once we have the umem_odp->umem_mutex locked as required by ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock() might trigger in the same task the exit_mmap()->__mmu_notifier_release()->mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() which may dead lock when trying to lock the same mutex. Moving to use mmput_async() will solve the problem as the above exit_mmap() flow will be called in other task and will be executed once the lock will be available. [1] [64843.077665] task:kworker/u133:2 state:D stack: 0 pid:80906 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [64843.077672] Workqueue: mlx5_ib_page_fault mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action [mlx5_ib] [64843.077719] Call Trace: [64843.077722] <TASK> [64843.077724] __schedule+0x23d/0x590 [64843.077729] schedule+0x4e/0xb0 [64843.077735] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10 [64843.077740] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x263/0x490 [64843.077747] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20 [64843.077752] mutex_lock+0x34/0x40 [64843.077758] mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x48/0x270 [mlx5_ib] [64843.077808] __mmu_notifier_release+0x1a4/0x200 [64843.077816] exit_mmap+0x1bc/0x200 [64843.077822] ? walk_page_range+0x9c/0x120 [64843.077828] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 [64843.077833] ? mutex_lock+0x13/0x40 [64843.077839] ? uprobe_clear_state+0xac/0x120 [64843.077860] mmput+0x5f/0x140 [64843.077867] ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock+0x21b/0x580 [ib_core] [64843.077931] pagefault_real_mr+0x9a/0x140 [mlx5_ib] [64843.077962] pagefault_mr+0xb4/0x550 [mlx5_ib] [64843.077992] pagefault_single_data_segment.constprop.0+0x2ac/0x560 [mlx5_ib] [64843.078022] mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action+0x528/0x780 [mlx5_ib] [64843.078051] process_one_work+0x22b/0x3d0 [64843.078059] worker_thread+0x53/0x410 [64843.078065] ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0 [64843.078073] kthread+0x12a/0x150 [64843.078079] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [64843.078085] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [64843.078093] </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf/sw-sync: don't enable IRQ from sync_print_obj() Since commit a6aa8fca4d79 ("dma-buf/sw-sync: Reduce irqsave/irqrestore from known context") by error replaced spin_unlock_irqrestore() with spin_unlock_irq() for both sync_debugfs_show() and sync_print_obj() despite sync_print_obj() is called from sync_debugfs_show(), lockdep complains inconsistent lock state warning. Use plain spin_{lock,unlock}() for sync_print_obj(), for sync_debugfs_show() is already using spin_{lock,unlock}_irq().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: staging: rtl8192e: Fix deadlock in rtllib_beacons_stop() There is a deadlock in rtllib_beacons_stop(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | rtllib_send_beacon() rtllib_beacons_stop() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irqsave() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | rtllib_send_beacon_cb() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irqsave() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold ieee->beacon_lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need ieee->beacon_lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, rtllib_beacons_stop() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irqsave(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: fsl-qdma: fix SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read There is chip (ls1028a) errata: The SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read transactions by QDMA. Unaligned read transactions initiated by QDMA may stall in the NOC (Network On-Chip), causing a deadlock condition. Stalled transactions will trigger completion timeouts in PCIe controller. Workaround: Enable prefetch by setting the source descriptor prefetchable bit ( SD[PF] = 1 ). Implement this workaround.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Fix circular locking dependency The rule inside kvm enforces that the vcpu->mutex is taken *inside* kvm->lock. The rule is violated by the pkvm_create_hyp_vm() which acquires the kvm->lock while already holding the vcpu->mutex lock from kvm_vcpu_ioctl(). Avoid the circular locking dependency altogether by protecting the hyp vm handle with the config_lock, much like we already do for other forms of VM-scoped data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: fix deadlock between bd_link_disk_holder and partition scan 'open_mutex' of gendisk is used to protect open/close block devices. But in bd_link_disk_holder(), it is used to protect the creation of symlink between holding disk and slave bdev, which introduces some issues. When bd_link_disk_holder() is called, the driver is usually in the process of initialization/modification and may suspend submitting io. At this time, any io hold 'open_mutex', such as scanning partitions, can cause deadlocks. For example, in raid: T1 T2 bdev_open_by_dev lock open_mutex [1] ... efi_partition ... md_submit_bio md_ioctl mddev_syspend -> suspend all io md_add_new_disk bind_rdev_to_array bd_link_disk_holder try lock open_mutex [2] md_handle_request -> wait mddev_resume T1 scan partition, T2 add a new device to raid. T1 waits for T2 to resume mddev, but T2 waits for open_mutex held by T1. Deadlock occurs. Fix it by introducing a local mutex 'blk_holder_mutex' to replace 'open_mutex'.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Fix potential deadlock in blk_ia_range_sysfs_show() When being read, a sysfs attribute is already protected against removal with the kobject node active reference counter. As a result, in blk_ia_range_sysfs_show(), there is no need to take the queue sysfs lock when reading the value of a range attribute. Using the queue sysfs lock in this function creates a potential deadlock situation with the disk removal, something that a lockdep signals with a splat when the device is removed: [ 760.703551] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 760.703551] [ 760.703554] CPU0 CPU1 [ 760.703556] ---- ---- [ 760.703558] lock(&q->sysfs_lock); [ 760.703565] lock(kn->active#385); [ 760.703573] lock(&q->sysfs_lock); [ 760.703579] lock(kn->active#385); [ 760.703587] [ 760.703587] *** DEADLOCK *** Solve this by removing the mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() calls from blk_ia_range_sysfs_show().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel When setting bootparams="trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" in the cmdline, the output_printk() was called, and the spin_lock_irqsave() was called in the atomic and irq disable interrupt context suitation. On the PREEMPT_RT kernel, these locks are replaced with sleepable rt-spinlock, so the stack calltrace will be triggered. Fix it by raw_spin_lock_irqsave when PREEMPT_RT and "trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" enabled. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffffff8992303e>] try_to_wake_up+0x7e/0xba0 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.1-rt17+ #19 34c5812404187a875f32bee7977f7367f9679ea7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x8c dump_stack+0x10/0x12 __might_resched.cold+0x11d/0x155 rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x70 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x2fa/0x4c0 ? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93 trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start+0xbe/0x110 ? perf_trace_initcall_finish+0x210/0x210 ? probe_sched_wakeup+0x34/0x40 ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0xda/0x310 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x35/0x170 ? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93 do_one_initcall+0x217/0x3c0 ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level+0x170/0x170 ? push_cpu_stop+0x400/0x400 ? cblist_init_generic+0x241/0x290 kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x347 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x65/0x80 ? rest_init+0xf0/0xf0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker Quota disable ioctl starts a transaction before waiting for the qgroup rescan worker completes. However, this wait can be infinite and results in deadlock because of circular dependency among the quota disable ioctl, the qgroup rescan worker and the other task with transaction such as block group relocation task. The deadlock happens with the steps following: 1) Task A calls ioctl to disable quota. It starts a transaction and waits for qgroup rescan worker completes. 2) Task B such as block group relocation task starts a transaction and joins to the transaction that task A started. Then task B commits to the transaction. In this commit, task B waits for a commit by task A. 3) Task C as the qgroup rescan worker starts its job and starts a transaction. In this transaction start, task C waits for completion of the transaction that task A started and task B committed. This deadlock was found with fstests test case btrfs/115 and a zoned null_blk device. The test case enables and disables quota, and the block group reclaim was triggered during the quota disable by chance. The deadlock was also observed by running quota enable and disable in parallel with 'btrfs balance' command on regular null_blk devices. An example report of the deadlock: [372.469894] INFO: task kworker/u16:6:103 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [372.479944] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.485067] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.493898] task:kworker/u16:6 state:D stack: 0 pid: 103 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.503285] Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [372.510782] Call Trace: [372.514092] <TASK> [372.521684] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.530104] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.538842] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.547092] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.555591] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.561894] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x18bb/0x2610 [btrfs] [372.570506] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [372.578875] ? free_unref_page+0x3f2/0x650 [372.585484] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.591594] ? release_extent_buffer+0x224/0x420 [btrfs] [372.599264] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xc13/0x10c0 [btrfs] [372.607157] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [372.613054] ? btrfs_qgroup_account_extent+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs] [372.620960] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [372.627137] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.633215] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [372.639404] btrfs_work_helper+0x1ae/0xa90 [btrfs] [372.646268] process_one_work+0x7e9/0x1320 [372.652321] ? lock_release+0x6d0/0x6d0 [372.658081] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [372.664513] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.670529] worker_thread+0x59e/0xf90 [372.676172] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320 [372.682440] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [372.687550] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [372.693811] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [372.700052] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [372.705517] </TASK> [372.709747] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:2347 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [372.729827] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.745907] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.767106] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid: 2347 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.787776] Call Trace: [372.801652] <TASK> [372.812961] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.830011] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.852547] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.871761] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.886792] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.901685] wait_current_trans+0x22c/0x310 [btrfs] [372.919743] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x3d0/0x3d0 [btrfs] [372.938923] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.959085] ? join_transaction+0xc7 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree for clk_summary Similar to the previous commit, we should make sure that all devices are runtime resumed before printing the clk_summary through debugfs. Failure to do so would result in a deadlock if the thread is resuming a device to print clk state and that device is also runtime resuming in another thread, e.g the screen is turning on and the display driver is starting up. We remove the calls to clk_pm_runtime_{get,put}() in this path because they're superfluous now that we know the devices are runtime resumed. This also squashes a bug where the return value of clk_pm_runtime_get() wasn't checked, leading to an RPM count underflow on error paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: aoe: avoid potential deadlock at set_capacity Move set_capacity() outside of the section procected by (&d->lock). To avoid possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [1] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); local_irq_disable(); [2] lock(&d->lock); [3] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); <Interrupt> [4] lock(&d->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Where [1](&bdev->bd_size_lock) hold by zram_add()->set_capacity(). [2]lock(&d->lock) hold by aoeblk_gdalloc(). And aoeblk_gdalloc() is trying to acquire [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) at set_capacity() call. In this situation an attempt to acquire [4]lock(&d->lock) from aoecmd_cfg_rsp() will lead to deadlock. So the simplest solution is breaking lock dependency [2](&d->lock) -> [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) by moving set_capacity() outside.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error() inet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock. IPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option and trigger a KCSAN warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethn ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: initialize locks earlier in f2fs_fill_super() syzbot is reporting lockdep warning at f2fs_handle_error() [1], for spin_lock(&sbi->error_lock) is called before spin_lock_init() is called. For safe locking in error handling, move initialization of locks (and obvious structures) in f2fs_fill_super() to immediately after memory allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Move cfg_log_verbose check before calling lpfc_dmp_dbg() In an attempt to log message 0126 with LOG_TRACE_EVENT, the following hard lockup call trace hangs the system. Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x40 lpfc_dmp_dbg.part.32+0x28/0x220 [lpfc] lpfc_cmpl_els_fdisc+0x145/0x460 [lpfc] lpfc_sli_cancel_jobs+0x92/0xd0 [lpfc] lpfc_els_flush_cmd+0x43c/0x670 [lpfc] lpfc_els_flush_all_cmd+0x37/0x60 [lpfc] lpfc_sli4_async_event_proc+0x956/0x1720 [lpfc] lpfc_do_work+0x1485/0x1d70 [lpfc] kthread+0x112/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP The same CPU tries to claim the phba->port_list_lock twice. Move the cfg_log_verbose checks as part of the lpfc_printf_vlog() and lpfc_printf_log() macros before calling lpfc_dmp_dbg(). There is no need to take the phba->port_list_lock within lpfc_dmp_dbg().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix deadlock in nilfs_count_free_blocks() A semaphore deadlock can occur if nilfs_get_block() detects metadata corruption while locating data blocks and a superblock writeback occurs at the same time: task 1 task 2 ------ ------ * A file operation * nilfs_truncate() nilfs_get_block() down_read(rwsem A) <-- nilfs_bmap_lookup_contig() ... generic_shutdown_super() nilfs_put_super() * Prepare to write superblock * down_write(rwsem B) <-- nilfs_cleanup_super() * Detect b-tree corruption * nilfs_set_log_cursor() nilfs_bmap_convert_error() nilfs_count_free_blocks() __nilfs_error() down_read(rwsem A) <-- nilfs_set_error() down_write(rwsem B) <-- *** DEADLOCK *** Here, nilfs_get_block() readlocks rwsem A (= NILFS_MDT(dat_inode)->mi_sem) and then calls nilfs_bmap_lookup_contig(), but if it fails due to metadata corruption, __nilfs_error() is called from nilfs_bmap_convert_error() inside the lock section. Since __nilfs_error() calls nilfs_set_error() unless the filesystem is read-only and nilfs_set_error() attempts to writelock rwsem B (= nilfs->ns_sem) to write back superblock exclusively, hierarchical lock acquisition occurs in the order rwsem A -> rwsem B. Now, if another task starts updating the superblock, it may writelock rwsem B during the lock sequence above, and can deadlock trying to readlock rwsem A in nilfs_count_free_blocks(). However, there is actually no need to take rwsem A in nilfs_count_free_blocks() because it, within the lock section, only reads a single integer data on a shared struct with nilfs_sufile_get_ncleansegs(). This has been the case after commit aa474a220180 ("nilfs2: add local variable to cache the number of clean segments"), that is, even before this bug was introduced. So, this resolves the deadlock problem by just not taking the semaphore in nilfs_count_free_blocks().

Guests can trigger deadlock in Linux netback driver T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] The patch for XSA-392 introduced another issue which might result in a deadlock when trying to free the SKB of a packet dropped due to the XSA-392 handling (CVE-2022-42328). Additionally when dropping packages for other reasons the same deadlock could occur in case of netpoll being active for the interface the xen-netback driver is connected to (CVE-2022-42329).

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). A missing lock when clearing sk_user_data can lead to a race condition and NULL pointer dereference. A local user could use this flaw to potentially crash the system causing a denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: vmscan: remove deadlock due to throttling failing to make progress A soft lockup bug in kcompactd was reported in a private bugzilla with the following visible in dmesg; watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 26s! [kcompactd0:479] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 52s! [kcompactd0:479] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 78s! [kcompactd0:479] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 104s! [kcompactd0:479] The machine had 256G of RAM with no swap and an earlier failed allocation indicated that node 0 where kcompactd was run was potentially unreclaimable; Node 0 active_anon:29355112kB inactive_anon:2913528kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:64kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB mapped:8kB dirty:0kB writeback:0kB shmem:26780kB shmem_thp: 0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 23480320kB writeback_tmp:0kB kernel_stack:2272kB pagetables:24500kB all_unreclaimable? yes Vlastimil Babka investigated a crash dump and found that a task migrating pages was trying to drain PCP lists; PID: 52922 TASK: ffff969f820e5000 CPU: 19 COMMAND: "kworker/u128:3" Call Trace: __schedule schedule schedule_timeout wait_for_completion __flush_work __drain_all_pages __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.114 __alloc_pages alloc_migration_target migrate_pages migrate_to_node do_migrate_pages cpuset_migrate_mm_workfn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork This failure is specific to CONFIG_PREEMPT=n builds. The root of the problem is that kcompact0 is not rescheduling on a CPU while a task that has isolated a large number of the pages from the LRU is waiting on kcompact0 to reschedule so the pages can be released. While shrink_inactive_list() only loops once around too_many_isolated, reclaim can continue without rescheduling if sc->skipped_deactivate == 1 which could happen if there was no file LRU and the inactive anon list was not low.

Guests can trigger deadlock in Linux netback driver T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] The patch for XSA-392 introduced another issue which might result in a deadlock when trying to free the SKB of a packet dropped due to the XSA-392 handling (CVE-2022-42328). Additionally when dropping packages for other reasons the same deadlock could occur in case of netpoll being active for the interface the xen-netback driver is connected to (CVE-2022-42329).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: usb: host: Fix deadlock in oxu_bus_suspend() There is a deadlock in oxu_bus_suspend(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | timer_action() oxu_bus_suspend() | mod_timer() spin_lock_irq() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | oxu_watchdog() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_irq() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold oxu->lock in position (1) of thread 1, and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need oxu->lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, oxu_bus_suspend() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_irq(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ib_srp: Fix a deadlock Remove the flush_workqueue(system_long_wq) call since flushing system_long_wq is deadlock-prone and since that call is redundant with a preceding cancel_work_sync()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net, neigh: Do not trigger immediate probes on NUD_FAILED from neigh_managed_work syzkaller was able to trigger a deadlock for NTF_MANAGED entries [0]: kworker/0:16/14617 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: ___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652 [...] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: neigh_managed_work+0x35/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1572 The neighbor entry turned to NUD_FAILED state, where __neigh_event_send() triggered an immediate probe as per commit cd28ca0a3dd1 ("neigh: reduce arp latency") via neigh_probe() given table lock was held. One option to fix this situation is to defer the neigh_probe() back to the neigh_timer_handler() similarly as pre cd28ca0a3dd1. For the case of NTF_MANAGED, this deferral is acceptable given this only happens on actual failure state and regular / expected state is NUD_VALID with the entry already present. The fix adds a parameter to __neigh_event_send() in order to communicate whether immediate probe is allowed or disallowed. Existing call-sites of neigh_event_send() default as-is to immediate probe. However, the neigh_managed_work() disables it via use of neigh_event_send_probe(). [0] <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2956 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2999 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3788 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5027 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5639 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5604 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:202 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:334 ___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652 ip6_finish_output2+0x1070/0x14f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:191 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x61e/0xe90 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:170 ip6_finish_output+0x32/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:201 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline] ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:224 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0xa99/0x17f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:508 ndisc_send_ns+0x3a9/0x840 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:650 ndisc_solicit+0x2cd/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:742 neigh_probe+0xc2/0x110 net/core/neighbour.c:1040 __neigh_event_send+0x37d/0x1570 net/core/neighbour.c:1201 neigh_event_send include/net/neighbour.h:470 [inline] neigh_managed_work+0x162/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1574 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: staging: rtl8192bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle() There is a deadlock in rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | _set_timer() rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle()| mod_timer() spin_lock_bh() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | _rtw_join_timeout_handler() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_bh() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold pmlmepriv->lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need pmlmepriv->lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_bh(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. What`s more, we change spin_lock_bh() to spin_lock_irq() in _rtw_join_timeout_handler() in order to prevent deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Use pci_try_reset_function() to avoid deadlock There are multiple places from where the recovery work gets scheduled asynchronously. Also, there are multiple places where the caller waits synchronously for the recovery to be completed. One such place is during the PM shutdown() callback. If the device is not alive during recovery_work, it will try to reset the device using pci_reset_function(). This function internally will take the device_lock() first before resetting the device. By this time, if the lock has already been acquired, then recovery_work will get stalled while waiting for the lock. And if the lock was already acquired by the caller which waits for the recovery_work to be completed, it will lead to deadlock. This is what happened on the X1E80100 CRD device when the device died before shutdown() callback. Driver core calls the driver's shutdown() callback while holding the device_lock() leading to deadlock. And this deadlock scenario can occur on other paths as well, like during the PM suspend() callback, where the driver core would hold the device_lock() before calling driver's suspend() callback. And if the recovery_work was already started, it could lead to deadlock. This is also observed on the X1E80100 CRD. So to fix both issues, use pci_try_reset_function() in recovery_work. This function first checks for the availability of the device_lock() before trying to reset the device. If the lock is available, it will acquire it and reset the device. Otherwise, it will return -EAGAIN. If that happens, recovery_work will fail with the error message "Recovery failed" as not much could be done.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix merge preference rule failure condition syzbot reported a lock held when returning to userspace[1]. This is because if argc is less than 0 and the function returns directly, the held inode lock is not released. Fix this by store the error in ret and jump to done to clean up instead of returning directly. [dh: Modified Lizhi Xu's original patch to make it honour the error code from afs_split_string()] [1] WARNING: lock held when returning to user space! 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00209-g499551201b5f #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------ syz-executor133/5823 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by syz-executor133/5823: #0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:818 [inline] #0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: afs_proc_addr_prefs_write+0x2bb/0x14e0 fs/afs/addr_prefs.c:388