Linux Kernel contains an improper ownership management vulnerability, where unauthorized access to the execution of the setuid file with capabilities was found in the Linux kernel’s OverlayFS subsystem in how a user copies a capable file from a nosuid mount into another mount. This uid mapping bug allows a local user to escalate their privileges on the system.
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-test: Fix double free that causes kernel to oops Fix a kernel oops found while testing the stm32_pcie Endpoint driver with handling of PERST# deassertion: During EP initialization, pci_epf_test_alloc_space() allocates all BARs, which are further freed if epc_set_bar() fails (for instance, due to no free inbound window). However, when pci_epc_set_bar() fails, the error path: pci_epc_set_bar() -> pci_epf_free_space() does not clear the previous assignment to epf_test->reg[bar]. Then, if the host reboots, the PERST# deassertion restarts the BAR allocation sequence with the same allocation failure (no free inbound window), creating a double free situation since epf_test->reg[bar] was deallocated and is still non-NULL. Thus, make sure that pci_epf_alloc_space() and pci_epf_free_space() invocations are symmetric, and as such, set epf_test->reg[bar] to NULL when memory is freed. [kwilczynski: commit log]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: HWS, change error flow on matcher disconnect Currently, when firmware failure occurs during matcher disconnect flow, the error flow of the function reconnects the matcher back and returns an error, which continues running the calling function and eventually frees the matcher that is being disconnected. This leads to a case where we have a freed matcher on the matchers list, which in turn leads to use-after-free and eventual crash. This patch fixes that by not trying to reconnect the matcher back when some FW command fails during disconnect. Note that we're dealing here with FW error. We can't overcome this problem. This might lead to bad steering state (e.g. wrong connection between matchers), and will also lead to resource leakage, as it is the case with any other error handling during resource destruction. However, the goal here is to allow the driver to continue and not crash the machine with use-after-free error.
Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host versions prior to 25.1.102 and Application versions prior to 25.1.1413 (macOS/Linux client deployments) are vulnerable to an authentication bypass in PrinterInstallerClientService. The service requires root privileges for certain administrative operations, but these checks rely on calls to geteuid(). By preloading a malicious shared object overriding geteuid(), a local attacker can trick the service into believing it is running with root privileges. This bypass enables execution of administrative commands (e.g., enabling debug mode, managing configurations, or invoking privileged features) without proper authorization. While some actions requiring write access to protected files may still fail, the flaw effectively breaks the intended security model of the inter-process communication (IPC) system, allowing local attackers to escalate privileges and compromise system integrity. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.6.5. There is a use-after-free in block/bfq-iosched.c related to bfq_idle_slice_timer_body.
Integer overflow in the firmware for some Intel(R) Graphics Drivers for Windows * before version 26.20.100.7212 and before Linux kernel version 5.5 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable an escalation of privilege via local access.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/scs: Reset task stack state in bringup_cpu() To hot unplug a CPU, the idle task on that CPU calls a few layers of C code before finally leaving the kernel. When KASAN is in use, poisoned shadow is left around for each of the active stack frames, and when shadow call stacks are in use. When shadow call stacks (SCS) are in use the task's saved SCS SP is left pointing at an arbitrary point within the task's shadow call stack. When a CPU is offlined than onlined back into the kernel, this stale state can adversely affect execution. Stale KASAN shadow can alias new stackframes and result in bogus KASAN warnings. A stale SCS SP is effectively a memory leak, and prevents a portion of the shadow call stack being used. Across a number of hotplug cycles the idle task's entire shadow call stack can become unusable. We previously fixed the KASAN issue in commit: e1b77c92981a5222 ("sched/kasan: remove stale KASAN poison after hotplug") ... by removing any stale KASAN stack poison immediately prior to onlining a CPU. Subsequently in commit: f1a0a376ca0c4ef1 ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") ... the refactoring left the KASAN and SCS cleanup in one-time idle thread initialization code rather than something invoked prior to each CPU being onlined, breaking both as above. We fixed SCS (but not KASAN) in commit: 63acd42c0d4942f7 ("sched/scs: Reset the shadow stack when idle_task_exit") ... but as this runs in the context of the idle task being offlined it's potentially fragile. To fix these consistently and more robustly, reset the SCS SP and KASAN shadow of a CPU's idle task immediately before we online that CPU in bringup_cpu(). This ensures the idle task always has a consistent state when it is running, and removes the need to so so when exiting an idle task. Whenever any thread is created, dup_task_struct() will give the task a stack which is free of KASAN shadow, and initialize the task's SCS SP, so there's no need to specially initialize either for idle thread within init_idle(), as this was only necessary to handle hotplug cycles. I've tested this on arm64 with: * gcc 11.1.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK * clang 12.0.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK, SHADOW_CALL_STACK ... offlining and onlining CPUS with: | while true; do | for C in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/online; do | echo 0 > $C; | echo 1 > $C; | done | done
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API. Reproducer: # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null ... [ 194.196391] ================================================================== [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899 [ 194.197707] [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43 [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs] [ 194.200032] Call Trace: [ 194.200191] <TASK> [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0 [ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210 [ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0 [ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 [ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340 [ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140 [ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs] [ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs] [ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs] This is because TFM is being used in parallel. Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done in smb3_calc_signature()). Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: cancel nfsd_shrinker_work using sync mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net In the normal case, when we excute `echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads`, the function `nfs4_state_destroy_net` in `nfs4_state_shutdown_net` will release all resources related to the hashed `nfs4_client`. If the `nfsd_client_shrinker` is running concurrently, the `expire_client` function will first unhash this client and then destroy it. This can lead to the following warning. Additionally, numerous use-after-free errors may occur as well. nfsd_client_shrinker echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads expire_client nfsd_shutdown_net unhash_client ... nfs4_state_shutdown_net /* won't wait shrinker exit */ /* cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work) * nfsd_file for this /* won't destroy unhashed client1 */ * client1 still alive nfs4_state_destroy_net */ nfsd_file_cache_shutdown /* trigger warning */ kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_slab) kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_mark_slab) /* release nfsd_file and mark */ __destroy_client ==================================================================== BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on __kmem_cache_shutdown() -------------------------------------------------------------------- CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 764 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ==================================================================== BUG nfsd_file_mark (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining nfsd_file_mark on __kmem_cache_shutdown() -------------------------------------------------------------------- dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xc8/0x210 [nfsd] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e To resolve this issue, cancel `nfsd_shrinker_work` using synchronous mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: i2c: ds90ub9x3: Fix extra fwnode_handle_put() The ub913 and ub953 drivers call fwnode_handle_put(priv->sd.fwnode) as part of their remove process, and if the driver is removed multiple times, eventually leads to put "overflow", possibly causing memory corruption or crash. The fwnode_handle_put() is a leftover from commit 905f88ccebb1 ("media: i2c: ds90ub9x3: Fix sub-device matching"), which changed the code related to the sd.fwnode, but missed removing these fwnode_handle_put() calls.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost-scsi: Fix handling of multiple calls to vhost_scsi_set_endpoint If vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called multiple times without a vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint between them, we can hit multiple bugs found by Haoran Zhang: 1. Use-after-free when no tpgs are found: This fixes a use after free that occurs when vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called more than once and calls after the first call do not find any tpgs to add to the vs_tpg. When vhost_scsi_set_endpoint first finds tpgs to add to the vs_tpg array match=true, so we will do: vhost_vq_set_backend(vq, vs_tpg); ... kfree(vs->vs_tpg); vs->vs_tpg = vs_tpg; If vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called again and no tpgs are found match=false so we skip the vhost_vq_set_backend call leaving the pointer to the vs_tpg we then free via: kfree(vs->vs_tpg); vs->vs_tpg = vs_tpg; If a scsi request is then sent we do: vhost_scsi_handle_vq -> vhost_scsi_get_req -> vhost_vq_get_backend which sees the vs_tpg we just did a kfree on. 2. Tpg dir removal hang: This patch fixes an issue where we cannot remove a LIO/target layer tpg (and structs above it like the target) dir due to the refcount dropping to -1. The problem is that if vhost_scsi_set_endpoint detects a tpg is already in the vs->vs_tpg array or if the tpg has been removed so target_depend_item fails, the undepend goto handler will do target_undepend_item on all tpgs in the vs_tpg array dropping their refcount to 0. At this time vs_tpg contains both the tpgs we have added in the current vhost_scsi_set_endpoint call as well as tpgs we added in previous calls which are also in vs->vs_tpg. Later, when vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint runs it will do target_undepend_item on all the tpgs in the vs->vs_tpg which will drop their refcount to -1. Userspace will then not be able to remove the tpg and will hang when it tries to do rmdir on the tpg dir. 3. Tpg leak: This fixes a bug where we can leak tpgs and cause them to be un-removable because the target name is overwritten when vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called multiple times but with different target names. The bug occurs if a user has called VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT and setup a vhost-scsi device to target/tpg mapping, then calls VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT again with a new target name that has tpgs we haven't seen before (target1 has tpg1 but target2 has tpg2). When this happens we don't teardown the old target tpg mapping and just overwrite the target name and the vs->vs_tpg array. Later when we do vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint, we are passed in either target1 or target2's name and we will only match that target's tpgs when we loop over the vs->vs_tpg. We will then return from the function without doing target_undepend_item on the tpgs. Because of all these bugs, it looks like being able to call vhost_scsi_set_endpoint multiple times was never supported. The major user, QEMU, already has checks to prevent this use case. So to fix the issues, this patch prevents vhost_scsi_set_endpoint from being called if it's already successfully added tpgs. To add, remove or change the tpg config or target name, you must do a vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint first.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: uvcvideo: Remove dangling pointers When an async control is written, we copy a pointer to the file handle that started the operation. That pointer will be used when the device is done. Which could be anytime in the future. If the user closes that file descriptor, its structure will be freed, and there will be one dangling pointer per pending async control, that the driver will try to use. Clean all the dangling pointers during release(). To avoid adding a performance penalty in the most common case (no async operation), a counter has been introduced with some logic to make sure that it is properly handled.
Integer overflow in the mem_check_range function in drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption), obtain sensitive information from kernel memory, or possibly have unspecified other impact via a write or read request involving the "RDMA protocol over infiniband" (aka Soft RoCE) technology.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfs/localio: must clear res.replen in nfs_local_read_done Otherwise memory corruption can occur due to NFSv3 LOCALIO reads leaving garbage in res.replen: - nfs3_read_done() copies that into server->read_hdrsize; from there nfs3_proc_read_setup() copies it to args.replen in new requests. - nfs3_xdr_enc_read3args() passes that to rpc_prepare_reply_pages() which includes it in hdrsize for xdr_init_pages, so that rq_rcv_buf contains a ridiculous len. - This is copied to rq_private_buf and xs_read_stream_request() eventually passes the kvec to sock_recvmsg() which receives incoming data into entirely the wrong place. This is easily reproduced with NFSv3 LOCALIO that is servicing reads when it is made to pivot back to using normal RPC. This switch back to using normal NFSv3 with RPC can occur for a few reasons but this issue was exposed with a test that stops and then restarts the NFSv3 server while LOCALIO is performing heavy read IO.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix double brelse() the buffer of the extents path In ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(), set path[1].p_bh to NULL after it has been released, otherwise it may be released twice. An example of what triggers this is as follows: split2 map split1 |--------|-------|--------| ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents ext4_split_convert_extents // path->p_depth == 0 ext4_split_extent // 1. do split1 ext4_split_extent_at |ext4_ext_insert_extent | ext4_ext_create_new_leaf | ext4_ext_grow_indepth | le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1) | ext4_find_extent | // return -ENOMEM |// get error and try zeroout |path = ext4_find_extent | path->p_depth = 1 |ext4_ext_try_to_merge | ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up | path->p_depth = 0 | brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> not set to NULL here |// zeroout success // 2. update path ext4_find_extent // 3. do split2 ext4_split_extent_at ext4_ext_insert_extent ext4_ext_create_new_leaf ext4_ext_grow_indepth le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1) ext4_find_extent path[0].p_bh = NULL; path->p_depth = 1 read_extent_tree_block ---> return err // path[1].p_bh is still the old value ext4_free_ext_path ext4_ext_drop_refs // path->p_depth == 1 brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> brelse a buffer twice Finally got the following WARRNING when removing the buffer from lru: ============================================ VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 72 at fs/buffer.c:1241 __brelse+0x58/0x90 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u19:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #716 RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x58/0x90 Call Trace: <TASK> __find_get_block+0x6e7/0x810 bdev_getblk+0x2b/0x480 __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x48a/0x1240 ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x150 ext4_reserve_inode_write+0xb7/0x230 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x144/0x6a0 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x9c8/0x3230 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xf45/0x2dc0 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70 [...] ============================================
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid OOB when system.data xattr changes underneath the filesystem When looking up for an entry in an inlined directory, if e_value_offs is changed underneath the filesystem by some change in the block device, it will lead to an out-of-bounds access that KASAN detects as an UAF. EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 r/w without journal. Quota mode: none. loop0: detected capacity change from 2048 to 2047 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_search_dir+0xf2/0x1c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1500 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88803e91130f by task syz-executor269/5103 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5103 Comm: syz-executor269 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 ext4_search_dir+0xf2/0x1c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1500 ext4_find_inline_entry+0x4be/0x5e0 fs/ext4/inline.c:1697 __ext4_find_entry+0x2b4/0x1b30 fs/ext4/namei.c:1573 ext4_lookup_entry fs/ext4/namei.c:1727 [inline] ext4_lookup+0x15f/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:1795 lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x11f/0x260 fs/namei.c:1633 filename_create+0x297/0x540 fs/namei.c:3980 do_symlinkat+0xf9/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4587 __do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4610 [inline] __se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4607 [inline] __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x95/0xb0 fs/namei.c:4607 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f3e73ced469 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff4d40c258 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0032656c69662f2e RCX: 00007f3e73ced469 RDX: 0000000020000200 RSI: 00000000ffffff9c RDI: 00000000200001c0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff4d40c290 R09: 00007fff4d40c290 R10: 0023706f6f6c2f76 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff4d40c27c R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007fff4d40c2b0 </TASK> Calling ext4_xattr_ibody_find right after reading the inode with ext4_get_inode_loc will lead to a check of the validity of the xattrs, avoiding this problem.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ila: call nf_unregister_net_hooks() sooner syzbot found an use-after-free Read in ila_nf_input [1] Issue here is that ila_xlat_exit_net() frees the rhashtable, then call nf_unregister_net_hooks(). It should be done in the reverse way, with a synchronize_rcu(). This is a good match for a pre_exit() method. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_lookup_fast+0x77a/0x9b0 include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888064620008 by task ksoftirqd/0/16 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00238-g2ad6d23f465a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] __rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 [inline] rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline] rhashtable_lookup_fast+0x77a/0x9b0 include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 ila_lookup_wildcards net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:132 [inline] ila_xlat_addr net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:652 [inline] ila_nf_input+0x1fe/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:190 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline] NF_HOOK+0x29e/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:312 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1ea/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 run_ksoftirqd+0xca/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:928 smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa30 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x64620 flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xbfffffff(buddy) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0000959608 ffffea00019d9408 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 00000000bfffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as freed page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), pid 5242, tgid 5242 (syz-executor), ts 73611328570, free_ts 618981657187 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1493 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1501 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e4c/0x2f10 mm/page_alloc.c:3439 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4695 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:269 [inline] alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:296 [inline] ___kmalloc_large_node+0x8b/0x1d0 mm/slub.c:4103 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x1a/0x80 mm/slub.c:4130 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4146 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2d2/0x440 mm/slub.c:4164 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:650 bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline] rhashtable_init_noprof+0x534/0xa60 lib/rhashtable.c:1071 ila_xlat_init_net+0xa0/0x110 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:613 ops_ini ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: bfa: Fix use-after-free in bfad_im_module_exit() BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x2aca/0x3a20 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881082d80c8 by task modprobe/25303 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x95/0xe0 print_report+0xcb/0x620 kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0 __lock_acquire+0x2aca/0x3a20 lock_acquire+0x19b/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2b/0x40 attribute_container_unregister+0x30/0x160 fc_release_transport+0x19/0x90 [scsi_transport_fc] bfad_im_module_exit+0x23/0x60 [bfa] bfad_init+0xdb/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 25303: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 fc_attach_transport+0x4f/0x4740 [scsi_transport_fc] bfad_im_module_init+0x17/0x80 [bfa] bfad_init+0x23/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 25303: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x38/0x50 kfree+0x212/0x480 bfad_im_module_init+0x7e/0x80 [bfa] bfad_init+0x23/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Above issue happens as follows: bfad_init error = bfad_im_module_init() fc_release_transport(bfad_im_scsi_transport_template); if (error) goto ext; ext: bfad_im_module_exit(); fc_release_transport(bfad_im_scsi_transport_template); --> Trigger double release Don't call bfad_im_module_exit() if bfad_im_module_init() failed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: fix uaf for flush rq while iterating tags blk_mq_clear_flush_rq_mapping() is not called during scsi probe, by checking blk_queue_init_done(). However, QUEUE_FLAG_INIT_DONE is cleared in del_gendisk by commit aec89dc5d421 ("block: keep q_usage_counter in atomic mode after del_gendisk"), hence for disk like scsi, following blk_mq_destroy_queue() will not clear flush rq from tags->rqs[] as well, cause following uaf that is found by our syzkaller for v6.6: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_mq_find_and_get_req+0x16e/0x1a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:261 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811c969c20 by task kworker/1:2H/224909 CPU: 1 PID: 224909 Comm: kworker/1:2H Not tainted 6.6.0-ga836a5060850 #32 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300 mm/kasan/report.c:364 print_report+0x3e/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:475 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588 blk_mq_find_and_get_req+0x16e/0x1a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:261 bt_iter block/blk-mq-tag.c:288 [inline] __sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:295 [inline] sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:316 [inline] bt_for_each+0x455/0x790 block/blk-mq-tag.c:325 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x320/0x740 block/blk-mq-tag.c:534 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x1a3/0x7b0 block/blk-mq.c:1673 process_one_work+0x7c4/0x1450 kernel/workqueue.c:2631 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2704 [inline] worker_thread+0x804/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2785 kthread+0x346/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293 Allocated by task 942: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:383 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:198 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1007 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x69/0x170 mm/slab_common.c:1014 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:620 [inline] kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline] blk_alloc_flush_queue+0x144/0x2f0 block/blk-flush.c:499 blk_mq_alloc_hctx+0x601/0x940 block/blk-mq.c:3788 blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x27f/0x330 block/blk-mq.c:4261 blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x488/0x5e0 block/blk-mq.c:4294 blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x188/0x860 block/blk-mq.c:4350 blk_mq_init_queue_data block/blk-mq.c:4166 [inline] blk_mq_init_queue+0x8d/0x100 block/blk-mq.c:4176 scsi_alloc_sdev+0x843/0xd50 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:335 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x77c/0xde0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1189 __scsi_scan_target+0x1fc/0x5a0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1727 scsi_scan_channel drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1815 [inline] scsi_scan_channel+0x14b/0x1e0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1791 scsi_scan_host_selected+0x2fe/0x400 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1844 scsi_scan+0x3a0/0x3f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c:151 store_scan+0x2a/0x60 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c:191 dev_attr_store+0x5c/0x90 drivers/base/core.c:2388 sysfs_kf_write+0x11c/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3fc/0x610 fs/kernfs/file.c:338 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2083 [inline] new_sync_write+0x1b4/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:493 vfs_write+0x76c/0xb00 fs/read_write.c:586 ksys_write+0x127/0x250 fs/read_write.c:639 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 Freed by task 244687: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:522 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x12a/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [in ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: prevent use-after-free due to open_cached_dir error paths If open_cached_dir() encounters an error parsing the lease from the server, the error handling may race with receiving a lease break, resulting in open_cached_dir() freeing the cfid while the queued work is pending. Update open_cached_dir() to drop refs rather than directly freeing the cfid. Have cached_dir_lease_break(), cfids_laundromat_worker(), and invalidate_all_cached_dirs() clear has_lease immediately while still holding cfids->cfid_list_lock, and then use this to also simplify the reference counting in cfids_laundromat_worker() and invalidate_all_cached_dirs(). Fixes this KASAN splat (which manually injects an error and lease break in open_cached_dir()): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_cached_lease_break+0x27/0xb0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811cc24c10 by task kworker/3:1/65 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-g255cf264e6e5-dirty #87 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_cached_lease_break Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 print_report+0xce/0x660 kasan_report+0xd3/0x110 smb2_cached_lease_break+0x27/0xb0 process_one_work+0x50a/0xc50 worker_thread+0x2ba/0x530 kthread+0x17c/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 2464: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 open_cached_dir+0xa7d/0x1fb0 smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0 cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10 cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210 cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460 cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470 vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160 vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150 vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 2464: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70 kfree+0x174/0x520 open_cached_dir+0x97f/0x1fb0 smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0 cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10 cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210 cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460 cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470 vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160 vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150 vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xad/0xc0 insert_work+0x32/0x100 __queue_work+0x5c9/0x870 queue_work_on+0x82/0x90 open_cached_dir+0x1369/0x1fb0 smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0 cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10 cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210 cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460 cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470 vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160 vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150 vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811cc24c00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88811cc24c00, ffff88811cc25000)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Protect against overflow of ALIGN() during iova allocation Userspace can supply an iova and uptr such that the target iova alignment becomes really big and ALIGN() overflows which corrupts the selected area range during allocation. CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST can detect this: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 Comm: syz-executor294 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-syzkaller-00294-g3ffea9a7a6f7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 RIP: 0010:iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline] RIP: 0010:iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352 Code: fc e9 a4 f3 ff ff e8 1a 8b 4c fc 41 be e4 ff ff ff e9 8a f3 ff ff e8 0a 8b 4c fc 90 0f 0b 90 e9 37 f5 ff ff e8 fc 8a 4c fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 68 f3 ff ff 48 c7 c1 ec 82 ad 8f 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ebf9e0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff85499fa4 RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: ffff888079b49e00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc90003ebfc50 R08: ffffffff85499b30 R09: ffffffff85499942 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff888079b49e00 R12: ffff8880228e0010 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff920007d7f68 R15: ffffc90003ebfd00 FS: 000055557d760380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000005fdeb8 CR3: 000000007404a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> iommufd_ioas_copy+0x610/0x7b0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c:274 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x4d9/0x5a0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:421 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Cap the automatic alignment to the huge page size, which is probably a better idea overall. Huge automatic alignments can fragment and chew up the available IOVA space without any reason.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: venus: hfi: add check to handle incorrect queue size qsize represents size of shared queued between driver and video firmware. Firmware can modify this value to an invalid large value. In such situation, empty_space will be bigger than the space actually available. Since new_wr_idx is not checked, so the following code will result in an OOB write. ... qsize = qhdr->q_size if (wr_idx >= rd_idx) empty_space = qsize - (wr_idx - rd_idx) .... if (new_wr_idx < qsize) { memcpy(wr_ptr, packet, dwords << 2) --> OOB write Add check to ensure qsize is within the allocated size while reading and writing packets into the queue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bounds access in 'dcn21_link_encoder_create' An issue was identified in the dcn21_link_encoder_create function where an out-of-bounds access could occur when the hpd_source index was used to reference the link_enc_hpd_regs array. This array has a fixed size and the index was not being checked against the array's bounds before accessing it. This fix adds a conditional check to ensure that the hpd_source index is within the valid range of the link_enc_hpd_regs array. If the index is out of bounds, the function now returns NULL to prevent undefined behavior. References: [ 65.920507] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 65.920510] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/resource/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c:1312:29 [ 65.920519] index 7 is out of range for type 'dcn10_link_enc_hpd_registers [5]' [ 65.920523] CPU: 3 PID: 1178 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G OE 6.8.0-cleanershaderfeatureresetasdntipmi200nv2132 #13 [ 65.920525] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS WMJ0429N_Weekly_20_04_2 04/29/2020 [ 65.920527] Call Trace: [ 65.920529] <TASK> [ 65.920532] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 [ 65.920541] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 65.920543] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa2/0xe0 [ 65.920549] dcn21_link_encoder_create+0xd9/0x140 [amdgpu] [ 65.921009] link_create+0x6d3/0xed0 [amdgpu] [ 65.921355] create_links+0x18a/0x4e0 [amdgpu] [ 65.921679] dc_create+0x360/0x720 [amdgpu] [ 65.921999] ? dmi_matches+0xa0/0x220 [ 65.922004] amdgpu_dm_init+0x2b6/0x2c90 [amdgpu] [ 65.922342] ? console_unlock+0x77/0x120 [ 65.922348] ? dev_printk_emit+0x86/0xb0 [ 65.922354] dm_hw_init+0x15/0x40 [amdgpu] [ 65.922686] amdgpu_device_init+0x26a8/0x33a0 [amdgpu] [ 65.922921] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1b/0xa0 [amdgpu] [ 65.923087] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b7/0x630 [amdgpu] [ 65.923087] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0 [ 65.923087] pci_device_probe+0xc8/0x280 [ 65.923087] really_probe+0x187/0x300 [ 65.923087] __driver_probe_device+0x85/0x130 [ 65.923087] driver_probe_device+0x24/0x110 [ 65.923087] __driver_attach+0xac/0x1d0 [ 65.923087] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 65.923087] bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xd0 [ 65.923087] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [ 65.923087] bus_add_driver+0xf2/0x200 [ 65.923087] driver_register+0x64/0x130 [ 65.923087] ? __pfx_amdgpu_init+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 65.923087] __pci_register_driver+0x61/0x70 [ 65.923087] amdgpu_init+0x7d/0xff0 [amdgpu] [ 65.923087] do_one_initcall+0x49/0x310 [ 65.923087] ? kmalloc_trace+0x136/0x360 [ 65.923087] do_init_module+0x6a/0x270 [ 65.923087] load_module+0x1fce/0x23a0 [ 65.923087] init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0 [ 65.923087] ? init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0 [ 65.923087] idempotent_init_module+0x179/0x230 [ 65.923087] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5d/0xa0 [ 65.923087] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x120 [ 65.923087] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 65.923087] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f1e88d [ 65.923087] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 65.923087] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7bc1aa78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 65.923087] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c9c1db130 RCX: 00007f2d80f1e88d [ 65.923087] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000564c9c1e5480 RDI: 000000000000000f [ 65.923087] RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 65.923087] R10: 000000000000000f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000564c9c1e5480 [ 65.923087] R13: 0000564c9c1db260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000564c9c1e54b0 [ 65.923087] </TASK> [ 65.923927] ---[ end trace ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: cdc-acm: Check control transfer buffer size before access If the first fragment is shorter than struct usb_cdc_notification, we can't calculate an expected_size. Log an error and discard the notification instead of reading lengths from memory outside the received data, which can lead to memory corruption when the expected_size decreases between fragments, causing `expected_size - acm->nb_index` to wrap. This issue has been present since the beginning of git history; however, it only leads to memory corruption since commit ea2583529cd1 ("cdc-acm: reassemble fragmented notifications"). A mitigating factor is that acm_ctrl_irq() can only execute after userspace has opened /dev/ttyACM*; but if ModemManager is running, ModemManager will do that automatically depending on the USB device's vendor/product IDs and its other interfaces.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: neighbour: use RCU protection in __neigh_notify() __neigh_notify() can be called without RTNL or RCU protection. Use RCU protection to avoid potential UAF.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix use-after-free issue in hid_ishtp_cl_remove() During the `rmmod` operation for the `intel_ishtp_hid` driver, a use-after-free issue can occur in the hid_ishtp_cl_remove() function. The function hid_ishtp_cl_deinit() is called before ishtp_hid_remove(), which can lead to accessing freed memory or resources during the removal process. Call Trace: ? ishtp_cl_send+0x168/0x220 [intel_ishtp] ? hid_output_report+0xe3/0x150 [hid] hid_ishtp_set_feature+0xb5/0x120 [intel_ishtp_hid] ishtp_hid_request+0x7b/0xb0 [intel_ishtp_hid] hid_hw_request+0x1f/0x40 [hid] sensor_hub_set_feature+0x11f/0x190 [hid_sensor_hub] _hid_sensor_power_state+0x147/0x1e0 [hid_sensor_trigger] hid_sensor_runtime_resume+0x22/0x30 [hid_sensor_trigger] sensor_hub_remove+0xa8/0xe0 [hid_sensor_hub] hid_device_remove+0x49/0xb0 [hid] hid_destroy_device+0x6f/0x90 [hid] ishtp_hid_remove+0x42/0x70 [intel_ishtp_hid] hid_ishtp_cl_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [intel_ishtp_hid] ishtp_cl_device_remove+0x4a/0x60 [intel_ishtp] ... Additionally, ishtp_hid_remove() is a HID level power off, which should occur before the ISHTP level disconnect. This patch resolves the issue by reordering the calls in hid_ishtp_cl_remove(). The function ishtp_hid_remove() is now called before hid_ishtp_cl_deinit().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-cgroup: Fix UAF in blkcg_unpin_online() blkcg_unpin_online() walks up the blkcg hierarchy putting the online pin. To walk up, it uses blkcg_parent(blkcg) but it was calling that after blkcg_destroy_blkgs(blkcg) which could free the blkcg, leading to the following UAF: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blkcg_unpin_online+0x15a/0x270 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881057678c0 by task kworker/9:1/117 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kworker/9:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-work-00182-gb8f52214c61a-dirty #48 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 Workqueue: cgwb_release cgwb_release_workfn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x27/0x80 print_report+0x151/0x710 kasan_report+0xc0/0x100 blkcg_unpin_online+0x15a/0x270 cgwb_release_workfn+0x194/0x480 process_scheduled_works+0x71b/0xe20 worker_thread+0x82a/0xbd0 kthread+0x242/0x2c0 ret_from_fork+0x33/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ... Freed by task 1944: kasan_save_track+0x2b/0x70 kasan_save_free_info+0x3c/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x33/0x50 kfree+0x10c/0x330 css_free_rwork_fn+0xe6/0xb30 process_scheduled_works+0x71b/0xe20 worker_thread+0x82a/0xbd0 kthread+0x242/0x2c0 ret_from_fork+0x33/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Note that the UAF is not easy to trigger as the free path is indirected behind a couple RCU grace periods and a work item execution. I could only trigger it with artifical msleep() injected in blkcg_unpin_online(). Fix it by reading the parent pointer before destroying the blkcg's blkg's.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: amd_sfh: free driver_data after destroying hid device HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several callbacks. I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output: [ 13.050438] ================================================================== [ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh] [ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3 [ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479 [ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0 [ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024 [ 13.067860] Call Trace: [ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8 [ 13.071486] <TASK> [ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082] [ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0 [ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b] [ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0 [ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150 [ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0 [ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370 [ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120 [ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0 [ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180 [ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0 [ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360 [ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380 [ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70 [ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750 [ 13.2196 ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: fix mddev uaf while iterating all_mddevs list While iterating all_mddevs list from md_notify_reboot() and md_exit(), list_for_each_entry_safe is used, and this can race with deletint the next mddev, causing UAF: t1: spin_lock //list_for_each_entry_safe(mddev, n, ...) mddev_get(mddev1) // assume mddev2 is the next entry spin_unlock t2: //remove mddev2 ... mddev_free spin_lock list_del spin_unlock kfree(mddev2) mddev_put(mddev1) spin_lock //continue dereference mddev2->all_mddevs The old helper for_each_mddev() actually grab the reference of mddev2 while holding the lock, to prevent from being freed. This problem can be fixed the same way, however, the code will be complex. Hence switch to use list_for_each_entry, in this case mddev_put() can free the mddev1 and it's not safe as well. Refer to md_seq_show(), also factor out a helper mddev_put_locked() to fix this problem.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: Fix slab-use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove This fixes the following crash: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888136335380 by task kworker/6:0/140241 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 140241 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc6+ #1 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: LENOVO 30FNA1V7CW/1057, BIOS S0EKT54A 07/01/2024 Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card [rtsx_usb_ms] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x320 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx_rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x10/0x10 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 ? kick_pool+0x3b/0x270 process_one_work+0x357/0x660 worker_thread+0x390/0x4c0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x190/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 161446: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x470 memstick_alloc_host+0x1f/0xe0 [memstick] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_probe+0x47/0x320 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_probe+0x60/0xe0 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 bus_probe_device+0xbd/0xd0 device_add+0x4a5/0x760 platform_device_add+0x189/0x370 mfd_add_device+0x587/0x5e0 mfd_add_devices+0xb1/0x130 rtsx_usb_probe+0x28e/0x2e0 [rtsx_usb] usb_probe_interface+0x15c/0x460 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 rebind_marked_interfaces.isra.0+0xcc/0x110 usb_reset_device+0x352/0x410 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xe5c/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 161506: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x36/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x50 kfree+0x1fd/0x3b0 device_release+0x56/0xf0 kobject_cleanup+0x73/0x1c0 rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x13d/0x220 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_remove+0x2f/0x50 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 bus_remove_device+0x124/0x1d0 device_del+0x239/0x530 platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x40 mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x167/0x170 device_for_each_child_reverse+0xc9/0x130 mfd_remove_devices+0x6e/0xa0 rtsx_usb_disconnect+0x2e/0xd0 [rtsx_usb] usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x3f0 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 proc_disconnect_claim+0x13d/0x220 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xb5e/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: protect access to buffers with no active references nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(), which iterates through the buffers attached to dirty data folios/pages, accesses the attached buffers without locking the folios/pages. For data cache, nilfs_clear_folio_dirty() may be called asynchronously when the file system degenerates to read only, so nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() still has the potential to cause use after free issues when buffers lose the protection of their dirty state midway due to this asynchronous clearing and are unintentionally freed by try_to_free_buffers(). Eliminate this race issue by adjusting the lock section in this function.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: clear acl_access/acl_default after releasing them If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in nfs3svc_release_getacl like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Modules linked in: CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75 e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb cd 0f b6 1d 8a3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380 RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56 R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? __warn+0xa5/0x140 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0 svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60 ? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0 ? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10 ? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120 ? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190 svc_process+0x2a7/0x330 svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940 svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0 nfsd+0x168/0x200 ? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0 ? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent UAF from being triggered.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix session use-after-free in multichannel connection There is a race condition between session setup and ksmbd_sessions_deregister. The session can be freed before the connection is added to channel list of session. This patch check reference count of session before freeing it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-after-free of signing key Customers have reported use-after-free in @ses->auth_key.response with SMB2.1 + sign mounts which occurs due to following race: task A task B cifs_mount() dfs_mount_share() get_session() cifs_mount_get_session() cifs_send_recv() cifs_get_smb_ses() compound_send_recv() cifs_setup_session() smb2_setup_request() kfree_sensitive() smb2_calc_signature() crypto_shash_setkey() *UAF* Fix this by ensuring that we have a valid @ses->auth_key.response by checking whether @ses->ses_status is SES_GOOD or SES_EXITING with @ses->ses_lock held. After commit 24a9799aa8ef ("smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()"), we made sure to call ->logoff() only when @ses was known to be good (e.g. valid ->auth_key.response), so it's safe to access signing key when @ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: fix flushing uninitialized delayed_work on cache_ctr error An unexpected WARN_ON from flush_work() may occur when cache creation fails, caused by destroying the uninitialized delayed_work waker in the error path of cache_create(). For example, the warning appears on the superblock checksum error. Reproduce steps: dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct dmsetup create cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" Kernel logs: (snip) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 84 at kernel/workqueue.c:4178 __flush_work+0x5d4/0x890 Fix by pulling out the cancel_delayed_work_sync() from the constructor's error path. This patch doesn't affect the use-after-free fix for concurrent dm_resume and dm_destroy (commit 6a459d8edbdb ("dm cache: Fix UAF in destroy()")) as cache_dtr is not changed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parport: Proper fix for array out-of-bounds access The recent fix for array out-of-bounds accesses replaced sprintf() calls blindly with snprintf(). However, since snprintf() returns the would-be-printed size, not the actually output size, the length calculation can still go over the given limit. Use scnprintf() instead of snprintf(), which returns the actually output letters, for addressing the potential out-of-bounds access properly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: vertexcom: mse102x: Fix possible double free of TX skb The scope of the TX skb is wider than just mse102x_tx_frame_spi(), so in case the TX skb room needs to be expanded, we should free the the temporary skb instead of the original skb. Otherwise the original TX skb pointer would be freed again in mse102x_tx_work(), which leads to crashes: Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#2] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 712 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G D 6.6.23 Hardware name: chargebyte Charge SOM DC-ONE (DT) Workqueue: events mse102x_tx_work [mse102x] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_release_data+0xb8/0x1d8 lr : skb_release_data+0x1ac/0x1d8 sp : ffff8000819a3cc0 x29: ffff8000819a3cc0 x28: ffff0000046daa60 x27: ffff0000057f2dc0 x26: ffff000005386c00 x25: 0000000000000002 x24: 00000000ffffffff x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff0000057f2e50 x20: 0000000000000006 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff00003fdacfcc x17: e69ad452d0c49def x16: 84a005feff870102 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 000000000000024a x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000400 x10: 0000000000000930 x9 : ffff00003fd913e8 x8 : fffffc00001bc008 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000008 x5 : ffff00003fd91340 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000009 x2 : 00000000fffffffe x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: skb_release_data+0xb8/0x1d8 kfree_skb_reason+0x48/0xb0 mse102x_tx_work+0x164/0x35c [mse102x] process_one_work+0x138/0x260 worker_thread+0x32c/0x438 kthread+0x118/0x11c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: aa1303e0 97fffab6 72001c1f 54000141 (f9400660)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: aacraid: Fix double-free on probe failure aac_probe_one() calls hardware-specific init functions through the aac_driver_ident::init pointer, all of which eventually call down to aac_init_adapter(). If aac_init_adapter() fails after allocating memory for aac_dev::queues, it frees the memory but does not clear that member. After the hardware-specific init function returns an error, aac_probe_one() goes down an error path that frees the memory pointed to by aac_dev::queues, resulting.in a double-free.
Linux drivers/char/lp.c Out-of-Bounds Write. Due to a missing bounds check, and the fact that parport_ptr integer is static, a 'secure boot' kernel command line adversary (can happen due to bootloader vulns, e.g. Google Nexus 6's CVE-2016-10277, where due to a vulnerability the adversary has partial control over the command line) can overflow the parport_nr array in the following code, by appending many (>LP_NO) 'lp=none' arguments to the command line.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix incorrect size calculation for loop [WHY] fe_clk_en has size of 5 but sizeof(fe_clk_en) has byte size 20 which is lager than the array size. [HOW] Divide byte size 20 by its element size. This fixes 2 OVERRUN issues reported by Coverity.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb() syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1] After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock(). A similar issue has been fixed in commit a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()") Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a separate patch. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588 rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160 do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890 vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971 do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8 </TASK> Allocated by task 6530: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044 dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89 ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670 make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline] xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257 rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548 dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline] rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree. ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix WARNING:at_kernel/workqueue.c:#check_flush_dependency In the commit aee2424246f9 ("RDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs"), the function flush_workqueue is invoked to flush the work queue iwcm_wq. But at that time, the work queue iwcm_wq was created via the function alloc_ordered_workqueue without the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM. Because the current process is trying to flush the whole iwcm_wq, if iwcm_wq doesn't have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, verify that the current process is not reclaiming memory or running on a workqueue which doesn't have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM as that can break forward-progress guarantee leading to a deadlock. The call trace is as below: [ 125.350876][ T1430] Call Trace: [ 125.356281][ T1430] <TASK> [ 125.361285][ T1430] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:693) [ 125.367640][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.375689][ T1430] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219) [ 125.382505][ T1430] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239) [ 125.388987][ T1430] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1)) [ 125.395831][ T1430] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621) [ 125.403125][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.410984][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.418764][ T1430] __flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3970) [ 125.426021][ T1430] ? __pfx___might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10151) [ 125.433431][ T1430] ? destroy_cm_id (drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c:375) iw_cm [ 125.441209][ T1430] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3910) [ 125.473900][ T1430] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 include/linux/spinlock.h:187 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 125.473909][ T1430] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:161) [ 125.482537][ T1430] _destroy_id (drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2044) rdma_cm [ 125.495072][ T1430] nvme_rdma_free_queue (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:656 drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:650) nvme_rdma [ 125.505827][ T1430] nvme_rdma_reset_ctrl_work (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:2180) nvme_rdma [ 125.505831][ T1430] process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) [ 125.515122][ T1430] worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 kernel/workqueue.c:3393) [ 125.515127][ T1430] ? __pfx_worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3339) [ 125.531837][ T1430] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) [ 125.539864][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342) [ 125.550628][ T1430] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) [ 125.558840][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342) [ 125.558844][ T1430] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) [ 125.566487][ T1430] </TASK> [ 125.566488][ T1430] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtw89: cfo: check mac_id to avoid out-of-bounds Somehow, hardware reports incorrect mac_id and pollute memory. Check index before we access the array. UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rtw89/phy.c:2517:23 index 188 is out of range for type 's32 [64]' CPU: 1 PID: 51550 Comm: irq/35-rtw89_pc Tainted: G OE Call Trace: <IRQ> show_stack+0x52/0x58 dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x63 dump_stack+0x10/0x12 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 ? __alloc_skb+0x92/0x1d0 rtw89_phy_cfo_parse+0x44/0x7f [rtw89_core] rtw89_core_rx+0x261/0x871 [rtw89_core] ? __alloc_skb+0xee/0x1d0 rtw89_pci_napi_poll+0x3fa/0x4ea [rtw89_pci] __napi_poll+0x33/0x1a0 net_rx_action+0x126/0x260 ? __queue_work+0x217/0x4c0 __do_softirq+0xd9/0x315 ? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10 do_softirq.part.0+0x6d/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x62/0x70 rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0x182/0x1a6 [rtw89_pci] irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x60 irq_thread+0xc8/0x190 ? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60 kthread+0x16b/0x190 ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: avoid use-after-free in ip6_fragment() Blamed commit claimed rcu_read_lock() was held by ip6_fragment() callers. It seems to not be always true, at least for UDP stack. syzbot reported: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:245 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_fragment+0x2724/0x2770 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801d403e80 by task syz-executor.3/7618 CPU: 1 PID: 7618 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00012-g4312098baf37 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:245 [inline] ip6_fragment+0x2724/0x2770 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:193 [inline] ip6_finish_output+0x9a3/0x1170 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:206 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:291 [inline] ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:227 dst_output include/net/dst.h:445 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xb3/0x1a0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1966 udp_v6_send_skb+0x82a/0x18a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1286 udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x140/0x200 net/ipv6/udp.c:1313 udpv6_sendmsg+0x18da/0x2c80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1606 inet6_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:665 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734 sock_write_iter+0x295/0x3d0 net/socket.c:1108 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2191 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x9ed/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x1ec/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fde3588c0d9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fde365b6168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fde359ac050 RCX: 00007fde3588c0d9 RDX: 000000000000ffdc RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007fde358e7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fde35acfb1f R14: 00007fde365b6300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Allocated by task 7618: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:325 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x2b4/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:3422 dst_alloc+0x14a/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92 ip6_dst_alloc+0x32/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:344 ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:1369 [inline] rt6_make_pcpu_route net/ipv6/route.c:1417 [inline] ip6_pol_route+0x901/0x1190 net/ipv6/route.c:2254 pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:582 [inline] fib6_rule_lookup+0x52e/0x6f0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121 ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2e6/0x380 net/ipv6/route.c:2625 ip6_route_output_flags+0x76/0x320 net/ipv6/route.c:2638 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:98 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x5ab/0x1620 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1092 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x90/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1222 ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow+0x553/0x980 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1260 udpv6_sendmsg+0x151d/0x2c80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1554 inet6_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:665 sock_sendmsg_nosec n ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: emu10k1: Fix out of bounds access in snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc() The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc() accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around. This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64). The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur. This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels: aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40 index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]' CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7 Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 dump_stack+0x10/0x16 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: do not queue data on closed subflows Dipanjan reported a syzbot splat at close time: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 10818 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 inet_sock_destruct+0x6d0/0x8e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 Modules linked in: uio_ivshmem(OE) uio(E) CPU: 1 PID: 10818 Comm: kworker/1:16 Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-rc6-g2eae0556bb9d #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x6d0/0x8e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:153 Code: 21 02 00 00 41 8b 9c 24 28 02 00 00 e9 07 ff ff ff e8 34 4d 91 f9 89 ee 4c 89 e7 e8 4a 47 60 ff e9 a6 fc ff ff e8 20 4d 91 f9 <0f> 0b e9 84 fe ff ff e8 14 4d 91 f9 0f 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff e8 08 4d RSP: 0018:ffffc9001b35fa78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000002879d0 RCX: ffff8881326f3b00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8881326f3b00 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffff888179662674 R08: ffffffff87e983a0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 00000000000004ea R12: ffff888179662400 R13: ffff888179662428 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88817e38e258 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f5f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020007bc0 CR3: 0000000179592000 CR4: 0000000000150ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> __sk_destruct+0x4f/0x8e0 net/core/sock.c:2067 sk_destruct+0xbd/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:2112 __sk_free+0xef/0x3d0 net/core/sock.c:2123 sk_free+0x78/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2134 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1927 [inline] __mptcp_close_ssk+0x50f/0x780 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2351 __mptcp_destroy_sock+0x332/0x760 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2828 mptcp_worker+0x5d2/0xc90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2586 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x623/0x1070 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 </TASK> The root cause of the problem is that an mptcp-level (re)transmit can race with mptcp_close() and the packet scheduler checks the subflow state before acquiring the socket lock: we can try to (re)transmit on an already closed ssk. Fix the issue checking again the subflow socket status under the subflow socket lock protection. Additionally add the missing check for the fallback-to-tcp case.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Prevent buffer overflow crashes in debugfs with malformed user input Malformed user input to debugfs results in buffer overflow crashes. Adapt input string lengths to fit within internal buffers, leaving space for NULL terminators.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: clear optc underflow before turn off odm clock [Why] After ODM clock off, optc underflow bit will be kept there always and clear not work. We need to clear that before clock off. [How] Clear that if have when clock off.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macsec: fix UAF bug for real_dev Create a new macsec device but not get reference to real_dev. That can not ensure that real_dev is freed after macsec. That will trigger the UAF bug for real_dev as following: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662 Call Trace: ... macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662 dev_get_iflink+0x73/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:637 default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:42 [inline] rfc2863_policy+0x233/0x2d0 net/core/link_watch.c:54 linkwatch_do_dev+0x2a/0x150 net/core/link_watch.c:161 Allocated by task 22209: ... alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10549 rtnl_create_link+0x9d7/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3235 veth_newlink+0x20e/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1748 Freed by task 8: ... kfree+0xd6/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4552 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:615 device_release+0x9f/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2229 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:673 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:704 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x1c8/0x540 lib/kobject.c:721 netdev_run_todo+0x72e/0x10b0 net/core/dev.c:10327 After commit faab39f63c1f ("net: allow out-of-order netdev unregistration") and commit e5f80fcf869a ("ipv6: give an IPv6 dev to blackhole_netdev"), we can add dev_hold_track() in macsec_dev_init() and dev_put_track() in macsec_free_netdev() to fix the problem.