A use-after-free flaw was found in ndlc_remove in drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c in the Linux Kernel. This flaw could allow an attacker to crash the system due to a race problem.

A use-after-free flaw was found in xen_9pfs_front_removet in net/9p/trans_xen.c in Xen transport for 9pfs in the Linux Kernel. This flaw could allow a local attacker to crash the system due to a race problem, possibly leading to a kernel information leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: gadgetfs: Fix race between mounting and unmounting The syzbot fuzzer and Gerald Lee have identified a use-after-free bug in the gadgetfs driver, involving processes concurrently mounting and unmounting the gadgetfs filesystem. In particular, gadgetfs_fill_super() can race with gadgetfs_kill_sb(), causing the latter to deallocate the_device while the former is using it. The output from KASAN says, in part: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:102 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880276d7840 by task syz-executor126/18689 CPU: 0 PID: 18689 Comm: syz-executor126 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> ... atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332 vfs_get_super fs/super.c:1190 [inline] get_tree_single+0xd0/0x160 fs/super.c:1207 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1531 vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:232 [inline] The simplest solution is to ensure that gadgetfs_fill_super() and gadgetfs_kill_sb() are serialized by making them both acquire a new mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: fix SRCU protection of nvme_ns_head list Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths(). Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu. Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees. Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove(). Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel (it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition). Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx; computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk). Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL. The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic). [37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 [37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064 [37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0 [37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X --------- - - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1 [37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018 [37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core] [37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core] [37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3 [37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000 [37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800 [37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff [37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000 [37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000 [37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37315.645111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [37315.799267] Call Trace: [37315.828515] nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core] [37315.892075] nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core] [37315.961871] ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90 [37316.015021] nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core] [37316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [37316.212024] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.258939] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [37316.297557] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [37316.347590] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ex ---truncated---

A use-after-free flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Memory Management subsystem when a user wins two races at the same time with a fail in the mas_prev_slot function. This issue could allow a local user to crash the system.

A vulnerability was found in Linux kernel, where a use-after-frees in nouveau's postclose() handler could happen if removing device (that is not common to remove video card physically without power-off, but same happens if "unbind" the driver).

A use-after-free flaw was found in qdisc_graft in net/sched/sch_api.c in the Linux Kernel due to a race problem. This flaw leads to a denial of service issue. If patch ebda44da44f6 ("net: sched: fix race condition in qdisc_graft()") not applied yet, then kernel could be affected.

A flaw was found in the MCTP protocol in the Linux kernel. The function mctp_unregister() reclaims the device's relevant resource when a netcard detaches. However, a running routine may be unaware of this and cause the use-after-free of the mdev->addrs object, potentially leading to a denial of service.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 5.9.1, as used with Xen through 4.14.x. drivers/xen/events/events_base.c allows event-channel removal during the event-handling loop (a race condition). This can cause a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference, as demonstrated by a dom0 crash via events for an in-reconfiguration paravirtualized device, aka CID-073d0552ead5.

A NULL pointer dereference flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s Amateur Radio AX.25 protocol functionality in the way a user connects with the protocol. This flaw allows a local user to crash the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between transaction aborts and fsyncs leading to use-after-free There is a race between a task aborting a transaction during a commit, a task doing an fsync and the transaction kthread, which leads to an use-after-free of the log root tree. When this happens, it results in a stack trace like the following: BTRFS info (device dm-0): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1958: errno=-5 IO failure BTRFS warning (device dm-0): lost page write due to IO error on /dev/mapper/error-test (-5) BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0xa4e8 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS error (device dm-0): error writing primary super block to device 1 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e000 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e008 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS warning (device dm-0): direct IO failed ino 261 rw 0,0 sector 0x12e010 len 4096 err no 10 BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in write_all_supers:4110: errno=-5 IO failure (1 errors while writing supers) BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in btrfs_sync_log:3308: errno=-5 IO failure general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 2 PID: 2458471 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-btrfs-next-84 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x139/0xa40 Code: c0 74 19 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9f18830d7b00 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: ffffffffb9c54d13 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff9f18830d7bc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9f18830d7be0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8c6cd199c040 R13: ffff8c6c95821358 R14: 00000000fffffffb R15: ffff8c6cbcf01358 FS: 00007fa9140c2b80(0000) GS:ffff8c6fac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa913d52000 CR3: 000000013d2b4003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? __btrfs_handle_fs_error+0xde/0x146 [btrfs] ? btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs] ? btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_log+0x7c1/0xf20 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x40c/0x580 [btrfs] do_fsync+0x38/0x70 __x64_sys_fsync+0x10/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fa9142a55c3 Code: 8b 15 09 (...) RSP: 002b:00007fff26278d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563c83cb4560 RCX: 00007fa9142a55c3 RDX: 00007fff26278cb0 RSI: 00007fff26278cb0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff26278d5c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000340 R13: 00007fff26278de0 R14: 00007fff26278d96 R15: 0000563c83ca57c0 Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) ---[ end trace ee2f1b19327d791d ]--- The steps that lead to this crash are the following: 1) We are at transaction N; 2) We have two tasks with a transaction handle attached to transaction N. Task A and Task B. Task B is doing an fsync; 3) Task B is at btrfs_sync_log(), and has saved fs_info->log_root_tree into a local variable named 'log_root_tree' at the top of btrfs_sync_log(). Task B is about to call write_all_supers(), but before that... 4) Task A calls btrfs_commit_transaction(), and after it sets the transaction state to TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START, an error happens before it w ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: Fix GEM handle creation UAF Userspace can guess the handle value and try to race GEM object creation with handle close, resulting in a use-after-free if we dereference the object after dropping the handle's reference. For that reason, dropping the handle's reference must be done *after* we are done dereferencing the object.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 6.2.9. A use-after-free was found in bq24190_remove in drivers/power/supply/bq24190_charger.c. It could allow a local attacker to crash the system due to a race condition.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a use-after-free in atalk_proc_exit, related to net/appletalk/atalk_proc.c, net/appletalk/ddp.c, and net/appletalk/sysctl_net_atalk.c.

roccat_report_event in drivers/hid/hid-roccat.c in the Linux kernel through 5.19.12 has a race condition and resultant use-after-free in certain situations where a report is received while copying a report->value is in progress.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED When eventfs was introduced, special care had to be done to coordinate the freeing of the file meta data with the files that are exposed to user space. The file meta data would have a ref count that is set when the file is created and would be decremented and freed after the last user that opened the file closed it. When the file meta data was to be freed, it would set a flag (EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) to denote that the file is freed, and any new references made (like new opens or reads) would fail as it is marked freed. This allowed other meta data to be freed after this flag was set (under the event_mutex). All the files that were dynamically created in the events directory had a pointer to the file meta data and would call event_release() when the last reference to the user space file was closed. This would be the time that it is safe to free the file meta data. A shortcut was made for the "format" file. It's i_private would point to the "call" entry directly and not point to the file's meta data. This is because all format files are the same for the same "call", so it was thought there was no reason to differentiate them. The other files maintain state (like the "enable", "trigger", etc). But this meant if the file were to disappear, the "format" file would be unaware of it. This caused a race that could be trigger via the user_events test (that would create dynamic events and free them), and running a loop that would read the user_events format files: In one console run: # cd tools/testing/selftests/user_events # while true; do ./ftrace_test; done And in another console run: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/ # while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null With KASAN memory checking, it would trigger a use-after-free bug report (which was a real bug). This was because the format file was not checking the file's meta data flag "EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED", so it would access the event that the file meta data pointed to after the event was freed. After inspection, there are other locations that were found to not check the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag when accessing the trace_event_file. Add a new helper function: event_file_file() that will make sure that the event_mutex is held, and will return NULL if the trace_event_file has the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag set. Have the first reference of the struct file pointer use event_file_file() and check for NULL. Later uses can still use the event_file_data() helper function if the event_mutex is still held and was not released since the event_file_file() call.

Race condition in the tty_fasync function in drivers/char/tty_io.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.32.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors, related to the put_tty_queue and __f_setown functions. NOTE: the vulnerability was addressed in a different way in 2.6.32.9.

A data race flaw was found in the Linux kernel, between where con is allocated and con->sock is set. This issue leads to a NULL pointer dereference when accessing con->sock->sk in net/tipc/topsrv.c in the tipc protocol in the Linux kernel.

A race problem was found in fs/proc/task_mmu.c in the memory management sub-component in the Linux kernel. This issue may allow a local attacker with user privilege to cause a denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: fix performance regression in swap operation The patch "netfilter: ipset: fix race condition between swap/destroy and kernel side add/del/test", commit 28628fa9 fixes a race condition. But the synchronize_rcu() added to the swap function unnecessarily slows it down: it can safely be moved to destroy and use call_rcu() instead. Eric Dumazet pointed out that simply calling the destroy functions as rcu callback does not work: sets with timeout use garbage collectors which need cancelling at destroy which can wait. Therefore the destroy functions are split into two: cancelling garbage collectors safely at executing the command received by netlink and moving the remaining part only into the rcu callback.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: receive: annotate data-race around receiving_counter.counter Syzkaller with KCSAN identified a data-race issue when accessing keypair->receiving_counter.counter. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations to mark the data race as intentional. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_decrypt_worker / wg_packet_rx_poll write to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: counter_validate drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:321 [inline] wg_packet_rx_poll+0x3ac/0xf00 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:461 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6536 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6605 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6738 __do_softirq+0xc4/0x279 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x5e/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:381 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x36/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x6c5/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:499 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] ... read to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by task 3196 on cpu 1: decrypt_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:252 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x220/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:501 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: switchdev: Skip MDB replays of deferred events on offload Before this change, generation of the list of MDB events to replay would race against the creation of new group memberships, either from the IGMP/MLD snooping logic or from user configuration. While new memberships are immediately visible to walkers of br->mdb_list, the notification of their existence to switchdev event subscribers is deferred until a later point in time. So if a replay list was generated during a time that overlapped with such a window, it would also contain a replay of the not-yet-delivered event. The driver would thus receive two copies of what the bridge internally considered to be one single event. On destruction of the bridge, only a single membership deletion event was therefore sent. As a consequence of this, drivers which reference count memberships (at least DSA), would be left with orphan groups in their hardware database when the bridge was destroyed. This is only an issue when replaying additions. While deletion events may still be pending on the deferred queue, they will already have been removed from br->mdb_list, so no duplicates can be generated in that scenario. To a user this meant that old group memberships, from a bridge in which a port was previously attached, could be reanimated (in hardware) when the port joined a new bridge, without the new bridge's knowledge. For example, on an mv88e6xxx system, create a snooping bridge and immediately add a port to it: root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link add dev br0 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 && \ > ip link set dev x3 up master br0 And then destroy the bridge: root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link del dev br0 root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ mvls atu ADDRESS FID STATE Q F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a DEV:0 Marvell 88E6393X 33:33:00:00:00:6a 1 static - - 0 . . . . . . . . . . 33:33:ff:87:e4:3f 1 static - - 0 . . . . . . . . . . ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 1 static - - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ The two IPv6 groups remain in the hardware database because the port (x3) is notified of the host's membership twice: once via the original event and once via a replay. Since only a single delete notification is sent, the count remains at 1 when the bridge is destroyed. Then add the same port (or another port belonging to the same hardware domain) to a new bridge, this time with snooping disabled: root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link add dev br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 0 && \ > ip link set dev x3 up master br1 All multicast, including the two IPv6 groups from br0, should now be flooded, according to the policy of br1. But instead the old memberships are still active in the hardware database, causing the switch to only forward traffic to those groups towards the CPU (port 0). Eliminate the race in two steps: 1. Grab the write-side lock of the MDB while generating the replay list. This prevents new memberships from showing up while we are generating the replay list. But it leaves the scenario in which a deferred event was already generated, but not delivered, before we grabbed the lock. Therefore: 2. Make sure that no deferred version of a replay event is already enqueued to the switchdev deferred queue, before adding it to the replay list, when replaying additions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: quota: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference Below race may cause NULL pointer dereference P1 P2 dquot_free_inode quota_off drop_dquot_ref remove_dquot_ref dquots = i_dquot(inode) dquots = i_dquot(inode) srcu_read_lock dquots[cnt]) != NULL (1) dquots[type] = NULL (2) spin_lock(&dquots[cnt]->dq_dqb_lock) (3) .... If dquot_free_inode(or other routines) checks inode's quota pointers (1) before quota_off sets it to NULL(2) and use it (3) after that, NULL pointer dereference will be triggered. So let's fix it by using a temporary pointer to avoid this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pds_core: Prevent race issues involving the adminq There are multiple paths that can result in using the pdsc's adminq. [1] pdsc_adminq_isr and the resulting work from queue_work(), i.e. pdsc_work_thread()->pdsc_process_adminq() [2] pdsc_adminq_post() When the device goes through reset via PCIe reset and/or a fw_down/fw_up cycle due to bad PCIe state or bad device state the adminq is destroyed and recreated. A NULL pointer dereference can happen if [1] or [2] happens after the adminq is already destroyed. In order to fix this, add some further state checks and implement reference counting for adminq uses. Reference counting was used because multiple threads can attempt to access the adminq at the same time via [1] or [2]. Additionally, multiple clients (i.e. pds-vfio-pci) can be using [2] at the same time. The adminq_refcnt is initialized to 1 when the adminq has been allocated and is ready to use. Users/clients of the adminq (i.e. [1] and [2]) will increment the refcnt when they are using the adminq. When the driver goes into a fw_down cycle it will set the PDSC_S_FW_DEAD bit and then wait for the adminq_refcnt to hit 1. Setting the PDSC_S_FW_DEAD before waiting will prevent any further adminq_refcnt increments. Waiting for the adminq_refcnt to hit 1 allows for any current users of the adminq to finish before the driver frees the adminq. Once the adminq_refcnt hits 1 the driver clears the refcnt to signify that the adminq is deleted and cannot be used. On the fw_up cycle the driver will once again initialize the adminq_refcnt to 1 allowing the adminq to be used again.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hv_netvsc: Fix race condition between netvsc_probe and netvsc_remove In commit ac5047671758 ("hv_netvsc: Disable NAPI before closing the VMBus channel"), napi_disable was getting called for all channels, including all subchannels without confirming if they are enabled or not. This caused hv_netvsc getting hung at napi_disable, when netvsc_probe() has finished running but nvdev->subchan_work has not started yet. netvsc_subchan_work() -> rndis_set_subchannel() has not created the sub-channels and because of that netvsc_sc_open() is not running. netvsc_remove() calls cancel_work_sync(&nvdev->subchan_work), for which netvsc_subchan_work did not run. netif_napi_add() sets the bit NAPI_STATE_SCHED because it ensures NAPI cannot be scheduled. Then netvsc_sc_open() -> napi_enable will clear the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit, so it can be scheduled. napi_disable() does the opposite. Now during netvsc_device_remove(), when napi_disable is called for those subchannels, napi_disable gets stuck on infinite msleep. This fix addresses this problem by ensuring that napi_disable() is not getting called for non-enabled NAPI struct. But netif_napi_del() is still necessary for these non-enabled NAPI struct for cleanup purpose. Call trace: [ 654.559417] task:modprobe state:D stack: 0 pid: 2321 ppid: 1091 flags:0x00004002 [ 654.568030] Call Trace: [ 654.571221] <TASK> [ 654.573790] __schedule+0x2d6/0x960 [ 654.577733] schedule+0x69/0xf0 [ 654.581214] schedule_timeout+0x87/0x140 [ 654.585463] ? __bpf_trace_tick_stop+0x20/0x20 [ 654.590291] msleep+0x2d/0x40 [ 654.593625] napi_disable+0x2b/0x80 [ 654.597437] netvsc_device_remove+0x8a/0x1f0 [hv_netvsc] [ 654.603935] rndis_filter_device_remove+0x194/0x1c0 [hv_netvsc] [ 654.611101] ? do_wait_intr+0xb0/0xb0 [ 654.615753] netvsc_remove+0x7c/0x120 [hv_netvsc] [ 654.621675] vmbus_remove+0x27/0x40 [hv_vmbus]

A deadlock flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s BPF subsystem. This flaw allows a local user to potentially crash the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to truncate meta inode pages forcely Below race case can cause data corruption: Thread A GC thread - gc_data_segment - ra_data_block - locked meta_inode page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - invalidate_mapping_pages : fail to invalidate meta_inode page due to lock failure or dirty|writeback status - f2fs_submit_page_bio : write last dirty data to old blkaddr - move_data_block - load old data from meta_inode page - f2fs_submit_page_write : write old data to new blkaddr Because invalidate_mapping_pages() will skip invalidating page which has unclear status including locked, dirty, writeback and so on, so we need to use truncate_inode_pages_range() instead of invalidate_mapping_pages() to make sure meta_inode page will be dropped.

The inode double locking code in fs/ocfs2/file.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.30 before 2.6.30-rc3, 2.6.27 before 2.6.27.24, 2.6.29 before 2.6.29.4, and possibly other versions down to 2.6.19 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation and removal) via a series of splice system calls that trigger a deadlock between the generic_file_splice_write, splice_from_pipe, and ocfs2_file_splice_write functions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix race between async notify and socket close The submitting thread (one which called recvmsg/sendmsg) may exit as soon as the async crypto handler calls complete() so any code past that point risks touching already freed data. Try to avoid the locking and extra flags altogether. Have the main thread hold an extra reference, this way we can depend solely on the atomic ref counter for synchronization. Don't futz with reiniting the completion, either, we are now tightly controlling when completion fires.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp/dccp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept. While reading sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading icmp sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_early_retrans. While reading sysctl_tcp_early_retrans, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix race condition between ext4_write and ext4_convert_inline_data Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:805: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free clusters kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 25371 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:ext4_put_nojournal fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53 [inline] RIP: 0010:__ext4_journal_stop+0x10e/0x110 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:116 [...] Call Trace: ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x59a/0x730 fs/ext4/inline.c:795 generic_perform_write+0x279/0x3c0 mm/filemap.c:3344 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2e3/0x3d0 fs/ext4/file.c:270 ext4_file_write_iter+0x30a/0x11c0 fs/ext4/file.c:520 do_iter_readv_writev+0x339/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:732 do_iter_write+0x107/0x430 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:934 [inline] do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x380 fs/read_write.c:1031 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: cpu1 cpu2 __________________________|__________________________ do_pwritev vfs_writev do_iter_write ext4_file_write_iter ext4_buffered_write_iter generic_perform_write ext4_da_write_begin vfs_fallocate ext4_fallocate ext4_convert_inline_data ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_map_blocks ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_good_group_nolock ext4_mb_init_group ext4_mb_init_cache ext4_mb_generate_buddy --> error ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_restore_inline_data set EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_block_write_begin ext4_da_write_end ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_write_inline_data_end handle=NULL ext4_journal_stop(handle) __ext4_journal_stop ext4_put_nojournal(handle) ref_cnt = (unsigned long)handle BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0) ---> BUG_ON The lock held by ext4_convert_inline_data is xattr_sem, but the lock held by generic_perform_write is i_rwsem. Therefore, the two locks can be concurrent. To solve above issue, we add inode_lock() for ext4_convert_inline_data(). At the same time, move ext4_convert_inline_data() in front of ext4_punch_hole(), remove similar handling from ext4_punch_hole().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh. While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority. While reading sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: Fix data-races around nexthop_compat_mode. While reading nexthop_compat_mode, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold. While reading sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout. While reading sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat. While reading sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data-races in proc_dou8vec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dou8vec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dou8vec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_max_reordering. While reading sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: raw: Fix a data-race around sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr. While reading sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback. While reading sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields. While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_recovery. While reading sysctl_tcp_recovery, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.