A race condition was found in the Linux kernel's sound/hda device driver in snd_hdac_regmap_sync() function. This can result in a null pointer dereference issue, possibly leading to a kernel panic or denial of service issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filelock: Fix fcntl/close race recovery compat path When I wrote commit 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected"), I missed that there are two copies of the code I was patching: The normal version, and the version for 64-bit offsets on 32-bit kernels. Thanks to Greg KH for stumbling over this while doing the stable backport... Apply exactly the same fix to the compat path for 32-bit kernels.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Fix a data race on last_boosted_vcpu in kvm_vcpu_on_spin() Use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to access kvm->last_boosted_vcpu to ensure the loads and stores are atomic. In the extremely unlikely scenario the compiler tears the stores, it's theoretically possible for KVM to attempt to get a vCPU using an out-of-bounds index, e.g. if the write is split into multiple 8-bit stores, and is paired with a 32-bit load on a VM with 257 vCPUs: CPU0 CPU1 last_boosted_vcpu = 0xff; (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x100) last_boosted_vcpu[15:8] = 0x01; i = (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x1ff) last_boosted_vcpu[7:0] = 0x00; vcpu = kvm->vcpu_array[0x1ff]; As detected by KCSAN: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] / kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] write to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4340 on cpu 16: kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4112) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:? arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) read to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4342 on cpu 4: kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4069) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:? arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) value changed: 0x00000012 -> 0x00000000

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10: net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822) <snip> read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2: netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393) netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?) <snip> value changed: 0x0000000a -> 0xffffffff This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi->poll_owner non atomically. The ->poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding the lock. Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: fix oops during rmmod "rmmod bonding" causes an oops ever since commit cc317ea3d927 ("bonding: remove redundant NULL check in debugfs function"). Here are the relevant functions being called: bonding_exit() bond_destroy_debugfs() debugfs_remove_recursive(bonding_debug_root); bonding_debug_root = NULL; <--------- SET TO NULL HERE bond_netlink_fini() rtnl_link_unregister() __rtnl_link_unregister() unregister_netdevice_many_notify() bond_uninit() bond_debug_unregister() (commit removed check for bonding_debug_root == NULL) debugfs_remove() simple_recursive_removal() down_write() -> OOPS However, reverting the bad commit does not solve the problem completely because the original code contains a race that could cause the same oops, although it was much less likely to be triggered unintentionally: CPU1 rmmod bonding bonding_exit() bond_destroy_debugfs() debugfs_remove_recursive(bonding_debug_root); CPU2 echo -bond0 > /sys/class/net/bonding_masters bond_uninit() bond_debug_unregister() if (!bonding_debug_root) CPU1 bonding_debug_root = NULL; So do NOT revert the bad commit (since the removed checks were racy anyway), and instead change the order of actions taken during module removal. The same oops can also happen if there is an error during module init, so apply the same fix there.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "xsk: Support redirect to any socket bound to the same umem" This reverts commit 2863d665ea41282379f108e4da6c8a2366ba66db. This patch introduced a potential kernel crash when multiple napi instances redirect to the same AF_XDP socket. By removing the queue_index check, it is possible for multiple napi instances to access the Rx ring at the same time, which will result in a corrupted ring state which can lead to a crash when flushing the rings in __xsk_flush(). This can happen when the linked list of sockets to flush gets corrupted by concurrent accesses. A quick and small fix is not possible, so let us revert this for now.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However, sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL. This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map, while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it. That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701 Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840 R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870 FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline] __x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070 Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If, then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel psock->work. As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is less convoluted. After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE anymore.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix crash on racing fsync and size-extending write into prealloc We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix uninit-value access in __ip_make_skb() KMSAN reported uninit-value access in __ip_make_skb() [1]. __ip_make_skb() tests HDRINCL to know if the skb has icmphdr. However, HDRINCL can cause a race condition. If calling setsockopt(2) with IP_HDRINCL changes HDRINCL while __ip_make_skb() is running, the function will access icmphdr in the skb even if it is not included. This causes the issue reported by KMSAN. Check FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH on fl4->flowi4_flags instead of testing HDRINCL on the socket. Also, fl4->fl4_icmp_type and fl4->fl4_icmp_code are not initialized. These are union in struct flowi4 and are implicitly initialized by flowi4_init_output(), but we should not rely on specific union layout. Initialize these explicitly in raw_sendmsg(). [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 ip_finish_skb include/net/ip.h:243 [inline] ip_push_pending_frames+0x4c/0x5c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1508 raw_sendmsg+0x2381/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:654 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5f6/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35a/0x7c0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] __ip_append_data+0x49ab/0x68c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1128 ip_append_data+0x1e7/0x260 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1365 raw_sendmsg+0x22b1/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:648 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 1 PID: 15709 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.8.0-11567-gb3603fcb79b1 #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Disable idle reallow as part of command/gpint execution [Why] Workaroud for a race condition where DMCUB is in the process of committing to IPS1 during the handshake causing us to miss the transition into IPS2 and touch the INBOX1 RPTR causing a HW hang. [How] Disable the reallow to ensure that we have enough of a gap between entry and exit and we're not seeing back-to-back wake_and_executes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eeprom: at24: fix memory corruption race condition If the eeprom is not accessible, an nvmem device will be registered, the read will fail, and the device will be torn down. If another driver accesses the nvmem device after the teardown, it will reference invalid memory. Move the failure point before registering the nvmem device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition The cros_ec_uart_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before it calls serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This can trigger a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... ? ttyport_receive_buf A simplified version of crashing code is as follows: static inline size_t serdev_controller_receive_buf(struct serdev_controller *ctrl, const u8 *data, size_t count) { struct serdev_device *serdev = ctrl->serdev; if (!serdev || !serdev->ops->receive_buf) // CRASH! return 0; return serdev->ops->receive_buf(serdev, data, count); } It assumes that if SERPORT_ACTIVE is set and serdev exists, serdev->ops will also exist. This conflicts with the existing cros_ec_uart_probe() logic, as it first calls devm_serdev_device_open() (which sets SERPORT_ACTIVE), and only later sets serdev->ops via serdev_device_set_client_ops(). Commit 01f95d42b8f4 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: fix race condition") attempted to fix a similar race condition, but while doing so, made the window of error for this race condition to happen much wider. Attempt to fix the race condition again, making sure we fully setup before calling devm_serdev_device_open().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/PM: Drain runtime-idle callbacks before driver removal A race condition between the .runtime_idle() callback and the .remove() callback in the rtsx_pcr PCI driver leads to a kernel crash due to an unhandled page fault [1]. The problem is that rtsx_pci_runtime_idle() is not expected to be running after pm_runtime_get_sync() has been called, but the latter doesn't really guarantee that. It only guarantees that the suspend and resume callbacks will not be running when it returns. However, if a .runtime_idle() callback is already running when pm_runtime_get_sync() is called, the latter will notice that the runtime PM status of the device is RPM_ACTIVE and it will return right away without waiting for the former to complete. In fact, it cannot wait for .runtime_idle() to complete because it may be called from that callback (it arguably does not make much sense to do that, but it is not strictly prohibited). Thus in general, whoever is providing a .runtime_idle() callback needs to protect it from running in parallel with whatever code runs after pm_runtime_get_sync(). [Note that .runtime_idle() will not start after pm_runtime_get_sync() has returned, but it may continue running then if it has started earlier.] One way to address that race condition is to call pm_runtime_barrier() after pm_runtime_get_sync() (not before it, because a nonzero value of the runtime PM usage counter is necessary to prevent runtime PM callbacks from being invoked) to wait for the .runtime_idle() callback to complete should it be running at that point. A suitable place for doing that is in pci_device_remove() which calls pm_runtime_get_sync() before removing the driver, so it may as well call pm_runtime_barrier() subsequently, which will prevent the race in question from occurring, not just in the rtsx_pcr driver, but in any PCI drivers providing .runtime_idle() callbacks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Always drain health in shutdown callback There is no point in recovery during device shutdown. if health work started need to wait for it to avoid races and NULL pointer access. Hence, drain health WQ on shutdown callback.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix data-races around user->unix_inflight. user->unix_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but too_many_unix_fds() reads it locklessly. Let's annotate the write/read accesses to user->unix_inflight. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_attach_fds / unix_inflight write to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44798 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x157/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:66 unix_attach_fds+0x147/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 read to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44814 on cpu 0: too_many_unix_fds net/unix/scm.c:101 [inline] unix_attach_fds+0x54/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:110 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 value changed: 0x000000000000000c -> 0x000000000000000d Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 44814 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

An issue was discovered in drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c in the Linux kernel 6.2. In hci_uart_tty_ioctl, there is a race condition between HCIUARTSETPROTO and HCIUARTGETPROTO. HCI_UART_PROTO_SET is set before hu->proto is set. A NULL pointer dereference may occur.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix a race between readers and resize checks The reader code in rb_get_reader_page() swaps a new reader page into the ring buffer by doing cmpxchg on old->list.prev->next to point it to the new page. Following that, if the operation is successful, old->list.next->prev gets updated too. This means the underlying doubly-linked list is temporarily inconsistent, page->prev->next or page->next->prev might not be equal back to page for some page in the ring buffer. The resize operation in ring_buffer_resize() can be invoked in parallel. It calls rb_check_pages() which can detect the described inconsistency and stop further tracing: [ 190.271762] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 190.271771] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6186 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1467 rb_check_pages.isra.0+0x6a/0xa0 [ 190.271789] Modules linked in: [...] [ 190.271991] Unloaded tainted modules: intel_uncore_frequency(E):1 skx_edac(E):1 [ 190.272002] CPU: 1 PID: 6186 Comm: cmd.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.9.0-rc6-default #5 158d3e1e6d0b091c34c3b96bfd99a1c58306d79f [ 190.272011] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552c-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 190.272015] RIP: 0010:rb_check_pages.isra.0+0x6a/0xa0 [ 190.272023] Code: [...] [ 190.272028] RSP: 0018:ffff9c37463abb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 190.272034] RAX: ffff8eba04b6cb80 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: ffff8eba01f13d80 [ 190.272038] RDX: ffff8eba01f130c0 RSI: ffff8eba04b6cd00 RDI: ffff8eba0004c700 [ 190.272042] RBP: ffff8eba0004c700 R08: 0000000000010002 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272045] R10: 00000000ffff7f52 R11: ffff8eba7f600000 R12: ffff8eba0004c720 [ 190.272049] R13: ffff8eba00223a00 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffff8eba067a8000 [ 190.272053] FS: 00007f1bd64752c0(0000) GS:ffff8eba7f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 190.272057] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 190.272061] CR2: 00007f1bd6662590 CR3: 000000010291e001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 190.272070] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272073] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 190.272077] Call Trace: [ 190.272098] <TASK> [ 190.272189] ring_buffer_resize+0x2ab/0x460 [ 190.272199] __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x23/0xa0 [ 190.272206] tracing_resize_ring_buffer+0x65/0x90 [ 190.272216] tracing_entries_write+0x74/0xc0 [ 190.272225] vfs_write+0xf5/0x420 [ 190.272248] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 190.272256] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170 [ 190.272363] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 190.272373] RIP: 0033:0x7f1bd657d263 [ 190.272381] Code: [...] [ 190.272385] RSP: 002b:00007ffe72b643f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 190.272391] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f1bd657d263 [ 190.272395] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000555a6eb538e0 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 190.272398] RBP: 0000555a6eb538e0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000000 [ 190.272401] R10: 0000555a6eb55190 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1bd6662500 [ 190.272404] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007f1bd6667c00 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 190.272412] </TASK> [ 190.272414] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Note that ring_buffer_resize() calls rb_check_pages() only if the parent trace_buffer has recording disabled. Recent commit d78ab792705c ("tracing: Stop current tracer when resizing buffer") causes that it is now always the case which makes it more likely to experience this issue. The window to hit this race is nonetheless very small. To help reproducing it, one can add a delay loop in rb_get_reader_page(): ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page); if (!ret) goto spin; for (unsigned i = 0; i < 1U << 26; i++) /* inserted delay loop */ __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory"); rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list; .. ---truncated---

An issue was discovered in do_madvise in mm/madvise.c in the Linux kernel before 5.6.8. There is a race condition between coredump operations and the IORING_OP_MADVISE implementation, aka CID-bc0c4d1e176e.

A flaw was found in the subsequent get_user_pages_fast in the Linux kernel’s interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms in the skcipher_recvmsg of crypto/algif_skcipher.c function. This flaw allows a local user to crash the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix data races in unix_release_sock/unix_stream_sendmsg A data-race condition has been identified in af_unix. In one data path, the write function unix_release_sock() atomically writes to sk->sk_shutdown using WRITE_ONCE. However, on the reader side, unix_stream_sendmsg() does not read it atomically. Consequently, this issue is causing the following KCSAN splat to occur: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_release_sock / unix_stream_sendmsg write (marked) to 0xffff88867256ddbb of 1 bytes by task 7270 on cpu 28: unix_release_sock (net/unix/af_unix.c:640) unix_release (net/unix/af_unix.c:1050) sock_close (net/socket.c:659 net/socket.c:1421) __fput (fs/file_table.c:422) __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:508) __se_sys_close (fs/open.c:1559 fs/open.c:1541) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1541) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) read to 0xffff88867256ddbb of 1 bytes by task 989 on cpu 14: unix_stream_sendmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:2273) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:745) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2584) __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2638 net/socket.c:2724) __x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2753 net/socket.c:2750 net/socket.c:2750) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) value changed: 0x01 -> 0x03 The line numbers are related to commit dd5a440a31fa ("Linux 6.9-rc7"). Commit e1d09c2c2f57 ("af_unix: Fix data races around sk->sk_shutdown.") addressed a comparable issue in the past regarding sk->sk_shutdown. However, it overlooked resolving this particular data path. This patch only offending unix_stream_sendmsg() function, since the other reads seem to be protected by unix_state_lock() as discussed in

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race in read_extent_buffer_pages() There are reports from tree-checker that detects corrupted nodes, without any obvious pattern so possibly an overwrite in memory. After some debugging it turns out there's a race when reading an extent buffer the uptodate status can be missed. To prevent concurrent reads for the same extent buffer, read_extent_buffer_pages() performs these checks: /* (1) */ if (test_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE, &eb->bflags)) return 0; /* (2) */ if (test_and_set_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_READING, &eb->bflags)) goto done; At this point, it seems safe to start the actual read operation. Once that completes, end_bbio_meta_read() does /* (3) */ set_extent_buffer_uptodate(eb); /* (4) */ clear_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_READING, &eb->bflags); Normally, this is enough to ensure only one read happens, and all other callers wait for it to finish before returning. Unfortunately, there is a racey interleaving: Thread A | Thread B | Thread C ---------+----------+--------- (1) | | | (1) | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | | (2) | | | (1) When this happens, thread B kicks of an unnecessary read. Worse, thread C will see UPTODATE set and return immediately, while the read from thread B is still in progress. This race could result in tree-checker errors like this as the extent buffer is concurrently modified: BTRFS critical (device dm-0): corrupted node, root=256 block=8550954455682405139 owner mismatch, have 11858205567642294356 expect [256, 18446744073709551360] Fix it by testing UPTODATE again after setting the READING bit, and if it's been set, skip the unnecessary read. [ minor update of changelog ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data-races in proc_dou8vec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dou8vec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dou8vec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

A race problem was found in fs/proc/task_mmu.c in the memory management sub-component in the Linux kernel. This issue may allow a local attacker with user privilege to cause a denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/timerlat: Fix a race during cpuhp processing There is another found exception that the "timerlat/1" thread was scheduled on CPU0, and lead to timer corruption finally: ``` ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888237c2e108 object type: hrtimer hint: timerlat_irq+0x0/0x220 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 426 at lib/debugobjects.c:518 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 426 Comm: timerlat/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #45 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7c/0x110 ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1d0 ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20 ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? __pfx_timerlat_irq+0x10/0x10 __debug_object_init+0x110/0x150 hrtimer_init+0x1d/0x60 timerlat_main+0xab/0x2d0 ? __pfx_timerlat_main+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xb7/0xe0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ``` After tracing the scheduling event, it was discovered that the migration of the "timerlat/1" thread was performed during thread creation. Further analysis confirmed that it is because the CPU online processing for osnoise is implemented through workers, which is asynchronous with the offline processing. When the worker was scheduled to create a thread, the CPU may has already been removed from the cpu_online_mask during the offline process, resulting in the inability to select the right CPU: T1 | T2 [CPUHP_ONLINE] | cpu_device_down() osnoise_hotplug_workfn() | | cpus_write_lock() | takedown_cpu(1) | cpus_write_unlock() [CPUHP_OFFLINE] | cpus_read_lock() | start_kthread(1) | cpus_read_unlock() | To fix this, skip online processing if the CPU is already offline.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: dlm: fix race in lowcomms This patch fixes a race between queue_work() in _dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() and srcu_read_unlock(). The queue_work() can take the final reference of a dlm_msg and so msg->idx can contain garbage which is signaled by the following warning: [ 676.237050] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 676.237052] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1060 at include/linux/srcu.h:189 dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50 [ 676.238945] Modules linked in: dlm_locktorture torture rpcsec_gss_krb5 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support qxl kvm_intel drm_ttm_helper vmw_vsock_virtio_transport kvm vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common ttm irqbypass crc32_pclmul joydev crc32c_intel serio_raw drm_kms_helper vsock virtio_scsi virtio_console virtio_balloon snd_pcm drm syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt snd_timer fb_sys_fops i2c_i801 lpc_ich snd i2c_smbus soundcore pcspkr [ 676.244227] CPU: 0 PID: 1060 Comm: lock_torture_wr Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3+ #1546 [ 676.245216] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-2.module+el8.7.0+15506+033991b0 04/01/2014 [ 676.246460] RIP: 0010:dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg+0x41/0x50 [ 676.247132] Code: fe ff ff ff 75 24 48 c7 c6 bd 0f 49 bb 48 c7 c7 38 7c 01 bd e8 00 e7 ca ff 89 de 48 c7 c7 60 78 01 bd e8 42 3d cd ff 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b eb d8 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 [ 676.249253] RSP: 0018:ffffa401c18ffc68 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 676.249855] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000ffff8b76 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 676.250713] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffbccf3a10 RDI: ffffffffbcc7b62e [ 676.251610] RBP: ffffa401c18ffc70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 676.252481] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005 [ 676.253421] R13: ffff8b76786ec370 R14: ffff8b76786ec370 R15: ffff8b76786ec480 [ 676.254257] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8b7777800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 676.255239] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 676.255897] CR2: 00005590205d88b8 CR3: 000000017656c003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 676.256734] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 676.257567] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 676.258397] PKRU: 55555554 [ 676.258729] Call Trace: [ 676.259063] <TASK> [ 676.259354] dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0xcc/0x110 [ 676.259964] queue_bast+0x8b/0xb0 [ 676.260423] grant_pending_locks+0x166/0x1b0 [ 676.261007] _unlock_lock+0x75/0x90 [ 676.261469] unlock_lock.isra.57+0x62/0xa0 [ 676.262009] dlm_unlock+0x21e/0x330 [ 676.262457] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture] [ 676.263183] torture_unlock+0x5a/0x90 [dlm_locktorture] [ 676.263815] ? preempt_count_sub+0xba/0x100 [ 676.264361] ? complete+0x1d/0x60 [ 676.264777] lock_torture_writer+0xb8/0x150 [dlm_locktorture] [ 676.265555] kthread+0x10a/0x130 [ 676.266007] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 676.266616] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 676.267097] </TASK> [ 676.267381] irq event stamp: 9579855 [ 676.267824] hardirqs last enabled at (9579863): [<ffffffffbb14e6f8>] __up_console_sem+0x58/0x60 [ 676.268896] hardirqs last disabled at (9579872): [<ffffffffbb14e6dd>] __up_console_sem+0x3d/0x60 [ 676.270008] softirqs last enabled at (9579798): [<ffffffffbc200349>] __do_softirq+0x349/0x4c7 [ 676.271438] softirqs last disabled at (9579897): [<ffffffffbb0d54c0>] irq_exit_rcu+0xb0/0xf0 [ 676.272796] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- I reproduced this warning with dlm_locktorture test which is currently not upstream. However this patch fix the issue by make a additional refcount between dlm_lowcomms_new_msg() and dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg(). In case of the race the kref_put() in dlm_lowcomms_commit_msg() will be the final put.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix race at SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC There is a small race window at snd_pcm_oss_sync() that is called from OSS PCM SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC ioctl; namely the function calls snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() at first, then takes the params_lock mutex for the rest. When the stream is set up again by another thread between them, it leads to inconsistency, and may result in unexpected results such as NULL dereference of OSS buffer as a fuzzer spotted recently. The fix is simply to cover snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() call into the same params_lock mutex with snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked() variant.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue sk->sk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM sockets its RX path takes mux->rx_lock to protect more than just skb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue lock, so race conditions still exist. We can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux->rx_lock too but this would introduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can be shared by multiple KCM sockets. So we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle skb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately, skb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by other sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after getting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and kcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets, so it is safe to get rid of this check too. I ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154/adf7242: defer destroy_workqueue call There is a possible race condition (use-after-free) like below (FREE) | (USE) adf7242_remove | adf7242_channel cancel_delayed_work_sync | destroy_workqueue (1) | adf7242_cmd_rx | mod_delayed_work (2) | The root cause for this race is that the upper layer (ieee802154) is unaware of this detaching event and the function adf7242_channel can be called without any checks. To fix this, we can add a flag write at the beginning of adf7242_remove and add flag check in adf7242_channel. Or we can just defer the destructive operation like other commit 3e0588c291d6 ("hamradio: defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev") which let the ieee802154_unregister_hw() to handle the synchronization. This patch takes the second option. runs")

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading icmp sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: raw: Fix a data-race around sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race where eprobes can be called before the event The flag that tells the event to call its triggers after reading the event is set for eprobes after the eprobe is enabled. This leads to a race where the eprobe may be triggered at the beginning of the event where the record information is NULL. The eprobe then dereferences the NULL record causing a NULL kernel pointer bug. Test for a NULL record to keep this from happening.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qrtr: start MHI channel after endpoit creation MHI channel may generates event/interrupt right after enabling. It may leads to 2 race conditions issues. 1) Such event may be dropped by qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback() at check: if (!qdev || mhi_res->transaction_status) return; Because dev_set_drvdata(&mhi_dev->dev, qdev) may be not performed at this moment. In this situation qrtr-ns will be unable to enumerate services in device. --------------------------------------------------------------- 2) Such event may come at the moment after dev_set_drvdata() and before qrtr_endpoint_register(). In this case kernel will panic with accessing wrong pointer at qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback(): rc = qrtr_endpoint_post(&qdev->ep, mhi_res->buf_addr, mhi_res->bytes_xferd); Because endpoint is not created yet. -------------------------------------------------------------- So move mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue after endpoint creation to fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe. While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: netlink notifier might race to release objects commit release path is invoked via call_rcu and it runs lockless to release the objects after rcu grace period. The netlink notifier handler might win race to remove objects that the transaction context is still referencing from the commit release path. Call rcu_barrier() to ensure pending rcu callbacks run to completion if the list of transactions to be destroyed is not empty.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd: Fix crash due to race between amd_pmu_enable_all, perf NMI and throttling amd_pmu_enable_all() does: if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) continue; amd_pmu_enable_event(cpuc->events[idx]); A perf NMI of another event can come between these two steps. Perf NMI handler internally disables and enables _all_ events, including the one which nmi-intercepted amd_pmu_enable_all() was in process of enabling. If that unintentionally enabled event has very low sampling period and causes immediate successive NMI, causing the event to be throttled, cpuc->events[idx] and cpuc->active_mask gets cleared by x86_pmu_stop(). This will result in amd_pmu_enable_event() getting called with event=NULL when amd_pmu_enable_all() resumes after handling the NMIs. This causes a kernel crash: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000198 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [...] Call Trace: <TASK> amd_pmu_enable_all+0x68/0xb0 ctx_resched+0xd9/0x150 event_function+0xb8/0x130 ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x141/0x4a0 ? perf_duration_warn+0x30/0x30 remote_function+0x4d/0x60 __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0xc4/0x500 flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x11d/0x1b0 do_idle+0x18f/0x2d0 cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 start_secondary+0x121/0x160 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb </TASK> amd_pmu_disable_all()/amd_pmu_enable_all() calls inside perf NMI handler were recently added as part of BRS enablement but I'm not sure whether we really need them. We can just disable BRS in the beginning and enable it back while returning from NMI. This will solve the issue by not enabling those events whose active_masks are set but are not yet enabled in hw pmu.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix a data-race around sysctl_ip_autobind_reuse. While reading sysctl_ip_autobind_reuse, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh. While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: Fix race at socket teardown Fix a race in the xsk socket teardown code that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference splat. The current xsk unbind code in xsk_unbind_dev() starts by setting xs->state to XSK_UNBOUND, sets xs->dev to NULL and then waits for any NAPI processing to terminate using synchronize_net(). After that, the release code starts to tear down the socket state and free allocated memory. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 PGD 8000000932469067 P4D 8000000932469067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 25 PID: 69132 Comm: grpcpp_sync_ser Tainted: G I 5.16.0+ #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0599V5, BIOS 1.2.10 03/09/2015 RIP: 0010:__xsk_sendmsg+0x2c/0x690 [...] RSP: 0018:ffffa2348bd13d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffff8d5fc632d258 RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: ffffa2348bd13e10 RDI: ffff8d5fc5489800 RBP: ffffa2348bd13db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffffffff000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d5fc5489800 R13: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R14: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f991cff9400(0000) GS:ffff8d6f1f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000114888005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1b0 xsk_sendmsg+0xf0/0x110 sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x190 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x23/0x50 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa5/0x1d0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae There are two problems with the current code. First, setting xs->dev to NULL before waiting for all users to stop using the socket is not correct. The entry to the data plane functions xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), and xsk_recvmsg() are all guarded by a test that xs->state is in the state XSK_BOUND and if not, it returns right away. But one process might have passed this test but still have not gotten to the point in which it uses xs->dev in the code. In this interim, a second process executing xsk_unbind_dev() might have set xs->dev to NULL which will lead to a crash for the first process. The solution here is just to get rid of this NULL assignment since it is not used anymore. Before commit 42fddcc7c64b ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization"), xs->dev was the gatekeeper to admit processes into the data plane functions, but it was replaced with the state variable xs->state in the aforementioned commit. The second problem is that synchronize_net() does not wait for any process in xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() to complete, which means that the state they rely on might be cleaned up prematurely. This can happen when the notifier gets called (at driver unload for example) as it uses xsk_unbind_dev(). Solve this by extending the RCU critical region from just the ndo_xsk_wakeup to the whole functions mentioned above, so that both the test of xs->state == XSK_BOUND and the last use of any member of xs is covered by the RCU critical section. This will guarantee that when synchronize_net() completes, there will be no processes left executing xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() and state can be cleaned up safely. Note that we need to drop the RCU lock for the skb xmit path as it uses functions that might sleep. Due to this, we have to retest the xs->state after we grab the mutex that protects the skb xmit code from, among a number of things, an xsk_unbind_dev() being executed from the notifier at the same time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix potential CAN frame reception race in isotp_rcv() When receiving a CAN frame the current code logic does not consider concurrently receiving processes which do not show up in real world usage. Ziyang Xuan writes: The following syz problem is one of the scenarios. so->rx.len is changed by isotp_rcv_ff() during isotp_rcv_cf(), so->rx.len equals 0 before alloc_skb() and equals 4096 after alloc_skb(). That will trigger skb_over_panic() in skb_put(). ======================================================= CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x16c/0x16e net/core/skbuff.c:113 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:118 [inline] skb_put.cold+0x24/0x24 net/core/skbuff.c:1990 isotp_rcv_cf net/can/isotp.c:570 [inline] isotp_rcv+0xa38/0x1e30 net/can/isotp.c:668 deliver net/can/af_can.c:574 [inline] can_rcv_filter+0x445/0x8d0 net/can/af_can.c:635 can_receive+0x31d/0x580 net/can/af_can.c:665 can_rcv+0x120/0x1c0 net/can/af_can.c:696 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5465 __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5579 Therefore we make sure the state changes and data structures stay consistent at CAN frame reception time by adding a spin_lock in isotp_rcv(). This fixes the issue reported by syzkaller but does not affect real world operation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority. While reading sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: Fix data-races around nexthop_compat_mode. While reading nexthop_compat_mode, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fwmark_reflect. While reading sysctl_fwmark_reflect, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_igmp_qrv. While reading sysctl_igmp_qrv, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. This test can be packed into a helper, so such changes will be in the follow-up series after net is merged into net-next. qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv);

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor. While reading sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_recovery. While reading sysctl_tcp_recovery, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page list without defending against page migration. Since pages which haven't yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different lethal races. It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages (since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the process). Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize with page migration.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: configfs: fix a race in configfs_{,un}register_subsystem() When configfs_register_subsystem() or configfs_unregister_subsystem() is executing link_group() or unlink_group(), it is possible that two processes add or delete list concurrently. Some unfortunate interleavings of them can cause kernel panic. One of cases is: A --> B --> C --> D A <-- B <-- C <-- D delete list_head *B | delete list_head *C --------------------------------|----------------------------------- configfs_unregister_subsystem | configfs_unregister_subsystem unlink_group | unlink_group unlink_obj | unlink_obj list_del_init | list_del_init __list_del_entry | __list_del_entry __list_del | __list_del // next == C | next->prev = prev | | next->prev = prev prev->next = next | | // prev == B | prev->next = next Fix this by adding mutex when calling link_group() or unlink_group(), but parent configfs_subsystem is NULL when config_item is root. So I create a mutex configfs_subsystem_mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix race condition between ext4_write and ext4_convert_inline_data Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:805: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free clusters kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 25371 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1 RIP: 0010:ext4_put_nojournal fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53 [inline] RIP: 0010:__ext4_journal_stop+0x10e/0x110 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:116 [...] Call Trace: ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x59a/0x730 fs/ext4/inline.c:795 generic_perform_write+0x279/0x3c0 mm/filemap.c:3344 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2e3/0x3d0 fs/ext4/file.c:270 ext4_file_write_iter+0x30a/0x11c0 fs/ext4/file.c:520 do_iter_readv_writev+0x339/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:732 do_iter_write+0x107/0x430 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:934 [inline] do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x380 fs/read_write.c:1031 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: cpu1 cpu2 __________________________|__________________________ do_pwritev vfs_writev do_iter_write ext4_file_write_iter ext4_buffered_write_iter generic_perform_write ext4_da_write_begin vfs_fallocate ext4_fallocate ext4_convert_inline_data ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_map_blocks ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_good_group_nolock ext4_mb_init_group ext4_mb_init_cache ext4_mb_generate_buddy --> error ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_restore_inline_data set EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ext4_block_write_begin ext4_da_write_end ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA) ext4_write_inline_data_end handle=NULL ext4_journal_stop(handle) __ext4_journal_stop ext4_put_nojournal(handle) ref_cnt = (unsigned long)handle BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0) ---> BUG_ON The lock held by ext4_convert_inline_data is xattr_sem, but the lock held by generic_perform_write is i_rwsem. Therefore, the two locks can be concurrent. To solve above issue, we add inode_lock() for ext4_convert_inline_data(). At the same time, move ext4_convert_inline_data() in front of ext4_punch_hole(), remove similar handling from ext4_punch_hole().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp/dccp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept. While reading sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.