In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size plpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to provide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this is communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has no idea. For example, if I write a bug like this: long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...); This compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack corruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end of the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not found a real instance yet.) To make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized array parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall APIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now provokes a diagnostic like this: error: array argument is too small; is of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds] 60 | plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, | ^ ~~~~~~ [1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit 0da6e5fd6c37 ("gcc: disable '-Warray-bounds' for gcc-13 too") and related changes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: nxp-fspi: fix the KASAN report out-of-bounds bug Change the memcpy length to fix the out-of-bounds issue when writing the data that is not 4 byte aligned to TX FIFO. To reproduce the issue, write 3 bytes data to NOR chip. dd if=3b of=/dev/mtd0 [ 36.926103] ================================================================== [ 36.933409] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nxp_fspi_exec_op+0x26ec/0x2838 [ 36.940514] Read of size 4 at addr ffff00081037c2a0 by task dd/455 [ 36.946721] [ 36.948235] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 455 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-gc7b0e37c8434 #1070 [ 36.956185] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT) [ 36.961260] Call trace: [ 36.963723] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8 [ 36.967414] show_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 36.970749] dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 [ 36.974451] print_report+0x114/0x5cc [ 36.978151] kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0 [ 36.981670] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x1c/0x28 [ 36.986587] nxp_fspi_exec_op+0x26ec/0x2838 [ 36.990800] spi_mem_exec_op+0x8ec/0xd30 [ 36.994762] spi_mem_no_dirmap_read+0x190/0x1e0 [ 36.999323] spi_mem_dirmap_write+0x238/0x32c [ 37.003710] spi_nor_write_data+0x220/0x374 [ 37.007932] spi_nor_write+0x110/0x2e8 [ 37.011711] mtd_write_oob_std+0x154/0x1f0 [ 37.015838] mtd_write_oob+0x104/0x1d0 [ 37.019617] mtd_write+0xb8/0x12c [ 37.022953] mtdchar_write+0x224/0x47c [ 37.026732] vfs_write+0x1e4/0x8c8 [ 37.030163] ksys_write+0xec/0x1d0 [ 37.033586] __arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c [ 37.037539] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258 [ 37.041327] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c [ 37.046244] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c [ 37.049589] el0_svc+0x38/0x78 [ 37.052681] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 [ 37.057077] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 37.060775] [ 37.062274] Allocated by task 455: [ 37.065701] kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54 [ 37.069570] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c [ 37.073438] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54 [ 37.077736] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8 [ 37.081515] __kmalloc_noprof+0x158/0x2f8 [ 37.085563] mtd_kmalloc_up_to+0x120/0x154 [ 37.089690] mtdchar_write+0x130/0x47c [ 37.093469] vfs_write+0x1e4/0x8c8 [ 37.096901] ksys_write+0xec/0x1d0 [ 37.100332] __arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c [ 37.104287] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258 [ 37.108064] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c [ 37.112972] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c [ 37.116319] el0_svc+0x38/0x78 [ 37.119401] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 [ 37.123788] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 37.127474] [ 37.128977] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00081037c2a0 [ 37.128977] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 [ 37.141177] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of [ 37.141177] allocated 3-byte region [ffff00081037c2a0, ffff00081037c2a3) [ 37.153465] [ 37.154971] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 37.160559] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x89037c [ 37.168596] flags: 0xbfffe0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 37.175149] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) [ 37.179021] raw: 0bfffe0000000000 ffff000800002500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 37.186788] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080800080 00000001fdffffff 0000000000000000 [ 37.194553] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 37.200144] [ 37.201647] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 37.206460] ffff00081037c180: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc [ 37.213701] ffff00081037c200: fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 03 fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc [ 37.220946] >ffff00081037c280: 06 fc fc fc 03 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 37.228186] ^ [ 37.232473] ffff00081037c300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 37.239718] ffff00081037c380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 37.246962] ============================================================== ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Protect against overflow of ALIGN() during iova allocation Userspace can supply an iova and uptr such that the target iova alignment becomes really big and ALIGN() overflows which corrupts the selected area range during allocation. CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST can detect this: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 Comm: syz-executor294 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-syzkaller-00294-g3ffea9a7a6f7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 RIP: 0010:iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline] RIP: 0010:iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352 Code: fc e9 a4 f3 ff ff e8 1a 8b 4c fc 41 be e4 ff ff ff e9 8a f3 ff ff e8 0a 8b 4c fc 90 0f 0b 90 e9 37 f5 ff ff e8 fc 8a 4c fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 68 f3 ff ff 48 c7 c1 ec 82 ad 8f 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ebf9e0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff85499fa4 RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: ffff888079b49e00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc90003ebfc50 R08: ffffffff85499b30 R09: ffffffff85499942 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff888079b49e00 R12: ffff8880228e0010 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff920007d7f68 R15: ffffc90003ebfd00 FS: 000055557d760380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000005fdeb8 CR3: 000000007404a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> iommufd_ioas_copy+0x610/0x7b0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c:274 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x4d9/0x5a0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:421 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Cap the automatic alignment to the huge page size, which is probably a better idea overall. Huge automatic alignments can fragment and chew up the available IOVA space without any reason.

In the Linux kernel before 4.20.12, net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic_main.c in the SNMP NAT module has insufficient ASN.1 length checks (aka an array index error), making out-of-bounds read and write operations possible, leading to an OOPS or local privilege escalation. This affects snmp_version and snmp_helper.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpt3sas: Avoid test/set_bit() operating in non-allocated memory There is a potential out-of-bounds access when using test_bit() on a single word. The test_bit() and set_bit() functions operate on long values, and when testing or setting a single word, they can exceed the word boundary. KASAN detects this issue and produces a dump: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _scsih_add_device.constprop.0 (./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:60 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:29 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c:7331) mpt3sas Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26e3c60 by task kworker/u1536:2/2965 For full log, please look at [1]. Make the allocation at least the size of sizeof(unsigned long) so that set_bit() and test_bit() have sufficient room for read/write operations without overwriting unallocated memory. [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZkNcALr3W3KGYYJG@gmail.com/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in one of the probes: [...] 13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar() 14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff 16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff 17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff)) 18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) 19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1 REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) 19: R6_w=0x7fffffff 20: (95) exit from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 23: (95) exit from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0 [...] What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value, meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1, true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2). Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant. Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now, for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101). When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in regs_refine_cond_op(): [...] t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); reg1->var_o ---truncated---

The sr_do_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sr_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel through 4.16.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact because sense buffers have different sizes at the CDROM layer and the SCSI layer, as demonstrated by a CDROMREADMODE2 ioctl call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: r8169: Fix possible ring buffer corruption on fragmented Tx packets. An issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented packets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring buffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null address. This was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags which may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware quirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2(). To fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been applied.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ecryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet The 'TAG 66 Packet Format' description is missing the cipher code and checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result, the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the buffer. Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet will always fit in the buffer. This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70 print_report+0xc5/0x610 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 kasan_report+0xc2/0x110 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 __asan_store1+0x62/0x80 ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540 ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d] ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0 ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550 ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10 ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190 ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150 ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0 path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30 ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330 do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67 Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67 RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040 </TASK> Allocated by task 181: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x66/0x160 ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0 ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550 ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150 ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0 path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0 do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290 do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160 __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: prevent pt_regs corruption for secondary idle threads Top of the kernel thread stack should be reserved for pt_regs. However this is not the case for the idle threads of the secondary boot harts. Their stacks overlap with their pt_regs, so both may get corrupted. Similar issue has been fixed for the primary hart, see c7cdd96eca28 ("riscv: prevent stack corruption by reserving task_pt_regs(p) early"). However that fix was not propagated to the secondary harts. The problem has been noticed in some CPU hotplug tests with V enabled. The function smp_callin stored several registers on stack, corrupting top of pt_regs structure including status field. As a result, kernel attempted to save or restore inexistent V context.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ext4 filesystem. A local user can cause an out-of-bounds write and a denial of service or unspecified other impact is possible by mounting and operating a crafted ext4 filesystem image.

An out-of-bounds memory access flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s TUN/TAP device driver functionality in how a user generates a malicious (too big) networking packet when napi frags is enabled. This flaw allows a local user to crash or potentially escalate their privileges on the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: 9381/1: kasan: clear stale stack poison We found below OOB crash: [ 33.452494] ================================================================== [ 33.453513] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec [ 33.454660] Write of size 164 at addr c1d03d30 by task swapper/0/0 [ 33.455515] [ 33.455767] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 6.1.25-mainline #1 [ 33.456880] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 33.457555] unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c [ 33.458326] show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x4c [ 33.459072] dump_stack_lvl from print_report+0x158/0x4a4 [ 33.459863] print_report from kasan_report+0x9c/0x148 [ 33.460616] kasan_report from kasan_check_range+0x94/0x1a0 [ 33.461424] kasan_check_range from memset+0x20/0x3c [ 33.462157] memset from refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec [ 33.463064] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0 from tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick+0x180/0x53c [ 33.464181] tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick from do_idle+0x264/0x354 [ 33.465029] do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24 [ 33.465769] cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xf0/0xf4 [ 33.466528] rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x18 [ 33.467397] [ 33.467644] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0/0 [ 33.468493] and is located at offset 112 in frame: [ 33.469172] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0x0/0x2ec [ 33.469917] [ 33.470165] This frame has 2 objects: [ 33.470696] [32, 76) 'global_zone_diff' [ 33.470729] [112, 276) 'global_node_diff' [ 33.471294] [ 33.472095] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 33.472862] page:3cd72da8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x41d03 [ 33.473944] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 33.474565] raw: 00001000 ed741470 ed741470 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 [ 33.475656] raw: 00000000 [ 33.476050] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 33.476816] [ 33.477061] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 33.477732] c1d03c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 33.478630] c1d03c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 [ 33.479526] >c1d03d00: 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 [ 33.480415] ^ [ 33.481195] c1d03d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 [ 33.482088] c1d03e00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 33.482978] ================================================================== We find the root cause of this OOB is that arm does not clear stale stack poison in the case of cpuidle. This patch refer to arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S to resolve this issue. From cited commit [1] that explain the problem Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning. In the case of cpuidle, CPUs exit the kernel a number of levels deep in C code. Any instrumented functions on this critical path will leave portions of the stack shadow poisoned. If CPUs lose context and return to the kernel via a cold path, we restore a prior context saved in __cpu_suspend_enter are forgotten, and we never remove the poison they placed in the stack shadow area by functions calls between this and the actual exit of the kernel. Thus, (depending on stackframe layout) subsequent calls to instrumented functions may hit this stale poison, resulting in (spurious) KASAN splats to the console. To avoid this, clear any stale poison from the idle thread for a CPU prior to bringing a CPU online. From cited commit [2] Extend to check for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK [1] commit 0d97e6d8024c ("arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison") [2] commit d56a9ef84bd0 ("kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK")

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: uvc: use correct buffer size when parsing configfs lists This commit fixes uvc gadget support on 32-bit platforms. Commit 0df28607c5cb ("usb: gadget: uvc: Generalise helper functions for reuse") introduced a helper function __uvcg_iter_item_entries() to aid with parsing lists of items on configfs attributes stores. This function is a generalization of another very similar function, which used a stack-allocated temporary buffer of fixed size for each item in the list and used the sizeof() operator to check for potential buffer overruns. The new function was changed to allocate the now variably sized temp buffer on heap, but wasn't properly updated to also check for max buffer size using the computed size instead of sizeof() operator. As a result, the maximum item size was 7 (plus null terminator) on 64-bit platforms, and 3 on 32-bit ones. While 7 is accidentally just barely enough, 3 is definitely too small for some of UVC configfs attributes. For example, dwFrameInteval, specified in 100ns units, usually has 6-digit item values, e.g. 166666 for 60fps.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bna: ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated Currently, we allocate a nbytes-sized kernel buffer and copy nbytes from userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we don't ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead to OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: sch_multiq: fix possible OOB write in multiq_tune() q->bands will be assigned to qopt->bands to execute subsequent code logic after kmalloc. So the old q->bands should not be used in kmalloc. Otherwise, an out-of-bounds write will occur.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix the pre-flush when appending to a file in writethrough mode In netfs_perform_write(), when the file is marked NETFS_ICTX_WRITETHROUGH or O_*SYNC or RWF_*SYNC was specified, write-through caching is performed on a buffered file. When setting up for write-through, we flush any conflicting writes in the region and wait for the write to complete, failing if there's a write error to return. The issue arises if we're writing at or above the EOF position because we skip the flush and - more importantly - the wait. This becomes a problem if there's a partial folio at the end of the file that is being written out and we want to make a write to it too. Both the already-running write and the write we start both want to clear the writeback mark, but whoever is second causes a warning looking something like: ------------[ cut here ]------------ R=00000012: folio 11 is not under writeback WARNING: CPU: 34 PID: 654 at fs/netfs/write_collect.c:105 ... CPU: 34 PID: 654 Comm: kworker/u386:27 Tainted: G S ... ... Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_write_collection_worker ... RIP: 0010:netfs_writeback_lookup_folio Fix this by making the flush-and-wait unconditional. It will do nothing if there are no folios in the pagecache and will return quickly if there are no folios in the region specified. Further, move the WBC attachment above the flush call as the flush is going to attach a WBC and detach it again if it is not present - and since we need one anyway we might as well share it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: make sure that WRITTEN is set on all metadata blocks We previously would call btrfs_check_leaf() if we had the check integrity code enabled, which meant that we could only run the extended leaf checks if we had WRITTEN set on the header flags. This leaves a gap in our checking, because we could end up with corruption on disk where WRITTEN isn't set on the leaf, and then the extended leaf checks don't get run which we rely on to validate all of the item pointers to make sure we don't access memory outside of the extent buffer. However, since 732fab95abe2 ("btrfs: check-integrity: remove CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY option") we no longer call btrfs_check_leaf() from btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(), which means we only ever call it on blocks that are being written out, and thus have WRITTEN set, or that are being read in, which should have WRITTEN set. Add checks to make sure we have WRITTEN set appropriately, and then make sure __btrfs_check_leaf() always does the item checking. This will protect us from file systems that have been corrupted and no longer have WRITTEN set on some of the blocks. This was hit on a crafted image tweaking the WRITTEN bit and reported by KASAN as out-of-bound access in the eb accessors. The example is a dir item at the end of an eb. [2.042] BTRFS warning (device loop1): bad eb member start: ptr 0x3fff start 30572544 member offset 16410 size 2 [2.040] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0009d1000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [2.537] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0005088000000018-0x000508800000001f] [2.729] CPU: 0 PID: 2587 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 [2.729] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [2.621] RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_16+0x34b/0x6d0 [2.621] RSP: 0018:ffff88810871fab8 EFLAGS: 00000206 [2.621] RAX: 0000a11000000003 RBX: ffff888104ff8720 RCX: ffff88811b2288c0 [2.621] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff81dd8aca RDI: ffff88810871f748 [2.621] RBP: 000000000000401a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10210e3ee9 [2.621] R10: ffff88810871f74f R11: 205d323430333737 R12: 000000000000001a [2.621] R13: 000508800000001a R14: 1ffff110210e3f5d R15: ffffffff850011e8 [2.621] FS: 00007f56ea275840(0000) GS:ffff88811b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2.621] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2.621] CR2: 00007febd13b75c0 CR3: 000000010bb50000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [2.621] Call Trace: [2.621] <TASK> [2.621] ? show_regs+0x74/0x80 [2.621] ? die_addr+0x46/0xc0 [2.621] ? exc_general_protection+0x161/0x2a0 [2.621] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [2.621] ? btrfs_get_16+0x33a/0x6d0 [2.621] ? btrfs_get_16+0x34b/0x6d0 [2.621] ? btrfs_get_16+0x33a/0x6d0 [2.621] ? __pfx_btrfs_get_16+0x10/0x10 [2.621] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [2.621] btrfs_match_dir_item_name+0x101/0x1a0 [2.621] btrfs_lookup_dir_item+0x1f3/0x280 [2.621] ? __pfx_btrfs_lookup_dir_item+0x10/0x10 [2.621] btrfs_get_tree+0xd25/0x1910 [ copy more details from report ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done(). syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue. ---truncated---

drivers/char/virtio_console.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.12 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Linux kernel's net/sched: sch_qfq component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. The qfq_change_agg() function in net/sched/sch_qfq.c allows an out-of-bounds write because lmax is updated according to packet sizes without bounds checks. We recommend upgrading past commit 3e337087c3b5805fe0b8a46ba622a962880b5d64.

An issue was discovered in fl_set_geneve_opt in net/sched/cls_flower.c in the Linux kernel before 6.3.7. It allows an out-of-bounds write in the flower classifier code via TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ENC_OPTS_GENEVE packets. This may result in denial of service or privilege escalation.

The vmw_surface_define_ioctl function in drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not validate addition of certain levels data, which allows local users to trigger an integer overflow and out-of-bounds write, and cause a denial of service (system hang or crash) or possibly gain privileges, via a crafted ioctl call for a /dev/dri/renderD* device.

Linux Kernel nftables Out-Of-Bounds Read/Write Vulnerability; nft_byteorder poorly handled vm register contents when CAP_NET_ADMIN is in any user or network namespace

There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.

The fix for XSA-423 added logic to Linux'es netback driver to deal with a frontend splitting a packet in a way such that not all of the headers would come in one piece. Unfortunately the logic introduced there didn't account for the extreme case of the entire packet being split into as many pieces as permitted by the protocol, yet still being smaller than the area that's specially dealt with to keep all (possible) headers together. Such an unusual packet would therefore trigger a buffer overrun in the driver.

There is heap-based buffer overflow in Linux kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfs/localio: must clear res.replen in nfs_local_read_done Otherwise memory corruption can occur due to NFSv3 LOCALIO reads leaving garbage in res.replen: - nfs3_read_done() copies that into server->read_hdrsize; from there nfs3_proc_read_setup() copies it to args.replen in new requests. - nfs3_xdr_enc_read3args() passes that to rpc_prepare_reply_pages() which includes it in hdrsize for xdr_init_pages, so that rq_rcv_buf contains a ridiculous len. - This is copied to rq_private_buf and xs_read_stream_request() eventually passes the kvec to sock_recvmsg() which receives incoming data into entirely the wrong place. This is easily reproduced with NFSv3 LOCALIO that is servicing reads when it is made to pivot back to using normal RPC. This switch back to using normal NFSv3 with RPC can occur for a few reasons but this issue was exposed with a test that stops and then restarts the NFSv3 server while LOCALIO is performing heavy read IO.

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel, where a Heap Overflow was found in mwifiex_set_wmm_params() function of Marvell Wifi Driver.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: locking/ww_mutex/test: Fix potential workqueue corruption In some cases running with the test-ww_mutex code, I was seeing odd behavior where sometimes it seemed flush_workqueue was returning before all the work threads were finished. Often this would cause strange crashes as the mutexes would be freed while they were being used. Looking at the code, there is a lifetime problem as the controlling thread that spawns the work allocates the "struct stress" structures that are passed to the workqueue threads. Then when the workqueue threads are finished, they free the stress struct that was passed to them. Unfortunately the workqueue work_struct node is in the stress struct. Which means the work_struct is freed before the work thread returns and while flush_workqueue is waiting. It seems like a better idea to have the controlling thread both allocate and free the stress structures, so that we can be sure we don't corrupt the workqueue by freeing the structure prematurely. So this patch reworks the test to do so, and with this change I no longer see the early flush_workqueue returns.

The HMAC implementation (crypto/hmac.c) in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not validate that the underlying cryptographic hash algorithm is unkeyed, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based hash interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) and the SHA-3 hash algorithm (CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) to cause a kernel stack buffer overflow by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that encounter a missing SHA-3 initialization.

A heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Linux Kernel ipvlan network driver can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. The out-of-bounds write is caused by missing skb->cb initialization in the ipvlan network driver. The vulnerability is reachable if CONFIG_IPVLAN is enabled. We recommend upgrading past commit 90cbed5247439a966b645b34eb0a2e037836ea8e.

Linux kernel: heap out-of-bounds in AF_PACKET sockets. This new issue is analogous to previously disclosed CVE-2016-8655. In both cases, a socket option that changes socket state may race with safety checks in packet_set_ring. Previously with PACKET_VERSION. This time with PACKET_RESERVE. The solution is similar: lock the socket for the update. This issue may be exploitable, we did not investigate further. As this issue affects PF_PACKET sockets, it requires CAP_NET_RAW in the process namespace. But note that with user namespaces enabled, any process can create a namespace in which it has CAP_NET_RAW.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: fix memory corruption bug with suspend and rebuild The ice driver would previously panic after suspend. This is caused from the driver *only* calling the ice_vsi_free_q_vectors() function by itself, when it is suspending. Since commit b3e7b3a6ee92 ("ice: prevent NULL pointer deref during reload") the driver has zeroed out num_q_vectors, and only restored it in ice_vsi_cfg_def(). This further causes the ice_rebuild() function to allocate a zero length buffer, after which num_q_vectors is updated, and then the new value of num_q_vectors is used to index into the zero length buffer, which corrupts memory. The fix entails making sure all the code referencing num_q_vectors only does so after it has been reset via ice_vsi_cfg_def(). I didn't perform a full bisect, but I was able to test against 6.1.77 kernel and that ice driver works fine for suspend/resume with no panic, so sometime since then, this problem was introduced. Also clean up an un-needed init of a local variable in the function being modified. PANIC from 6.8.0-rc1: [1026674.915596] PM: suspend exit [1026675.664697] ice 0000:17:00.1: PTP reset successful [1026675.664707] ice 0000:17:00.1: 2755 msecs passed between update to cached PHC time [1026675.667660] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [1026675.675944] ice 0000:b1:00.0: 2832 msecs passed between update to cached PHC time [1026677.137733] ixgbe 0000:31:00.0 ens787: NIC Link is Up 1 Gbps, Flow Control: None [1026677.190201] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [1026677.192753] ice 0000:17:00.0: PTP reset successful [1026677.192764] ice 0000:17:00.0: 4548 msecs passed between update to cached PHC time [1026677.197928] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [1026677.197933] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [1026677.197937] PGD 1557a7067 P4D 0 [1026677.212133] ice 0000:b1:00.1: PTP reset successful [1026677.212143] ice 0000:b1:00.1: 4344 msecs passed between update to cached PHC time [1026677.212575] [1026677.243142] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [1026677.247918] CPU: 23 PID: 42790 Comm: kworker/23:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc1+ #1 [1026677.257989] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50CYP2SBSTD/M50CYP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C620.86B.01.01.0005.2202160810 02/16/2022 [1026677.269367] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [1026677.274592] RIP: 0010:ice_vsi_rebuild_set_coalesce+0x130/0x1e0 [ice] [1026677.281421] Code: 0f 84 3a ff ff ff 41 0f b7 74 ec 02 66 89 b0 22 02 00 00 81 e6 ff 1f 00 00 e8 ec fd ff ff e9 35 ff ff ff 48 8b 43 30 49 63 ed <41> 0f b7 34 24 41 83 c5 01 48 8b 3c e8 66 89 b7 aa 02 00 00 81 e6 [1026677.300877] RSP: 0018:ff3be62a6399bcc0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [1026677.306556] RAX: ff28691e28980828 RBX: ff28691e41099828 RCX: 0000000000188000 [1026677.314148] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: ff28691e41099828 [1026677.321730] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [1026677.329311] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffffffffffffc0 R12: 0000000000000010 [1026677.336896] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff28691e0eaa81a0 [1026677.344472] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff28693cbffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1026677.353000] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1026677.359195] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000128df4001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [1026677.366779] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1026677.374369] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1026677.381952] PKRU: 55555554 [1026677.385116] Call Trace: [1026677.388023] <TASK> [1026677.390589] ? __die+0x20/0x70 [1026677.394105] ? page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160 [1026677.398576] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x6a0 [1026677.403307] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x150 [1026677.407694] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [1026677.412349] ? ice_vsi_rebuild_set_coalesce+0x130/0x1e0 [ice] [1026677.4186 ---truncated---

A flaw out of bounds memory write in the Linux kernel UDF file system functionality was found in the way user triggers some file operation which triggers udf_write_fi(). A local user could use this flaw to crash the system or potentially

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix space cache corruption and potential double allocations When testing space_cache v2 on a large set of machines, we encountered a few symptoms: 1. "unable to add free space :-17" (EEXIST) errors. 2. Missing free space info items, sometimes caught with a "missing free space info for X" error. 3. Double-accounted space: ranges that were allocated in the extent tree and also marked as free in the free space tree, ranges that were marked as allocated twice in the extent tree, or ranges that were marked as free twice in the free space tree. If the latter made it onto disk, the next reboot would hit the BUG_ON() in add_new_free_space(). 4. On some hosts with no on-disk corruption or error messages, the in-memory space cache (dumped with drgn) disagreed with the free space tree. All of these symptoms have the same underlying cause: a race between caching the free space for a block group and returning free space to the in-memory space cache for pinned extents causes us to double-add a free range to the space cache. This race exists when free space is cached from the free space tree (space_cache=v2) or the extent tree (nospace_cache, or space_cache=v1 if the cache needs to be regenerated). struct btrfs_block_group::last_byte_to_unpin and struct btrfs_block_group::progress are supposed to protect against this race, but commit d0c2f4fa555e ("btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit") subtly broke this by allowing multiple transactions to be unpinning extents at the same time. Specifically, the race is as follows: 1. An extent is deleted from an uncached block group in transaction A. 2. btrfs_commit_transaction() is called for transaction A. 3. btrfs_run_delayed_refs() -> __btrfs_free_extent() runs the delayed ref for the deleted extent. 4. __btrfs_free_extent() -> do_free_extent_accounting() -> add_to_free_space_tree() adds the deleted extent back to the free space tree. 5. do_free_extent_accounting() -> btrfs_update_block_group() -> btrfs_cache_block_group() queues up the block group to get cached. block_group->progress is set to block_group->start. 6. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction A calls switch_commit_roots(). It sets block_group->last_byte_to_unpin to block_group->progress, which is block_group->start because the block group hasn't been cached yet. 7. The caching thread gets to our block group. Since the commit roots were already switched, load_free_space_tree() sees the deleted extent as free and adds it to the space cache. It finishes caching and sets block_group->progress to U64_MAX. 8. btrfs_commit_transaction() advances transaction A to TRANS_STATE_SUPER_COMMITTED. 9. fsync calls btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction B. Since transaction A is already in TRANS_STATE_SUPER_COMMITTED and the commit is for fsync, it advances. 10. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction B calls switch_commit_roots(). This time, the block group has already been cached, so it sets block_group->last_byte_to_unpin to U64_MAX. 11. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction A calls btrfs_finish_extent_commit(), which calls unpin_extent_range() for the deleted extent. It sees last_byte_to_unpin set to U64_MAX (by transaction B!), so it adds the deleted extent to the space cache again! This explains all of our symptoms above: * If the sequence of events is exactly as described above, when the free space is re-added in step 11, it will fail with EEXIST. * If another thread reallocates the deleted extent in between steps 7 and 11, then step 11 will silently re-add that space to the space cache as free even though it is actually allocated. Then, if that space is allocated *again*, the free space tree will be corrupted (namely, the wrong item will be deleted). * If we don't catch this free space tree corr ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Protect against send buffer overflow in NFSv2 READ Since before the git era, NFSD has conserved the number of pages held by each nfsd thread by combining the RPC receive and send buffers into a single array of pages. This works because there are no cases where an operation needs a large RPC Call message and a large RPC Reply at the same time. Once an RPC Call has been received, svc_process() updates svc_rqst::rq_res to describe the part of rq_pages that can be used for constructing the Reply. This means that the send buffer (rq_res) shrinks when the received RPC record containing the RPC Call is large. A client can force this shrinkage on TCP by sending a correctly- formed RPC Call header contained in an RPC record that is excessively large. The full maximum payload size cannot be constructed in that case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iomap: iomap: fix memory corruption when recording errors during writeback Every now and then I see this crash on arm64: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8 Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733687, async page read Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 42-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000139750000 [00000000000000f8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733688, async page read Dumping ftrace buffer: Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733689, async page read (ftrace buffer empty) XFS (dm-0): log I/O error -5 Modules linked in: dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data XFS (dm-0): Metadata I/O Error (0x1) detected at xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x1ec/0x590 [xfs] (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:296). dm_bio_prison XFS (dm-0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (dm-0): xfs_imap_lookup: xfs_ialloc_read_agi() returned error -5, agno 0 dm_bufio dm_log_writes xfs nft_chain_nat xt_REDIRECT nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. nf_reject_ipv6 potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 CPU: 1 PID: 122166 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7 rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss xt_tcpudp ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xt_set nft_compat ip_set_hash_mac ip_set nf_tables Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 pstate: 60001000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) ip_tables pc : 000003fd6d7df200 x_tables lr : 000003fd6d7df1ec overlay nfsv4 CPU: 0 PID: 54031 Comm: u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7405 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn sp : 000003ffd9522fd0 (flush-253:0) pstate: 60401005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 x29: 000003ffd9522fd0 x28: 0000000000000023 x27: 000002acefeb6780 x26: 0000000000000005 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000005 lr : __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 x21: 0000000000000006 sp : fffffe000f80f760 x29: fffffe000f80f760 x28: 0000000000000003 x27: fffffe000f80f9f8 x26: 0000000002523000 x25: 00000000fffffffb x24: fffffe000f80f868 x23: fffffe000f80fbb0 x22: fffffc0180c26a78 x21: 0000000002530000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000470af3 x12: fffffc0058f70000 x11: 0000000000000040 x10: 0000000000001b20 x9 : fffffe000836b288 x8 : fffffc00eb9fd480 x7 : 0000000000f83659 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000869 x4 : 0000000000000005 x3 : 00000000000000f8 x20: 000003fd6d740020 x19: 000000000001dd36 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 000003fd6d78704c x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 000002acfac87668 x2 : 0000000000000ffa x1 : 00000000fffffffb x0 : 00000000000000f8 Call trace: errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 iomap_do_writepage+0x5e4/0xd5c write_cache_pages+0x208/0x674 iomap_writepages+0x34/0x60 xfs_vm_writepages+0x8c/0xcc [xfs 7a861f39c43631f15d3a5884246ba5035d4ca78b] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2064656e72757465 x12: 0000000000002180 x11: 000003fd6d8a82d0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 000003fd6d8ae288 x8 : 0000000000000083 x7 : 00000000ffffffff x6 : 00000000ffffffee x5 : 00000000fbad2887 x4 : 000003fd6d9abb58 x3 : 000003fd6d740020 x2 : 0000000000000006 x1 : 000000000001dd36 x0 : 0000000000000000 CPU: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: cp2112: prevent a buffer overflow in cp2112_xfer() Smatch warnings: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c:793 cp2112_xfer() error: __memcpy() 'data->block[1]' too small (33 vs 255) drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c:793 cp2112_xfer() error: __memcpy() 'buf' too small (64 vs 255) The 'read_length' variable is provided by 'data->block[0]' which comes from user and it(read_length) can take a value between 0-255. Add an upper bound to 'read_length' variable to prevent a buffer overflow in memcpy().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: Intel: avs: Fix potential RX buffer overflow If an event caused firmware to return invalid RX size for LARGE_CONFIG_GET, memcpy_fromio() could end up copying too many bytes. Fix by utilizing min_t().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/hdmi: fix memory corruption with too many bridges Add the missing sanity check on the bridge counter to avoid corrupting data beyond the fixed-sized bridge array in case there are ever more than eight bridges. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/502670/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/selftests: fix subtraction overflow bug On some machines hole_end can be small enough to cause subtraction overflow. On the other side (addr + 2 * min_alignment) can overflow in case of mock tests. This patch should handle both cases. (cherry picked from commit ab3edc679c552a466e4bf0b11af3666008bd65a2)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/radeon: fix potential buffer overflow in ni_set_mc_special_registers() The last case label can write two buffers 'mc_reg_address[j]' and 'mc_data[j]' with 'j' offset equal to SMC_NISLANDS_MC_REGISTER_ARRAY_SIZE since there are no checks for this value in both case labels after the last 'j++'. Instead of changing '>' to '>=' there, add the bounds check at the start of the second 'case' (the first one already has it). Also, remove redundant last checks for 'j' index bigger than array size. The expression is always false. Moreover, before or after the patch 'table->last' can be equal to SMC_NISLANDS_MC_REGISTER_ARRAY_SIZE and it seems it can be a valid value. Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: mcp2221: prevent a buffer overflow in mcp_smbus_write() Smatch Warning: drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c:388 mcp_smbus_write() error: __memcpy() '&mcp->txbuf[5]' too small (59 vs 255) drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c:388 mcp_smbus_write() error: __memcpy() 'buf' too small (34 vs 255) The 'len' variable can take a value between 0-255 as it can come from data->block[0] and it is user data. So add an bound check to prevent a buffer overflow in memcpy().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390: avoid using global register for current_stack_pointer Commit 30de14b1884b ("s390: current_stack_pointer shouldn't be a function") made current_stack_pointer a global register variable like on many other architectures. Unfortunately on s390 it uncovers old gcc bug which is fixed only since gcc-9.1 [gcc commit 3ad7fed1cc87 ("S/390: Fix PR89775. Stackpointer save/restore instructions removed")] and backported to gcc-8.4 and later. Due to this bug gcc versions prior to 8.4 generate broken code which leads to stack corruptions. Current minimal gcc version required to build the kernel is declared as 5.1. It is not possible to fix all old gcc versions, so work around this problem by avoiding using global register variable for current_stack_pointer.