In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: always wait for both firmware loading attempts In 'rtw_wait_firmware_completion()', always wait for both (regular and wowlan) firmware loading attempts. Otherwise if 'rtw_usb_intf_init()' has failed in 'rtw_usb_probe()', 'rtw_usb_disconnect()' may issue 'ieee80211_free_hw()' when one of 'rtw_load_firmware_cb()' (usually the wowlan one) is still in progress, causing UAF detected by KASAN.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: vhci: Prevent use-after-free by removing debugfs files early Move the creation of debugfs files into a dedicated function, and ensure they are explicitly removed during vhci_release(), before associated data structures are freed. Previously, debugfs files such as "force_suspend", "force_wakeup", and others were created under hdev->debugfs but not removed in vhci_release(). Since vhci_release() frees the backing vhci_data structure, any access to these files after release would result in use-after-free errors. Although hdev->debugfs is later freed in hci_release_dev(), user can access files after vhci_data is freed but before hdev->debugfs is released.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost_vdpa: assign irq bypass producer token correctly We used to call irq_bypass_unregister_producer() in vhost_vdpa_setup_vq_irq() which is problematic as we don't know if the token pointer is still valid or not. Actually, we use the eventfd_ctx as the token so the life cycle of the token should be bound to the VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL instead of vhost_vdpa_setup_vq_irq() which could be called by set_status(). Fixing this by setting up irq bypass producer's token when handling VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL and un-registering the producer before calling vhost_vring_ioctl() to prevent a possible use after free as eventfd could have been released in vhost_vring_ioctl(). And such registering and unregistering will only be done if DRIVER_OK is set.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/migrate: prevent potential UAF If we hit the error path, the previous fence (if there is one) has already been put() prior to this, so doing a fence_wait could lead to UAF. Tweak the flow to do to the put() until after we do the wait. (cherry picked from commit 9b7ca35ed28fe5fad86e9d9c24ebd1271e4c9c3e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix use-after-free in bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach() If bpf_link_prime() fails, bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach() goes to the error_free label and frees the array of bpf_uprobe's without calling bpf_uprobe_unregister(). This leaks bpf_uprobe->uprobe and worse, this frees bpf_uprobe->consumer without removing it from the uprobe->consumers list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath9k: fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb Syzbot reported use-after-free Read in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() [0]. The problem was in incorrect htc_handle->drv_priv initialization. Probable call trace which can trigger use-after-free: ath9k_htc_probe_device() /* htc_handle->drv_priv = priv; */ ath9k_htc_wait_for_target() <--- Failed ieee80211_free_hw() <--- priv pointer is freed <IRQ> ... ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream() RX_STAT_INC() <--- htc_handle->drv_priv access In order to not add fancy protection for drv_priv we can move htc_handle->drv_priv initialization at the end of the ath9k_htc_probe_device() and add helper macro to make all *_STAT_* macros NULL safe, since syzbot has reported related NULL deref in that macros [1]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Don't return OOB skb in manage_oob(). syzbot reported use-after-free in unix_stream_recv_urg(). [0] The scenario is 1. send(MSG_OOB) 2. recv(MSG_OOB) -> The consumed OOB remains in recv queue 3. send(MSG_OOB) 4. recv() -> manage_oob() returns the next skb of the consumed OOB -> This is also OOB, but unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is not cleared 5. recv(MSG_OOB) -> unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is used but already freed The recent commit 8594d9b85c07 ("af_unix: Don't call skb_get() for OOB skb.") uncovered the issue. If the OOB skb is consumed and the next skb is peeked in manage_oob(), we still need to check if the skb is OOB. Let's do so by falling back to the following checks in manage_oob() and add the test case in selftest. Note that we need to add a similar check for SIOCATMARK. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880326abcc4 by task syz-executor178/5235 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5235 Comm: syz-executor178 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-syzkaller-00742-gfbdaffe41adc #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959 unix_stream_recv_urg+0x1df/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2640 unix_stream_read_generic+0x2456/0x2520 net/unix/af_unix.c:2778 unix_stream_recvmsg+0x22b/0x2c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2996 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2816 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2858 [inline] __sys_recvmsg+0x2f0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2888 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5360d6b4e9 Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 37 17 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff29b3a458 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff29b3a638 RCX: 00007f5360d6b4e9 RDX: 0000000000002001 RSI: 0000000020000640 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f5360dde610 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007fff29b3a628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Allocated by task 5235: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4080 __alloc_skb+0x1c3/0x440 net/core/skbuff.c:667 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1320 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc3/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:6528 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x91a/0xa60 net/core/sock.c:2815 sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1778 [inline] queue_oob+0x108/0x680 net/unix/af_unix.c:2198 unix_stream_sendmsg+0xd24/0xf80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2351 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 5235: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix WARNING:at_kernel/workqueue.c:#check_flush_dependency In the commit aee2424246f9 ("RDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs"), the function flush_workqueue is invoked to flush the work queue iwcm_wq. But at that time, the work queue iwcm_wq was created via the function alloc_ordered_workqueue without the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM. Because the current process is trying to flush the whole iwcm_wq, if iwcm_wq doesn't have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, verify that the current process is not reclaiming memory or running on a workqueue which doesn't have the flag WQ_MEM_RECLAIM as that can break forward-progress guarantee leading to a deadlock. The call trace is as below: [ 125.350876][ T1430] Call Trace: [ 125.356281][ T1430] <TASK> [ 125.361285][ T1430] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:693) [ 125.367640][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.375689][ T1430] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219) [ 125.382505][ T1430] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239) [ 125.388987][ T1430] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1)) [ 125.395831][ T1430] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621) [ 125.403125][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.410984][ T1430] ? check_flush_dependency (kernel/workqueue.c:3706 (discriminator 9)) [ 125.418764][ T1430] __flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3970) [ 125.426021][ T1430] ? __pfx___might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10151) [ 125.433431][ T1430] ? destroy_cm_id (drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c:375) iw_cm [ 125.441209][ T1430] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:3910) [ 125.473900][ T1430] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 include/linux/spinlock.h:187 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 125.473909][ T1430] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:161) [ 125.482537][ T1430] _destroy_id (drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2044) rdma_cm [ 125.495072][ T1430] nvme_rdma_free_queue (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:656 drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:650) nvme_rdma [ 125.505827][ T1430] nvme_rdma_reset_ctrl_work (drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c:2180) nvme_rdma [ 125.505831][ T1430] process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) [ 125.515122][ T1430] worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 kernel/workqueue.c:3393) [ 125.515127][ T1430] ? __pfx_worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3339) [ 125.531837][ T1430] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) [ 125.539864][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342) [ 125.550628][ T1430] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) [ 125.558840][ T1430] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:342) [ 125.558844][ T1430] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) [ 125.566487][ T1430] </TASK> [ 125.566488][ T1430] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: rt5645: Fix errorenous cleanup order There is a logic error when removing rt5645 device as the function rt5645_i2c_remove() first cancel the &rt5645->jack_detect_work and delete the &rt5645->btn_check_timer latter. However, since the timer handler rt5645_btn_check_callback() will re-queue the jack_detect_work, this cleanup order is buggy. That is, once the del_timer_sync in rt5645_i2c_remove is concurrently run with the rt5645_btn_check_callback, the canceled jack_detect_work will be rescheduled again, leading to possible use-after-free. This patch fix the issue by placing the del_timer_sync function before the cancel_delayed_work_sync.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cnic: Fix use-after-free bugs in cnic_delete_task The original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw(), which does not guarantee that the delayed work item 'delete_task' has fully completed if it was already running. Additionally, the delayed work item is cyclic, the flush_workqueue() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() only blocks and waits for work items that were already queued to the workqueue prior to its invocation. Any work items submitted after flush_workqueue() is called are not included in the set of tasks that the flush operation awaits. This means that after the cyclic work items have finished executing, a delayed work item may still exist in the workqueue. This leads to use-after-free scenarios where the cnic_dev is deallocated by cnic_free_dev(), while delete_task remains active and attempt to dereference cnic_dev in cnic_delete_task(). A typical race condition is illustrated below: CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback) cnic_netdev_event() | cnic_stop_hw() | cnic_delete_task() cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() | ... cancel_delayed_work() | /* the queue_delayed_work() flush_workqueue() | executes after flush_workqueue()*/ | queue_delayed_work() cnic_free_dev(dev)//free | cnic_delete_task() //new instance | dev = cp->dev; //use Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure that the cyclic delayed work item is properly canceled and that any ongoing execution of the work item completes before the cnic_dev is deallocated. Furthermore, since cancel_delayed_work_sync() uses __flush_work(work, true) to synchronously wait for any currently executing instance of the work item to finish, the flush_workqueue() becomes redundant and should be removed. This bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the issue and validate the fix, I simulated the cnic PCI device in QEMU and introduced intentional delays — such as inserting calls to ssleep() within the cnic_delete_task() function — to increase the likelihood of triggering the bug.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove() When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bfq: Update cgroup information before merging bio When the process is migrated to a different cgroup (or in case of writeback just starts submitting bios associated with a different cgroup) bfq_merge_bio() can operate with stale cgroup information in bic. Thus the bio can be merged to a request from a different cgroup or it can result in merging of bfqqs for different cgroups or bfqqs of already dead cgroups and causing possible use-after-free issues. Fix the problem by updating cgroup information in bfq_merge_bio().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: dapm: Fix UAF for snd_soc_pcm_runtime object When using kernel with the following extra config, - CONFIG_KASAN=y - CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y - CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y - CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y - CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=4096 kernel detects that snd_pcm_suspend_all() access a freed 'snd_soc_pcm_runtime' object when the system is suspended, which leads to a use-after-free bug: [ 52.047746] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_pcm_suspend_all+0x1a8/0x270 [ 52.047765] Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000b9434d50 by task systemd-sleep/2330 [ 52.047785] Call trace: [ 52.047787] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 [ 52.047794] show_stack+0x34/0x50 [ 52.047797] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x8c [ 52.047802] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2c0 [ 52.047809] kasan_report+0x210/0x230 [ 52.047815] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x3c/0x50 [ 52.047820] snd_pcm_suspend_all+0x1a8/0x270 [ 52.047824] snd_soc_suspend+0x19c/0x4e0 The snd_pcm_sync_stop() has a NULL check on 'substream->runtime' before making any access. So we need to always set 'substream->runtime' to NULL everytime we kfree() it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sch/netem: fix use after free in netem_dequeue If netem_dequeue() enqueues packet to inner qdisc and that qdisc returns __NET_XMIT_STOLEN. The packet is dropped but qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is not called to update the parent's q.qlen, leading to the similar use-after-free as Commit e04991a48dbaf382 ("netem: fix return value if duplicate enqueue fails") Commands to trigger KASAN UaF: ip link add type dummy ip link set lo up ip link set dummy0 up tc qdisc add dev lo parent root handle 1: drr tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: netem tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2: handle 3: drr tc filter add dev lo parent 3: basic classid 3:1 action mirred egress redirect dev dummy0 tc class add dev lo classid 3:1 drr ping -c1 -W0.01 localhost # Trigger bug tc class del dev lo classid 1:1 tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr ping -c1 -W0.01 localhost # UaF

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/timerlat: Only clear timer if a kthread exists The timerlat tracer can use user space threads to check for osnoise and timer latency. If the program using this is killed via a SIGTERM, the threads are shutdown one at a time and another tracing instance can start up resetting the threads before they are fully closed. That causes the hrtimer assigned to the kthread to be shutdown and freed twice when the dying thread finally closes the file descriptors, causing a use-after-free bug. Only cancel the hrtimer if the associated thread is still around. Also add the interface_lock around the resetting of the tlat_var->kthread. Note, this is just a quick fix that can be backported to stable. A real fix is to have a better synchronization between the shutdown of old threads and the starting of new ones.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF caused by offsets overwrite Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted. Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434 binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Allocated by task 743: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270 binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8 binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Freed by task 745: kfree+0xbc/0x208 binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c [...] ================================================================== To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the boundaries of the data section.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/arm-smmu-v3-sva: Fix mm use-after-free We currently call arm64_mm_context_put() without holding a reference to the mm, which can result in use-after-free. Call mmgrab()/mmdrop() to ensure the mm only gets freed after we unpinned the ASID.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: avoid use-after-free after removing device When a disk is removed, bdi_unregister gets called to stop further writeback and wait for associated delayed work to complete. However, wb_inode_writeback_end() may schedule bandwidth estimation dwork after this has completed, which can result in the timer attempting to access the just freed bdi_writeback. Fix this by checking if the bdi_writeback is alive, similar to when scheduling writeback work. Since this requires wb->work_lock, and wb_inode_writeback_end() may get called from interrupt, switch wb->work_lock to an irqsafe lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igb: fix a use-after-free issue in igb_clean_tx_ring Fix the following use-after-free bug in igb_clean_tx_ring routine when the NIC is running in XDP mode. The issue can be triggered redirecting traffic into the igb NIC and then closing the device while the traffic is flowing. [ 73.322719] CPU: 1 PID: 487 Comm: xdp_redirect Not tainted 5.18.3-apu2 #9 [ 73.330639] Hardware name: PC Engines APU2/APU2, BIOS 4.0.7 02/28/2017 [ 73.337434] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa7/0xf0 [ 73.362283] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000081f798 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 73.367761] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000420f80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 73.375200] RDX: ffff88811ad22d00 RSI: ffff88811ad171e0 RDI: ffff88811ad171e0 [ 73.382590] RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: ffffffff82298f28 R09: 0000000000000058 [ 73.390008] R10: 0000000000000219 R11: ffffffff82280f40 R12: 0000000000000090 [ 73.397356] R13: ffff888102343a40 R14: ffff88810359e0e4 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 73.404806] FS: 00007ff38d31d740(0000) GS:ffff88811ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 73.413129] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 73.419096] CR2: 000055cff35f13f8 CR3: 0000000106391000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 73.426565] Call Trace: [ 73.429087] <TASK> [ 73.431314] igb_clean_tx_ring+0x43/0x140 [igb] [ 73.436002] igb_down+0x1d7/0x220 [igb] [ 73.439974] __igb_close+0x3c/0x120 [igb] [ 73.444118] igb_xdp+0x10c/0x150 [igb] [ 73.447983] ? igb_pci_sriov_configure+0x70/0x70 [igb] [ 73.453362] dev_xdp_install+0xda/0x110 [ 73.457371] dev_xdp_attach+0x1da/0x550 [ 73.461369] do_setlink+0xfd0/0x10f0 [ 73.465166] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x89/0xc70 [ 73.469714] rtnl_setlink+0x11a/0x1e0 [ 73.473547] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3d0 [ 73.477709] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130 [ 73.482258] netlink_rcv_skb+0x8d/0x110 [ 73.486229] netlink_unicast+0x230/0x340 [ 73.490317] netlink_sendmsg+0x215/0x470 [ 73.494395] __sys_sendto+0x179/0x190 [ 73.498268] ? move_addr_to_user+0x37/0x70 [ 73.502547] ? __sys_getsockname+0x84/0xe0 [ 73.506853] ? netlink_setsockopt+0x1c1/0x4a0 [ 73.511349] ? __sys_setsockopt+0xc8/0x1d0 [ 73.515636] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [ 73.519603] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 [ 73.523399] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 73.528712] RIP: 0033:0x7ff38d41f20c [ 73.551866] RSP: 002b:00007fff3b945a68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 73.559640] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff38d41f20c [ 73.567066] RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 00007fff3b945b30 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 73.574457] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 73.581852] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3b945ab0 [ 73.589179] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fff3b945b30 [ 73.596545] </TASK> [ 73.598842] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk The elevator is only used for file system requests, which are stopped in del_gendisk. Move disabling the elevator and freeing the scheduler tags to the end of del_gendisk instead of doing that work in disk_release and blk_cleanup_queue to avoid a use after free on q->tag_set from disk_release as the tag_set might not be alive at that point. Move the blk_qos_exit call as well, as it just depends on the elevator exit and would be the only reason to keep the not exactly cheap queue freeze in disk_release.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/srpt: Fix a use-after-free Change the LIO port members inside struct srpt_port from regular members into pointers. Allocate the LIO port data structures from inside srpt_make_tport() and free these from inside srpt_make_tport(). Keep struct srpt_device as long as either an RDMA port or a LIO target port is associated with it. This patch decouples the lifetime of struct srpt_port (controlled by the RDMA core) and struct srpt_port_id (controlled by LIO). This patch fixes the following KASAN complaint: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in srpt_enable_tpg+0x31/0x70 [ib_srpt] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888141cc34b8 by task check/5093 Call Trace: <TASK> show_stack+0x4e/0x53 dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x66 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xea/0x41e print_report.cold+0x90/0x205 kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0 __asan_load8+0x69/0x90 srpt_enable_tpg+0x31/0x70 [ib_srpt] target_fabric_tpg_base_enable_store+0xe2/0x140 [target_core_mod] configfs_write_iter+0x18b/0x210 new_sync_write+0x1f2/0x2f0 vfs_write+0x3e3/0x540 ksys_write+0xbb/0x140 __x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pci: cx23885: Fix the error handling in cx23885_initdev() When the driver fails to call the dma_set_mask(), the driver will get the following splat: [ 55.853884] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.854486] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810de60408 by task modprobe/590 [ 55.856822] Call Trace: [ 55.860327] __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.861347] bus_for_each_dev+0x102/0x160 [ 55.861681] i2c_del_driver+0x2f/0x50 This is because the driver has initialized the i2c related resources in cx23885_dev_setup() but not released them in error handling, fix this bug by modifying the error path that jumps after failing to call the dma_set_mask().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: prevent UAF around preempt fence The fence lock is part of the queue, therefore in the current design anything locking the fence should then also hold a ref to the queue to prevent the queue from being freed. However, currently it looks like we signal the fence and then drop the queue ref, but if something is waiting on the fence, the waiter is kicked to wake up at some later point, where upon waking up it first grabs the lock before checking the fence state. But if we have already dropped the queue ref, then the lock might already be freed as part of the queue, leading to uaf. To prevent this, move the fence lock into the fence itself so we don't run into lifetime issues. Alternative might be to have device level lock, or only release the queue in the fence release callback, however that might require pushing to another worker to avoid locking issues. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2454 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2342 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2020 (cherry picked from commit 7116c35aacedc38be6d15bd21b2fc936eed0008b)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on remove Pass the correct dev_id to free_irq() to fix this splat when the driver is unbound: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1895 free_irq Trying to free already-free IRQ 65 Call Trace: warn_slowpath_fmt free_irq goldfish_tty_remove platform_remove device_remove device_release_driver_internal device_driver_detach unbind_store drv_attr_store ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-throttle: Set BIO_THROTTLED when bio has been throttled 1.In current process, all bio will set the BIO_THROTTLED flag after __blk_throtl_bio(). 2.If bio needs to be throttled, it will start the timer and stop submit bio directly. Bio will submit in blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn() when the timer expires.But in the current process, if bio is throttled. The BIO_THROTTLED will be set to bio after timer start. If the bio has been completed, it may cause use-after-free blow. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801b8902d4 by task fio/26380 dump_stack+0x9b/0xce print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60 kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70 submit_bio_checks+0x701/0x1550 submit_bio_noacct+0x83/0xc80 submit_bio+0xa7/0x330 mpage_readahead+0x380/0x500 read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0 do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110 ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0 page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300 generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130 generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490 blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0 aio_read+0x2ad/0x450 io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60 __se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Allocated by task 26380: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x146/0x440 mempool_alloc+0x125/0x2f0 bio_alloc_bioset+0x353/0x590 mpage_alloc+0x3b/0x240 do_mpage_readpage+0xddf/0x1ef0 mpage_readahead+0x264/0x500 read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0 do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110 ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0 page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300 generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130 generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490 blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0 aio_read+0x2ad/0x450 io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60 __se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160 kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460 mempool_free+0xd6/0x320 bio_free+0xe0/0x130 bio_put+0xab/0xe0 bio_endio+0x3a6/0x5d0 blk_update_request+0x590/0x1370 scsi_end_request+0x7d/0x400 scsi_io_completion+0x1aa/0xe50 scsi_softirq_done+0x11b/0x240 blk_mq_complete_request+0xd4/0x120 scsi_mq_done+0xf0/0x200 virtscsi_vq_done+0xbc/0x150 vring_interrupt+0x179/0x390 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf7/0x490 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7b/0x160 handle_irq_event+0xcc/0x170 handle_edge_irq+0x215/0xb20 common_interrupt+0x60/0x120 asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 Fix this by move BIO_THROTTLED set into the queue_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bonding: fix use-after-free after 802.3ad slave unbind commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"), resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond. bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when __agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for, previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory. Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ), before ad_clear_agg(). The KASAN logs are as follows: [ 767.617392] ================================================================== [ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 [ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767 [ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15 [ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT) [ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler [ 767.666468] Call trace: [ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 [ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8 [ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260 [ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0 [ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs. Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the iterator's hash between writers and readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Fix potential use-after-free in nfsd_file_put() nfsd_file_put_noref() can free @nf, so don't dereference @nf immediately upon return from nfsd_file_put_noref().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty() An use-after-free issue occurred when __mark_inode_dirty() get the bdi_writeback that was in the progress of switching. CPU: 1 PID: 562 Comm: systemd-random- Not tainted 6.6.56-gb4403bd46a8e #1 ...... pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418 lr : __mark_inode_dirty+0x118/0x418 sp : ffffffc08c9dbbc0 ........ Call trace: __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418 generic_update_time+0x4c/0x60 file_modified+0xcc/0xd0 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x58/0x124 ext4_file_write_iter+0x54/0x704 vfs_write+0x1c0/0x308 ksys_write+0x74/0x10c __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x40/0xe4 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 Root cause is: systemd-random-seed kworker ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ___mark_inode_dirty inode_switch_wbs_work_fn spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); inode_attach_wb locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list get inode->i_wb spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); spin_lock(&wb->list_lock) spin_lock(&inode->i_lock) inode_io_list_move_locked spin_unlock(&wb->list_lock) spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock) spin_lock(&old_wb->list_lock) inode_do_switch_wbs spin_lock(&inode->i_lock) inode->i_wb = new_wb spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock) spin_unlock(&old_wb->list_lock) wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched) cgwb_release old wb released wb_wakeup_delayed() accesses wb, then trigger the use-after-free issue Fix this race condition by holding inode spinlock until wb_wakeup_delayed() finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: android: binder: stop saving a pointer to the VMA Do not record a pointer to a VMA outside of the mmap_lock for later use. This is unsafe and there are a number of failure paths *after* the recorded VMA pointer may be freed during setup. There is no callback to the driver to clear the saved pointer from generic mm code. Furthermore, the VMA pointer may become stale if any number of VMA operations end up freeing the VMA so saving it was fragile to being with. Instead, change the binder_alloc struct to record the start address of the VMA and use vma_lookup() to get the vma when needed. Add lockdep mmap_lock checks on updates to the vma pointer to ensure the lock is held and depend on that lock for synchronization of readers and writers - which was already the case anyways, so the smp_wmb()/smp_rmb() was not necessary. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/android/binder_alloc_selftest.c]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent race during ffs_ep0_queue_wait While performing fast composition switch, there is a possibility that the process of ffs_ep0_write/ffs_ep0_read get into a race condition due to ep0req being freed up from functionfs_unbind. Consider the scenario that the ffs_ep0_write calls the ffs_ep0_queue_wait by taking a lock &ffs->ev.waitq.lock. However, the functionfs_unbind isn't bounded so it can go ahead and mark the ep0req to NULL, and since there is no NULL check in ffs_ep0_queue_wait we will end up in use-after-free. Fix this by making a serialized execution between the two functions using a mutex_lock(ffs->mutex).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: open_tree_attr: do not allow id-mapping changes without OPEN_TREE_CLONE As described in commit 7a54947e727b ('Merge patch series "fs: allow changing idmappings"'), open_tree_attr(2) was necessary in order to allow for a detached mount to be created and have its idmappings changed without the risk of any racing threads operating on it. For this reason, mount_setattr(2) still does not allow for id-mappings to be changed. However, there was a bug in commit 2462651ffa76 ("fs: allow changing idmappings") which allowed users to bypass this restriction by calling open_tree_attr(2) *without* OPEN_TREE_CLONE. can_idmap_mount() prevented this bug from allowing an attached mountpoint's id-mapping from being modified (thanks to an is_anon_ns() check), but this still allows for detached (but visible) mounts to have their be id-mapping changed. This risks the same UAF and locking issues as described in the merge commit, and was likely unintentional.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: Fix UAF in ieee80211_scan_rx() ieee80211_scan_rx() tries to access scan_req->flags after a null check, but a UAF is observed when the scan is completed and __ieee80211_scan_completed() executes, which then calls cfg80211_scan_done() leading to the freeing of scan_req. Since scan_req is rcu_dereference()'d, prevent the racing in __ieee80211_scan_completed() by ensuring that from mac80211's POV it is no longer accessed from an RCU read critical section before we call cfg80211_scan_done().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/debug_vm_pgtable: clear page table entries at destroy_args() The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct. That in itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those entries with the *_clear functions. The problem is that leaves stale entries. If another process allocates an mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the stale entry. This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function): [ 2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000 [ 2.539366] kmem_cache info [ 2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508 [ 2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e (...) [ 2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.552816] Modules linked in: [ 2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY [ 2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries [ 2.552872] NIP: c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90 [ 2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug) [ 2.552899] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002822 XER: 0000000a [ 2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0 [ 2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff [ 2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000 [ 2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb [ 2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0 [ 2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000 [ 2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760 [ 2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 [ 2.553199] Call Trace: [ 2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable) [ 2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0 [ 2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570 [ 2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650 [ 2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290 [ 2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0 [ 2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870 [ 2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150 [ 2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50 [ 2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0 [ 2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec (...) [ 2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1 [ 2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144 Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test. That is not a problem, since the mm_stru ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubi: ubi_create_volume: Fix use-after-free when volume creation failed There is an use-after-free problem for 'eba_tbl' in ubi_create_volume()'s error handling path: ubi_eba_replace_table(vol, eba_tbl) vol->eba_tbl = tbl out_mapping: ubi_eba_destroy_table(eba_tbl) // Free 'eba_tbl' out_unlock: put_device(&vol->dev) vol_release kfree(tbl->entries) // UAF Fix it by removing redundant 'eba_tbl' releasing. Fetch a reproducer in [Link].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8712: fix use after free bugs _Read/Write_MACREG callbacks are NULL so the read/write_macreg_hdl() functions don't do anything except free the "pcmd" pointer. It results in a use after free. Delete them.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix use-after-free in chanctx code In ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(), when we have an old context and the new context's replace_state is set to IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACE_NONE, we free the old context in ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_reassign(). Therefore, we cannot check the old_ctx anymore, so we should set it to NULL after this point. However, since the new_ctx replace state is clearly not IEEE80211_CHANCTX_REPLACES_OTHER, we're not going to do anything else in this function and can just return to avoid accessing the freed old_ctx.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: pn533: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by pn532_cmd_timeout When the pn532 uart device is detaching, the pn532_uart_remove() is called. But there are no functions in pn532_uart_remove() that could delete the cmd_timeout timer, which will cause use-after-free bugs. The process is shown below: (thread 1) | (thread 2) | pn532_uart_send_frame pn532_uart_remove | mod_timer(&pn532->cmd_timeout,...) ... | (wait a time) kfree(pn532) //FREE | pn532_cmd_timeout | pn532_uart_send_frame | pn532->... //USE This patch adds del_timer_sync() in pn532_uart_remove() in order to prevent the use-after-free bugs. What's more, the pn53x_unregister_nfc() is well synchronized, it sets nfc_dev->shutting_down to true and there are no syscalls could restart the cmd_timeout timer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Fix null pointer dereference after failing to issue FLOGI and PLOGI If lpfc_issue_els_flogi() fails and returns non-zero status, the node reference count is decremented to trigger the release of the nodelist structure. However, if there is a prior registration or dev-loss-evt work pending, the node may be released prematurely. When dev-loss-evt completes, the released node is referenced causing a use-after-free null pointer dereference. Similarly, when processing non-zero ELS PLOGI completion status in lpfc_cmpl_els_plogi(), the ndlp flags are checked for a transport registration before triggering node removal. If dev-loss-evt work is pending, the node may be released prematurely and a subsequent call to lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_handler() results in a use after free ndlp dereference. Add test for pending dev-loss before decrementing the node reference count for FLOGI, PLOGI, PRLI, and ADISC handling.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: do not allow CHAIN_ID to refer to another table When doing lookups for chains on the same batch by using its ID, a chain from a different table can be used. If a rule is added to a table but refers to a chain in a different table, it will be linked to the chain in table2, but would have expressions referring to objects in table1. Then, when table1 is removed, the rule will not be removed as its linked to a chain in table2. When expressions in the rule are processed or removed, that will lead to a use-after-free. When looking for chains by ID, use the table that was used for the lookup by name, and only return chains belonging to that same table.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix KASAN use-after-free Read in compute_effective_progs Syzbot found a Use After Free bug in compute_effective_progs(). The reproducer creates a number of BPF links, and causes a fault injected alloc to fail, while calling bpf_link_detach on them. Link detach triggers the link to be freed by bpf_link_free(), which calls __cgroup_bpf_detach() and update_effective_progs(). If the memory allocation in this function fails, the function restores the pointer to the bpf_cgroup_link on the cgroup list, but the memory gets freed just after it returns. After this, every subsequent call to update_effective_progs() causes this already deallocated pointer to be dereferenced in prog_list_length(), and triggers KASAN UAF error. To fix this issue don't preserve the pointer to the prog or link in the list, but remove it and replace it with a dummy prog without shrinking the table. The subsequent call to __cgroup_bpf_detach() or __cgroup_bpf_detach() will correct it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: don't touch ->tagset in blk_mq_get_sq_hctx blk_mq_run_hw_queues() could be run when there isn't queued request and after queue is cleaned up, at that time tagset is freed, because tagset lifetime is covered by driver, and often freed after blk_cleanup_queue() returns. So don't touch ->tagset for figuring out current default hctx by the mapping built in request queue, so use-after-free on tagset can be avoided. Meantime this way should be fast than retrieving mapping from tagset.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: Run unregister_netdev() before unbind() again Commit 2c9d6c2b871d ("usbnet: run unbind() before unregister_netdev()") sought to fix a use-after-free on disconnect of USB Ethernet adapters. It turns out that a different fix is necessary to address the issue: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/18b3541e5372bc9b9fc733d422f4e698c089077c.1650177997.git.lukas@wunner.de/ So the commit was not necessary. The commit made binding and unbinding of USB Ethernet asymmetrical: Before, usbnet_probe() first invoked the ->bind() callback and then register_netdev(). usbnet_disconnect() mirrored that by first invoking unregister_netdev() and then ->unbind(). Since the commit, the order in usbnet_disconnect() is reversed and no longer mirrors usbnet_probe(). One consequence is that a PHY disconnected (and stopped) in ->unbind() is afterwards stopped once more by unregister_netdev() as it closes the netdev before unregistering. That necessitates a contortion in ->stop() because the PHY may only be stopped if it hasn't already been disconnected. Reverting the commit allows making the call to phy_stop() unconditional in ->stop().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix use-after-free on amdgpu_bo_list mutex If amdgpu_cs_vm_handling returns r != 0, then it will unlock the bo_list_mutex inside the function amdgpu_cs_vm_handling and again on amdgpu_cs_parser_fini. This problem results in the following use-after-free problem: [ 220.280990] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 220.281000] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 220.281019] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3746 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110 [ 220.281029] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 220.281415] CPU: 1 PID: 3746 Comm: chrome:cs0 Tainted: G W L ------- --- 5.20.0-0.rc0.20220812git7ebfc85e2cd7.10.fc38.x86_64 #1 [ 220.281421] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X570-I GAMING, BIOS 4403 04/27/2022 [ 220.281426] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110 [ 220.281431] Code: 01 01 e8 79 4a 6f 00 0f 0b e9 42 47 a5 00 80 3d de 7e be 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 98 8e 98 c6 05 ce 7e be 01 01 e8 56 4a 6f 00 <0f> 0b e9 1f 47 a5 00 80 3d b9 7e be 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 [ 220.281437] RSP: 0018:ffffb4b0d18d7a80 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 220.281443] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 220.281448] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff988d06dc RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 220.281452] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb4b0d18d7930 [ 220.281457] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffa0672e2fffe8 R12: ffffa058ca360400 [ 220.281461] R13: ffffa05846c50a18 R14: 00000000fffffe00 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 220.281465] FS: 00007f82683e06c0(0000) GS:ffffa066e2e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 220.281470] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 220.281475] CR2: 00003590005cc000 CR3: 00000001fca46000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 220.281480] Call Trace: [ 220.281485] <TASK> [ 220.281490] amdgpu_cs_ioctl+0x4e2/0x2070 [amdgpu] [ 220.281806] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu] [ 220.282028] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa4/0x150 [ 220.282043] drm_ioctl+0x21f/0x420 [ 220.282053] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu] [ 220.282275] ? lock_release+0x14f/0x460 [ 220.282282] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60 [ 220.282290] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60 [ 220.282297] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 220.282305] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60 [ 220.282317] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4a/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 220.282534] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0 [ 220.282545] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80 [ 220.282551] ? futex_wake+0x6c/0x150 [ 220.282568] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140 [ 220.282580] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 220.282585] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 220.282592] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 220.282597] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 220.282602] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 220.282609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 220.282616] RIP: 0033:0x7f8282a4f8bf [ 220.282639] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 18 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00 [ 220.282644] RSP: 002b:00007f82683df410 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 220.282651] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f82683df588 RCX: 00007f8282a4f8bf [ 220.282655] RDX: 00007f82683df4d0 RSI: 00000000c0186444 RDI: 0000000000000018 [ 220.282659] RBP: 00007f82683df4d0 R08: 00007f82683df5e0 R09: 00007f82683df4b0 [ 220.282663] R10: 00001d04000a0600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c0186444 [ 220.282667] R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00007f82683df588 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 220.282689] </TASK> [ 220.282693] irq event stamp: 6232311 [ 220.282697] hardirqs last enabled at (6232319): [<ffffffff9718cd7e>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0x70 [ 220.282704] hardirqs last disabled at (6232326): [<ffffffff9718cd63>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0x70 [ 220.282709] softirqs last enabled at (6232072): [<ffffffff970ff669>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf9/0x170 [ 220.282716] softirqs last disabled at (6232061): [<ffffffff97 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers:md:fix a potential use-after-free bug In line 2884, "raid5_release_stripe(sh);" drops the reference to sh and may cause sh to be released. However, sh is subsequently used in lines 2886 "if (sh->batch_head && sh != sh->batch_head)". This may result in an use-after-free bug. It can be fixed by moving "raid5_release_stripe(sh);" to the bottom of the function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macsec: fix UAF bug for real_dev Create a new macsec device but not get reference to real_dev. That can not ensure that real_dev is freed after macsec. That will trigger the UAF bug for real_dev as following: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662 Call Trace: ... macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662 dev_get_iflink+0x73/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:637 default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:42 [inline] rfc2863_policy+0x233/0x2d0 net/core/link_watch.c:54 linkwatch_do_dev+0x2a/0x150 net/core/link_watch.c:161 Allocated by task 22209: ... alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10549 rtnl_create_link+0x9d7/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3235 veth_newlink+0x20e/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1748 Freed by task 8: ... kfree+0xd6/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4552 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:615 device_release+0x9f/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2229 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:673 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:704 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x1c8/0x540 lib/kobject.c:721 netdev_run_todo+0x72e/0x10b0 net/core/dev.c:10327 After commit faab39f63c1f ("net: allow out-of-order netdev unregistration") and commit e5f80fcf869a ("ipv6: give an IPv6 dev to blackhole_netdev"), we can add dev_hold_track() in macsec_dev_init() and dev_put_track() in macsec_free_netdev() to fix the problem.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mt76: fix use-after-free by removing a non-RCU wcid pointer Fixes an issue caught by KASAN about use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule by protecting mtxq->wcid with rcu_lock between mt76_txq_schedule and sta_info_[alloc, free]. [18853.876689] ================================================================== [18853.876751] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76] [18853.876773] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffaf989a2138 by task mt76-tx phy0/883 [18853.876786] [18853.876810] CPU: 5 PID: 883 Comm: mt76-tx phy0 Not tainted 5.10.100-fix-510-56778d365941-kasan #5 0b01fbbcf41a530f52043508fec2e31a4215 [18853.876840] Call trace: [18853.876861] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3ec [18853.876878] show_stack+0x20/0x2c [18853.876899] dump_stack+0x11c/0x1ac [18853.876918] print_address_description+0x74/0x514 [18853.876934] kasan_report+0x134/0x174 [18853.876948] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x44/0x50 [18853.876976] mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877002] mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x2c/0x48 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877030] mt7921_tx_worker+0xa0/0x1cc [mt7921_common f0875ebac9d7b4754e1010549e7db50fbd90a047] [18853.877054] __mt76_worker_fn+0x190/0x22c [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2] [18853.877071] kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8 [18853.877087] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 [18853.877098] [18853.877112] Allocated by task 941: [18853.877131] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68 [18853.877147] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xfc [18853.877163] kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c [18853.877177] __kmalloc+0x264/0x3c4 [18853.877294] sta_info_alloc+0x460/0xf88 [mac80211] [18853.877410] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x204/0x1ee0 [mac80211] [18853.877523] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x6c4/0xa4c [mac80211] [18853.877635] ieee80211_auth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211] [18853.877733] rdev_auth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211] [18853.877826] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x26c/0x390 [cfg80211] [18853.877919] nl80211_authenticate+0x6d4/0x904 [cfg80211] [18853.877938] genl_rcv_msg+0x748/0x93c [18853.877954] netlink_rcv_skb+0x160/0x2a8 [18853.877969] genl_rcv+0x3c/0x54 [18853.877985] netlink_unicast_kernel+0x104/0x1ec [18853.877999] netlink_unicast+0x178/0x268 [18853.878015] netlink_sendmsg+0x3cc/0x5f0 [18853.878030] sock_sendmsg+0xb4/0xd8 [18853.878043] ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x53c [18853.878058] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150 [18853.878071] __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x1f4 [18853.878087] __arm64_compat_sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x9c [18853.878101] el0_svc_common+0x1b4/0x390 [18853.878115] do_el0_svc_compat+0x8c/0xdc [18853.878131] el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c [18853.878146] el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc [18853.878161] el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0 [18853.878171] [18853.878183] Freed by task 10927: [18853.878200] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68 [18853.878215] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c [18853.878228] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48 [18853.878244] __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x154 [18853.878259] kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x24 [18853.878273] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xac/0x1b0 [18853.878287] kfree+0x104/0x390 [18853.878402] sta_info_free+0x198/0x210 [mac80211] [18853.878515] __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x230/0x2d4 [mac80211] [18853.878628] __sta_info_flush+0x300/0x37c [mac80211] [18853.878740] ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x2cc/0xa7c [mac80211] [18853.878851] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x4a4/0x10a0 [mac80211] [18853.878962] ieee80211_deauth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211] [18853.879057] rdev_deauth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211] [18853.879150] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x274/0x414 [cfg80211] [18853.879243] cfg80211_mlme_down+0xe4/0x118 [cfg80211] [18853.879335] cfg80211_disconnect+0x218/0x2d8 [cfg80211] [18853.879427] __cfg80211_leave+0x17c/0x240 [cfg80211] [18853.879519] cfg80211_leave+0x3c/0x58 [cfg80211] [18853.879611] wiphy_suspend+0xdc/0x200 [cfg80211] [18853.879628] dpm_run_callback+0x58/0x408 [18853.879642] __device_suspend+0x4cc/0x864 [18853.879658] async_suspend+0x34/0xf4 [18 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: video: fbdev: vesafb: Fix a use-after-free due early fb_info cleanup Commit b3c9a924aab6 ("fbdev: vesafb: Cleanup fb_info in .fb_destroy rather than .remove") fixed a use-after-free error due the vesafb driver freeing the fb_info in the .remove handler instead of doing it in .fb_destroy. This can happen if the .fb_destroy callback is executed after the .remove callback, since the former tries to access a pointer freed by the latter. But that change didn't take into account that another possible scenario is that .fb_destroy is called before the .remove callback. For example, if no process has the fbdev chardev opened by the time the driver is removed. If that's the case, fb_info will be freed when unregister_framebuffer() is called, making the fb_info pointer accessed in vesafb_remove() after that to no longer be valid. To prevent that, move the expression containing the info->par to happen before the unregister_framebuffer() function call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: core: Fix use-after-free in snd_soc_exit() KASAN reports a use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in device_del+0xb5b/0xc60 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888008655050 by task rmmod/387 CPU: 2 PID: 387 Comm: rmmod Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0x9a print_report+0x17f/0x47b kasan_report+0xbb/0xf0 device_del+0xb5b/0xc60 platform_device_del.part.0+0x24/0x200 platform_device_unregister+0x2e/0x40 snd_soc_exit+0xa/0x22 [snd_soc_core] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x34f/0x5b0 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... </TASK> It's bacause in snd_soc_init(), snd_soc_util_init() is possble to fail, but its ret is ignored, which makes soc_dummy_dev unregistered twice. snd_soc_init() snd_soc_util_init() platform_device_register_simple(soc_dummy_dev) platform_driver_register() # fail platform_device_unregister(soc_dummy_dev) platform_driver_register() # success ... snd_soc_exit() snd_soc_util_exit() # soc_dummy_dev will be unregistered for second time To fix it, handle error and stop snd_soc_init() when util_init() fail. Also clean debugfs when util_init() or driver_register() fail.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: Fix use after free in remove_phb_dynamic() In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed.