A vulnerability has been identified in Capital Embedded AR Classic 431-422 (All versions), Capital Embedded AR Classic R20-11 (All versions < V2303), Nucleus NET (All versions), Nucleus ReadyStart V3 (All versions < V2017.02.4), Nucleus ReadyStart V4 (All versions < V4.1.0), Nucleus Source Code (All versions including affected IPv6 stack). The function that processes the Hop-by-Hop extension header in IPv6 packets and its options lacks any checks against the length field of the header, allowing attackers to put the function into an infinite loop by supplying arbitrary length values.

Marked is a markdown parser and compiler. From 18.0.0 to 18.0.1, a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in marked. By providing a specific 3-byte input sequence a tab, a vertical tab, and a newline (\x09\x0b\n)—an unauthenticated attacker can trigger an infinite recursion loop during parsing. This leads to unbounded memory allocation, causing the host Node.js application to crash via Memory Exhaustion (OOM). This vulnerability is fixed in 18.0.2.

When a Client SSL profile is configured with Allow Dynamic Record Sizing on a UDP virtual server, undisclosed traffic can cause the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) to terminate.  Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

When reading binary Ion data through Amazon.IonDotnet using the RawBinaryReader class, Amazon.IonDotnet does not check the number of bytes read from the underlying stream while deserializing the binary format. If the Ion data is malformed or truncated, this triggers an infinite loop condition that could potentially result in a denial of service. Users should upgrade to Amazon.IonDotnet version 1.3.1 and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via worker process exhaustion. 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':do_read_chunked_data!/5 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex terminates only when the last-chunk line 0\r\n is followed immediately by the empty trailer line \r\n. RFC 9112 §7.1.2 permits zero or more trailer fields between them. When trailers are present, none of the match clauses fit: the catch-all arm computes a negative to_read, calls read_available!/2, receives <<>> on timeout, and tail-recurses with unchanged state. The worker process is pinned for the lifetime of the TCP connection. A handful of concurrent connections sending RFC-conformant chunked requests with trailer fields is sufficient to exhaust the Bandit worker pool and render the server unresponsive to all further traffic. No authentication, special headers, or large payload is required. Proxies such as NGINX and HAProxy legitimately forward trailer-bearing requests, so servers behind such proxies may be affected without any malicious client involvement. This issue affects bandit: from 1.6.1 before 1.11.1.

facil.io is a C micro-framework for web applications. Prior to commit 5128747363055201d3ecf0e29bf0a961703c9fa0, `fio_json_parse` can enter an infinite loop when it encounters a nested JSON value starting with `i` or `I`. The process spins in user space and pegs one CPU core at ~100% instead of returning a parse error. Because `iodine` vendors the same parser code, the issue also affects `iodine` when it parses attacker-controlled JSON. The smallest reproducer I found is `[i`. The quoted-value form that originally exposed the issue, `[""i`, reaches the same bug because the parser tolerates missing commas and then treats the trailing `i` as the start of another value. Commit 5128747363055201d3ecf0e29bf0a961703c9fa0 fixes the issue.

A vulnerability has been identified in Capital Embedded AR Classic 431-422 (All versions), Capital Embedded AR Classic R20-11 (All versions < V2303), Nucleus NET (All versions), Nucleus ReadyStart V3 (All versions < V2017.02.4), Nucleus ReadyStart V4 (All versions < V4.1.0), Nucleus Source Code (All versions including affected IPv6 stack). The function that processes IPv6 headers does not check the lengths of extension header options, allowing attackers to put this function into an infinite loop with crafted length values.

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.