In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/omap: Fix buffer overflow in debugfs There are two issues here: 1) The "len" variable needs to be checked before the very first write. Otherwise if omap2_iommu_dump_ctx() with "bytes" less than 32 it is a buffer overflow. 2) The snprintf() function returns the number of bytes that *would* have been copied if there were enough space. But we want to know the number of bytes which were *actually* copied so use scnprintf() instead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() Add a paranoia check to make sure it doesn't stray beyond valid memory region containing ocfs2 xattr entries when scanning for a match. It will prevent out-of-bound access in case of crafted images.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iomap: iomap: fix memory corruption when recording errors during writeback Every now and then I see this crash on arm64: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8 Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733687, async page read Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 42-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000139750000 [00000000000000f8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733688, async page read Dumping ftrace buffer: Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 8733689, async page read (ftrace buffer empty) XFS (dm-0): log I/O error -5 Modules linked in: dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data XFS (dm-0): Metadata I/O Error (0x1) detected at xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x1ec/0x590 [xfs] (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:296). dm_bio_prison XFS (dm-0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (dm-0): xfs_imap_lookup: xfs_ialloc_read_agi() returned error -5, agno 0 dm_bufio dm_log_writes xfs nft_chain_nat xt_REDIRECT nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. nf_reject_ipv6 potentially unexpected fatal signal 6. ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 CPU: 1 PID: 122166 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7 rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss xt_tcpudp ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xt_set nft_compat ip_set_hash_mac ip_set nf_tables Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 pstate: 60001000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) ip_tables pc : 000003fd6d7df200 x_tables lr : 000003fd6d7df1ec overlay nfsv4 CPU: 0 PID: 54031 Comm: u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc5-djwa #rc5 3004c9f1de887ebae86015f2677638ce51ee7405 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn sp : 000003ffd9522fd0 (flush-253:0) pstate: 60401005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 x29: 000003ffd9522fd0 x28: 0000000000000023 x27: 000002acefeb6780 x26: 0000000000000005 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000005 lr : __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 x21: 0000000000000006 sp : fffffe000f80f760 x29: fffffe000f80f760 x28: 0000000000000003 x27: fffffe000f80f9f8 x26: 0000000002523000 x25: 00000000fffffffb x24: fffffe000f80f868 x23: fffffe000f80fbb0 x22: fffffc0180c26a78 x21: 0000000002530000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000470af3 x12: fffffc0058f70000 x11: 0000000000000040 x10: 0000000000001b20 x9 : fffffe000836b288 x8 : fffffc00eb9fd480 x7 : 0000000000f83659 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000869 x4 : 0000000000000005 x3 : 00000000000000f8 x20: 000003fd6d740020 x19: 000000000001dd36 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 000003fd6d78704c x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 000002acfac87668 x2 : 0000000000000ffa x1 : 00000000fffffffb x0 : 00000000000000f8 Call trace: errseq_set+0x1c/0x100 __filemap_set_wb_err+0x24/0xe0 iomap_do_writepage+0x5e4/0xd5c write_cache_pages+0x208/0x674 iomap_writepages+0x34/0x60 xfs_vm_writepages+0x8c/0xcc [xfs 7a861f39c43631f15d3a5884246ba5035d4ca78b] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2064656e72757465 x12: 0000000000002180 x11: 000003fd6d8a82d0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 000003fd6d8ae288 x8 : 0000000000000083 x7 : 00000000ffffffff x6 : 00000000ffffffee x5 : 00000000fbad2887 x4 : 000003fd6d9abb58 x3 : 000003fd6d740020 x2 : 0000000000000006 x1 : 000000000001dd36 x0 : 0000000000000000 CPU: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential stack-out-of-bounds in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds() This patch fixes a stack-out-of-bounds read in brcmfmac that occurs when 'buf' that is not null-terminated is passed as an argument of strsep() in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(). This buffer is filled with a firmware version string by memcpy() in brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get(). The patch ensures buf is null-terminated. Found by a modified version of syzkaller. [ 47.569679][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43236b for chip BCM43236/3 [ 47.582839][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_process_clm_blob: no clm_blob available (err=-2), device may have limited channels available [ 47.601565][ T1897] ================================================================== [ 47.602574][ T1897] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0 [ 47.603447][ T1897] Read of size 1 at addr ffffc90001f6f000 by task kworker/0:2/1897 [ 47.604336][ T1897] [ 47.604621][ T1897] CPU: 0 PID: 1897 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #131 [ 47.605617][ T1897] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 47.606907][ T1897] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 47.607453][ T1897] Call Trace: [ 47.607801][ T1897] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1 [ 47.608295][ T1897] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x334 [ 47.609009][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0 [ 47.609434][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0 [ 47.609863][ T1897] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 47.610366][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0 [ 47.610882][ T1897] strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0 [ 47.611300][ T1897] ? brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get+0x3a/0xf0 [ 47.611883][ T1897] brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x995/0xc40 [ 47.612434][ T1897] ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100 [ 47.613078][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 [ 47.613662][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 47.614208][ T1897] ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0 [ 47.614704][ T1897] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 47.615236][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260 [ 47.615741][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0 [ 47.616288][ T1897] brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40 [ 47.616758][ T1897] ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1703/0x1dd0 [ 47.617280][ T1897] ? kmemdup+0x43/0x50 [ 47.617720][ T1897] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 [ 47.618244][ T1897] ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470 [ 47.618901][ T1897] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760 [ 47.619429][ T1897] ? usb_probe_device+0x250/0x250 [ 47.619950][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 47.620435][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130 [ 47.621048][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 47.621595][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130 [ 47.622209][ T1897] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 47.622739][ T1897] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 47.623287][ T1897] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 47.623796][ T1897] ? bus_rescan_devices+0x30/0x30 [ 47.624309][ T1897] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 [ 47.624907][ T1897] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x160 [ 47.625437][ T1897] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0 [ 47.625924][ T1897] ? device_bind_driver+0xd0/0xd0 [ 47.626433][ T1897] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x287/0x14b0 [ 47.627057][ T1897] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290 [ 47.627557][ T1897] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0 [ 47.628027][ T1897] ? wait_for_completion+0x290/0x290 [ 47.628593][ T1897] ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x5a0/0x5a0 [ 47.629249][ T1897] usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0 [ 47.629829][ T1897] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0 [ 47.630385][ T1897] usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250 [ 47.630927][ T1897] ? usb_suspend+0x590/0x590 [ 47.631397][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 47.631855][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130 [ 47.632469][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 47.633002][ ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Protect against send buffer overflow in NFSv2 READ Since before the git era, NFSD has conserved the number of pages held by each nfsd thread by combining the RPC receive and send buffers into a single array of pages. This works because there are no cases where an operation needs a large RPC Call message and a large RPC Reply at the same time. Once an RPC Call has been received, svc_process() updates svc_rqst::rq_res to describe the part of rq_pages that can be used for constructing the Reply. This means that the send buffer (rq_res) shrinks when the received RPC record containing the RPC Call is large. A client can force this shrinkage on TCP by sending a correctly- formed RPC Call header contained in an RPC record that is excessively large. The full maximum payload size cannot be constructed in that case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: intel_th: msu: Fix vmalloced buffers After commit f5ff79fddf0e ("dma-mapping: remove CONFIG_DMA_REMAP") there's a chance of DMA buffer getting allocated via vmalloc(), which messes up the mmapping code: > RIP: msc_mmap_fault [intel_th_msu] > Call Trace: > <TASK> > __do_fault > do_fault ... Fix this by accounting for vmalloc possibility.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: media: dvb-frontends/rtl2830: fix an out-of-bounds write error Ensure index in rtl2830_pid_filter does not exceed 31 to prevent out-of-bounds access. dev->filters is a 32-bit value, so set_bit and clear_bit functions should only operate on indices from 0 to 31. If index is 32, it will attempt to access a non-existent 33rd bit, leading to out-of-bounds access. Change the boundary check from index > 32 to index >= 32 to resolve this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: sja1105: fix buffer overflow in sja1105_setup_devlink_regions() If an error occurs in dsa_devlink_region_create(), then 'priv->regions' array will be accessed by negative index '-1'. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/hdmi: fix memory corruption with too many bridges Add the missing sanity check on the bridge counter to avoid corrupting data beyond the fixed-sized bridge array in case there are ever more than eight bridges. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/502670/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: oss: Fix PCM OSS buffer allocation overflow We've got syzbot reports hitting INT_MAX overflow at vmalloc() allocation that is called from snd_pcm_plug_alloc(). Although we apply the restrictions to input parameters, it's based only on the hw_params of the underlying PCM device. Since the PCM OSS layer allocates a temporary buffer for the data conversion, the size may become unexpectedly large when more channels or higher rates is given; in the reported case, it went over INT_MAX, hence it hits WARN_ON(). This patch is an attempt to avoid such an overflow and an allocation for too large buffers. First off, it adds the limit of 1MB as the upper bound for period bytes. This must be large enough for all use cases, and we really don't want to handle a larger temporary buffer than this size. The size check is performed at two places, where the original period bytes is calculated and where the plugin buffer size is calculated. In addition, the driver uses array_size() and array3_size() for multiplications to catch overflows for the converted period size and buffer bytes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: fastrpc: fix memory corruption on probe Add the missing sanity check on the probed-session count to avoid corrupting memory beyond the fixed-size slab-allocated session array when there are more than FASTRPC_MAX_SESSIONS sessions defined in the devicetree.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gem: add missing boundary check in vm_access A missing bounds check in vm_access() can lead to an out-of-bounds read or write in the adjacent memory area, since the len attribute is not validated before the memcpy later in the function, potentially hitting: [ 183.637831] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000c86000 [ 183.637934] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 183.637997] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 183.638059] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100258067 PMD 106341067 PTE 0 [ 183.638144] Oops: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 183.638201] CPU: 3 PID: 1790 Comm: poc Tainted: G D 5.17.0-rc6-ci-drm-11296+ #1 [ 183.638298] Hardware name: Intel Corporation CoffeeLake Client Platform/CoffeeLake H DDR4 RVP, BIOS CNLSFWR1.R00.X208.B00.1905301319 05/30/2019 [ 183.638430] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 183.640213] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001763d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 183.641117] RAX: ffff888109c14000 RBX: ffff888111bece40 RCX: 0000000000000ffc [ 183.642029] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffc90000c86000 RDI: ffff888109c14004 [ 183.642946] RBP: 0000000000000ffc R08: 800000000000016b R09: 0000000000000000 [ 183.643848] R10: ffffc90000c85000 R11: 0000000000000048 R12: 0000000000001000 [ 183.644742] R13: ffff888111bed190 R14: ffff888109c14000 R15: 0000000000001000 [ 183.645653] FS: 00007fe5ef807540(0000) GS:ffff88845b380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 183.646570] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 183.647481] CR2: ffffc90000c86000 CR3: 000000010ff02006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 183.648384] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 183.649271] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 183.650142] Call Trace: [ 183.650988] <TASK> [ 183.651793] vm_access+0x1f0/0x2a0 [i915] [ 183.652726] __access_remote_vm+0x224/0x380 [ 183.653561] mem_rw.isra.0+0xf9/0x190 [ 183.654402] vfs_read+0x9d/0x1b0 [ 183.655238] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0 [ 183.656065] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 [ 183.656882] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 183.657663] RIP: 0033:0x7fe5ef725142 [ 183.659351] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1e81c7e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 183.660227] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557055dfb780 RCX: 00007fe5ef725142 [ 183.661104] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffe1e81d880 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 183.661972] RBP: 00007ffe1e81e890 R08: 0000000000000030 R09: 0000000000000046 [ 183.662832] R10: 0000557055dfc2e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000557055dfb1c0 [ 183.663691] R13: 00007ffe1e81e980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Changes since v1: - Updated if condition with range_overflows_t [Chris Wilson] [mauld: tidy up the commit message and add Cc: stable] (cherry picked from commit 661412e301e2ca86799aa4f400d1cf0bd38c57c6)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: Fix a slab-out-of-bounds write bug in udf_find_entry() Syzbot reported a slab-out-of-bounds Write bug: loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2048 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in udf_find_entry+0x8a5/0x14f0 fs/udf/namei.c:253 Write of size 105 at addr ffff8880123ff896 by task syz-executor323/3610 CPU: 0 PID: 3610 Comm: syz-executor323 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-syzkaller-00105-gb229b6ca5abb #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/11/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495 kasan_check_range+0x2a7/0x2e0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 memcpy+0x3c/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66 udf_find_entry+0x8a5/0x14f0 fs/udf/namei.c:253 udf_lookup+0xef/0x340 fs/udf/namei.c:309 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3391 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline] path_openat+0x10e6/0x2df0 fs/namei.c:3710 do_filp_open+0x264/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:3740 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1310 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1326 [inline] __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1402 [inline] __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1396 [inline] __x64_sys_creat+0x11f/0x160 fs/open.c:1396 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7ffab0d164d9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe1a7e6bb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffab0d164d9 RDX: 00007ffab0d164d9 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000180 RBP: 00007ffab0cd5a10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00005555573552c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffab0cd5aa0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 3610: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x97/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:576 [inline] udf_find_entry+0x7b6/0x14f0 fs/udf/namei.c:243 udf_lookup+0xef/0x340 fs/udf/namei.c:309 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3391 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline] path_openat+0x10e6/0x2df0 fs/namei.c:3710 do_filp_open+0x264/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:3740 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1310 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1326 [inline] __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1402 [inline] __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1396 [inline] __x64_sys_creat+0x11f/0x160 fs/open.c:1396 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880123ff800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 150 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff8880123ff800, ffff8880123ff900) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea000048ff80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x123fe head:ffffea000048ff80 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 ffffea00004b8500 dead000000000003 ffff888012041b40 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x0(), pid 1, tgid 1 (swapper/0), ts 1841222404, free_ts 0 create_dummy_stack mm/page_owner.c: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr Use the actual length of volume coherency data when setting the xattr to avoid the following KASAN report. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] Write of size 4 at addr ffff888101e02af4 by task kworker/6:0/1347 CPU: 6 PID: 1347 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-nfs-fscache-netfs+ #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events fscache_create_volume_work [fscache] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db ? __lock_text_start+0x8/0x8 ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] kasan_report+0xab/0x120 ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0 memcpy+0x39/0x60 cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles] ? __cachefiles_free_volume+0x90/0x90 [cachefiles] fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache] process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0 worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650 ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 kthread+0x16c/0x1a0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1347: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0x76/0x350 [cachefiles] cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles] fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache] process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0 worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650 kthread+0x16c/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888101e02af0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of 8-byte region [ffff888101e02af0, ffff888101e02af8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a2292d70 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x101e02 flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100042280 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080660066 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888101e02980: fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc ffff888101e02a00: 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 >ffff888101e02a80: fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 04 fc ^ ffff888101e02b00: fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc ffff888101e02b80: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc ==================================================================

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: be2net: Fix buffer overflow in be_get_module_eeprom be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data assumes that it is given a buffer that is at least PAGE_DATA_LEN long, or twice that if the module supports SFF 8472. However, this is not always the case. Fix this by passing the desired offset and length to be_cmd_read_port_transceiver_data so that we only copy the bytes once.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lapbether: fix issue of invalid opcode in lapbeth_open() If lapb_register() failed when lapb device goes to up for the first time, the NAPI is not disabled. As a result, the invalid opcode issue is reported when the lapb device goes to up for the second time. The stack info is as follows: [ 1958.311422][T11356] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6442! [ 1958.312206][T11356] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [ 1958.315979][T11356] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x16a/0x1f0 [ 1958.332310][T11356] Call Trace: [ 1958.332817][T11356] <TASK> [ 1958.336135][T11356] lapbeth_open+0x18/0x90 [ 1958.337446][T11356] __dev_open+0x258/0x490 [ 1958.341672][T11356] __dev_change_flags+0x4d4/0x6a0 [ 1958.345325][T11356] dev_change_flags+0x93/0x160 [ 1958.346027][T11356] devinet_ioctl+0x1276/0x1bf0 [ 1958.346738][T11356] inet_ioctl+0x1c8/0x2d0 [ 1958.349638][T11356] sock_ioctl+0x5d1/0x750 [ 1958.356059][T11356] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3ec/0x1790 [ 1958.365594][T11356] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 1958.366239][T11356] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 1958.377381][T11356] </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: entry: avoid kprobe recursion The cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() function is called when handling debug exceptions (and synchronous exceptions from BRK instructions), and so is called when a probed function executes. If the compiler does not inline cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler(), it can be probed. If cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is probed, any debug exception or software breakpoint exception will result in recursive exceptions leading to a stack overflow. This can be triggered with the ftrace multiple_probes selftest, and as per the example splat below. This is a regression caused by commit: 6459b8469753e9fe ("arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround") ... which removed the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() annotation associated with the function. My intent was that cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() would be inlined into its caller, el1_dbg(), which is marked noinstr and cannot be probed. Mark cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() as __always_inline to ensure this. Example splat prior to this patch (with recursive entries elided): | # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events | # echo p do_el0_svc >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events | # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/enable | Insufficient stack space to handle exception! | ESR: 0x0000000096000047 -- DABT (current EL) | FAR: 0xffff800009cefff0 | Task stack: [0xffff800009cf0000..0xffff800009cf4000] | IRQ stack: [0xffff800008000000..0xffff800008004000] | Overflow stack: [0xffff00007fbc00f0..0xffff00007fbc10f0] | CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20 | lr : el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c | sp : ffff800009cf0000 | x29: ffff800009cf0000 x28: ffff000002c74740 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 00000000604003c5 x22: ffff80000801745c x21: 0000aaaac95ac068 | x20: 00000000f2000004 x19: ffff800009cf0040 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 | x11: 0000000000000010 x10: ffff800008c87190 x9 : ffff800008ca00d0 | x8 : 000000000000003c x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000043a4 | x2 : 00000000f2000004 x1 : 00000000f2000004 x0 : ffff800009cf0040 | Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow | CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0xe4/0x104 | show_stack+0x18/0x4c | dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c | dump_stack+0x18/0x38 | panic+0x14c/0x338 | test_taint+0x0/0x2c | panic_bad_stack+0x104/0x118 | handle_bad_stack+0x34/0x48 | __bad_stack+0x78/0x7c | arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34 ... | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34 ... | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | do_el0_svc+0x0/0x28 | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 | el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x0080,00005021,19001080 | Memory Limit: none | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow ]--- With this patch, cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is inlined into el1_dbg(), and el1_dbg() cannot be probed: | # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events | sh: write error: No such file or directory | # grep -w cortex_a76_errat ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-clt: Reset cid to con_num - 1 to stay in bounds In the function init_conns(), after the create_con() and create_cm() for loop if something fails. In the cleanup for loop after the destroy tag, we access out of bound memory because cid is set to clt_path->s.con_num. This commits resets the cid to clt_path->s.con_num - 1, to stay in bounds in the cleanup loop later.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: core: Fix boundary conditions in interpolation The functions power_supply_temp2resist_simple and power_supply_ocv2cap_simple handle boundary conditions incorrectly. The change was introduced in a4585ba2050f460f749bbaf2b67bd56c41e30283 ("power: supply: core: Use library interpolation"). There are two issues: First, the lines "high = i - 1" and "high = i" in ocv2cap have the wrong order compared to temp2resist. As a consequence, ocv2cap sets high=-1 if ocv>table[0].ocv, which causes an out-of-bounds read. Second, the logic of temp2resist is also not correct. Consider the case table[] = {{20, 100}, {10, 80}, {0, 60}}. For temp=5, we expect a resistance of 70% by interpolation. However, temp2resist sets high=low=2 and returns 60.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix memory corruption in VF driver Disable VF's RX/TX queues, when it's disabled. VF can have queues enabled, when it requests a reset. If PF driver assumes that VF is disabled, while VF still has queues configured, VF may unmap DMA resources. In such scenario device still can map packets to memory, which ends up silently corrupting it. Previously, VF driver could experience memory corruption, which lead to crash: [ 5119.170157] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00001b9780003237 [ 5119.170166] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5119.170173] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI [ 5119.170181] CPU: 30 PID: 427592 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I --------- - - 4.18.0-372.9.1.rt7.166.el8.x86_64 #1 [ 5119.170189] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/014X06, BIOS 2.3.10 08/15/2019 [ 5119.170193] Workqueue: iavf iavf_adminq_task [iavf] [ 5119.170219] RIP: 0010:__page_frag_cache_drain+0x5/0x30 [ 5119.170238] Code: 0f 0f b6 77 51 85 f6 74 07 31 d2 e9 05 df ff ff e9 90 fe ff ff 48 8b 05 49 db 33 01 eb b4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <f0> 29 77 34 74 01 c3 48 8b 07 f6 c4 80 74 0f 0f b6 77 51 85 f6 74 [ 5119.170244] RSP: 0018:ffffa43b0bdcfd78 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 5119.170250] RAX: ffffffff896b3e40 RBX: ffff8fb282524000 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 5119.170254] RDX: 0000000049000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00001b9780003203 [ 5119.170259] RBP: ffff8fb248217b00 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 0000000000000009 [ 5119.170262] R10: 2b849d6300000000 R11: 0000000000000020 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 5119.170265] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000000009 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 5119.170269] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fb1201c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5119.170274] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5119.170279] CR2: 00001b9780003237 CR3: 00000008f3e1a003 CR4: 00000000007726e0 [ 5119.170283] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5119.170286] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5119.170290] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5119.170292] Call Trace: [ 5119.170298] iavf_clean_rx_ring+0xad/0x110 [iavf] [ 5119.170324] iavf_free_rx_resources+0xe/0x50 [iavf] [ 5119.170342] iavf_free_all_rx_resources.part.51+0x30/0x40 [iavf] [ 5119.170358] iavf_virtchnl_completion+0xd8a/0x15b0 [iavf] [ 5119.170377] ? iavf_clean_arq_element+0x210/0x280 [iavf] [ 5119.170397] iavf_adminq_task+0x126/0x2e0 [iavf] [ 5119.170416] process_one_work+0x18f/0x420 [ 5119.170429] worker_thread+0x30/0x370 [ 5119.170437] ? process_one_work+0x420/0x420 [ 5119.170445] kthread+0x151/0x170 [ 5119.170452] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 [ 5119.170460] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 5119.170477] Modules linked in: iavf sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel mlx4_en mlx4_core nfp tls vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM ipt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dell_smbios wmi_bmof dell_wmi_descriptor dcdbas kvm_intel kvm irqbypass intel_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac irdma nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal i40e intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl ipmi_ssif intel_cstate intel_uncore mei_me pcspkr acpi_ipmi ib_core mei lpc_ich i2c_i801 ipmi_si ipmi_devintf wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ice ahci drm libahci crc32c_intel libata tg3 megaraid_sas [ 5119.170613] i2c_algo_bit dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [last unloaded: iavf] [ 5119.170627] CR2: 00001b9780003237

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm integrity: fix memory corruption when tag_size is less than digest size It is possible to set up dm-integrity in such a way that the "tag_size" parameter is less than the actual digest size. In this situation, a part of the digest beyond tag_size is ignored. In this case, dm-integrity would write beyond the end of the ic->recalc_tags array and corrupt memory. The corruption happened in integrity_recalc->integrity_sector_checksum->crypto_shash_final. Fix this corruption by increasing the tags array so that it has enough padding at the end to accomodate the loop in integrity_recalc() being able to write a full digest size for the last member of the tags array.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390: avoid using global register for current_stack_pointer Commit 30de14b1884b ("s390: current_stack_pointer shouldn't be a function") made current_stack_pointer a global register variable like on many other architectures. Unfortunately on s390 it uncovers old gcc bug which is fixed only since gcc-9.1 [gcc commit 3ad7fed1cc87 ("S/390: Fix PR89775. Stackpointer save/restore instructions removed")] and backported to gcc-8.4 and later. Due to this bug gcc versions prior to 8.4 generate broken code which leads to stack corruptions. Current minimal gcc version required to build the kernel is declared as 5.1. It is not possible to fix all old gcc versions, so work around this problem by avoiding using global register variable for current_stack_pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/selftests: fix subtraction overflow bug On some machines hole_end can be small enough to cause subtraction overflow. On the other side (addr + 2 * min_alignment) can overflow in case of mock tests. This patch should handle both cases. (cherry picked from commit ab3edc679c552a466e4bf0b11af3666008bd65a2)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/aux: Fix AUX buffer serialization Ole reported that event->mmap_mutex is strictly insufficient to serialize the AUX buffer, add a per RB mutex to fully serialize it. Note that in the lock order comment the perf_event::mmap_mutex order was already wrong, that is, it nesting under mmap_lock is not new with this patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panfrost: Fix shrinker list corruption by madvise IOCTL Calling madvise IOCTL twice on BO causes memory shrinker list corruption and crashes kernel because BO is already on the list and it's added to the list again, while BO should be removed from the list before it's re-added. Fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watch_queue: Fix filter limit check In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8) which is fine, but the second does: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG) which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to a too-large type: (1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter (2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated. Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the number of types we actually know about. The bug may cause an oops looking something like: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611 ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 ... kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ... watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 ... __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Allocated by task 611: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)

In the Linux kernel before 6.1.3, fs/ntfs3/record.c does not validate resident attribute names. An out-of-bounds write may occur.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix error handling in ext4_fc_record_modified_inode() Current code does not fully takes care of krealloc() error case, which could lead to silent memory corruption or a kernel bug. This patch fixes that. Also it cleans up some duplicated error handling logic from various functions in fast_commit.c file.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy() In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally writing across neighboring fields. Use flexible arrays instead of zero-element arrays (which look like they are always overflowing) and split the cross-field memcpy() into two halves that can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler. We were doing: #define ETH_HLEN 14 #define VLAN_HLEN 4 ... #define MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN) ... struct mlx5e_tx_wqe *wqe = mlx5_wq_cyc_get_wqe(wq, pi); ... struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg *eseg = &wqe->eth; struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg = wqe->data; ... memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, xdptxd->data, MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE); target is wqe->eth.inline_hdr.start (which the compiler sees as being 2 bytes in size), but copying 18, intending to write across start (really vlan_tci, 2 bytes). The remaining 16 bytes get written into wqe->data[0], covering byte_count (4 bytes), lkey (4 bytes), and addr (8 bytes). struct mlx5e_tx_wqe { struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg ctrl; /* 0 16 */ struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg eth; /* 16 16 */ struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg data[]; /* 32 0 */ /* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ }; struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg { u8 swp_outer_l4_offset; /* 0 1 */ u8 swp_outer_l3_offset; /* 1 1 */ u8 swp_inner_l4_offset; /* 2 1 */ u8 swp_inner_l3_offset; /* 3 1 */ u8 cs_flags; /* 4 1 */ u8 swp_flags; /* 5 1 */ __be16 mss; /* 6 2 */ __be32 flow_table_metadata; /* 8 4 */ union { struct { __be16 sz; /* 12 2 */ u8 start[2]; /* 14 2 */ } inline_hdr; /* 12 4 */ struct { __be16 type; /* 12 2 */ __be16 vlan_tci; /* 14 2 */ } insert; /* 12 4 */ __be32 trailer; /* 12 4 */ }; /* 12 4 */ /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */ /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg { __be32 byte_count; /* 0 4 */ __be32 lkey; /* 4 4 */ __be64 addr; /* 8 8 */ /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */ /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; So, split the memcpy() so the compiler can reason about the buffer sizes. "pahole" shows no size nor member offset changes to struct mlx5e_tx_wqe nor struct mlx5e_umr_wqe. "objdump -d" shows no meaningful object code changes (i.e. only source line number induced differences and optimizations).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: sja1105: avoid out of bounds access in sja1105_init_l2_policing() The SJA1105 family has 45 L2 policing table entries (SJA1105_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT) and SJA1110 has 110 (SJA1110_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT). Keeping the table structure but accounting for the difference in port count (5 in SJA1105 vs 10 in SJA1110) does not fully explain the difference. Rather, the SJA1110 also has L2 ingress policers for multicast traffic. If a packet is classified as multicast, it will be processed by the policer index 99 + SRCPORT. The sja1105_init_l2_policing() function initializes all L2 policers such that they don't interfere with normal packet reception by default. To have a common code between SJA1105 and SJA1110, the index of the multicast policer for the port is calculated because it's an index that is out of bounds for SJA1105 but in bounds for SJA1110, and a bounds check is performed. The code fails to do the proper thing when determining what to do with the multicast policer of port 0 on SJA1105 (ds->num_ports = 5). The "mcast" index will be equal to 45, which is also equal to table->ops->max_entry_count (SJA1105_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT). So it passes through the check. But at the same time, SJA1105 doesn't have multicast policers. So the code programs the SHARINDX field of an out-of-bounds element in the L2 Policing table of the static config. The comparison between index 45 and 45 entries should have determined the code to not access this policer index on SJA1105, since its memory wasn't even allocated. With enough bad luck, the out-of-bounds write could even overwrite other valid kernel data, but in this case, the issue was detected using KASAN. Kernel log: sja1105 spi5.0: Probed switch chip: SJA1105Q ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sja1105_setup+0x1cbc/0x2340 Write of size 8 at addr ffffff880bd57708 by task kworker/u8:0/8 ... Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: ... sja1105_setup+0x1cbc/0x2340 dsa_register_switch+0x1284/0x18d0 sja1105_probe+0x748/0x840 ... Allocated by task 8: ... sja1105_setup+0x1bcc/0x2340 dsa_register_switch+0x1284/0x18d0 sja1105_probe+0x748/0x840 ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: tsc2046: fix memory corruption by preventing array overflow On one side we have indio_dev->num_channels includes all physical channels + timestamp channel. On other side we have an array allocated only for physical channels. So, fix memory corruption by ARRAY_SIZE() instead of num_channels variable. Note the first case is a cleanup rather than a fix as the software timestamp channel bit in active_scanmask is never set by the IIO core.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Check bounds for second channel in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() The bounds checks in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() are only being applied to the first channel, meaning it is possible to write out of bounds values to the second channel in stereo controls. Add appropriate checks.

The sr_do_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sr_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel through 4.16.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact because sense buffers have different sizes at the CDROM layer and the SCSI layer, as demonstrated by a CDROMREADMODE2 ioctl call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: betop: fix slab-out-of-bounds Write in betop_probe Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds Write bug in hid-betopff driver. The problem is the driver assumes the device must have an input report but some malicious devices violate this assumption. So this patch checks hid_device's input is non empty before it's been used.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 6.0.11. Missing validation of IEEE80211_P2P_ATTR_CHANNEL_LIST in drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/cfg80211.c in the WILC1000 wireless driver can trigger a heap-based buffer overflow when parsing the operating channel attribute from Wi-Fi management frames.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ext4 filesystem. A local user can cause an out-of-bounds write and a denial of service or unspecified other impact is possible by mounting and operating a crafted ext4 filesystem image.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 6.0.11. Missing validation of IEEE80211_P2P_ATTR_OPER_CHANNEL in drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/cfg80211.c in the WILC1000 wireless driver can trigger an out-of-bounds write when parsing the channel list attribute from Wi-Fi management frames.

A stack overflow flaw was found in the Linux kernel's SYSCTL subsystem in how a user changes certain kernel parameters and variables. This flaw allows a local user to crash or potentially escalate their privileges on the system.

drivers/char/virtio_console.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.12 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.

The vmw_surface_define_ioctl function in drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not validate addition of certain levels data, which allows local users to trigger an integer overflow and out-of-bounds write, and cause a denial of service (system hang or crash) or possibly gain privileges, via a crafted ioctl call for a /dev/dri/renderD* device.

The packet_set_ring function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not properly validate certain block-size data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer signedness error and out-of-bounds write), or gain privileges (if the CAP_NET_RAW capability is held), via crafted system calls.

NVIDIA vGPU software contains a vulnerability in the Virtual GPU Manager (vGPU plugin), where an input index is not validated, which may lead to buffer overrun, which in turn may cause data tampering, information disclosure, or denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: clk-loongson2: Fix memory corruption bug in struct loongson2_clk_provider Some heap space is allocated for the flexible structure `struct clk_hw_onecell_data` and its flexible-array member `hws` through the composite structure `struct loongson2_clk_provider` in function `loongson2_clk_probe()`, as shown below: 289 struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp; ... 296 for (p = data; p->name; p++) 297 clks_num++; 298 299 clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num), 300 GFP_KERNEL); Then some data is written into the flexible array: 350 clp->clk_data.hws[p->id] = hw; This corrupts `clk_lock`, which is the spinlock variable immediately following the `clk_data` member in `struct loongson2_clk_provider`: struct loongson2_clk_provider { void __iomem *base; struct device *dev; struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data; spinlock_t clk_lock; /* protect access to DIV registers */ }; The problem is that the flexible structure is currently placed in the middle of `struct loongson2_clk_provider` instead of at the end. Fix this by moving `struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data;` to the end of `struct loongson2_clk_provider`. Also, add a code comment to help prevent this from happening again in case new members are added to the structure in the future. This change also fixes the following -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warning: drivers/clk/clk-loongson2.c:32:36: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: avoid buffer overflow in WID string configuration Fix the following copy overflow warning identified by Smatch checker. drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/wlan_cfg.c:184 wilc_wlan_parse_response_frame() error: '__memcpy()' 'cfg->s[i]->str' copy overflow (512 vs 65537) This patch introduces size check before accessing the memory buffer. The checks are base on the WID type of received data from the firmware. For WID string configuration, the size limit is determined by individual element size in 'struct wilc_cfg_str_vals' that is maintained in 'len' field of 'struct wilc_cfg_str'.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds dynptr write in bpf_crypto_crypt Stanislav reported that in bpf_crypto_crypt() the destination dynptr's size is not validated to be at least as large as the source dynptr's size before calling into the crypto backend with 'len = src_len'. This can result in an OOB write when the destination is smaller than the source. Concretely, in mentioned function, psrc and pdst are both linear buffers fetched from each dynptr: psrc = __bpf_dynptr_data(src, src_len); [...] pdst = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(dst, dst_len); [...] err = decrypt ? ctx->type->decrypt(ctx->tfm, psrc, pdst, src_len, piv) : ctx->type->encrypt(ctx->tfm, psrc, pdst, src_len, piv); The crypto backend expects pdst to be large enough with a src_len length that can be written. Add an additional src_len > dst_len check and bail out if it's the case. Note that these kfuncs are accessible under root privileges only.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: libwx: fix the using of Rx buffer DMA The wx_rx_buffer structure contained two DMA address fields: 'dma' and 'page_dma'. However, only 'page_dma' was actually initialized and used to program the Rx descriptor. But 'dma' was uninitialized and used in some paths. This could lead to undefined behavior, including DMA errors or use-after-free, if the uninitialized 'dma' was used. Althrough such error has not yet occurred, it is worth fixing in the code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-thc: Fix incorrect pointer arithmetic in I2C regs save Improper use of secondary pointer (&dev->i2c_subip_regs) caused kernel crash and out-of-bounds error: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888136005dc0 by task kworker/u33:5/5107 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5107 Comm: kworker/u33:5 Not tainted 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 print_report+0xd1/0x660 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x26/0x200 kasan_report+0xe1/0x120 ? _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510 ? _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510 __asan_report_store4_noabort+0x17/0x30 _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510 ? __pfx__regmap_bulk_read+0x10/0x10 regmap_bulk_read+0x270/0x3d0 pio_complete+0x1ee/0x2c0 [intel_thc] ? __pfx_pio_complete+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc] ? __pfx_pio_wait+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc] ? regmap_update_bits_base+0x13b/0x1f0 thc_i2c_subip_pio_read+0x117/0x270 [intel_thc] thc_i2c_subip_regs_save+0xc2/0x140 [intel_thc] ? __pfx_thc_i2c_subip_regs_save+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc] [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888136005d00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-12-192 of size 192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 192-byte region [ffff888136005d00, ffff888136005dc0) Replaced with direct array indexing (&dev->i2c_subip_regs[i]) to ensure safe memory access.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: Block access to folio overlimit syz reported a slab-out-of-bounds Write in fuse_dev_do_write. When the number of bytes to be retrieved is truncated to the upper limit by fc->max_pages and there is an offset, the oob is triggered. Add a loop termination condition to prevent overruns.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: fix potential buffer overflow in do_register_framebuffer() The current implementation may lead to buffer overflow when: 1. Unregistration creates NULL gaps in registered_fb[] 2. All array slots become occupied despite num_registered_fb < FB_MAX 3. The registration loop exceeds array bounds Add boundary check to prevent registered_fb[FB_MAX] access.