A physical attack vulnerability exists in certain Moxa industrial computers using TPM-backed LUKS full-disk encryption on Moxa Industrial Linux 3, where the discrete TPM is connected to the CPU via an SPI bus. Exploitation requires invasive physical access, including opening the device and attaching external equipment to the SPI bus to capture TPM communications. If successful, the captured data may allow offline decryption of eMMC contents. This attack cannot be performed through brief or opportunistic physical access and requires extended physical access, possession of the device, appropriate equipment, and sufficient time for signal capture and analysis. Remote exploitation is not possible.

A vulnerability exists in serial device servers where active debug code remains enabled in the UART interface. An attacker with physical access to the device can directly connect to the UART interface and, without authentication, user interaction, or execution conditions, gain unauthorized access to internal debug functionality. Exploitation is low complexity and allows an attacker to execute privileged operations and access sensitive system resources, resulting in a high impact to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected device. No security impact to external or dependent systems has been identified.

Logs storing credentials are insufficiently protected and can be decoded through the use of open source tools.