Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.11.4, there is a flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.11.4.

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.12.4, when using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters. Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.4.

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.11.7, IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The `IPV4_REGEX` pattern and `convertIPv4ToBinary` function in `src/utils/ipaddr.ts` do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls. Version 4.11.7 contains a patch for the issue.

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.16, bodyLimit() does not reliably enforce maxSize for requests without a usable Content-Length (e.g. Transfer-Encoding: chunked). Oversized requests can reach handlers and return 200 instead of 413. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.16.

browserify-sign is a package to duplicate the functionality of node's crypto public key functions, much of this is based on Fedor Indutny's work on indutny/tls.js. An upper bound check issue in `dsaVerify` function allows an attacker to construct signatures that can be successfully verified by any public key, thus leading to a signature forgery attack. All places in this project that involve DSA verification of user-input signatures will be affected by this vulnerability. This issue has been patched in version 4.2.2.

Tendermint is a high-performance blockchain consensus engine for Byzantine fault tolerant applications. Versions prior to 0.28.0 contain a potential attack via Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature, affecting anyone using the tendermint-light-client and related packages to perform light client verification (e.g. IBC-rs, Hermes). The light client does not check that the chain IDs of the trusted and untrusted headers match, resulting in a possible attack vector where someone who finds a header from an untrusted chain that satisfies all other verification conditions (e.g. enough overlapping validator signatures) could fool a light client. The attack vector is currently theoretical, and no proof-of-concept exists yet to exploit it on live networks. This issue is patched in version 0.28.0. There are no workarounds.

Mailvelope prior to 3.3.0 allows private key operations without user interaction via its client-API. By modifying an URL parameter in Mailvelope, an attacker is able to sign (and encrypt) arbitrary messages with Mailvelope, assuming the private key password is cached. A second vulnerability allows an attacker to decrypt an arbitrary message when the GnuPG backend is used in Mailvelope.

Adobe Acrobat and Reader versions 2019.008.20081 and earlier, 2019.008.20080 and earlier, 2019.008.20081 and earlier, 2017.011.30106 and earlier version, 2017.011.30105 and earlier version, 2015.006.30457 and earlier, and 2015.006.30456 and earlier have a security bypass vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to information disclosure.

This issue affects Apache Spark versions before 3.4.4, 3.5.2 and 4.0.0. Apache Spark versions before 4.0.0, 3.5.2 and 3.4.4 use an insecure default network encryption cipher for RPC communication between nodes. When spark.network.crypto.enabled is set to true (it is set to false by default), but spark.network.crypto.cipher is not explicitly configured, Spark defaults to AES in CTR mode (AES/CTR/NoPadding), which provides encryption without authentication. This vulnerability allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to modify encrypted RPC traffic undetected by flipping bits in ciphertext, potentially compromising heartbeat messages or application data and affecting the integrity of Spark workflows. To mitigate this issue, users should either configure spark.network.crypto.cipher to AES/GCM/NoPadding to enable authenticated encryption or enable SSL encryption by setting spark.ssl.enabled to true, which provides stronger transport security.

Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the Admidio SAML Identity Provider implementation discards the return value of its validateSignature() method at both call sites (handleSSORequest() line 418 and handleSLORequest() line 613). The method returns error strings on failure rather than throwing exceptions, but the developer believed it would throw (per comments on lines 416 and 611). This means the smc_require_auth_signed configuration option is completely ineffective — unsigned or invalidly-signed SAML AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests are processed identically to properly signed ones. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.