Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, /api/v1/public-chatbotConfig/:id ep exposes sensitive data including API keys, HTTP authorization headers and internal configuration without any authentication. An attacker with knowledge just of a chatflow UUID can retrieve credentials stored in password type fields and HTTP headers, leading to credential theft and more. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, Flowise contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain OAuth 2.0 access tokens associated with a public chatflow. By accessing a public chatflow configuration endpoint, an attacker can retrieve internal workflow data, including OAuth credential identifiers, which can then be used to refresh and obtain valid OAuth 2.0 access tokens without authentication. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. In version 3.0.5 and earlier, the `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO). This vulnerability applies to both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments that expose the same API. Commit 9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863 in version 3.0.6 secures password reset endpoints. Several recommended remediation steps are available. Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments. Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.