OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the iOS A2UI bridge that treats generic local-network pages as trusted origins. Attackers can inject unauthorized agent.request runs by loading attacker-controlled pages from local-network or tailnet hosts, polluting session state and consuming budget.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 fails to filter Slack thread context by sender allowlist, allowing non-allowlisted messages to enter agent context. Attackers can inject unauthorized thread messages through allowlisted user replies to bypass sender access controls and manipulate model context.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains a wide-area discovery vulnerability allowing arbitrary tailnet peers to be accepted as DNS authorities. Attackers with same-tailnet position and CA-trusted endpoint access can exfiltrate operator credentials through DNS steering manipulation.

OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an allowlist bypass vulnerability in Matrix thread root and reply context handling that fails to properly validate message senders. Attackers can fetch thread-root and reply context messages that should be filtered by sender allowlists, bypassing access controls.

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to version 4.5.2, in Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global `[passwords] default` credential. An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.