Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, Netty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows a Content-Length header to be accompanied by a second Content-Length header, or by a Transfer-Encoding header.

HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows an HTTP header that lacks a colon, which might be interpreted as a separate header with an incorrect syntax, or might be interpreted as an "invalid fold."

Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.1.124.Final, and 4.2.0.Alpha3 through 4.2.4.Final, Netty incorrectly accepts standalone newline characters (LF) as a chunk-size line terminator, regardless of a preceding carriage return (CR), instead of requiring CRLF per HTTP/1.1 standards. When combined with reverse proxies that parse LF differently (treating it as part of the chunk extension), attackers can craft requests that the proxy sees as one request but Netty processes as two, enabling request smuggling attacks. This is fixed in versions 4.1.125.Final and 4.2.5.Final.

Netty before 4.1.42.Final mishandles whitespace before the colon in HTTP headers (such as a "Transfer-Encoding : chunked" line), which leads to HTTP request smuggling.

Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. Netty prior to version 4.1.71.Final skips control chars when they are present at the beginning / end of the header name. It should instead fail fast as these are not allowed by the spec and could lead to HTTP request smuggling. Failing to do the validation might cause netty to "sanitize" header names before it forward these to another remote system when used as proxy. This remote system can't see the invalid usage anymore, and therefore does not do the validation itself. Users should upgrade to version 4.1.71.Final.

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.

Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.

Netty 4.1.43.Final allows HTTP Request Smuggling because it mishandles Transfer-Encoding whitespace (such as a [space]Transfer-Encoding:chunked line) and a later Content-Length header. This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2019-16869.

FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), released under the Apache license. Affected versions are subject to an IntegerOverflow leading to Out-Of-Bound Write Vulnerability in the `gdi_CreateSurface` function. This issue affects FreeRDP based clients only. FreeRDP proxies are not affected as image decoding is not done by a proxy. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.11.0 and 3.0.0-beta3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in apr_base64 functions of Apache Portable Runtime Utility (APR-util) allows an attacker to write beyond bounds of a buffer. This issue affects Apache Portable Runtime Utility (APR-util) 1.6.1 and prior versions.

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Micrium OS Versions 5.10.1 and prior are vulnerable to integer wrap-around in functions Mem_DynPoolCreate, Mem_DynPoolCreateHW and Mem_PoolCreate. This unverified memory assignment can lead to arbitrary memory allocation, resulting in unexpected behavior such as very small blocks of memory being allocated instead of very large ones.

ping in iputils before 20250602 allows a denial of service (application error in adaptive ping mode or incorrect data collection) via a crafted ICMP Echo Reply packet, because a zero timestamp can lead to large intermediate values that have an integer overflow when squared during statistics calculations. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-47268 (that fix was only about timestamp calculations, and it did not account for a specific scenario where the original timestamp in the ICMP payload is zero).

ping in iputils before 20250602 allows a denial of service (application error or incorrect data collection) via a crafted ICMP Echo Reply packet, because of a signed 64-bit integer overflow in timestamp multiplication.

aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Security-sensitive parts of the Python HTTP parser retained minor differences in allowable character sets, that must trigger error handling to robustly match frame boundaries of proxies in order to protect against injection of additional requests. Additionally, validation could trigger exceptions that were not handled consistently with processing of other malformed input. Being more lenient than internet standards require could, depending on deployment environment, assist in request smuggling. The unhandled exception could cause excessive resource consumption on the application server and/or its logging facilities. This vulnerability exists due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-47627. Version 3.9.2 fixes this vulnerability.

An integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow users to compromise the security of the system via a network. We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions: QTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTScloud c5.1.5.2651 and later

In libavif before 1.3.0, avifImageRGBToYUV in reformat.c has integer overflows in multiplications involving rgbRowBytes, yRowBytes, uRowBytes, and vRowBytes.

An issue was discovered in LibVNCServer before 0.9.13. libvncserver/scale.c has a pixel_value integer overflow.