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Vulnerability Details :

CVE-2026-42768

Summary
Assigner-openssl
Assigner Org ID-3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5
Published At-09 Jun, 2026 | 16:03
Updated At-10 Jun, 2026 | 07:48
Rejected At-
Credits

Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()

Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA key. The attack is possible in 2 variants. 1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success. An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is available. That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under it. 2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random key is substituted. An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle. We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this CVE has been evaluated as Low severity. To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit rejection was explicitly disabled. The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value, the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for decryption. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Vendors
-
Not available
Products
-
Metrics (CVSS)
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Weaknesses
Attack Patterns
Solution/Workaround
References
HyperlinkResource Type
EPSS History
Score
Latest Score
-
N/A
No data available for selected date range
Percentile
Latest Percentile
-
N/A
No data available for selected date range
Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC)
▼Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
cve.org
Assigner:openssl
Assigner Org ID:3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5
Published At:09 Jun, 2026 | 16:03
Updated At:10 Jun, 2026 | 07:48
Rejected At:
▼CVE Numbering Authority (CNA)
Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()

Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA key. The attack is possible in 2 variants. 1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success. An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is available. That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under it. 2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random key is substituted. An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle. We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this CVE has been evaluated as Low severity. To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit rejection was explicitly disabled. The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value, the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for decryption. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Affected Products
Vendor
OpenSSLOpenSSL
Product
OpenSSL
Default Status
unaffected
Versions
Affected
  • From 4.0.0 before 4.0.1 (semver)
  • From 3.6.0 before 3.6.3 (semver)
  • From 3.5.0 before 3.5.7 (semver)
  • From 3.4.0 before 3.4.6 (semver)
Problem Types
TypeCWE IDDescription
CWECWE-514CWE-514 Covert Channel
Type: CWE
CWE ID: CWE-514
Description: CWE-514 Covert Channel
Metrics
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Metrics Other Info
https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/
text:
Low
Impacts
CAPEC IDDescription
Solutions

Configurations

Workarounds

Exploits

Credits

reporter
Alex Gaynor (Anthropic)
remediation developer
Dmitry Belyavskiy (Red Hat)
remediation developer
Alicja Kario (Red Hat)
Timeline
EventDate
Replaced By

Rejected Reason

References
HyperlinkResource
https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt
vendor-advisory
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3e
patch
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4f
patch
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d
patch
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd
patch
Hyperlink: https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt
Resource:
vendor-advisory
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3e
Resource:
patch
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4f
Resource:
patch
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d
Resource:
patch
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd
Resource:
patch
▼Authorized Data Publishers (ADP)
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
Affected Products
Metrics
VersionBase scoreBase severityVector
3.13.7LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Version: 3.1
Base score: 3.7
Base severity: LOW
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Metrics Other Info
Impacts
CAPEC IDDescription
Solutions

Configurations

Workarounds

Exploits

Credits

Timeline
EventDate
Replaced By

Rejected Reason

References
HyperlinkResource
Information is not available yet
▼National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
nvd.nist.gov
Source:openssl-security@openssl.org
Published At:09 Jun, 2026 | 17:17
Updated At:10 Jun, 2026 | 08:16

Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA key. The attack is possible in 2 variants. 1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success. An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is available. That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under it. 2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random key is substituted. An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle. We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this CVE has been evaluated as Low severity. To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit rejection was explicitly disabled. The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value, the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for decryption. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

CISA Catalog
Date AddedDue DateVulnerability NameRequired Action
N/A
Date Added: N/A
Due Date: N/A
Vulnerability Name: N/A
Required Action: N/A
Metrics
TypeVersionBase scoreBase severityVector
Secondary3.13.7LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Type: Secondary
Version: 3.1
Base score: 3.7
Base severity: LOW
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CPE Matches

Weaknesses
CWE IDTypeSource
CWE-514Secondaryopenssl-security@openssl.org
CWE ID: CWE-514
Type: Secondary
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Evaluator Description

Evaluator Impact

Evaluator Solution

Vendor Statements

References
HyperlinkSourceResource
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4fopenssl-security@openssl.org
N/A
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54dopenssl-security@openssl.org
N/A
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abdopenssl-security@openssl.org
N/A
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3eopenssl-security@openssl.org
N/A
https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txtopenssl-security@openssl.org
N/A
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4f
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Resource: N/A
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Resource: N/A
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Resource: N/A
Hyperlink: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3e
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Resource: N/A
Hyperlink: https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt
Source: openssl-security@openssl.org
Resource: N/A

Change History

0
Information is not available yet

Similar CVEs

3Records found

CVE-2026-42770
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
ShareView Details
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
CVSS Score-3.7||LOW
EPSS-Not Assigned
Published-09 Jun, 2026 | 16:03
Updated-10 Jun, 2026 | 08:16
Rejected-Not Available
Known To Be Used In Ransomware Campaigns?-Not Available
KEV Added-Not Available
KEV Action Due Date-Not Available
FFC-DH Peer Validation Uses Attacker-Supplied q

Issue summary: When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42) peer key, the peer key is not properly checked for the subgroup membership. Impact summary: A malicious peer which presents an X9.42 key carrying the victim's p and g parameters, a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the cofactor (p−1)/q_local), and a public value Y of order r can recover the victim's private key after a small number of key exchange attempts. When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42) peer key, the subgroup membership check Y^q ≡ 1 (mod p) is performed using the peer's own q parameter, not the local key's q. The peer's domain parameters are then matched against the domain parameters of the private key, but the value of q is not compared. A malicious peer who presents an X9.42 key carrying the victim's p, g, a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the cofactor), and a public value Y of order r passes all checks. The shared secret then takes only r distinct values, leaking priv mod r. Repeating for each small-prime factor of the cofactor and combining via CRT recovers the full private key (Lim–Lee / small-subgroup-confinement attack). The realistic attack surface is narrow: principally CMP deployments with long-lived RA/CA DHX keys and bespoke enterprise or government applications using X9.42 DHX static keys with interactive protocols and therefore this issue was assigned Low severity. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are affected by this issue.

Action-Not Available
Vendor-OpenSSL
Product-OpenSSL
CWE ID-CWE-325
Missing Cryptographic Step
CVE-2020-1968
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
ShareView Details
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
CVSS Score-3.7||LOW
EPSS-1.04% / 77.82%
||
7 Day CHG~0.00%
Published-09 Sep, 2020 | 13:50
Updated-16 Apr, 2026 | 15:16
Rejected-Not Available
Known To Be Used In Ransomware Campaigns?-Not Available
KEV Added-Not Available
KEV Action Due Date-Not Available
Raccoon attack

The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can lead to an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections which have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this would result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted communications sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited if an implementation re-uses a DH secret across multiple TLS connections. Note that this issue only impacts DH ciphersuites and not ECDH ciphersuites. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.2 which is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. OpenSSL 1.1.1 is not vulnerable to this issue. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2w (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2v).

Action-Not Available
Vendor-Oracle CorporationDebian GNU/LinuxFujitsu LimitedCanonical Ltd.OpenSSL
Product-ethernet_switch_es2-72_firmwarem10-1_firmwareethernet_switch_es1-24m10-4s_firmwareethernet_switch_es2-72ethernet_switch_tor-72m12-2_firmwareethernet_switch_es1-24_firmwarem10-4m12-1_firmwarem10-4sdebian_linuxpeoplesoft_enterprise_peopletoolsubuntu_linuxm10-1opensslm12-2s_firmwarem12-1m10-4_firmwareethernet_switch_es2-64_firmwareethernet_switch_es2-64ethernet_switch_tor-72_firmwarem12-2sm12-2jd_edwards_world_securityOpenSSL
CWE ID-CWE-203
Observable Discrepancy
CVE-2019-1563
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
ShareView Details
Matching Score-8
Assigner-OpenSSL Software Foundation
CVSS Score-3.7||LOW
EPSS-1.12% / 78.61%
||
7 Day CHG~0.00%
Published-10 Sep, 2019 | 16:58
Updated-17 Sep, 2024 | 01:11
Rejected-Not Available
Known To Be Used In Ransomware Campaigns?-Not Available
KEV Added-Not Available
KEV Action Due Date-Not Available
Padding Oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey

In situations where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to decrypt. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0l (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2t (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2s).

Action-Not Available
Vendor-OpenSSL
Product-opensslOpenSSL
CWE ID-CWE-327
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CWE ID-CWE-203
Observable Discrepancy
Details not found