Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.8.0-beta.27, A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability has been identified in Grav related to the handling of scheduled_at parameters. Specifically, the application fails to properly sanitize input for cron expressions. By manipulating the scheduled_at parameter with a malicious input, such as a single quote, the application admin panel becomes non-functional, causing significant disruptions to administrative operations. The only way to recover from this issue is to manually access the host server and modify the backup.yaml file to correct the corrupted cron expression. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.0-beta.27.

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.8.0-beta.27, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability was identified in the "Languages" submenu of the Grav admin configuration panel (/admin/config/system). Specifically, the Supported parameter fails to properly validate user input. If a malformed value is inserted—such as a single forward slash (/) or an XSS test string—it causes a fatal regular expression parsing error on the server. This leads to application-wide failure due to the use of the preg_match() function with an improperly constructed regular expression, resulting in an error. Once triggered, the site becomes completely unavailable to all users. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.0-beta.27.

Grav before 2.0.1 contains a decompression bomb vulnerability in ZipArchiver::extract() that lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth. Attackers can supply a crafted ZIP archive that expands to fill available disk space, causing denial of service by exhausting storage resources.

Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

Audiobookshelf is a self-hosted audiobook and podcast server. Prior to 2.32.2, the POST /api/backups/upload endpoint decompresses the details entry from an uploaded .audiobookshelf ZIP file entirely into memory using zip.entryData(), with no limit on the decompressed size. The upload middleware also has no file size limit. An admin user can upload a crafted ZIP containing a highly compressed details entry that, when decompressed, consumes hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes of memory, crashing the server process via out-of-memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.32.2.

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.