Grav before 2.0.4 contains a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the regex_replace filter and function, which are allowlisted in the Twig content sandbox. When Twig processing in page content is enabled (security.twig_content.process_enabled: true, disabled by default), an authenticated page editor can supply a catastrophically backtracking PCRE pattern that is passed directly to PHP's preg_replace(), causing unbounded CPU consumption and denial of service to the web server process.

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0, an authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool because Installer::unZip calls ZipArchive::extractTo without limits on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.

Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

HashiCorp Nomad and Nomad Enterprise 1.2.15 up to 1.3.8, and 1.4.3 jobs using a maliciously compressed artifact stanza source can cause excessive disk usage. Fixed in 1.2.16, 1.3.9, and 1.4.4.

This vulnerability allows any authenticated user to cause the server to consume very large amounts of disk space when extracting a Zip Bomb. If user import is enabled (which is the default setting), any registered user can upload an archive for importing. The code uses the yauzl library for reading the archive. The yauzl library does not contain any mechanism to detect or prevent extraction of a Zip Bomb https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zip_bomb . Therefore, when using the User Import functionality with a Zip Bomb, PeerTube will try extracting the archive which will cause a disk space resource exhaustion.

Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Starting in version 2.17.0 and prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, `POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer. Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service). The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression. As a workaround, restrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of `coderd`.

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, vLLM's /v1/audio/transcriptions endpoint limits compressed upload size but not decoded PCM output. A 25MB OPUS file expands to ~14.9GB of float32 PCM at decode time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.

IBM Concert Software 1.0.0 through 1.0.5 could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service due to the expansion of archive files without controlling resource consumption.

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.

Mattermost versions 11.4.x <= 11.4.0, 11.3.x <= 11.3.1, 11.2.x <= 11.2.3, 10.11.x <= 10.11.11 fail to validate decompressed archive entry sizes during file extraction which allows authenticated users with file upload permissions to cause a denial of service via crafted zip archives containing highly compressed entries (zip bombs) that exhaust server memory.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00598

Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.5, a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability was in the recipe import functionality. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user to crash the server or make a significantly degrade its performance by uploading a large size ZIP file (ZIP Bomb). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.6.5.

MarkUs is a web application for the submission and grading of student assignments. Prior to version 2.9.4, MarkUs currently extracts zip files without any size or entry-count limits. For example, instructors can upload a zip file to provide an assignment configuration; students can upload a zip file for an assignment submission and indicate its contents should be extracted. This issue has been patched in version 2.9.4.

An issue was discovered in Cinnamon kotaemon 0.11.0. The _may_extract_zip function in the \libs\ktem\ktem\index\file\ui.py file does not check the contents of uploaded ZIP files. Although the contents are extracted into a temporary folder that is cleared before each extraction, successfully uploading a ZIP bomb could still cause the server to consume excessive resources during decompression. Moreover, if no further files are uploaded afterward, the extracted data could occupy disk space and potentially render the system unavailable. Anyone with permission to upload files can carry out this attack.

MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Typically, MobSF is deployed on centralized internal or cloud-based servers that also host other security tools and web applications. Access to the MobSF web interface is often granted to internal security teams, audit teams, and external vendors. MobSF provides a feature that allows users to upload ZIP files for static analysis. Upon upload, these ZIP files are automatically extracted and stored within the MobSF directory. However, in versions up to and including 4.3.2, this functionality lacks a check on the total uncompressed size of the ZIP file, making it vulnerable to a ZIP of Death (zip bomb) attack. Due to the absence of safeguards against oversized extractions, an attacker can craft a specially prepared ZIP file that is small in compressed form but expands to a massive size upon extraction. Exploiting this, an attacker can exhaust the server's disk space, leading to a complete denial of service (DoS) not just for MobSF, but also for any other applications or websites hosted on the same server. This vulnerability can lead to complete server disruption in an organization which can affect other internal portals and tools too (which are hosted on the same server). If some organization has created their customized cloud based mobile security tool using MobSF core then an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to crash their servers. Commit 6987a946485a795f4fd38cebdb4860b368a1995d fixes this issue. As an additional mitigation, it is recommended to implement a safeguard that checks the total uncompressed size of any uploaded ZIP file before extraction. If the estimated uncompressed size exceeds a safe threshold (e.g., 100 MB), MobSF should reject the file and notify the user.

A denial of service (DoS) condition was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 13.2.4 before 16.10.6, 16.11 before 16.11.3, and 17.0 before 17.0.1. By leveraging this vulnerability an attacker could create a DoS condition by sending crafted API calls.