Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Docker Engine before 1.8.3 and CS Docker Engine before 1.6.2-CS7 does not properly validate and extract the manifest object from its JSON representation during a pull, which allows attackers to inject new attributes in a JSON object and bypass pull-by-digest validation.

Docker Engine before 1.8.3 and CS Docker Engine before 1.6.2-CS7 do not use a globally unique identifier to store image layers, which makes it easier for attackers to poison the image cache via a crafted image in pull or push commands.