OpenPLC Runtime v3 contains an authenticated arbitrary file write vulnerability in the legacy web UI program‑upload workflow. The application stores an attacker‑supplied filename (prog_file) directly into the Programs.File database field and later uses this value as the destination path for an uploaded file without validating or restricting the path. Because Python os.path.join() honors attacker‑controlled absolute paths, an authenticated user can write arbitrary files anywhere writable by the OpenPLC webserver process. In the default build pipeline, all C++ source files within the OpenPLC runtime core directory are automatically compiled into the executable runtime binary. By writing a malicious .cpp file into this directory, an authenticated attacker can escalate the arbitrary file write into arbitrary native code execution when the operator triggers a normal program compilation and runtime start.

OpenPLC v3 contains an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers with valid credentials to inject malicious code through the hardware configuration interface. Attackers can upload a custom hardware layer with embedded reverse shell code that establishes a network connection to a specified IP and port, enabling remote command execution.

OpenPLC 3 through 64f9c11 has server.cpp Memory Corruption because a thread may access handleConnections arguments after the parent stack frame becomes unavailable.

OpenPLC_V3 contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability, which could be leveraged for malvertising or phishing campaigns.