The AuthPolicy metadata on Red Hat Connectivity Link contains an object which stores secretes, however it assumes those secretes are already in the kuadrant-system instead of copying it to the referred namespace. This creates space for a malicious actor with a developer persona access to leak those secrets over HTTP connection, as long the attacker knows the name of the targeted secrets and those secrets are limited to one line only.

A Developer persona can bring down the Authorino service, preventing the evaluation of all AuthPolicies on the cluster

The Authorino service in the Red Hat Connectivity Link is the authorization service for zero trust API security. Authorino allows the users with developer persona to add callbacks to be executed to HTTP endpoints once the authorization process is completed. It was found that an attacker with developer persona access can add a large number of those callbacks to be executed by Authorino and as the authentication policy is enforced by a single instance of the service, this leada to a Denial of Service in Authorino while processing the post-authorization callbacks.

A flaw was found in the cert-manager package. This flaw allows an attacker who can modify PEM data that the cert-manager reads, for example, in a Secret resource, to use large amounts of CPU in the cert-manager controller pod to effectively create a denial-of-service (DoS) vector for the cert-manager in the cluster.