The Wi-Fi router is vulnerable to de-authentication attacks due to the absence of management frame protection, allowing forged deauthentication and disassociation frames to be broadcast without authentication or encryption. An attacker can use this to cause unauthorized disruptions and create a denial-of-service condition.

The web management interface of the device renders the passwords in a plaintext input field. The current password is directly visible to anyone with access to the UI, potentially exposing administrator credentials to unauthorized observation via shoulder surfing, screenshots, or browser form caching.

The embedded web interface of the device does not support HTTPS/TLS for authentication and uses HTTP Basic Authentication. Traffic is encoded but not encrypted, exposing user credentials to passive interception by attackers on the same network.

The web management interface of the device allows the administrator username and password to be set to blank values. Once applied, the device permits authentication with empty credentials over the web management interface and Telnet service. This effectively disables authentication across all critical management channels, allowing any network-adjacent attacker to gain full administrative control without credentials.