The frontend gRPC server's streaming interceptor chain did not include the authorization interceptor. When a ClaimMapper and Authorizer are configured, unary RPCs enforce authentication and authorization, but the streaming AdminService/StreamWorkflowReplicationMessages endpoint accepted requests without credentials. This endpoint is registered on the same port as WorkflowService and cannot be disabled independently. An attacker with network access to the frontend port could open the replication stream without authentication. Data exfiltration is possible, but  only when a configured replication target is correctly configured and the attacker has knowledge of the cluster configuration, as the history service validates cluster IDs and peer membership before returning replication data. Temporal Cloud is not affected.

A writer role user in an attacker-controlled namespace could signal, delete, and reset workflows or activities in a victim namespace on the same cluster. Exploitation requires the attacker to know or guess specific victim workflow ID(s) and, for signal operations, signal names. This was due to a bug introduced in Temporal Server v1.29.0 which inadvertently allowed an attacker to control the namespace name value instead of using the server's own trusted name value within the batch activity code. The batch activity validated the namespace ID but did not cross-check the namespace name against the worker's bound namespace, allowing the per-namespace worker's privileged credentials to operate on an arbitrary namespace. Exploitation requires a server configuration where internal components have cross-namespace authorization, such as deployment of the internal-frontend service or equivalent TLS-based authorization for internal identities. This vulnerability also impacted Temporal Cloud when the attacker and victim namespaces were on the same cell, with the same preconditions as self-hosted clusters.

Insecure defaults in open-source Temporal Server before version 1.20 on all platforms allows an attacker to craft a task token with access to a namespace other than the one specified in the request. Creation of this task token must be done outside of the normal Temporal server flow. It requires the namespace UUID and information from the workflow history for the target namespace. Under these conditions, it is possible to interfere with pending tasks in other namespaces, such as marking a task failed or completed. If a task is targeted for completion by the attacker, the targeted namespace must also be using the same data converter configuration as the initial, valid, namespace for the task completion payload to be decoded by workers in the target namespace.