ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.3 fail to bind the authenticated principal in the MCP HTTP transport, causing all engine permission checks to silently pass as no-ops. Non-root MCP-allowed users can perform arbitrary database writes, DDL, schema mutations, and execute arbitrary JavaScript code via the query tool.

ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.3 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the MCP get_server_settings tool that leaks the arcadedb.ha.clusterToken in cleartext. Attackers with MCP access can retrieve the cluster token and use it with X-ArcadeDB-Cluster-Token and X-ArcadeDB-Forwarded-User headers to impersonate root and achieve full server compromise.

ArcadeDB before 26.7.3 binds the real LocalDatabase object into JavaScript trigger contexts with HostAccess.ALL, allowing schema-admins to call getSecurity().createUser() without permission checks. Attackers with UPDATE_SCHEMA permission can create triggers that execute JavaScript to create server-wide admin users, escalating privileges beyond their authorization level.

ArcadeDB before 26.7.2 (arcadedb-engine) allows trigger scripts to look up host classes in java.lang.* (via Java.type) because ScriptTriggerExecutor adds java.lang.* to the allowed packages. An authenticated user with UPDATE_SCHEMA permission can create a JavaScript trigger that invokes java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec() (or ProcessBuilder), achieving OS command execution when the trigger fires.

ArcadeDB before 26.7.2 fails to enforce the UPDATE_SCHEMA database permission on the ALTER TYPE ... CUSTOM and ALTER TYPE ... BUCKETSELECTIONSTRATEGY SQL operations, which map to setCustomValue and setBucketSelectionStrategy in LocalDocumentType. An authenticated user with only read access (e.g., a read-only API token) can submit these ALTER TYPE statements via the HTTP command endpoint to mutate a type's custom schema metadata and bucket-selection strategy, bypassing the documented updateSchema permission boundary and potentially corrupting schema metadata and record routing.

ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 fail to enforce scripting authorization checks on the SQL DEFINE FUNCTION statement with LANGUAGE js. Attackers with database access can execute arbitrary JavaScript code by submitting DEFINE FUNCTION statements, bypassing security controls intended to restrict scripting to administrators.

ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 fail to properly redact the cluster token in the GET /api/v1/server endpoint, allowing authenticated users to retrieve the arcadedb.ha.clusterToken value in cleartext. Attackers can use the leaked token with X-ArcadeDB-Cluster-Token and X-ArcadeDB-Forwarded-User headers to impersonate root and execute administrative actions including user creation, database operations, and server shutdown.

ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in HTTP handlers for time series, batch, Prometheus, and Grafana endpoints that fail to validate database access permissions. Attackers can access and modify databases they are not authorized to use by directly calling affected endpoints with arbitrary database parameters.

ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 2.6.4, authenticated users and API tokens scoped to a specific database could read, write, and mutate schema on any other database on the same server. Two distinct defects contributed: (1) ServerSecurityUser.getDatabaseUser() returned a DB user with an uninitialized fileAccessMap, which requestAccessOnFile treated as allow-all; (2) ArcadeDBServer.createDatabase() omitted factory.setSecurity(...) so any database created via POST /api/v1/server {"command":"create database X"} had its entire record-level authorization system silently disabled. In combination, record-level and database-level authorization could be bypassed by any authenticated principal. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.6.4.