Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In version 1.5.2, an Excessive Data Exposure vulnerability in the customers search endpoint allows an authenticated user to obtain appointment hashes belonging to other users. Using these hashes, an attacker can modify or delete appointments of other providers, resulting in an Appointments Takeover. Version 1.6.0 fixes the issue.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request's `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 correctly filter provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session. A normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 allow administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization. An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page. Version 1.6.0 fixes the issue.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions up to and including 1.5.2, the booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.

Plainpad is a self hosted note taking app. Prior to version 1.1.1, Plainpad allows a low-privilege authenticated user to self-escalate to administrator by submitting admin=true in PUT /api.php/v1/users/{id}. The endpoint directly persists the admin attribute from user input, and the escalated account can immediately access admin-only routes. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.1.

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In 1.5.2 and earlier, application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify() only enforces CSRF for POST requests and returns early for non-POST methods. Several application endpoints perform state-changing operations while accepting parameters from GET (or $_REQUEST), so an attacker can perform CSRF by forcing a victim's browser to issue a crafted GET request. Impact: creation of admin accounts, modification of admin email/password, and full admin account takeover.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in alextselegidis Easy!Appointments easyappointments allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Easy!Appointments: from n/a through <= 1.4.2.

A BOLA vulnerability in GET, PUT, DELETE /customers/{customerId} allows a low privileged user to fetch, modify or delete a low privileged user (customer). This results in unauthorized access and unauthorized data manipulation.

A BOLA vulnerability in GET, PUT, DELETE /appointments/{appointmentId} allows a low privileged user to fetch, modify or delete an appointment of any user (including admin). This results in unauthorized access and unauthorized data manipulation.

A BOLA vulnerability in POST /customers allows a low privileged user to create a low privileged user (customer) in the system. This results in unauthorized data manipulation.

A BOLA vulnerability in POST /appointments allows a low privileged user to create an appointment for any user in the system (including admin). This results in unauthorized data manipulation.

The Easy!Appointments plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'easyappointments' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Open Redirect in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Session Fixation in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Improper Access Control in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Code Injection in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

Use of Hard-coded Credentials in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.

API Privilege Escalation in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0. Full system takeover.

Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.4.3.