A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's net/sched: cls_u32 component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. When u32_change() is called on an existing filter, the whole tcf_result struct is always copied into the new instance of the filter. This causes a problem when updating a filter bound to a class, as tcf_unbind_filter() is always called on the old instance in the success path, decreasing filter_cnt of the still referenced class and allowing it to be deleted, leading to a use-after-free. We recommend upgrading past commit 3044b16e7c6fe5d24b1cdbcf1bd0a9d92d1ebd81.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix dangling sco_conn and use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout Connecting the same socket twice consecutively in sco_sock_connect() could lead to a race condition where two sco_conn objects are created but only one is associated with the socket. If the socket is closed before the SCO connection is established, the timer associated with the dangling sco_conn object won't be canceled. As the sock object is being freed, the use-after-free problem happens when the timer callback function sco_sock_timeout() accesses the socket. Here's the call trace: dump_stack+0x107/0x163 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/ print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x47e ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b kasan_report+0x13a/0x173 ? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b check_memory_region+0x132/0x139 refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b sco_sock_timeout+0xb2/0x1ba process_one_work+0x739/0xbd1 ? cancel_delayed_work+0x13f/0x13f ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0xf0/0xf0 ? to_kthread+0x59/0x85 worker_thread+0x593/0x70e kthread+0x346/0x35a ? drain_workqueue+0x31a/0x31a ? kthread_bind+0x4b/0x4b ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv) process_one_req(): for #2 addr_handler(): mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); !! Use after free on id_priv rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the req_list can have two reqs for the same "handle" but rdma_addr_cancel() only cancels the first one. The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers. Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never gets more than one item in it and doesn't cost anything in the normal flow that never uses this strange error path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnx2x: Fix multiple UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds Fix UBSAN warnings that occur when using a system with 32 physical cpu cores or more, or when the user defines a number of Ethernet queues greater than or equal to FP_SB_MAX_E1x using the num_queues module parameter. Currently there is a read/write out of bounds that occurs on the array "struct stats_query_entry query" present inside the "bnx2x_fw_stats_req" struct in "drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h". Looking at the definition of the "struct stats_query_entry query" array: struct stats_query_entry query[FP_SB_MAX_E1x+ BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX]; FP_SB_MAX_E1x is defined as the maximum number of fast path interrupts and has a value of 16, while BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX has a value of 3 meaning the array has a total size of 19. Since accesses to "struct stats_query_entry query" are offset-ted by BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX, that means that the total number of Ethernet queues should not exceed FP_SB_MAX_E1x (16). However one of these queues is reserved for FCOE and thus the number of Ethernet queues should be set to [FP_SB_MAX_E1x -1] (15) if FCOE is enabled or [FP_SB_MAX_E1x] (16) if it is not. This is also described in a comment in the source code in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h just above the Macro definition of FP_SB_MAX_E1x. Below is the part of this explanation that it important for this patch /* * The total number of L2 queues, MSIX vectors and HW contexts (CIDs) is * control by the number of fast-path status blocks supported by the * device (HW/FW). Each fast-path status block (FP-SB) aka non-default * status block represents an independent interrupts context that can * serve a regular L2 networking queue. However special L2 queues such * as the FCoE queue do not require a FP-SB and other components like * the CNIC may consume FP-SB reducing the number of possible L2 queues * * If the maximum number of FP-SB available is X then: * a. If CNIC is supported it consumes 1 FP-SB thus the max number of * regular L2 queues is Y=X-1 * b. In MF mode the actual number of L2 queues is Y= (X-1/MF_factor) * c. If the FCoE L2 queue is supported the actual number of L2 queues * is Y+1 * d. The number of irqs (MSIX vectors) is either Y+1 (one extra for * slow-path interrupts) or Y+2 if CNIC is supported (one additional * FP interrupt context for the CNIC). * e. The number of HW context (CID count) is always X or X+1 if FCoE * L2 queue is supported. The cid for the FCoE L2 queue is always X. */ However this driver also supports NICs that use the E2 controller which can handle more queues due to having more FP-SB represented by FP_SB_MAX_E2. Looking at the commits when the E2 support was added, it was originally using the E1x parameters: commit f2e0899f0f27 ("bnx2x: Add 57712 support"). Back then FP_SB_MAX_E2 was set to 16 the same as E1x. However the driver was later updated to take full advantage of the E2 instead of having it be limited to the capabilities of the E1x. But as far as we can tell, the array "stats_query_entry query" was still limited to using the FP-SB available to the E1x cards as part of an oversignt when the driver was updated to take full advantage of the E2, and now with the driver being aware of the greater queue size supported by E2 NICs, it causes the UBSAN warnings seen in the stack traces below. This patch increases the size of the "stats_query_entry query" array by replacing FP_SB_MAX_E1x with FP_SB_MAX_E2 to be large enough to handle both types of NICs. Stack traces: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1529:11 index 20 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: Fix use after free in remove_phb_dynamic() In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpi3mr: Sanitise num_phys Information is stored in mr_sas_port->phy_mask, values larger then size of this field shouldn't be allowed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iwlwifi: fix use-after-free If no firmware was present at all (or, presumably, all of the firmware files failed to parse), we end up unbinding by calling device_release_driver(), which calls remove(), which then in iwlwifi calls iwl_drv_stop(), freeing the 'drv' struct. However the new code I added will still erroneously access it after it was freed. Set 'failure=false' in this case to avoid the access, all data was already freed anyway.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: fix possible use-after-free in transport error_recovery work While nvme_tcp_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler itself changing the ctrl state.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: e100: Fix possible use after free in e100_xmit_prepare In e100_xmit_prepare(), if we can't map the skb, then return -ENOMEM, so e100_xmit_frame() will return NETDEV_TX_BUSY and the upper layer will resend the skb. But the skb is already freed, which will cause UAF bug when the upper layer resends the skb. Remove the harmful free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: of: fdt: fix off-by-one error in unflatten_dt_nodes() Commit 78c44d910d3e ("drivers/of: Fix depth when unflattening devicetree") forgot to fix up the depth check in the loop body in unflatten_dt_nodes() which makes it possible to overflow the nps[] buffer... Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: davinci: Validate the obtained number of IRQs Value of pdata->gpio_unbanked is taken from Device Tree. In case of broken DT due to any error this value can be any. Without this value validation there can be out of chips->irqs array boundaries access in davinci_gpio_probe(). Validate the obtained nirq value so that it won't exceed the maximum number of IRQs per bank. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's net/sched: cls_fw component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. When fw_change() is called on an existing filter, the whole tcf_result struct is always copied into the new instance of the filter. This causes a problem when updating a filter bound to a class, as tcf_unbind_filter() is always called on the old instance in the success path, decreasing filter_cnt of the still referenced class and allowing it to be deleted, leading to a use-after-free. We recommend upgrading past commit 76e42ae831991c828cffa8c37736ebfb831ad5ec.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: venus: fix use after free in vdec_close There appears to be a possible use after free with vdec_close(). The firmware will add buffer release work to the work queue through HFI callbacks as a normal part of decoding. Randomly closing the decoder device from userspace during normal decoding can incur a read after free for inst. Fix it by cancelling the work in vdec_close.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Skip finding free audio for unknown engine_id [WHY] ENGINE_ID_UNKNOWN = -1 and can not be used as an array index. Plus, it also means it is uninitialized and does not need free audio. [HOW] Skip and return NULL. This fixes 2 OVERRUN issues reported by Coverity.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: use memtostr_pad() for s_volume_name As with the other strings in struct ext4_super_block, s_volume_name is not NUL terminated. The other strings were marked in commit 072ebb3bffe6 ("ext4: add nonstring annotations to ext4.h"). Using strscpy() isn't the right replacement for strncpy(); it should use memtostr_pad() instead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs iw_conn_req_handler() associates a new struct rdma_id_private (conn_id) with an existing struct iw_cm_id (cm_id) as follows: conn_id->cm_id.iw = cm_id; cm_id->context = conn_id; cm_id->cm_handler = cma_iw_handler; rdma_destroy_id() frees both the cm_id and the struct rdma_id_private. Make sure that cm_work_handler() does not trigger a use-after-free by only freeing of the struct rdma_id_private after all pending work has finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: cyclic allocation of msg_id to avoid reuse Reusing the msg_id after a maliciously completed reopen request may cause a read request to remain unprocessed and result in a hung, as shown below: t1 | t2 | t3 ------------------------------------------------- cachefiles_ondemand_select_req cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_close(A) cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_reopening(A) queue_work(fscache_object_wq, &info->work) ondemand_object_worker cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(A) cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN) // get msg_id 6 wait_for_completion(&req_A->done) cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read // read msg_id 6 req_A cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd copy_to_user // Malicious completion msg_id 6 copen 6,-1 cachefiles_ondemand_copen complete(&req_A->done) // will not set the object to close // because ondemand_id && fd is valid. // ondemand_object_worker() is done // but the object is still reopening. // new open req_B cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(B) cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN) // reuse msg_id 6 process_open_req copen 6,A.size // The expected failed copen was executed successfully Expect copen to fail, and when it does, it closes fd, which sets the object to close, and then close triggers reopen again. However, due to msg_id reuse resulting in a successful copen, the anonymous fd is not closed until the daemon exits. Therefore read requests waiting for reopen to complete may trigger hung task. To avoid this issue, allocate the msg_id cyclically to avoid reusing the msg_id for a very short duration of time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible Use-After-Free in irq_process_work_list Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to allow iterating through the list and deleting the entry in the iteration process. The descriptor is freed via idxd_desc_complete() and there's a slight chance may cause issue for the list iterator when the descriptor is reused by another thread without it being deleted from the list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpt3sas: Avoid test/set_bit() operating in non-allocated memory There is a potential out-of-bounds access when using test_bit() on a single word. The test_bit() and set_bit() functions operate on long values, and when testing or setting a single word, they can exceed the word boundary. KASAN detects this issue and produces a dump: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _scsih_add_device.constprop.0 (./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:60 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:29 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c:7331) mpt3sas Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26e3c60 by task kworker/u1536:2/2965 For full log, please look at [1]. Make the allocation at least the size of sizeof(unsigned long) so that set_bit() and test_bit() have sufficient room for read/write operations without overwriting unallocated memory. [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZkNcALr3W3KGYYJG@gmail.com/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: fastrpc: avoid double fput() on failed usercopy If the copy back to userland fails for the FASTRPC_IOCTL_ALLOC_DMA_BUFF ioctl(), we shouldn't assume that 'buf->dmabuf' is still valid. In fact, dma_buf_fd() called fd_install() before, i.e. "consumed" one reference, leaving us with none. Calling dma_buf_put() will therefore put a reference we no longer own, leading to a valid file descritor table entry for an already released 'file' object which is a straight use-after-free. Simply avoid calling dma_buf_put() and rely on the process exit code to do the necessary cleanup, if needed, i.e. if the file descriptor is still valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free in bpf_link_free() After commit 1a80dbcb2dba, bpf_link can be freed by link->ops->dealloc_deferred, but the code still tests and uses link->ops->dealloc afterward, which leads to a use-after-free as reported by syzbot. Actually, one of them should be sufficient, so just call one of them instead of both. Also add a WARN_ON() in case of any problematic implementation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mst: fix suspicious rcu usage in br_mst_set_state I converted br_mst_set_state to RCU to avoid a vlan use-after-free but forgot to change the vlan group dereference helper. Switch to vlan group RCU deref helper to fix the suspicious rcu usage warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: bme680: Fix overflows in compensate() functions There are cases in the compensate functions of the driver that there could be overflows of variables due to bit shifting ops. These implications were initially discussed here [1] and they were mentioned in log message of Commit 1b3bd8592780 ("iio: chemical: Add support for Bosch BME680 sensor"). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20180728114028.3c1bbe81@archlinux/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: avoid double free special payload If a discard request needs to be retried, and that retry may fail before a new special payload is added, a double free will result. Clear the RQF_SPECIAL_LOAD when the request is cleaned.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Add platform entry for ETDM1_OUT_BE dai link Commit e70b8dd26711 ("ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Remove afe-dai component and rework codec link") removed the codec entry for the ETDM1_OUT_BE dai link entirely instead of replacing it with COMP_EMPTY(). This worked by accident as the remaining COMP_EMPTY() platform entry became the codec entry, and the platform entry became completely empty, effectively the same as COMP_DUMMY() since snd_soc_fill_dummy_dai() doesn't do anything for platform entries. This causes a KASAN out-of-bounds warning in mtk_soundcard_common_probe() in sound/soc/mediatek/common/mtk-soundcard-driver.c: for_each_card_prelinks(card, i, dai_link) { if (adsp_node && !strncmp(dai_link->name, "AFE_SOF", strlen("AFE_SOF"))) dai_link->platforms->of_node = adsp_node; else if (!dai_link->platforms->name && !dai_link->platforms->of_node) dai_link->platforms->of_node = platform_node; } where the code expects the platforms array to have space for at least one entry. Add an COMP_EMPTY() entry so that dai_link->platforms has space.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: xattr: fix buffer overflow for invalid xattr When an xattr size is not what is expected, it is printed out to the kernel log in hex format as a form of debugging. But when that xattr size is bigger than the expected size, printing it out can cause an access off the end of the buffer. Fix this all up by properly restricting the size of the debug hex dump in the kernel log.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptp: fix integer overflow in max_vclocks_store On 32bit systems, the "4 * max" multiply can overflow. Use kcalloc() to do the allocation to prevent this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gt: Fix potential UAF by revoke of fence registers CI has been sporadically reporting the following issue triggered by igt@i915_selftest@live@hangcheck on ADL-P and similar machines: <6> [414.049203] i915: Running intel_hangcheck_live_selftests/igt_reset_evict_fence ... <6> [414.068804] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: submission enabled <6> [414.068812] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: SLPC enabled <3> [414.070354] Unable to pin Y-tiled fence; err:-4 <3> [414.071282] i915_vma_revoke_fence:301 GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active)) ... <4>[ 609.603992] ------------[ cut here ]------------ <2>[ 609.603995] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_ggtt_fencing.c:301! <4>[ 609.604003] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <4>[ 609.604006] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kworker/u64:3 Tainted: G U W 6.9.0-CI_DRM_14785-g1ba62f8cea9c+ #1 <4>[ 609.604008] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR4 RVP, BIOS RPLPFWI1.R00.4035.A00.2301200723 01/20/2023 <4>[ 609.604010] Workqueue: i915 __i915_gem_free_work [i915] <4>[ 609.604149] RIP: 0010:i915_vma_revoke_fence+0x187/0x1f0 [i915] ... <4>[ 609.604271] Call Trace: <4>[ 609.604273] <TASK> ... <4>[ 609.604716] __i915_vma_evict+0x2e9/0x550 [i915] <4>[ 609.604852] __i915_vma_unbind+0x7c/0x160 [i915] <4>[ 609.604977] force_unbind+0x24/0xa0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605098] i915_vma_destroy+0x2f/0xa0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605210] __i915_gem_object_pages_fini+0x51/0x2f0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605330] __i915_gem_free_objects.isra.0+0x6a/0xc0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605440] process_scheduled_works+0x351/0x690 ... In the past, there were similar failures reported by CI from other IGT tests, observed on other platforms. Before commit 63baf4f3d587 ("drm/i915/gt: Only wait for GPU activity before unbinding a GGTT fence"), i915_vma_revoke_fence() was waiting for idleness of vma->active via fence_update(). That commit introduced vma->fence->active in order for the fence_update() to be able to wait selectively on that one instead of vma->active since only idleness of fence registers was needed. But then, another commit 0d86ee35097a ("drm/i915/gt: Make fence revocation unequivocal") replaced the call to fence_update() in i915_vma_revoke_fence() with only fence_write(), and also added that GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active)) in front. No justification was provided on why we might then expect idleness of vma->fence->active without first waiting on it. The issue can be potentially caused by a race among revocation of fence registers on one side and sequential execution of signal callbacks invoked on completion of a request that was using them on the other, still processed in parallel to revocation of those fence registers. Fix it by waiting for idleness of vma->fence->active in i915_vma_revoke_fence(). (cherry picked from commit 24bb052d3dd499c5956abad5f7d8e4fd07da7fb1)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in fscache_withdraw_volume() We got the following issue in our fault injection stress test: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fscache_withdraw_volume+0x2e1/0x370 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810680be08 by task ondemand-04-dae/5798 CPU: 0 PID: 5798 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #565 Call Trace: kasan_check_range+0xf6/0x1b0 fscache_withdraw_volume+0x2e1/0x370 cachefiles_withdraw_volume+0x31/0x50 cachefiles_withdraw_cache+0x3ad/0x900 cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount+0x1f6/0x250 cachefiles_daemon_release+0x13b/0x290 __fput+0x204/0xa00 task_work_run+0x139/0x230 Allocated by task 5820: __kmalloc+0x1df/0x4b0 fscache_alloc_volume+0x70/0x600 __fscache_acquire_volume+0x1c/0x610 erofs_fscache_register_volume+0x96/0x1a0 erofs_fscache_register_fs+0x49a/0x690 erofs_fc_fill_super+0x6c0/0xcc0 vfs_get_super+0xa9/0x140 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 do_new_mount+0x28c/0x580 [...] Freed by task 5820: kfree+0xf1/0x2c0 fscache_put_volume.part.0+0x5cb/0x9e0 erofs_fscache_unregister_fs+0x157/0x1b0 erofs_kill_sb+0xd9/0x1c0 deactivate_locked_super+0xa3/0x100 vfs_get_super+0x105/0x140 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 do_new_mount+0x28c/0x580 [...] ================================================================== Following is the process that triggers the issue: mount failed | daemon exit ------------------------------------------------------------ deactivate_locked_super cachefiles_daemon_release erofs_kill_sb erofs_fscache_unregister_fs fscache_relinquish_volume __fscache_relinquish_volume fscache_put_volume(fscache_volume, fscache_volume_put_relinquish) zero = __refcount_dec_and_test(&fscache_volume->ref, &ref); cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount cachefiles_daemon_unbind cachefiles_withdraw_cache cachefiles_withdraw_volumes list_del_init(&volume->cache_link) fscache_free_volume(fscache_volume) cache->ops->free_volume cachefiles_free_volume list_del_init(&cachefiles_volume->cache_link); kfree(fscache_volume) cachefiles_withdraw_volume fscache_withdraw_volume fscache_volume->n_accesses // fscache_volume UAF !!! The fscache_volume in cache->volumes must not have been freed yet, but its reference count may be 0. So use the new fscache_try_get_volume() helper function try to get its reference count. If the reference count of fscache_volume is 0, fscache_put_volume() is freeing it, so wait for it to be removed from cache->volumes. If its reference count is not 0, call cachefiles_withdraw_volume() with reference count protection to avoid the above issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object When queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object, cachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when the pending read request is completed intentionally and the related erofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is freed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below. process A processs B process C process D cachefiles_ondemand_send_req() // send a read req X // wait for its completion // close ondemand fd cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release() // set object as CLOSE cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read() // set object as REOPENING queue_work(fscache_wq, &info->ondemand_work) // close /dev/cachefiles cachefiles_daemon_release cachefiles_flush_reqs complete(&req->done) // read req X is completed // umount the erofs fs cachefiles_put_object() // object will be freed cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info() kmem_cache_free(object) // both info and object are freed ondemand_object_worker() When dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object, so use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker() to finish.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in one of the probes: [...] 13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar() 14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff 16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff 17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff)) 18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) 19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1 REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) 19: R6_w=0x7fffffff 20: (95) exit from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 23: (95) exit from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0 [...] What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value, meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1, true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2). Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant. Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now, for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101). When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in regs_refine_cond_op(): [...] t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); reg1->var_o ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix array-index-out-of-bounds in dml2/FCLKChangeSupport [Why] Potential out of bounds access in dml2_calculate_rq_and_dlg_params() because the value of out_lowest_state_idx used as an index for FCLKChangeSupport array can be greater than 1. [How] Currently dml2 core specifies identical values for all FCLKChangeSupport elements. Always use index 0 in the condition to avoid out of bounds access.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: cs_dsp: Fix overflow checking of wmfw header Fix the checking that firmware file buffer is large enough for the wmfw header, to prevent overrunning the buffer. The original code tested that the firmware data buffer contained enough bytes for the sums of the size of the structs wmfw_header + wmfw_adsp1_sizes + wmfw_footer But wmfw_adsp1_sizes is only used on ADSP1 firmware. For ADSP2 and Halo Core the equivalent struct is wmfw_adsp2_sizes, which is 4 bytes longer. So the length check didn't guarantee that there are enough bytes in the firmware buffer for a header with wmfw_adsp2_sizes. This patch splits the length check into three separate parts. Each of the wmfw_header, wmfw_adsp?_sizes and wmfw_footer are checked separately before they are used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Fix UAF in msi_capability_init KFENCE reports the following UAF: BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 Use-after-free read at 0x0000000024629571 (in kfence-#12): __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 kfence-#12: 0x0000000008614900-0x00000000e06c228d, size=104, cache=kmalloc-128 allocated by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.808142s: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1f0/0x2bc kmalloc_trace+0x44/0x138 msi_alloc_desc+0x3c/0x9c msi_domain_insert_msi_desc+0x30/0x78 msi_setup_msi_desc+0x13c/0x184 __pci_enable_msi_range+0x258/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 freed by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.811436s: msi_domain_free_descs+0xd4/0x10c msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0xc0/0x1d8 msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked+0xb4/0xbc pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x30/0x4c __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2a8/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 Descriptor allocation done in: __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init msi_setup_msi_desc msi_insert_msi_desc msi_domain_insert_msi_desc msi_alloc_desc ... Freed in case of failure in __msi_domain_alloc_locked() __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked msi_domain_alloc_locked __msi_domain_alloc_locked => fails msi_domain_free_locked ... That failure propagates back to pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() in msi_capability_init() which accesses the descriptor for unmasking in the error exit path. Cure it by copying the descriptor and using the copy for the error exit path unmask operation. [ tglx: Massaged change log ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: defer exposing anon_fd until after copy_to_user() succeeds After installing the anonymous fd, we can now see it in userland and close it. However, at this point we may not have gotten the reference count of the cache, but we will put it during colse fd, so this may cause a cache UAF. So grab the cache reference count before fd_install(). In addition, by kernel convention, fd is taken over by the user land after fd_install(), and the kernel should not call close_fd() after that, i.e., it should call fd_install() after everything is ready, thus fd_install() is called after copy_to_user() succeeds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: fix use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps There could be a potential use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps(). This could happen when: * new (say invalid) source caps are advertised * the existing source caps are unregistered * tcpm_register_source_caps() returns with an error as usb_power_delivery_register_capabilities() fails This causes port->partner_source_caps to hold on to the now freed source caps. Reset port->partner_source_caps value to NULL after unregistering existing source caps.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: lantiq_etop: fix double free in detach The number of the currently released descriptor is never incremented which results in the same skb being released multiple times.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Avoid splat in pskb_pull_reason syzkaller builds (CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y) frequently trigger a debug hint in pskb_may_pull. We'd like to retain this debug check because it might hint at integer overflows and other issues (kernel code should pull headers, not huge value). In bpf case, this splat isn't interesting at all: such (nonsensical) bpf programs are typically generated by a fuzzer anyway. Do what Eric suggested and suppress such warning. For CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=n we don't need the extra check because pskb_may_pull will do the right thing: return an error without the WARN() backtrace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: remove requests from xarray during flushing requests Even with CACHEFILES_DEAD set, we can still read the requests, so in the following concurrency the request may be used after it has been freed: mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2 ------------------------------------------------------------ cachefiles_ondemand_init_object cachefiles_ondemand_send_req REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len) wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done) cachefiles_daemon_read cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read // close dev fd cachefiles_flush_reqs complete(&REQ_A->done) kfree(REQ_A) xa_lock(&cache->reqs); cachefiles_ondemand_select_req req->msg.opcode != CACHEFILES_OP_READ // req use-after-free !!! xa_unlock(&cache->reqs); xa_destroy(&cache->reqs) Hence remove requests from cache->reqs when flushing them to avoid accessing freed requests.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block/ioctl: prefer different overflow check Running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer overflow sanitizer shows this report: [ 62.982337] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 62.985692] cgroup: Invalid name [ 62.986211] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../block/ioctl.c:36:46 [ 62.989370] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7343): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1 [ 62.992992] 9223372036854775807 + 4095 cannot be represented in type 'long long' [ 62.997827] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7345): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1 [ 62.999369] random: crng reseeded on system resumption [ 63.000634] GUP no longer grows the stack in syz-executor.2 (7353): 20002000-20003000 (20001000) [ 63.000668] CPU: 0 PID: 7353 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1 [ 63.000677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 63.000682] Call Trace: [ 63.000686] <TASK> [ 63.000731] dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 [ 63.000919] __get_user_pages+0x903/0xd30 [ 63.001030] __gup_longterm_locked+0x153e/0x1ba0 [ 63.001041] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x50 [ 63.001072] ? try_get_folio+0x29c/0x2d0 [ 63.001083] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x1119/0x1530 [ 63.001109] iov_iter_extract_pages+0x23b/0x580 [ 63.001206] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x4de/0x1220 [ 63.001235] iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x9b6/0x1410 [ 63.001297] __iomap_dio_rw+0xab4/0x1810 [ 63.001316] iomap_dio_rw+0x45/0xa0 [ 63.001328] ext4_file_write_iter+0xdde/0x1390 [ 63.001372] vfs_write+0x599/0xbd0 [ 63.001394] ksys_write+0xc8/0x190 [ 63.001403] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x1b0 [ 63.001421] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3a/0x60 [ 63.001479] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 [ 63.001535] RIP: 0033:0x7f7fd3ebf539 [ 63.001551] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 63.001562] RSP: 002b:00007f7fd32570c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 63.001584] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 RCX: 00007f7fd3ebf539 [ 63.001590] RDX: 4db6d1e4f7e43360 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 63.001595] RBP: 00007f7fd3f1e496 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 63.001599] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 63.001604] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 R15: 00007ffd415ad2b8 ... [ 63.018142] ---[ end trace ]--- Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been changed [1] in the newest version of Clang; It was re-enabled in the kernel with Commit 557f8c582a9ba8ab ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer"). Let's rework this overflow checking logic to not actually perform an overflow during the check itself, thus avoiding the UBSAN splat. [1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/82432

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Always stop health timer during driver removal Currently, if teardown_hca fails to execute during driver removal, mlx5 does not stop the health timer. Afterwards, mlx5 continue with driver teardown. This may lead to a UAF bug, which results in page fault Oops[1], since the health timer invokes after resources were freed. Hence, stop the health monitor even if teardown_hca fails. [1] mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: cleanup mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: wait_func:1155:(pid 1967079): TEARDOWN_HCA(0x103) timeout. Will cause a leak of a command resource mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: mlx5_function_close:1288:(pid 1967079): tear_down_hca failed, skip cleanup BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa26487064230 PGD 100c00067 P4D 100c00067 PUD 100e5a067 PMD 105ed7067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.7.0-68.fc38.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 RIP: 0010:ioread32be+0x34/0x60 RSP: 0018:ffffa26480003e58 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: ffffa26487064200 RBX: ffff9042d08161a0 RCX: ffff904c108222c0 RDX: 000000010bbf1b80 RSI: ffffffffc055ddb0 RDI: ffffa26487064230 RBP: ffff9042d08161a0 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: ffff904c108222e8 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000441 R12: ffffffffc055ddb0 R13: ffffa26487064200 R14: ffffa26480003f00 R15: ffff904c108222c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff904c10800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa26487064230 CR3: 00000002c4420006 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x175/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] ? ioread32be+0x34/0x60 mlx5_health_check_fatal_sensors+0x20/0x100 [mlx5_core] ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] poll_health+0x42/0x230 [mlx5_core] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0xbc/0x110 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] call_timer_fn+0x21/0x130 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] __run_timers+0x222/0x2c0 run_timer_softirq+0x1d/0x40 __do_softirq+0xc9/0x2c8 __irq_exit_rcu+0xa6/0xc0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xcc/0x440 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xbd/0x440 cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40 do_idle+0x20d/0x270 cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30 rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30 start_kernel+0x709/0xa90 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x96/0xa0 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Set object to close if ondemand_id < 0 in copen If copen is maliciously called in the user mode, it may delete the request corresponding to the random id. And the request may have not been read yet. Note that when the object is set to reopen, the open request will be done with the still reopen state in above case. As a result, the request corresponding to this object is always skipped in select_req function, so the read request is never completed and blocks other process. Fix this issue by simply set object to close if its id < 0 in copen.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del() When queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called. If there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current configuration, only 3 queues' napi should be registered and enabled. The ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for enabling only the using queue' napi. Unused queues' napi will not be registered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL. But it couldn't distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not because netif_napi_del() doesn't reset the .poll pointer to NULL. So, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was unregistered by netif_napi_del(). Reproducer: ethtool -L <interface name> rx 1 tx 1 combined 0 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 1 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 4 Splat looks like: kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16 Workqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 Code: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f RSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28 RBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] process_one_work+0x145/0x360 worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: add missing locking around taking dentry fid list Fix a use-after-free on dentry's d_fsdata fid list when a thread looks up a fid through dentry while another thread unlinks it: UAF thread: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. p9_fid_get linux/./include/net/9p/client.h:262 v9fs_fid_find+0x236/0x280 linux/fs/9p/fid.c:129 v9fs_fid_lookup_with_uid linux/fs/9p/fid.c:181 v9fs_fid_lookup+0xbf/0xc20 linux/fs/9p/fid.c:314 v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0xf9/0x360 linux/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c:400 vfs_statx+0xdd/0x4d0 linux/fs/stat.c:248 Freed by: p9_fid_destroy (inlined) p9_client_clunk+0xb0/0xe0 linux/net/9p/client.c:1456 p9_fid_put linux/./include/net/9p/client.h:278 v9fs_dentry_release+0xb5/0x140 linux/fs/9p/vfs_dentry.c:55 v9fs_remove+0x38f/0x620 linux/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c:518 vfs_unlink+0x29a/0x810 linux/fs/namei.c:4335 The problem is that d_fsdata was not accessed under d_lock, because d_release() normally is only called once the dentry is otherwise no longer accessible but since we also call it explicitly in v9fs_remove that lock is required: move the hlist out of the dentry under lock then unref its fids once they are no longer accessible.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: fix use-after-free due to race with dev replace While loading a zone's info during creation of a block group, we can race with a device replace operation and then trigger a use-after-free on the device that was just replaced (source device of the replace operation). This happens because at btrfs_load_zone_info() we extract a device from the chunk map into a local variable and then use the device while not under the protection of the device replace rwsem. So if there's a device replace operation happening when we extract the device and that device is the source of the replace operation, we will trigger a use-after-free if before we finish using the device the replace operation finishes and frees the device. Fix this by enlarging the critical section under the protection of the device replace rwsem so that all uses of the device are done inside the critical section.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead.

A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's netfilter: nf_tables component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. On an error when building a nftables rule, deactivating immediate expressions in nft_immediate_deactivate() can lead unbinding the chain and objects be deactivated but later used. We recommend upgrading past commit 0a771f7b266b02d262900c75f1e175c7fe76fec2.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read() We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore command: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888122e84088 by task ondemand-04-dae/963 CPU: 13 PID: 963 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #564 Call Trace: kasan_report+0x93/0xc0 cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60 vfs_read+0x169/0xb50 ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0 Allocated by task 116: kmem_cache_alloc+0x140/0x3a0 cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x140/0xcd0 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230 [...] Freed by task 792: kmem_cache_free+0xfe/0x390 cachefiles_put_object+0x241/0x480 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x5c8/0x1230 [...] ================================================================== Following is the process that triggers the issue: mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2 ------------------------------------------------------------ cachefiles_withdraw_cookie cachefiles_ondemand_clean_object(object) cachefiles_ondemand_send_req REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len) wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done) cachefiles_daemon_read cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req msg->object_id = req->object->ondemand->ondemand_id ------ restore ------ cachefiles_ondemand_restore xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX) xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW) cachefiles_daemon_read cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n) xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id) complete(&REQ_A->done) ------ close(fd) ------ cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release cachefiles_put_object cachefiles_put_object kmem_cache_free(cachefiles_object_jar, object) REQ_A->object->ondemand->ondemand_id // object UAF !!! When we see the request within xa_lock, req->object must not have been freed yet, so grab the reference count of object before xa_unlock to avoid the above issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete Currently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb will use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer. Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the destination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously if the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in the middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied buffer. Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy() calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space before we start moving characters around.

A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's netfilter: nf_tables component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. The nft_setelem_catchall_deactivate() function checks whether the catch-all set element is active in the current generation instead of the next generation before freeing it, but only flags it inactive in the next generation, making it possible to free the element multiple times, leading to a double free vulnerability. We recommend upgrading past commit b1db244ffd041a49ecc9618e8feb6b5c1afcdaa7.