In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_flow_offload: reset dst in route object after setting up flow dst is transferred to the flow object, route object does not own it anymore. Reset dst in route object, otherwise if flow_offload_add() fails, error path releases dst twice, leading to a refcount underflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix double free in SMC transport cleanup path When the generic SCMI code tears down a channel, it calls the chan_free callback function, defined by each transport. Since multiple protocols might share the same transport_info member, chan_free() might want to clean up the same member multiple times within the given SCMI transport implementation. In this case, it is SMC transport. This will lead to a NULL pointer dereference at the second time: | scmi_protocol scmi_dev.1: Enabled polling mode TX channel - prot_id:16 | arm-scmi firmware:scmi: SCMI Notifications - Core Enabled. | arm-scmi firmware:scmi: unable to communicate with SCMI | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000004 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 | CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 | GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000881ef8000 | [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-00124-g455ef3d016c9-dirty #793 | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT) | pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : smc_chan_free+0x3c/0x6c | lr : smc_chan_free+0x3c/0x6c | Call trace: | smc_chan_free+0x3c/0x6c | idr_for_each+0x68/0xf8 | scmi_cleanup_channels.isra.0+0x2c/0x58 | scmi_probe+0x434/0x734 | platform_probe+0x68/0xd8 | really_probe+0x110/0x27c | __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c | driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x118 | __driver_attach+0x74/0x128 | bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xe0 | driver_attach+0x24/0x30 | bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x1e8 | driver_register+0x60/0x128 | __platform_driver_register+0x28/0x34 | scmi_driver_init+0x84/0xc0 | do_one_initcall+0x78/0x33c | kernel_init_freeable+0x2b8/0x51c | kernel_init+0x24/0x130 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: f0004701 910a0021 aa1403e5 97b91c70 (b9400280) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Simply check for the struct pointer being NULL before trying to access its members, to avoid this situation. This was found when a transport doesn't really work (for instance no SMC service), the probe routines then tries to clean up, and triggers a crash.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dccp/tcp: Unhash sk from ehash for tb2 alloc failure after check_estalblished(). syzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no repro. WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash); However, the syzkaller's log hinted that connect() failed just before the warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1] When connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an available ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we call __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check if the bucket is reusable. If reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)->inet_num. Later, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate it if it does not exist. Although it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must revert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected socket could illegally occupy an ehash entry. Note that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have already responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free tw earlier under such memory presure. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Modules linked in: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40 RDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8 RBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0 R13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078) inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434) __sock_release (net/socket.c:660) sock_close (net/socket.c:1423) __fput (fs/file_table.c:377) __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb Code: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44 RSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c R10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000 R13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170 </TASK> [1]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748) kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867) inet_bind2_bucket_create ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Create persistent INTx handler A vulnerability exists where the eventfd for INTx signaling can be deconfigured, which unregisters the IRQ handler but still allows eventfds to be signaled with a NULL context through the SET_IRQS ioctl or through unmask irqfd if the device interrupt is pending. Ideally this could be solved with some additional locking; the igate mutex serializes the ioctl and config space accesses, and the interrupt handler is unregistered relative to the trigger, but the irqfd path runs asynchronous to those. The igate mutex cannot be acquired from the atomic context of the eventfd wake function. Disabling the irqfd relative to the eventfd registration is potentially incompatible with existing userspace. As a result, the solution implemented here moves configuration of the INTx interrupt handler to track the lifetime of the INTx context object and irq_type configuration, rather than registration of a particular trigger eventfd. Synchronization is added between the ioctl path and eventfd_signal() wrapper such that the eventfd trigger can be dynamically updated relative to in-flight interrupts or irqfd callbacks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: Don't ignore read-only array in md_check_recovery() Usually if the array is not read-write, md_check_recovery() won't register new sync_thread in the first place. And if the array is read-write and sync_thread is registered, md_set_readonly() will unregister sync_thread before setting the array read-only. md/raid follow this behavior hence there is no problem. After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh: 1) array is read-only. dm-raid update super block: rs_update_sbs ro = mddev->ro mddev->ro = 0 -> set array read-write md_update_sb 2) register new sync thread concurrently. 3) dm-raid set array back to read-only: rs_update_sbs mddev->ro = ro 4) stop the array: raid_dtr md_stop stop_sync_thread set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery); md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread); wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery)) 5) sync thread done: md_do_sync set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery); md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread); 6) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread: md_check_recovery if (!md_is_rdwr(mddev) && !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery)) return; -> -> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 4 hang; The root cause is that dm-raid manipulate 'mddev->ro' by itself, however, dm-raid really should stop sync thread before setting the array read-only. Unfortunately, I need to read more code before I can refacter the handler of 'mddev->ro' in dm-raid, hence let's fix the problem the easy way for now to prevent dm-raid regression.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: aoe: avoid potential deadlock at set_capacity Move set_capacity() outside of the section procected by (&d->lock). To avoid possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [1] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); local_irq_disable(); [2] lock(&d->lock); [3] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); <Interrupt> [4] lock(&d->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Where [1](&bdev->bd_size_lock) hold by zram_add()->set_capacity(). [2]lock(&d->lock) hold by aoeblk_gdalloc(). And aoeblk_gdalloc() is trying to acquire [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) at set_capacity() call. In this situation an attempt to acquire [4]lock(&d->lock) from aoecmd_cfg_rsp() will lead to deadlock. So the simplest solution is breaking lock dependency [2](&d->lock) -> [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) by moving set_capacity() outside.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/pci: Skip to handle RAS errors if CXL.mem device is detached The PCI AER model is an awkward fit for CXL error handling. While the expectation is that a PCI device can escalate to link reset to recover from an AER event, the same reset on CXL amounts to a surprise memory hotplug of massive amounts of memory. At present, the CXL error handler attempts some optimistic error handling to unbind the device from the cxl_mem driver after reaping some RAS register values. This results in a "hopeful" attempt to unplug the memory, but there is no guarantee that will succeed. A subsequent AER notification after the memdev unbind event can no longer assume the registers are mapped. Check for memdev bind before reaping status register values to avoid crashes of the form: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa00000195e9100 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [...] RIP: 0010:__cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core] [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160 ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110 ? exc_page_fault+0x113/0x170 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __pfx_dpc_reset_link+0x10/0x10 ? __cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core] ? find_cxl_port+0x59/0x80 [cxl_core] cxl_handle_rp_ras+0xbc/0xd0 [cxl_core] cxl_error_detected+0x6c/0xf0 [cxl_core] report_error_detected+0xc7/0x1c0 pci_walk_bus+0x73/0x90 pcie_do_recovery+0x23f/0x330 Longer term, the unbind and PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT behavior might need to be replaced with a new PCI_ERS_RESULT_PANIC.

kernel/sched/fair.c in the Linux kernel before 5.3.9, when cpu.cfs_quota_us is used (e.g., with Kubernetes), allows attackers to cause a denial of service against non-cpu-bound applications by generating a workload that triggers unwanted slice expiration, aka CID-de53fd7aedb1. (In other words, although this slice expiration would typically be seen with benign workloads, it is possible that an attacker could calculate how many stray requests are required to force an entire Kubernetes cluster into a low-performance state caused by slice expiration, and ensure that a DDoS attack sent that number of stray requests. An attack does not affect the stability of the kernel; it only causes mismanagement of application execution.)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: relax WARN_ON in ovl_verify_area() syzbot hit an assertion in copy up data loop which looks like it is the result of a lower file whose size is being changed underneath overlayfs. This type of use case is documented to cause undefined behavior, so returning EIO error for the copy up makes sense, but it should not be causing a WARN_ON assertion.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf If ->ProtocolId is SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM, smb2 request size validation could be skipped. if request size is smaller than sizeof(struct smb2_query_info_req), slab-out-of-bounds read can happen in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf(). This patch allocate response buffer after decrypting transform request. smb3_decrypt_req() will validate transform request size and avoid slab-out-of-bound in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: limit printing rate when illegal packet received by tun dev vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Use OPTS_SET() macro in bpf_xdp_query() When the feature_flags and xdp_zc_max_segs fields were added to the libbpf bpf_xdp_query_opts, the code writing them did not use the OPTS_SET() macro. This causes libbpf to write to those fields unconditionally, which means that programs compiled against an older version of libbpf (with a smaller size of the bpf_xdp_query_opts struct) will have its stack corrupted by libbpf writing out of bounds. The patch adding the feature_flags field has an early bail out if the feature_flags field is not part of the opts struct (via the OPTS_HAS) macro, but the patch adding xdp_zc_max_segs does not. For consistency, this fix just changes the assignments to both fields to use the OPTS_SET() macro.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/evtchn: avoid WARN() when unbinding an event channel When unbinding a user event channel, the related handler might be called a last time in case the kernel was built with CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ. This might cause a WARN() in the handler. Avoid that by adding an "unbinding" flag to struct user_event which will short circuit the handler.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: ep93xx: Add terminator to gpiod_lookup_table Without the terminator, if a con_id is passed to gpio_find() that does not exist in the lookup table the function will not stop looping correctly, and eventually cause an oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: Fix regression in writes when non-standard maximum write size negotiated The conversion to netfs in the 6.3 kernel caused a regression when maximum write size is set by the server to an unexpected value which is not a multiple of 4096 (similarly if the user overrides the maximum write size by setting mount parm "wsize", but sets it to a value that is not a multiple of 4096). When negotiated write size is not a multiple of 4096 the netfs code can skip the end of the final page when doing large sequential writes, causing data corruption. This section of code is being rewritten/removed due to a large netfs change, but until that point (ie for the 6.3 kernel until now) we can not support non-standard maximum write sizes. Add a warning if a user specifies a wsize on mount that is not a multiple of 4096 (and round down), also add a change where we round down the maximum write size if the server negotiates a value that is not a multiple of 4096 (we also have to check to make sure that we do not round it down to zero).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-raid456, md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with reshape For raid456, if reshape is still in progress, then IO across reshape position will wait for reshape to make progress. However, for dm-raid, in following cases reshape will never make progress hence IO will hang: 1) the array is read-only; 2) MD_RECOVERY_WAIT is set; 3) MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set; After commit c467e97f079f ("md/raid6: use valid sector values to determine if an I/O should wait on the reshape") fix the problem that IO across reshape position doesn't wait for reshape, the dm-raid test shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang: [root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/979/stack [<0>] wait_woken+0x7d/0x90 [<0>] raid5_make_request+0x929/0x1d70 [raid456] [<0>] md_handle_request+0xc2/0x3b0 [md_mod] [<0>] raid_map+0x2c/0x50 [dm_raid] [<0>] __map_bio+0x251/0x380 [dm_mod] [<0>] dm_submit_bio+0x1f0/0x760 [dm_mod] [<0>] __submit_bio+0xc2/0x1c0 [<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x17f/0x450 [<0>] submit_bio_noacct+0x2bc/0x780 [<0>] submit_bio+0x70/0xc0 [<0>] mpage_readahead+0x169/0x1f0 [<0>] blkdev_readahead+0x18/0x30 [<0>] read_pages+0x7c/0x3b0 [<0>] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ab/0x280 [<0>] force_page_cache_ra+0x9e/0x130 [<0>] page_cache_sync_ra+0x3b/0x110 [<0>] filemap_get_pages+0x143/0xa30 [<0>] filemap_read+0xdc/0x4b0 [<0>] blkdev_read_iter+0x75/0x200 [<0>] vfs_read+0x272/0x460 [<0>] ksys_read+0x7a/0x170 [<0>] __x64_sys_read+0x1c/0x30 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 This is because reshape can't make progress. For md/raid, the problem doesn't exist because register new sync_thread doesn't rely on the IO to be done any more: 1) If array is read-only, it can switch to read-write by ioctl/sysfs; 2) md/raid never set MD_RECOVERY_WAIT; 3) If MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set, mddev_suspend() doesn't hold 'reconfig_mutex', hence it can be cleared and reshape can continue by sysfs api 'sync_action'. However, I'm not sure yet how to avoid the problem in dm-raid yet. This patch on the one hand make sure raid_message() can't change sync_thread() through raid_message() after presuspend(), on the other hand detect the above 3 cases before wait for IO do be done in dm_suspend(), and let dm-raid requeue those IO.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Fix WARNING in _copy_from_iter Syzkaller reports a warning in _copy_from_iter because an iov_iter is supposedly used in the wrong direction. The reason is that syzcaller managed to generate a request with a transfer direction of SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV. This instructs the kernel to copy user buffers into the kernel, read into the copied buffers and then copy the data back to user space. Thus the iovec is used in both directions. Detect this situation in the block layer and construct a new iterator with the correct direction for the copy-in.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't set the MFP flag for the GTK The firmware doesn't need the MFP flag for the GTK, it can even make the firmware crash. in case the AP is configured with: group cipher TKIP and MFPC. We would send the GTK with cipher = TKIP and MFP which is of course not possible.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: meson: Add missing clocks to axg_clk_regmaps Some clocks were missing from axg_clk_regmaps, which caused kernel panic during cat /sys/kernel/debug/clk/clk_summary [ 57.349402] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000001fc ... [ 57.430002] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 57.436900] pc : regmap_read+0x1c/0x88 [ 57.440608] lr : clk_regmap_gate_is_enabled+0x3c/0xb0 [ 57.445611] sp : ffff800082f1b690 [ 57.448888] x29: ffff800082f1b690 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff800080eb9a70 [ 57.455961] x26: 0000000000000007 x25: 0000000000000016 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 57.463033] x23: ffff800080e8b488 x22: 0000000000000015 x21: ffff00000e7e7000 [ 57.470106] x20: ffff00000400ec00 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 57.477178] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000042a3000 [ 57.484251] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff0000042a2fec x12: 0000000005f5e100 [ 57.491323] x11: abcc77118461cefd x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : ffff8000805e4b24 [ 57.498396] x8 : ffff0000028063c0 x7 : ffff800082f1b710 x6 : ffff800082f1b710 [ 57.505468] x5 : 00000000ffffffd0 x4 : ffff800082f1b6e0 x3 : 0000000000001000 [ 57.512541] x2 : ffff800082f1b6e4 x1 : 000000000000012c x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 57.519615] Call trace: [ 57.522030] regmap_read+0x1c/0x88 [ 57.525393] clk_regmap_gate_is_enabled+0x3c/0xb0 [ 57.530050] clk_core_is_enabled+0x44/0x120 [ 57.534190] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x154/0x2f0 [ 57.538847] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.543505] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.548162] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.552820] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.557477] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.562135] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.566792] clk_summary_show_subtree+0x220/0x2f0 [ 57.571450] clk_summary_show+0x84/0xb8 [ 57.575245] seq_read_iter+0x1bc/0x4b8 [ 57.578954] seq_read+0x8c/0xd0 [ 57.582059] full_proxy_read+0x68/0xc8 [ 57.585767] vfs_read+0xb0/0x268 [ 57.588959] ksys_read+0x70/0x108 [ 57.592236] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38 [ 57.596031] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 [ 57.599740] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf8 [ 57.604397] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40 [ 57.607675] el0_svc+0x34/0xb8 [ 57.610694] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 [ 57.615006] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 [ 57.618635] Code: a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 aa0003f3 (b941fc00) [ 57.624668] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [jbrunet: add missing Fixes tag]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Fix nfs_netfs_issue_read() xarray locking for writeback interrupt The loop inside nfs_netfs_issue_read() currently does not disable interrupts while iterating through pages in the xarray to submit for NFS read. This is not safe though since after taking xa_lock, another page in the mapping could be processed for writeback inside an interrupt, and deadlock can occur. The fix is simple and clean if we use xa_for_each_range(), which handles the iteration with RCU while reducing code complexity. The problem is easily reproduced with the following test: mount -o vers=3,fsc 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt/nfs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin bs=4096 count=1 echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin of=/dev/null umount /mnt/nfs On the console with a lockdep-enabled kernel a message similar to the following will be seen: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.7.0-lockdbg+ #10 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. test5/1708 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffff888127baa598 (&xa->xa_lock#4){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x144/0x380 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0xa0 __folio_end_writeback+0x17e/0x5c0 folio_end_writeback+0x93/0x1b0 iomap_finish_ioend+0xeb/0x6a0 blk_update_request+0x204/0x7f0 blk_mq_end_request+0x30/0x1c0 blk_complete_reqs+0x7e/0xa0 __do_softirq+0x113/0x544 __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_call_function_single+0x6f/0x90 asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20 default_idle+0x9/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x40 start_secondary+0x19d/0x1c0 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b irq event stamp: 176891 hardirqs last enabled at (176891): [<ffffffffa67a0be4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (176890): [<ffffffffa67a0899>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x79/0xa0 softirqs last enabled at (176646): [<ffffffffa515d91e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 softirqs last disabled at (176633): [<ffffffffa515d91e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xa->xa_lock#4); <Interrupt> lock(&xa->xa_lock#4); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by test5/1708: #0: ffff888127baa498 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#22){++++}-{4:4}, at: nfs_start_io_read+0x28/0x90 [nfs] #1: ffff888127baa650 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xa4/0x280 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 1708 Comm: test5 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.7.0-lockdbg+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 mark_lock+0xb3f/0xd20 __lock_acquire+0x77b/0x3360 _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80 nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs] netfs_begin_read+0x77f/0x980 [netfs] nfs_netfs_readahead+0x45/0x60 [nfs] nfs_readahead+0x323/0x5a0 [nfs] read_pages+0xf3/0x5c0 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1c8/0x280 filemap_get_pages+0x38c/0xae0 filemap_read+0x206/0x5e0 nfs_file_read+0xb7/0x140 [nfs] vfs_read+0x2a9/0x460 ksys_read+0xb7/0x140

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error() inet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock. IPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option and trigger a KCSAN warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Fix NULL pointer dereference in tb_port_update_credits() Olliver reported that his system crashes when plugging in Thunderbolt 1 device: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:tb_port_do_update_credits+0x1b/0x130 [thunderbolt] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? tb_port_do_update_credits+0x1b/0x130 ? tb_switch_update_link_attributes+0x83/0xd0 tb_switch_add+0x7a2/0xfe0 tb_scan_port+0x236/0x6f0 tb_handle_hotplug+0x6db/0x900 process_one_work+0x171/0x340 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe5/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This is due the fact that some Thunderbolt 1 devices only have one lane adapter. Fix this by checking for the lane 1 before we read its credits.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this. Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcm80211: handle pmk_op allocation failure The kzalloc() in brcmf_pmksa_v3_op() will return null if the physical memory has run out. As a result, if we dereference the null value, the null pointer dereference bug will happen. Return -ENOMEM from brcmf_pmksa_v3_op() if kzalloc() fails for pmk_op.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix NULL pointer dereference when get power limit Because powerplay_table initialization is skipped under sriov case, We check and set default lower and upper OD value if powerplay_table is NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus trash whatever this register is used for. Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd(). To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not convert to an integer. This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach: We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word. In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction "or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler choosed for the error return code. In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register. Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT config option any longer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix support of SO_PEEK_OFF. Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless thread safety in the kernel. After this patch : - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock. - skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock. - af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(), because it does not lock u->iolock anymore. As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off(). [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415 sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046 ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 -> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025: #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Hardware name: Google Google C ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfs: fix panic when nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds() fails We've been seeing the following panic in production BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000065 PGD 2f485f067 P4D 2f485f067 PUD 2cc5d8067 PMD 0 RIP: 0010:ff_layout_cancel_io+0x3a/0x90 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x78/0xc0 ? page_fault_oops+0x286/0x380 ? __rpc_execute+0x2c3/0x470 [sunrpc] ? rpc_new_task+0x42/0x1c0 [sunrpc] ? exc_page_fault+0x5d/0x110 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? ff_layout_free_layoutreturn+0x110/0x110 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] ? ff_layout_cancel_io+0x3a/0x90 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] ? ff_layout_cancel_io+0x6f/0x90 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return+0x1b0/0x360 [nfsv4] pnfs_error_mark_layout_for_return+0x9e/0x110 [nfsv4] ? ff_layout_send_layouterror+0x50/0x160 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds+0x11f/0x290 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] ff_layout_pg_init_write+0xf0/0x1f0 [nfs_layout_flexfiles] __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x154/0x6c0 [nfs] nfs_pageio_add_request+0x26b/0x380 [nfs] nfs_do_writepage+0x111/0x1e0 [nfs] nfs_writepages_callback+0xf/0x30 [nfs] write_cache_pages+0x17f/0x380 ? nfs_pageio_init_write+0x50/0x50 [nfs] ? nfs_writepages+0x6d/0x210 [nfs] ? nfs_writepages+0x6d/0x210 [nfs] nfs_writepages+0x125/0x210 [nfs] do_writepages+0x67/0x220 ? generic_perform_write+0x14b/0x210 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x5b/0x80 file_write_and_wait_range+0x6d/0xc0 nfs_file_fsync+0x81/0x170 [nfs] ? nfs_file_mmap+0x60/0x60 [nfs] __x64_sys_fsync+0x53/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Inspecting the core with drgn I was able to pull this >>> prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0] #0 at 0xffffffffa079657a (ff_layout_cancel_io+0x3a/0x84) in ff_layout_cancel_io at fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c:2021:27 >>> prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]['idx'] (u32)1 >>> prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]['flseg'].mirror_array[1].mirror_ds (struct nfs4_ff_layout_ds *)0xffffffffffffffed This is clear from the stack trace, we call nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds() which could error out initializing the mirror_ds, and then we go to clean it all up and our check is only for if (!mirror->mirror_ds). This is inconsistent with the rest of the users of mirror_ds, which have if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mirror_ds)) to keep from tripping over this exact scenario. Fix this up in ff_layout_cancel_io() to make sure we don't panic when we get an error. I also spot checked all the other instances of checking mirror_ds and we appear to be doing the correct checks everywhere, only unconditionally dereferencing mirror_ds when we know it would be valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to remove unnecessary f2fs_bug_on() to avoid panic verify_blkaddr() will trigger panic once we inject fault into f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(), fix to remove this unnecessary f2fs_bug_on().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nbd: null check for nla_nest_start nla_nest_start() may fail and return NULL. Insert a check and set errno based on other call sites within the same source code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: rely on mac80211 debugfs handling for vif mac80211 started to delete debugfs entries in certain cases, causing a ath11k to crash when it tried to delete the entries later. Fix this by relying on mac80211 to delete the entries when appropriate and adding them from the vif_add_debugfs handler.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pci_iounmap(): Fix MMIO mapping leak The #ifdef ARCH_HAS_GENERIC_IOPORT_MAP accidentally also guards iounmap(), which means MMIO mappings are leaked. Move the guard so we call iounmap() for MMIO mappings.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that case the following macro works correctly to give correct register address: _MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4) However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12 because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value read/writes causing DSC corruption. This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS >=12. v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula) (cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5)

mwifiex_tm_cmd in drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.6 has some error-handling cases that did not free allocated hostcmd memory, aka CID-003b686ace82. This will cause a memory leak and denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Fix KASAN issue with tasklet KASAN testing revealed the following issue assocated with freeing an IRQ. [50006.466686] Call Trace: [50006.466691] <IRQ> [50006.489538] dump_stack+0x5c/0x80 [50006.493475] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x1a/0x150 [50006.499872] ? irdma_sc_process_ceq+0x483/0x790 [irdma] [50006.505742] ? irdma_sc_process_ceq+0x483/0x790 [irdma] [50006.511644] kasan_report.cold.11+0x7f/0x118 [50006.516572] ? irdma_sc_process_ceq+0x483/0x790 [irdma] [50006.522473] irdma_sc_process_ceq+0x483/0x790 [irdma] [50006.528232] irdma_process_ceq+0xb2/0x400 [irdma] [50006.533601] ? irdma_hw_flush_wqes_callback+0x370/0x370 [irdma] [50006.540298] irdma_ceq_dpc+0x44/0x100 [irdma] [50006.545306] tasklet_action_common.isra.14+0x148/0x2c0 [50006.551096] __do_softirq+0x1d0/0xaf8 [50006.555396] irq_exit_rcu+0x219/0x260 [50006.559670] irq_exit+0xa/0x20 [50006.563320] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1bf/0x690 [50006.568645] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [50006.573341] </IRQ> The issue is that a tasklet could be pending on another core racing the delete of the irq. Fix by insuring any scheduled tasklet is killed after deleting the irq.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: check offset alignment in binder_get_object() Commit 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn") introduced changes to how binder objects are copied. In doing so, it unintentionally removed an offset alignment check done through calls to binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() -> check_buffer(). These calls were replaced in binder_get_object() with copy_from_user(), so now an explicit offset alignment check is needed here. This avoids later complications when unwinding the objects gets harder. It is worth noting this check existed prior to commit 7a67a39320df ("binder: add function to copy binder object from buffer"), likely removed due to redundancy at the time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc2: host: Fix dereference issue in DDMA completion flow. Fixed variable dereference issue in DDMA completion flow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Both cadence-quadspi ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume() implementations start with: struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev); This obviously cannot be correct, unless "struct cqspi_st" is the first member of " struct spi_controller", or the other way around, but it is not the case. "struct spi_controller" is allocated by devm_spi_alloc_host(), which allocates an extra amount of memory for private data, used to store "struct cqspi_st". The ->probe() function of the cadence-quadspi driver then sets the device drvdata to store the address of the "struct cqspi_st" structure. Therefore: struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); is correct, but: struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev); is not, as it makes "host" point not to a "struct spi_controller" but to the same "struct cqspi_st" structure as above. This obviously leads to bad things (memory corruption, kernel crashes) directly during ->probe(), as ->probe() enables the device using PM runtime, leading the ->runtime_resume() hook being called, which in turns calls spi_controller_resume() with the wrong pointer. This has at least been reported [0] to cause a kernel crash, but the exact behavior will depend on the memory contents. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240226121803.5a7r5wkpbbowcxgx@dhruva/ This issue potentially affects all platforms that are currently using the cadence-quadspi driver.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/membarrier: reduce the ability to hammer on sys_membarrier On some systems, sys_membarrier can be very expensive, causing overall slowdowns for everything. So put a lock on the path in order to serialize the accesses to prevent the ability for this to be called at too high of a frequency and saturate the machine.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid allocating blocks from corrupted group in ext4_mb_try_best_found() Determine if the group block bitmap is corrupted before using ac_b_ex in ext4_mb_try_best_found() to avoid allocating blocks from a group with a corrupted block bitmap in the following concurrency and making the situation worse. ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_lock_group(sb, group) ext4_mb_good_group // check if the group bbitmap is corrupted ext4_mb_complex_scan_group // Scan group gets ac_b_ex but doesn't use it ext4_unlock_group(sb, group) ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted(group) // The block bitmap was corrupted during // the group unlock gap. ext4_mb_try_best_found ext4_lock_group(ac->ac_sb, group) ext4_mb_use_best_found mb_mark_used // Allocating blocks in block bitmap corrupted group

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: zswap: fix missing folio cleanup in writeback race path In zswap_writeback_entry(), after we get a folio from __read_swap_cache_async(), we grab the tree lock again to check that the swap entry was not invalidated and recycled. If it was, we delete the folio we just added to the swap cache and exit. However, __read_swap_cache_async() returns the folio locked when it is newly allocated, which is always true for this path, and the folio is ref'd. Make sure to unlock and put the folio before returning. This was discovered by code inspection, probably because this path handles a race condition that should not happen often, and the bug would not crash the system, it will only strand the folio indefinitely.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: fix double module refcount decrement Once the discipline is associated with the device, deleting the device takes care of decrementing the module's refcount. Doing it manually on this error path causes refcount to artificially decrease on each error while it should just stay the same.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Workaround for crashed firmware on system suspend When the system is suspended while audio is active, the sof_ipc4_pcm_hw_free() is invoked to reset the pipelines since during suspend the DSP is turned off, streams will be re-started after resume. If the firmware crashes during while audio is running (or when we reset the stream before suspend) then the sof_ipc4_set_multi_pipeline_state() will fail with IPC error and the state change is interrupted. This will cause misalignment between the kernel and firmware state on next DSP boot resulting errors returned by firmware for IPC messages, eventually failing the audio resume. On stream close the errors are ignored so the kernel state will be corrected on the next DSP boot, so the second boot after the DSP panic. If sof_ipc4_trigger_pipelines() is called from sof_ipc4_pcm_hw_free() then state parameter is SOF_IPC4_PIPE_RESET and only in this case. Treat a forced pipeline reset similarly to how we treat a pcm_free by ignoring error on state sending to allow the kernel's state to be consistent with the state the firmware will have after the next boot.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseport_add_sock(). syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb in reuseport_add_sock(). [0] The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first listener. The second listen() calls reuseport_add_sock() with the first listener as sk2, where sk2->sk_reuseport_cb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, but the close() does clear it by reuseport_detach_sock(). The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseport_alloc(), reuseport_add_sock(), and reuseport_detach_sock(). The caller of reuseport_alloc() and reuseport_{add,detach}_sock() must provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same reuseport group. Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and all groups except one would be silently dead. 1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently 2. No socket in the same group found in sctp_ep_hashtable[] 3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups 4. Only one group hit first in __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint() receives incoming packets Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur. TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock. Let's apply the locking strategy to __sctp_hash_endpoint() and __sctp_unhash_endpoint(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:reuseport_add_sock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:350 Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __sctp_hash_endpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] sctp_hash_endpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] __sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1900 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c R13: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: really cope with fastopen race Fastopen and PM-trigger subflow shutdown can race, as reported by syzkaller. In my first attempt to close such race, I missed the fact that the subflow status can change again before the subflow_state_change callback is invoked. Address the issue additionally copying with all the states directly reachable from TCP_FIN_WAIT1.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: perf: ctr_get_width function for legacy is not defined With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n linux kernel crashes when you try perf record: $ perf record ls [ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 46.750199] Oops [#1] [ 46.750342] Modules linked in: [ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2 [ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 46.751184] epc : 0x0 [ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e [ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0 [ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0 [ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930 [ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000 [ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004 [ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2 [ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078 [ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30 [ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c [ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec. [ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4 This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage. Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix memleak in map from abort path The delete set command does not rely on the transaction object for element removal, therefore, a combination of delete element + delete set from the abort path could result in restoring twice the refcount of the mapping. Check for inactive element in the next generation for the delete element command in the abort path, skip restoring state if next generation bit has been already cleared. This is similar to the activate logic using the set walk iterator. [ 6170.286929] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6170.286939] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 790302 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2086 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.287071] Modules linked in: [...] [ 6170.287633] CPU: 6 PID: 790302 Comm: kworker/6:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #365 [ 6170.287768] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.287886] Code: df 48 8d 7d 58 e8 69 2e 3b df 48 8b 7d 58 e8 80 1b 37 df 48 8d 7d 68 e8 57 2e 3b df 48 8b 7d 68 e8 6e 1b 37 df 48 89 ef eb c4 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 0f [ 6170.287895] RSP: 0018:ffff888134b8fd08 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 6170.287904] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888125bffb28 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 6170.287912] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffffa20298ab RDI: ffff88811ebe4750 [ 6170.287919] RBP: ffff88811ebe4700 R08: ffff88838e812650 R09: fffffbfff0623a55 [ 6170.287926] R10: ffffffff8311d2af R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888125bffb10 [ 6170.287933] R13: ffff888125bffb10 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 [ 6170.287940] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888390b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6170.287948] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6170.287955] CR2: 00007fd31fc00710 CR3: 0000000133f60004 CR4: 00000000001706f0 [ 6170.287962] Call Trace: [ 6170.287967] <TASK> [ 6170.287973] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [ 6170.287986] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.288092] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [ 6170.287986] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.288092] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [ 6170.288104] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 6170.288112] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [ 6170.288120] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 6170.288132] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x2b/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.288243] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.288366] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x2b/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 6170.288483] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x588/0x590 [nf_tables]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: ti: phy-omap-usb2: Fix NULL pointer dereference for SRP If the external phy working together with phy-omap-usb2 does not implement send_srp(), we may still attempt to call it. This can happen on an idle Ethernet gadget triggering a wakeup for example: configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: ECM Suspend configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: Port suspended. Triggering wakeup ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when execute ... PC is at 0x0 LR is at musb_gadget_wakeup+0x1d4/0x254 [musb_hdrc] ... musb_gadget_wakeup [musb_hdrc] from usb_gadget_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c [udc_core] usb_gadget_wakeup [udc_core] from eth_start_xmit+0x3b0/0x3d4 [u_ether] eth_start_xmit [u_ether] from dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x24c dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x104/0x2e4 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x334/0xd88 __dev_queue_xmit from arp_solicit+0xf0/0x268 arp_solicit from neigh_probe+0x54/0x7c neigh_probe from __neigh_event_send+0x22c/0x47c __neigh_event_send from neigh_resolve_output+0x14c/0x1c0 neigh_resolve_output from ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 ip_finish_output2 from ip_send_skb+0x40/0xd8 ip_send_skb from udp_send_skb+0x124/0x340 udp_send_skb from udp_sendmsg+0x780/0x984 udp_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0xd8/0x158 __sys_sendto from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x58 Let's fix the issue by checking for send_srp() and set_vbus() before calling them. For USB peripheral only cases these both could be NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tools/rtla: Fix clang warning about mount_point var size clang is reporting this warning: $ make HOSTCC=clang CC=clang LLVM_IAS=1 [...] clang -O -g -DVERSION=\"6.8.0-rc3\" -flto=auto -fexceptions -fstack-protector-strong -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fstack-clash-protection -Wall -Werror=format-security -Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wp,-D_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS $(pkg-config --cflags libtracefs) -c -o src/utils.o src/utils.c src/utils.c:548:66: warning: 'fscanf' may overflow; destination buffer in argument 3 has size 1024, but the corresponding specifier may require size 1025 [-Wfortify-source] 548 | while (fscanf(fp, "%*s %" STR(MAX_PATH) "s %99s %*s %*d %*d\n", mount_point, type) == 2) { | ^ Increase mount_point variable size to MAX_PATH+1 to avoid the overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: sysfs: Fix reference leak in sysfs_break_active_protection() The sysfs_break_active_protection() routine has an obvious reference leak in its error path. If the call to kernfs_find_and_get() fails then kn will be NULL, so the companion sysfs_unbreak_active_protection() routine won't get called (and would only cause an access violation by trying to dereference kn->parent if it was called). As a result, the reference to kobj acquired at the start of the function will never be released. Fix the leak by adding an explicit kobject_put() call when kn is NULL.