In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp/dccp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept. While reading sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fwmark_reflect. While reading sysctl_fwmark_reflect, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data-races in proc_dou8vec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dou8vec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dou8vec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing. While reading sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr. While reading sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu. While reading sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe. While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix a data-race in unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(). unix_dgram_poll() calls unix_dgram_peer_wake_me() without `other`'s lock held and check if its receive queue is full. Here we need to use unix_recvq_full_lockless() instead of unix_recvq_full(), otherwise KCSAN will report a data-race.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss. While reading sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race where eprobes can be called before the event The flag that tells the event to call its triggers after reading the event is set for eprobes after the eprobe is enabled. This leads to a race where the eprobe may be triggered at the beginning of the event where the record information is NULL. The eprobe then dereferences the NULL record causing a NULL kernel pointer bug. Test for a NULL record to keep this from happening.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_base_mss. While reading sysctl_tcp_base_mss, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a data-race around bpf_jit_limit. While reading bpf_jit_limit, it can be changed concurrently via sysctl, WRITE_ONCE() in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(). The size of bpf_jit_limit is long, so we need to add a paired READ_ONCE() to avoid load-tearing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading icmp sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: netlink notifier might race to release objects commit release path is invoked via call_rcu and it runs lockless to release the objects after rcu grace period. The netlink notifier handler might win race to remove objects that the transaction context is still referencing from the commit release path. Call rcu_barrier() to ensure pending rcu callbacks run to completion if the list of transactions to be destroyed is not empty.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page list without defending against page migration. Since pages which haven't yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different lethal races. It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages (since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the process). Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize with page migration.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue sk->sk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM sockets its RX path takes mux->rx_lock to protect more than just skb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue lock, so race conditions still exist. We can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux->rx_lock too but this would introduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can be shared by multiple KCM sockets. So we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle skb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately, skb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by other sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after getting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and kcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets, so it is safe to get rid of this check too. I ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_migrate_req. While reading sysctl_tcp_migrate_req, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_max_reordering. While reading sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh. While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields. While reading sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscache: Fix invalidation/lookup race If an NFS file is opened for writing and closed, fscache_invalidate() will be asked to invalidate the file - however, if the cookie is in the LOOKING_UP state (or the CREATING state), then request to invalidate doesn't get recorded for fscache_cookie_state_machine() to do something with. Fix this by making __fscache_invalidate() set a flag if it sees the cookie is in the LOOKING_UP state to indicate that we need to go to invalidation. Note that this requires a count on the n_accesses counter for the state machine, which that will release when it's done. fscache_cookie_state_machine() then shifts to the INVALIDATING state if it sees the flag. Without this, an nfs file can get corrupted if it gets modified locally and then read locally as the cache contents may not get updated.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_igmp_llm_reports. While reading sysctl_igmp_llm_reports, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. This test can be packed into a helper, so such changes will be in the follow-up series after net is merged into net-next. if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(pmc->multiaddr) && !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports))

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: list: fix a data-race around ep->rdllist ep_poll() first calls ep_events_available() with no lock held and checks if ep->rdllist is empty by list_empty_careful(), which reads rdllist->prev. Thus all accesses to it need some protection to avoid store/load-tearing. Note INIT_LIST_HEAD_RCU() already has the annotation for both prev and next. Commit bf3b9f6372c4 ("epoll: Add busy poll support to epoll with socket fds.") added the first lockless ep_events_available(), and commit c5a282e9635e ("fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()") made some ep_events_available() calls lockless and added single call under a lock, finally commit e59d3c64cba6 ("epoll: eliminate unnecessary lock for zero timeout") made the last ep_events_available() lockless. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_epoll_wait / do_epoll_wait write to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1802 on cpu 0: INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:38 [inline] list_splice_init include/linux/list.h:492 [inline] ep_start_scan fs/eventpoll.c:622 [inline] ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1656 [inline] ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1806 [inline] do_epoll_wait+0x4eb/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234 do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline] __do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline] __se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275 __x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1799 on cpu 1: list_empty_careful include/linux/list.h:329 [inline] ep_events_available fs/eventpoll.c:381 [inline] ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1797 [inline] do_epoll_wait+0x279/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234 do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline] __do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline] __se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275 __x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffff88810480c7d0 -> 0xffff888103c15098 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 1799 Comm: syz-fuzzer Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_early_retrans. While reading sysctl_tcp_early_retrans, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_fastopen. While reading sysctl_tcp_fastopen, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_probe_interval. While reading sysctl_tcp_probe_interval, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback. While reading sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154/adf7242: defer destroy_workqueue call There is a possible race condition (use-after-free) like below (FREE) | (USE) adf7242_remove | adf7242_channel cancel_delayed_work_sync | destroy_workqueue (1) | adf7242_cmd_rx | mod_delayed_work (2) | The root cause for this race is that the upper layer (ieee802154) is unaware of this detaching event and the function adf7242_channel can be called without any checks. To fix this, we can add a flag write at the beginning of adf7242_remove and add flag check in adf7242_channel. Or we can just defer the destructive operation like other commit 3e0588c291d6 ("hamradio: defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev") which let the ieee802154_unregister_hw() to handle the synchronization. This patch takes the second option. runs")

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle. While reading sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_prot_sock. sysctl_ip_prot_sock is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor. While reading sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_sync_mem. While reading sysctl_fib_sync_mem, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid a data-race.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Fix race on per-CQ variable napi work_done After calling napi_complete_done(), the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit may be cleared, and another CPU can start napi thread and access per-CQ variable, cq->work_done. If the other thread (for example, from busy_poll) sets it to a value >= budget, this thread will continue to run when it should stop, and cause memory corruption and panic. To fix this issue, save the per-CQ work_done variable in a local variable before napi_complete_done(), so it won't be corrupted by a possible concurrent thread after napi_complete_done(). Also, add a flag bit to advertise to the NIC firmware: the NAPI work_done variable race is fixed, so the driver is able to reliably support features like busy_poll.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cfg80211: fix race in netlink owner interface destruction My previous fix here to fix the deadlock left a race where the exact same deadlock (see the original commit referenced below) can still happen if cfg80211_destroy_ifaces() already runs while nl80211_netlink_notify() is still marking some interfaces as nl_owner_dead. The race happens because we have two loops here - first we dev_close() all the netdevs, and then we destroy them. If we also have two netdevs (first one need only be a wdev though) then we can find one during the first iteration, close it, and go to the second iteration -- but then find two, and try to destroy also the one we didn't close yet. Fix this by only iterating once.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/dp: do not complete dp_aux_cmd_fifo_tx() if irq is not for aux transfer There are 3 possible interrupt sources are handled by DP controller, HPDstatus, Controller state changes and Aux read/write transaction. At every irq, DP controller have to check isr status of every interrupt sources and service the interrupt if its isr status bits shows interrupts are pending. There is potential race condition may happen at current aux isr handler implementation since it is always complete dp_aux_cmd_fifo_tx() even irq is not for aux read or write transaction. This may cause aux read transaction return premature if host aux data read is in the middle of waiting for sink to complete transferring data to host while irq happen. This will cause host's receiving buffer contains unexpected data. This patch fixes this problem by checking aux isr and return immediately at aux isr handler if there are no any isr status bits set. Current there is a bug report regrading eDP edid corruption happen during system booting up. After lengthy debugging to found that VIDEO_READY interrupt was continuously firing during system booting up which cause dp_aux_isr() to complete dp_aux_cmd_fifo_tx() prematurely to retrieve data from aux hardware buffer which is not yet contains complete data transfer from sink. This cause edid corruption. Follows are the signature at kernel logs when problem happen, EDID has corrupt header panel-simple-dp-aux aux-aea0000.edp: Couldn't identify panel via EDID Changes in v2: -- do complete if (ret == IRQ_HANDLED) ay dp-aux_isr() -- add more commit text Changes in v3: -- add Stephen suggested -- dp_aux_isr() return IRQ_XXX back to caller -- dp_ctrl_isr() return IRQ_XXX back to caller Changes in v4: -- split into two patches Changes in v5: -- delete empty line between tags Changes in v6: -- remove extra "that" and fixed line more than 75 char at commit text Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/516121/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix fault in reweight_entity Syzbot found a GPF in reweight_entity. This has been bisected to commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba ("kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group") There is a race between sched_post_fork() and setpriority(PRIO_PGRP) within a thread group that causes a null-ptr-deref in reweight_entity() in CFS. The scenario is that the main process spawns number of new threads, which then call setpriority(PRIO_PGRP, 0, -20), wait, and exit. For each of the new threads the copy_process() gets invoked, which adds the new task_struct and calls sched_post_fork() for it. In the above scenario there is a possibility that setpriority(PRIO_PGRP) and set_one_prio() will be called for a thread in the group that is just being created by copy_process(), and for which the sched_post_fork() has not been executed yet. This will trigger a null pointer dereference in reweight_entity(), as it will try to access the run queue pointer, which hasn't been set. Before the mentioned change the cfs_rq pointer for the task has been set in sched_fork(), which is called much earlier in copy_process(), before the new task is added to the thread_group. Now it is done in the sched_post_fork(), which is called after that. To fix the issue the remove the update_load param from the update_load param() function and call reweight_task() only if the task flag doesn't have the TASK_NEW flag set.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: gadgetfs: Fix race between mounting and unmounting The syzbot fuzzer and Gerald Lee have identified a use-after-free bug in the gadgetfs driver, involving processes concurrently mounting and unmounting the gadgetfs filesystem. In particular, gadgetfs_fill_super() can race with gadgetfs_kill_sb(), causing the latter to deallocate the_device while the former is using it. The output from KASAN says, in part: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:102 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880276d7840 by task syz-executor126/18689 CPU: 0 PID: 18689 Comm: syz-executor126 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> ... atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332 vfs_get_super fs/super.c:1190 [inline] get_tree_single+0xd0/0x160 fs/super.c:1207 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1531 vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:232 [inline] The simplest solution is to ensure that gadgetfs_fill_super() and gadgetfs_kill_sb() are serialized by making them both acquire a new mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: Fix GEM handle creation UAF Userspace can guess the handle value and try to race GEM object creation with handle close, resulting in a use-after-free if we dereference the object after dropping the handle's reference. For that reason, dropping the handle's reference must be done *after* we are done dereferencing the object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: fix SRCU protection of nvme_ns_head list Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths(). Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu. Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees. Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove(). Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel (it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition). Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx; computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk). Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL. The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic). [37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 [37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064 [37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0 [37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X --------- - - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1 [37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018 [37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core] [37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core] [37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3 [37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000 [37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800 [37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff [37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000 [37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000 [37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37315.645111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [37315.799267] Call Trace: [37315.828515] nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core] [37315.892075] nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core] [37315.961871] ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90 [37316.015021] nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core] [37316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [37316.212024] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.258939] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [37316.297557] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [37316.347590] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ex ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix race condition during interface enslave Commit 5dbbbd01cbba83 ("ice: Avoid RTNL lock when re-creating auxiliary device") changes a process of re-creation of aux device so ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context. This unfortunately opens a race window that can result in dead-lock when interface has left LAG and immediately enters LAG again. Reproducer: ``` #!/bin/sh ip link add lag0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100 ip link set lag0 for n in {1..10}; do echo Cycle: $n ip link set ens7f0 master lag0 sleep 1 ip link set ens7f0 nomaster done ``` This results in: [20976.208697] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [20976.213422] Call Trace: [20976.215871] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.219364] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.222510] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.227043] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.235071] enum_all_gids_of_dev_cb+0x1c/0x100 [ib_core] [20976.251215] ib_enum_roce_netdev+0xa4/0xe0 [ib_core] [20976.256192] ib_cache_setup_one+0x33/0xa0 [ib_core] [20976.261079] ib_register_device+0x40d/0x580 [ib_core] [20976.266139] irdma_ib_register_device+0x129/0x250 [irdma] [20976.281409] irdma_probe+0x2c1/0x360 [irdma] [20976.285691] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x45/0x70 [20976.289790] really_probe+0x1f2/0x480 [20976.298509] driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0 [20976.302609] bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0 [20976.306448] __device_attach+0xdc/0x160 [20976.310286] bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0 [20976.314128] device_add+0x43c/0x890 [20976.321287] __auxiliary_device_add+0x43/0x60 [20976.325644] ice_plug_aux_dev+0xb2/0x100 [ice] [20976.330109] ice_service_task+0xd0c/0xed0 [ice] [20976.342591] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [20976.350536] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [20976.358128] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [20976.365547] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 ... [20976.438030] task:ip state:D stack: 0 pid:213658 ppid:213627 flags:0x00004084 [20976.446469] Call Trace: [20976.448921] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.452414] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.455559] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.460090] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.464364] device_del+0x36/0x3c0 [20976.467772] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice] [20976.472313] ice_lag_event_handler+0x2a2/0x520 [ice] [20976.477288] notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x70 [20976.481386] __netdev_upper_dev_link+0x18b/0x280 [20976.489845] bond_enslave+0xe05/0x1790 [bonding] [20976.494475] do_setlink+0x336/0xf50 [20976.502517] __rtnl_newlink+0x529/0x8b0 [20976.543441] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60 [20976.546934] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2b1/0x360 [20976.559238] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x120 [20976.563079] netlink_unicast+0x196/0x230 [20976.567005] netlink_sendmsg+0x204/0x3d0 [20976.570930] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50 [20976.574423] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1eb/0x250 [20976.586807] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0 [20976.606353] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [20976.609930] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0 [20976.613598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca 1. Command 'ip link ... set nomaster' causes that ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context, aux device is created and associated device->lock is taken. 2. Command 'ip link ... set master...' calls ice's notifier under RTNL lock and that notifier calls ice_unplug_aux_dev(). That function tries to take aux device->lock but this is already taken by ice_plug_aux_dev() in step 1 3. Later ice_plug_aux_dev() tries to take RTNL lock but this is already taken in step 2 4. Dead-lock The patch fixes this issue by following changes: - Bit ICE_FLAG_PLUG_AUX_DEV is kept to be set during ice_plug_aux_dev() call in ice_service_task() - The bit is checked in ice_clear_rdma_cap() and only if it is not set then ice_unplug_aux_dev() is called. If it is set (in other words plugging of aux device was requested and ice_plug_aux_dev() is potentially running) then the function only clears the ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filelock: Fix fcntl/close race recovery compat path When I wrote commit 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected"), I missed that there are two copies of the code I was patching: The normal version, and the version for 64-bit offsets on 32-bit kernels. Thanks to Greg KH for stumbling over this while doing the stable backport... Apply exactly the same fix to the compat path for 32-bit kernels.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10: net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822) <snip> read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2: netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393) netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?) <snip> value changed: 0x0000000a -> 0xffffffff This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi->poll_owner non atomically. The ->poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding the lock. Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 6.0.9. drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c has a memory leak because of the lack of a dvb_frontend_detach call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash If a UDP socket changes its local address while it's receiving datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated. Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad ("udp: bind() optimisation") and, as a result, a rehash operation became needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect(). This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 ("udp: add rehash on connect()") which isn't however a complete fix: the socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while it's pending. This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow. Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to send a (subsequent) datagram while the server's socket changes its address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the client, as apparent from the following reproducer: LEN=$(($(cat /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default) / 4)) dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=${LEN} of=tmp.in while :; do taskset -c 1 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc & sleep 0.1 || sleep 1 taskset -c 2 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null wait done where the client will eventually get ECONNREFUSED on a write() (typically the second or third one of a given iteration): 2024/11/13 21:28:23 socat[46901] E write(6, 0x556db2e3c000, 8192): Connection refused This issue was first observed as a seldom failure in Podman's tests checking UDP functionality while using pasta(1) to connect the container's network namespace, which leads us to a reproducer with the lookup error resulting in an ICMP packet on a tap device: LOCAL_ADDR="$(ip -j -4 addr show|jq -rM '.[] | .addr_info[0] | select(.scope == "global").local')" while :; do ./pasta --config-net -p pasta.pcap -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc & sleep 0.2 || sleep 1 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:${LOCAL_ADDR}:1337,shut-null wait cmp tmp.in tmp.out done Once this fails: tmp.in tmp.out differ: char 8193, line 29 we can finally have a look at what's going on: $ tshark -r pasta.pcap 1 0.000000 :: ? ff02::16 ICMPv6 110 Multicast Listener Report Message v2 2 0.168690 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 3 0.168767 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 4 0.168806 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 5 0.168827 c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ? Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 88.198.0.161? Tell 88.198.0.164 6 0.168851 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 ? c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ARP 42 88.198.0.161 is at 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 7 0.168875 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 8 0.168896 88.198.0.164 ? 88.198.0.161 ICMP 590 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable) 9 0.168926 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 10 0.168959 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 11 0.168989 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 4138 60260 ? 1337 Len=4096 12 0.169010 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 42 60260 ? 1337 Len=0 On the third datagram received, the network namespace of the container initiates an ARP lookup to deliver the ICMP message. In another variant of this reproducer, starting the client with: strace -f pasta --config-net -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,tru ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/guc_submit: fix race around suspend_pending Currently in some testcases we can trigger: xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Assertion `exec_queue_destroyed(q)` failed! .... WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 2640 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c:1826 xe_guc_sched_done_handler+0xa54/0xef0 [xe] xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT1: DEREGISTER_DONE: Unexpected engine state 0x00a1, guc_id=57 Looking at a snippet of corresponding ftrace for this GuC id we can see: 162.673311: xe_sched_msg_add: dev=0000:03:00.0, gt=1 guc_id=57, opcode=3 162.673317: xe_sched_msg_recv: dev=0000:03:00.0, gt=1 guc_id=57, opcode=3 162.673319: xe_exec_queue_scheduling_disable: dev=0000:03:00.0, 1:0x2, gt=1, width=1, guc_id=57, guc_state=0x29, flags=0x0 162.674089: xe_exec_queue_kill: dev=0000:03:00.0, 1:0x2, gt=1, width=1, guc_id=57, guc_state=0x29, flags=0x0 162.674108: xe_exec_queue_close: dev=0000:03:00.0, 1:0x2, gt=1, width=1, guc_id=57, guc_state=0xa9, flags=0x0 162.674488: xe_exec_queue_scheduling_done: dev=0000:03:00.0, 1:0x2, gt=1, width=1, guc_id=57, guc_state=0xa9, flags=0x0 162.678452: xe_exec_queue_deregister: dev=0000:03:00.0, 1:0x2, gt=1, width=1, guc_id=57, guc_state=0xa1, flags=0x0 It looks like we try to suspend the queue (opcode=3), setting suspend_pending and triggering a disable_scheduling. The user then closes the queue. However the close will also forcefully signal the suspend fence after killing the queue, later when the G2H response for disable_scheduling comes back we have now cleared suspend_pending when signalling the suspend fence, so the disable_scheduling now incorrectly tries to also deregister the queue. This leads to warnings since the queue has yet to even be marked for destruction. We also seem to trigger errors later with trying to double unregister the same queue. To fix this tweak the ordering when handling the response to ensure we don't race with a disable_scheduling that didn't actually intend to perform an unregister. The destruction path should now also correctly wait for any pending_disable before marking as destroyed. (cherry picked from commit f161809b362f027b6d72bd998e47f8f0bad60a2e)

roccat_report_event in drivers/hid/hid-roccat.c in the Linux kernel through 5.19.12 has a race condition and resultant use-after-free in certain situations where a report is received while copying a report->value is in progress.