Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users can use the `HINCRBYFLOAT` command to create an invalid hash field that will crash Redis on access in affected versions. This issue has been addressed in in versions 7.0.11, 6.2.12, and 6.0.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users issuing specially crafted `SRANDMEMBER`, `ZRANDMEMBER`, and `HRANDFIELD` commands can trigger an integer overflow, resulting in a runtime assertion and termination of the Redis server process. This problem affects all Redis versions. Patches were released in Redis version(s) 6.0.18, 6.2.11 and 7.0.9.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users can issue a `HRANDFIELD` or `ZRANDMEMBER` command with specially crafted arguments to trigger a denial-of-service by crashing Redis with an assertion failure. This problem affects Redis versions 6.2 or newer up to but not including 6.2.9 as well as versions 7.0 up to but not including 7.0.8. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users can use string matching commands (like `SCAN` or `KEYS`) with a specially crafted pattern to trigger a denial-of-service attack on Redis, causing it to hang and consume 100% CPU time. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 6.0.18, 6.2.11, 7.0.9.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users issuing specially crafted `SETRANGE` and `SORT(_RO)` commands can trigger an integer overflow, resulting with Redis attempting to allocate impossible amounts of memory and abort with an out-of-memory (OOM) panic. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.8, 6.2.9 and 6.0.17. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Prior to versions 6.2.7 and 7.0.0, an attacker attempting to load a specially crafted Lua script can cause NULL pointer dereference which will result with a crash of the redis-server process. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users can trigger a denial-of-service by using specially crafted, long string match patterns on supported commands such as `KEYS`, `SCAN`, `PSUBSCRIBE`, `FUNCTION LIST`, `COMMAND LIST` and ACL definitions. Matching of extremely long patterns may result in unbounded recursion, leading to stack overflow and process crash. This problem has been fixed in Redis versions 6.2.16, 7.2.6, and 7.4.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Redis before 6cbea7d allows a replica to cause an assertion failure in a primary server by sending a non-administrative command (specifically, a SET command). NOTE: this was fixed for Redis 6.2.x and 7.x in 2021. Versions before 6.2 were not intended to have safety guarantees related to this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2/dax: Fix ext2_setsize when len is page aligned PAGE_ALIGN(x) macro gives the next highest value which is multiple of pagesize. But if x is already page aligned then it simply returns x. So, if x passed is 0 in dax_zero_range() function, that means the length gets passed as 0 to ->iomap_begin(). In ext2 it then calls ext2_get_blocks -> max_blocks as 0 and hits bug_on here in ext2_get_blocks(). BUG_ON(maxblocks == 0); Instead we should be calling dax_truncate_page() here which takes care of it. i.e. it only calls dax_zero_range if the offset is not page/block aligned. This can be easily triggered with following on fsdax mounted pmem device. dd if=/dev/zero of=file count=1 bs=512 truncate -s 0 file [79.525838] EXT2-fs (pmem0): DAX enabled. Warning: EXPERIMENTAL, use at your own risk [79.529376] ext2 filesystem being mounted at /mnt1/test supports timestamps until 2038 (0x7fffffff) [93.793207] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [93.795102] kernel BUG at fs/ext2/inode.c:637! [93.796904] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [93.798659] CPU: 0 PID: 1192 Comm: truncate Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-xfstests-00056-g131086faa369 #139 [93.806459] RIP: 0010:ext2_get_blocks.constprop.0+0x524/0x610 <...> [93.835298] Call Trace: [93.836253] <TASK> [93.837103] ? lock_acquire+0xf8/0x110 [93.838479] ? d_lookup+0x69/0xd0 [93.839779] ext2_iomap_begin+0xa7/0x1c0 [93.841154] iomap_iter+0xc7/0x150 [93.842425] dax_zero_range+0x6e/0xa0 [93.843813] ext2_setsize+0x176/0x1b0 [93.845164] ext2_setattr+0x151/0x200 [93.846467] notify_change+0x341/0x4e0 [93.847805] ? lock_acquire+0xf8/0x110 [93.849143] ? do_truncate+0x74/0xe0 [93.850452] ? do_truncate+0x84/0xe0 [93.851739] do_truncate+0x84/0xe0 [93.852974] do_sys_ftruncate+0x2b4/0x2f0 [93.854404] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [93.855789] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: hfsplus: remove WARN_ON() from hfsplus_cat_{read,write}_inode() syzbot is hitting WARN_ON() in hfsplus_cat_{read,write}_inode(), for crafted filesystem image can contain bogus length. There conditions are not kernel bugs that can justify kernel to panic.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand While trying to get the subpage blocksize tests running, I hit the following panic on generic/476 assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229 kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1453 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ #12 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-26.fc38 03/01/2023 pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 Call trace: btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 btrfs_subpage_clear_checked+0x38/0xc0 btrfs_page_clear_checked+0x48/0x98 btrfs_truncate_block+0x5d0/0x6a8 btrfs_cont_expand+0x5c/0x528 btrfs_write_check.isra.0+0xf8/0x150 btrfs_buffered_write+0xb4/0x760 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2f8/0x4b0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1c/0x30 do_iter_readv_writev+0xc8/0x158 do_iter_write+0x9c/0x210 vfs_iter_write+0x24/0x40 iter_file_splice_write+0x224/0x390 direct_splice_actor+0x38/0x68 splice_direct_to_actor+0x12c/0x260 do_splice_direct+0x90/0xe8 generic_copy_file_range+0x50/0x90 vfs_copy_file_range+0x29c/0x470 __arm64_sys_copy_file_range+0xcc/0x498 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x168 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 This happens because during btrfs_cont_expand we'll get a page, set it as mapped, and if it's not Uptodate we'll read it. However between the read and re-locking the page we could have called release_folio() on the page, but left the page in the file mapping. release_folio() can clear the page private, and thus further down we blow up when we go to modify the subpage bits. Fix this by putting the set_page_extent_mapped() after the read. This is safe because read_folio() will call set_page_extent_mapped() before it does the read, and then if we clear page private but leave it on the mapping we're completely safe re-setting set_page_extent_mapped(). With this patch I can now run generic/476 without panicing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: can: j1939: enhanced error handling for tightly received RTS messages in xtp_rx_rts_session_new This patch enhances error handling in scenarios with RTS (Request to Send) messages arriving closely. It replaces the less informative WARN_ON_ONCE backtraces with a new error handling method. This provides clearer error messages and allows for the early termination of problematic sessions. Previously, sessions were only released at the end of j1939_xtp_rx_rts(). Potentially this could be reproduced with something like: testj1939 -r vcan0:0x80 & while true; do # send first RTS cansend vcan0 18EC8090#1014000303002301; # send second RTS cansend vcan0 18EC8090#1014000303002301; # send abort cansend vcan0 18EC8090#ff00000000002301; done

A vulnerability was detected in WebAssembly Binaryen up to 117. This issue affects the function IRBuilder::makeBrOn of the file src/wasm/wasm-ir-builder.cpp of the component BrOn Parser. Performing a manipulation results in reachable assertion. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit is now public and may be used. The patch is named 1251efbc1ea471c1311d2726b2bbe061ff2a291c. It is suggested to install a patch to address this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: vimc: Fix wrong function called when vimc_init() fails In vimc_init(), when platform_driver_register(&vimc_pdrv) fails, platform_driver_unregister(&vimc_pdrv) is wrongly called rather than platform_device_unregister(&vimc_pdev), which causes kernel warning: Unexpected driver unregister! WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14517 at drivers/base/driver.c:270 driver_unregister+0x8f/0xb0 RIP: 0010:driver_unregister+0x8f/0xb0 Call Trace: <TASK> vimc_init+0x7d/0x1000 [vimc] do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0 do_init_module+0x1cf/0x6b0 load_module+0x65c2/0x7820

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bgmac: Fix a BUG triggered by wrong bytes_compl On one of our machines we got: kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:27! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 1166 Comm: irq/41-bgmac Tainted: G W O 4.14.275-rt132 #1 Hardware name: BRCM XGS iProc task: ee3415c0 task.stack: ee32a000 PC is at dql_completed+0x168/0x178 LR is at bgmac_poll+0x18c/0x6d8 pc : [<c03b9430>] lr : [<c04b5a18>] psr: 800a0313 sp : ee32be14 ip : 000005ea fp : 00000bd4 r10: ee558500 r9 : c0116298 r8 : 00000002 r7 : 00000000 r6 : ef128810 r5 : 01993267 r4 : 01993851 r3 : ee558000 r2 : 000070e1 r1 : 00000bd4 r0 : ee52c180 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 12c5387d Table: 8e88c04a DAC: 00000051 Process irq/41-bgmac (pid: 1166, stack limit = 0xee32a210) Stack: (0xee32be14 to 0xee32c000) be00: ee558520 ee52c100 ef128810 be20: 00000000 00000002 c0116298 c04b5a18 00000000 c0a0c8c4 c0951780 00000040 be40: c0701780 ee558500 ee55d520 ef05b340 ef6f9780 ee558520 00000001 00000040 be60: ffffe000 c0a56878 ef6fa040 c0952040 0000012c c0528744 ef6f97b0 fffcfb6a be80: c0a04104 2eda8000 c0a0c4ec c0a0d368 ee32bf44 c0153534 ee32be98 ee32be98 bea0: ee32bea0 ee32bea0 ee32bea8 ee32bea8 00000000 c01462e4 ffffe000 ef6f22a8 bec0: ffffe000 00000008 ee32bee4 c0147430 ffffe000 c094a2a8 00000003 ffffe000 bee0: c0a54528 00208040 0000000c c0a0c8c4 c0a65980 c0124d3c 00000008 ee558520 bf00: c094a23c c0a02080 00000000 c07a9910 ef136970 ef136970 ee30a440 ef136900 bf20: ee30a440 00000001 ef136900 ee30a440 c016d990 00000000 c0108db0 c012500c bf40: ef136900 c016da14 ee30a464 ffffe000 00000001 c016dd14 00000000 c016db28 bf60: ffffe000 ee21a080 ee30a400 00000000 ee32a000 ee30a440 c016dbfc ee25fd70 bf80: ee21a09c c013edcc ee32a000 ee30a400 c013ec7c 00000000 00000000 00000000 bfa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c0108470 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [<c03b9430>] (dql_completed) from [<c04b5a18>] (bgmac_poll+0x18c/0x6d8) [<c04b5a18>] (bgmac_poll) from [<c0528744>] (net_rx_action+0x1c4/0x494) [<c0528744>] (net_rx_action) from [<c0124d3c>] (do_current_softirqs+0x1ec/0x43c) [<c0124d3c>] (do_current_softirqs) from [<c012500c>] (__local_bh_enable+0x80/0x98) [<c012500c>] (__local_bh_enable) from [<c016da14>] (irq_forced_thread_fn+0x84/0x98) [<c016da14>] (irq_forced_thread_fn) from [<c016dd14>] (irq_thread+0x118/0x1c0) [<c016dd14>] (irq_thread) from [<c013edcc>] (kthread+0x150/0x158) [<c013edcc>] (kthread) from [<c0108470>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) Code: a83f15e0 0200001a 0630a0e1 c3ffffea (f201f0e7) The issue seems similar to commit 90b3b339364c ("net: hisilicon: Fix a BUG trigered by wrong bytes_compl") and potentially introduced by commit b38c83dd0866 ("bgmac: simplify tx ring index handling"). If there is an RX interrupt between setting ring->end and netdev_sent_queue() we can hit the BUG_ON as bgmac_dma_tx_free() can miscalculate the queue size while called from bgmac_poll(). The machine which triggered the BUG runs a v4.14 RT kernel - but the issue seems present in mainline too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix BUG_ON() when directory entry has invalid rec_len The rec_len field in the directory entry has to be a multiple of 4. A corrupted filesystem image can be used to hit a BUG() in ext4_rec_len_to_disk(), called from make_indexed_dir(). ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4.h:2413! ... RIP: 0010:make_indexed_dir+0x53f/0x5f0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? add_dirent_to_buf+0x1b2/0x200 ext4_add_entry+0x36e/0x480 ext4_add_nondir+0x2b/0xc0 ext4_create+0x163/0x200 path_openat+0x635/0xe90 do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160 ? __create_object.isra.0+0x1de/0x3b0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x12/0x30 do_sys_openat2+0x91/0x150 __x64_sys_open+0x6c/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 The fix simply adds a call to ext4_check_dir_entry() to validate the directory entry, returning -EFSCORRUPTED if the entry is invalid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64/mm: fix incorrect file_map_count for non-leaf pmd/pud The page table check trigger BUG_ON() unexpectedly when collapse hugepage: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:82! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 68 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3+ #750 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : page_table_check_clear.isra.0+0x258/0x3f0 lr : page_table_check_clear.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0 [...] Call trace: page_table_check_clear.isra.0+0x258/0x3f0 __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0xbc/0x108 pmdp_collapse_flush+0xb0/0x160 collapse_huge_page+0xa08/0x1080 hpage_collapse_scan_pmd+0xf30/0x1590 khugepaged_scan_mm_slot.constprop.0+0x52c/0xac8 khugepaged+0x338/0x518 kthread+0x278/0x2f8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [...] Since pmd_user_accessible_page() doesn't check if a pmd is leaf, it decrease file_map_count for a non-leaf pmd comes from collapse_huge_page(). and so trigger BUG_ON() unexpectedly. Fix this problem by using pmd_leaf() insteal of pmd_present() in pmd_user_accessible_page(). Moreover, use pud_leaf() for pud_user_accessible_page() too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199! [...] RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199 [inline] RIP: 0010:__es_tree_search+0x1e0/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:217 [...] Call Trace: ext4_es_cache_extent+0x109/0x340 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:766 ext4_cache_extents+0x239/0x2e0 fs/ext4/extents.c:561 ext4_find_extent+0x6b7/0xa20 fs/ext4/extents.c:964 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x16b/0x4b70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4384 ext4_map_blocks+0xe26/0x19f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:567 ext4_getblk+0x320/0x4c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:980 ext4_bread+0x2d/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:1031 ext4_quota_read+0x248/0x320 fs/ext4/super.c:6257 v2_read_header+0x78/0x110 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:63 v2_check_quota_file+0x76/0x230 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:82 vfs_load_quota_inode+0x5d1/0x1530 fs/quota/dquot.c:2368 dquot_enable+0x28a/0x330 fs/quota/dquot.c:2490 ext4_quota_enable fs/ext4/super.c:6137 [inline] ext4_enable_quotas+0x5d7/0x960 fs/ext4/super.c:6163 ext4_fill_super+0xa7c9/0xdc00 fs/ext4/super.c:4754 mount_bdev+0x2e9/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1158 mount_fs+0x4b/0x1e4 fs/super.c:1261 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_fill_super ext4_enable_quotas ext4_quota_enable ext4_iget __ext4_iget ext4_ext_check_inode ext4_ext_check __ext4_ext_check ext4_valid_extent_entries Check for overlapping extents does't take effect dquot_enable vfs_load_quota_inode v2_check_quota_file v2_read_header ext4_quota_read ext4_bread ext4_getblk ext4_map_blocks ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_find_extent ext4_cache_extents ext4_es_cache_extent ext4_es_cache_extent __es_tree_search ext4_es_end BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) The error ext4 extents is as follows: 0af3 0300 0400 0000 00000000 extent_header 00000000 0100 0000 12000000 extent1 00000000 0100 0000 18000000 extent2 02000000 0400 0000 14000000 extent3 In the ext4_valid_extent_entries function, if prev is 0, no error is returned even if lblock<=prev. This was intended to skip the check on the first extent, but in the error image above, prev=0+1-1=0 when checking the second extent, so even though lblock<=prev, the function does not return an error. As a result, bug_ON occurs in __es_tree_search and the system panics. To solve this problem, we only need to check that: 1. The lblock of the first extent is not less than 0. 2. The lblock of the next extent is not less than the next block of the previous extent. The same applies to extent_idx.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: don't BUG if someone dirty pages without asking ext4 first [un]pin_user_pages_remote is dirtying pages without properly warning the file system in advance. A related race was noted by Jan Kara in 2018[1]; however, more recently instead of it being a very hard-to-hit race, it could be reliably triggered by process_vm_writev(2) which was discovered by Syzbot[2]. This is technically a bug in mm/gup.c, but arguably ext4 is fragile in that if some other kernel subsystem dirty pages without properly notifying the file system using page_mkwrite(), ext4 will BUG, while other file systems will not BUG (although data will still be lost). So instead of crashing with a BUG, issue a warning (since there may be potential data loss) and just mark the page as clean to avoid unprivileged denial of service attacks until the problem can be properly fixed. More discussion and background can be found in the thread starting at [2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20180103100430.GE4911@quack2.suse.cz [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/Yg0m6IjcNmfaSokM@google.com

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: add accessors to read/set tp->snd_cwnd We had various bugs over the years with code breaking the assumption that tp->snd_cwnd is greater than zero. Lately, syzbot reported the WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd) added in commit 8b8a321ff72c ("tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction") can trigger, and without a repro we would have to spend considerable time finding the bug. Instead of complaining too late, we want to catch where and when tp->snd_cwnd is set to an illegal value.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON: ================================================================== kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211! [...] RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f [...] Call Trace: ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80 ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10 ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30 do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0 file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140 ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0 vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260 do_fsync+0x48/0xa0 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- do_fsync vfs_fsync_range ext4_sync_file file_write_and_wait_range __filemap_fdatawrite_range do_writepages ext4_writepages mpage_map_and_submit_extent mpage_map_one_extent ext4_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_normalize_request >>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_simple_scan_group ext4_mb_use_best_found ext4_mb_new_preallocation ext4_mb_new_inode_pa ext4_mb_use_inode_pa >>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0 ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used >>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0); we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: `fallocate -l100M disk` `mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk` `mount disk /mnt` `fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1` The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP. Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment. In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug_on in ext4_writepages we got issue as follows: EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free cls ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2708! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 2 PID: 2147 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-next-20220413+ #155 RIP: 0010:ext4_writepages+0x1977/0x1c10 RSP: 0018:ffff88811d3e7880 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88811c098000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811c098000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffff888128140f50 R08: ffffffffb1ff6387 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffed10250281ea R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00000000000000a4 R14: ffff88811d3e7bb8 R15: ffff888128141028 FS: 00007f443aed9740(0000) GS:ffff8883aef00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020007200 CR3: 000000011c2a4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> do_writepages+0x130/0x3a0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x83/0xa0 filemap_flush+0xab/0xe0 ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0x51/0x120 __ext4_ioctl+0x1534/0x3210 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 It may happen as follows: 1. write inline_data inode vfs_write new_sync_write ext4_file_write_iter ext4_buffered_write_iter generic_perform_write ext4_da_write_begin ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin -> If inline data size too small will allocate block to write, then mapping will has dirty page ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent ->clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA 2. fallocate do_vfs_ioctl ioctl_preallocate vfs_fallocate ext4_fallocate ext4_convert_inline_data ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock ext4_map_blocks -> fail will goto restore data ext4_restore_inline_data ext4_create_inline_data ext4_write_inline_data ext4_set_inode_state -> set inode EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA 3. writepages __ext4_ioctl ext4_alloc_da_blocks filemap_flush filemap_fdatawrite_wbc do_writepages ext4_writepages if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) The root cause of this issue is we destory inline data until call ext4_writepages under delay allocation mode. But there maybe already convert from inline to extent. To solve this issue, we call filemap_flush first..

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: do not BUG when INLINE_DATA_FL lacks system.data xattr A syzbot fuzzed image triggered a BUG_ON in ext4_update_inline_data() when an inode had the INLINE_DATA_FL flag set but was missing the system.data extended attribute. Since this can happen due to a maiciouly fuzzed file system, we shouldn't BUG, but rather, report it as a corrupted file system. Add similar replacements of BUG_ON with EXT4_ERROR_INODE() ii ext4_create_inline_data() and ext4_inline_data_truncate().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix bug due to prealloc collision When userspace is using AF_RXRPC to provide a server, it has to preallocate incoming calls and assign to them call IDs that will be used to thread related recvmsg() and sendmsg() together. The preallocated call IDs will automatically be attached to calls as they come in until the pool is empty. To the kernel, the call IDs are just arbitrary numbers, but userspace can use the call ID to hold a pointer to prepared structs. In any case, the user isn't permitted to create two calls with the same call ID (call IDs become available again when the call ends) and EBADSLT should result from sendmsg() if an attempt is made to preallocate a call with an in-use call ID. However, the cleanup in the error handling will trigger both assertions in rxrpc_cleanup_call() because the call isn't marked complete and isn't marked as having been released. Fix this by setting the call state in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one() and then marking it as being released before calling the cleanup function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: Remove WARN_ON for device endpoint command timeouts This commit addresses a rarely observed endpoint command timeout which causes kernel panic due to warn when 'panic_on_warn' is enabled and unnecessary call trace prints when 'panic_on_warn' is disabled. It is seen during fast software-controlled connect/disconnect testcases. The following is one such endpoint command timeout that we observed: 1. Connect ======= ->dwc3_thread_interrupt ->dwc3_ep0_interrupt ->configfs_composite_setup ->composite_setup ->usb_ep_queue ->dwc3_gadget_ep0_queue ->__dwc3_gadget_ep0_queue ->__dwc3_ep0_do_control_data ->dwc3_send_gadget_ep_cmd 2. Disconnect ========== ->dwc3_thread_interrupt ->dwc3_gadget_disconnect_interrupt ->dwc3_ep0_reset_state ->dwc3_ep0_end_control_data ->dwc3_send_gadget_ep_cmd In the issue scenario, in Exynos platforms, we observed that control transfers for the previous connect have not yet been completed and end transfer command sent as a part of the disconnect sequence and processing of USB_ENDPOINT_HALT feature request from the host timeout. This maybe an expected scenario since the controller is processing EP commands sent as a part of the previous connect. It maybe better to remove WARN_ON in all places where device endpoint commands are sent to avoid unnecessary kernel panic due to warn.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix WARN_ON for monitor mode on some devices On devices without WANT_MONITOR_VIF (and probably without channel context support) we get a WARN_ON for changing the per-link setting of a monitor interface. Since we already skip AP_VLAN interfaces and MONITOR with WANT_MONITOR_VIF and/or NO_VIRTUAL_MONITOR should update the settings, catch this in the link change code instead of the warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: HWS, fix complex rules rehash error flow Moving rules from matcher to matcher should not fail. However, if it does fail due to various reasons, the error flow should allow the kernel to continue functioning (albeit with broken steering rules) instead of going into series of soft lock-ups or some other problematic behaviour. Similar to the simple rules, complex rules rehash logic suffers from the same problems. This patch fixes the error flow for moving complex rules: - If new rule creation fails before it was even enqeued, do not poll for completion - If TIMEOUT happened while moving the rule, no point trying to poll for completions for other rules. Something is broken, completion won't come, just abort the rehash sequence. - If some other completion with error received, don't give up. Continue handling rest of the rules to minimize the damage. - Make sure that the first error code that was received will be actually returned to the caller instead of replacing it with the generic error code. All the aforementioned issues stem from the same bad error flow, so no point fixing them one by one and leaving partially broken code - fixing them in one patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: clean up FDB, MDB, VLAN entries on unbind As explained in many places such as commit b117e1e8a86d ("net: dsa: delete dsa_legacy_fdb_add and dsa_legacy_fdb_del"), DSA is written given the assumption that higher layers have balanced additions/deletions. As such, it only makes sense to be extremely vocal when those assumptions are violated and the driver unbinds with entries still present. But Ido Schimmel points out a very simple situation where that is wrong: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZDazSM5UsPPjQuKr@shredder/ (also briefly discussed by me in the aforementioned commit). Basically, while the bridge bypass operations are not something that DSA explicitly documents, and for the majority of DSA drivers this API simply causes them to go to promiscuous mode, that isn't the case for all drivers. Some have the necessary requirements for bridge bypass operations to do something useful - see dsa_switch_supports_uc_filtering(). Although in tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/local_termination.sh, we made an effort to popularize better mechanisms to manage address filters on DSA interfaces from user space - namely macvlan for unicast, and setsockopt(IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP) - through mtools - for multicast, the fact is that 'bridge fdb add ... self static local' also exists as kernel UAPI, and might be useful to someone, even if only for a quick hack. It seems counter-productive to block that path by implementing shim .ndo_fdb_add and .ndo_fdb_del operations which just return -EOPNOTSUPP in order to prevent the ndo_dflt_fdb_add() and ndo_dflt_fdb_del() from running, although we could do that. Accepting that cleanup is necessary seems to be the only option. Especially since we appear to be coming back at this from a different angle as well. Russell King is noticing that the WARN_ON() triggers even for VLANs: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z_li8Bj8bD4-BYKQ@shell.armlinux.org.uk/ What happens in the bug report above is that dsa_port_do_vlan_del() fails, then the VLAN entry lingers on, and then we warn on unbind and leak it. This is not a straight revert of the blamed commit, but we now add an informational print to the kernel log (to still have a way to see that bugs exist), and some extra comments gathered from past years' experience, to justify the logic.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: prevent BUG_ON by blocking retries on failed device resumes A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object. Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading cache mappings into the incomplete policy object. Reproduce steps: 1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks, with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata. cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml <superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \ policy="smq" hint_width="4"> <mappings> <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/> </mappings> </superblock> EOF dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2 dmsetup remove cmeta 2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate data degradations. mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock 3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail due to the broken array block. dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dmsetup create cache --notable dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" dmsetup resume cache 4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered while loading cache mappings. dmsetup resume cache Kernel logs: (snip) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 #3 RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570 Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the initial attempt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: Fix WARN_ON in nouveau_fence_context_kill() Nouveau is mostly designed in a way that it's expected that fences only ever get signaled through nouveau_fence_signal(). However, in at least one other place, nouveau_fence_done(), can signal fences, too. If that happens (race) a signaled fence remains in the pending list for a while, until it gets removed by nouveau_fence_update(). Should nouveau_fence_context_kill() run in the meantime, this would be a bug because the function would attempt to set an error code on an already signaled fence. Have nouveau_fence_context_kill() check for a fence being signaled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gma500: Fix WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) error psb_gem_unpin() calls dma_resv_lock() but the underlying ww_mutex gets destroyed by drm_gem_object_release() move the drm_gem_object_release() call in psb_gem_free_object() to after the unpin to fix the below warning: [ 79.693962] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 79.693992] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 79.694015] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 240 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xfb0 [ 79.694052] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer qrtr bnep ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel ath3k snd_intel_dspcfg mac80211 snd_intel_sdw_acpi btusb snd_hda_codec btrtl btbcm btintel btmtk bluetooth at24 snd_hda_core snd_hwdep uvcvideo snd_seq libarc4 videobuf2_vmalloc ath videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common snd_seq_device videodev acer_wmi intel_powerclamp coretemp mc snd_pcm joydev sparse_keymap ecdh_generic pcspkr wmi_bmof cfg80211 i2c_i801 i2c_smbus snd_timer snd r8169 rfkill lpc_ich soundcore acpi_cpufreq zram rtsx_pci_sdmmc mmc_core serio_raw rtsx_pci gma500_gfx(E) video wmi ip6_tables ip_tables i2c_dev fuse [ 79.694436] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: plymouthd Tainted: G W E 6.0.0-rc3+ #490 [ 79.694457] Hardware name: Packard Bell dot s/SJE01_CT, BIOS V1.10 07/23/2013 [ 79.694469] RIP: 0010:__ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xfb0 [ 79.694496] Code: ff 85 c0 0f 84 15 fb ff ff 8b 05 ca 3c 11 01 85 c0 0f 85 07 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 30 cb 84 aa 48 c7 c7 a3 e1 82 aa e8 ac 29 f8 ff <0f> 0b e9 ed fa ff ff e8 5b 83 8a ff 85 c0 74 10 44 8b 0d 98 3c 11 [ 79.694513] RSP: 0018:ffffad1dc048bbe0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 79.694623] RAX: 0000000000000028 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 79.694636] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffaa8b0ffc RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 79.694650] RBP: ffffad1dc048bc80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffad1dc048ba90 [ 79.694662] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffaad62fe8 R12: ffff9ff302103138 [ 79.694675] R13: ffff9ff306ec8000 R14: ffff9ff307779078 R15: ffff9ff3014c0270 [ 79.694690] FS: 00007ff1cccf1740(0000) GS:ffff9ff3bc200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 79.694705] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 79.694719] CR2: 0000559ecbcb4420 CR3: 0000000013210000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 79.694734] Call Trace: [ 79.694749] <TASK> [ 79.694761] ? __schedule+0x47f/0x1670 [ 79.694796] ? psb_gem_unpin+0x27/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx] [ 79.694830] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140 [ 79.694864] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x38/0xa0 [ 79.694885] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0x30 [ 79.694902] ww_mutex_lock+0x38/0xa0 [ 79.694925] psb_gem_unpin+0x27/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx] [ 79.694964] psb_gem_unpin+0x199/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx] [ 79.694996] drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x50/0x60 [ 79.695020] ? drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xf0/0xf0 [ 79.695042] idr_for_each+0x4b/0xb0 [ 79.695066] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60 [ 79.695095] drm_gem_release+0x1c/0x30 [ 79.695118] drm_file_free.part.0+0x1ea/0x260 [ 79.695150] drm_release+0x6a/0x120 [ 79.695175] __fput+0x9f/0x260 [ 79.695203] task_work_run+0x59/0xa0 [ 79.695227] do_exit+0x387/0xbe0 [ 79.695250] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 79.695275] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 79.695304] do_group_exit+0x33/0xb0 [ 79.695331] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [ 79.695353] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 [ 79.695376] ? up_read+0x17/0x20 [ 79.695401] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140 [ 79.695429] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 79.695450] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 79.695473] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 79.695493] RIP: 0033:0x7ff1ccefe3f1 [ 79.695516] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7ff1ccefe3c7. [ 79.695607] RSP: 002b:00007ffed4413378 EFLAGS: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh() method that may fail for various reasons. The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility of failure to encode a file handle. There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails. Relax those assertions because they are wrong. The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit, but this is not accurate. The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs, inotify and drop_caches. Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels < v6.6. Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit. Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels < v6.6.

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (All versions < V3.3). Affected devices do not properly validate input sent to its listening port on the local loopback interface. This could allow an unauthenticated local attacker to cause a denial of service condition.

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can cause a denial of service by controlling the values of `num_segments` tensor argument for `UnsortedSegmentJoin`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/a2a607db15c7cd01d754d37e5448d72a13491bdb/tensorflow/core/kernels/unsorted_segment_join_op.cc#L92-L93) assumes that the `num_segments` tensor is a valid scalar. Since the tensor is empty the `CHECK` involved in `.scalar<T>()()` that checks that the number of elements is exactly 1 will be invalidated and this would result in process termination. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can trigger a denial of service via a `CHECK`-fail in `tf.raw_ops.CTCGreedyDecoder`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/1615440b17b364b875eb06f43d087381f1460a65/tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc#L37-L50) has a `CHECK_LT` inserted to validate some invariants. When this condition is false, the program aborts, instead of returning a valid error to the user. This abnormal termination can be weaponized in denial of service attacks. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It could occur while reading Interrupt Mask Registers (IMR). A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-wbt: remove WARN_ON_ONCE from wbt_init_enable_default() wbt_init_enable_default() uses WARN_ON_ONCE to check for failures from wbt_alloc() and wbt_init(). However, both are expected failure paths: - wbt_alloc() can return NULL under memory pressure (-ENOMEM) - wbt_init() can fail with -EBUSY if wbt is already registered syzbot triggers this by injecting memory allocation failures during MTD partition creation via ioctl(BLKPG), causing a spurious warning. wbt_init_enable_default() is a best-effort initialization called from blk_register_queue() with a void return type. Failure simply means the disk operates without writeback throttling, which is harmless. Replace WARN_ON_ONCE with plain if-checks, consistent with how wbt_set_lat() in the same file already handles these failures. Add a pr_warn() for the wbt_init() failure to retain diagnostic information without triggering a full stack trace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via pn_socket_autobind(): kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213! RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline] RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421 Call Trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280 ... pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on -EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the port is non-zero: err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn)); if (err != -EINVAL) return err; BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject)); return 0; /* socket was already bound */ However pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk->sk_state is not TCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is still 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a user-triggerable path. Treat the "bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0" case as a regular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing. Existing callers already translate a non-zero return from pn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here only changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate group add input before caching [BUG] OCFS2_IOC_GROUP_ADD can trigger a BUG_ON in ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate(): kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x194/0x1e0 fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509 Code: ffffe88f 42b9fe4c 89e64889 dfe8b4df Call Trace: ocfs2_group_add+0x3f1/0x1510 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:507 ocfs2_ioctl+0x309/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:887 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583 x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7bbfb55a966d [CAUSE] ocfs2_group_add() calls ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate() on a user-controlled group block before ocfs2_verify_group_and_input() validates that block number. That helper is only valid for newly allocated metadata and asserts that the block is not already present in the chosen metadata cache. The code also uses INODE_CACHE(inode) even though the group descriptor belongs to main_bm_inode and later journal accesses use that cache context instead. [FIX] Validate the on-disk group descriptor before caching it, then add it to the metadata cache tracked by INODE_CACHE(main_bm_inode). Keep the validation failure path separate from the later cleanup path so we only remove the buffer from that cache after it has actually been inserted. This keeps the group buffer lifetime consistent across validation, journaling, and cleanup.

Insufficient ID command validation in the SEV Firmware may allow a local authenticated attacker to perform a denial of service of the PSP.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in fence emission sdma_v4_0_ring_emit_fence() contains two BUG_ON(addr & 0x3) assertions that verify fence writeback addresses are dword-aligned. These assertions can be reached from unprivileged userspace via crafted DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_CS submissions, causing a fatal kernel panic in a scheduler worker thread. Replace both BUG_ON() calls with WARN_ON() to log the condition without crashing the kernel. A misaligned fence address at this point indicates a driver bug, but crashing the kernel is never the correct response when the assertion is reachable from userspace. The CS IOCTL path is the correct place to filter invalid submissions; the ring emission callback is too late to do anything about it. (cherry picked from commit b90250bd933afd1ba94d86d6b13821997b22b18e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE when accessing forward path array Although unlikely, recent support for IPIP tunnels increases chances of reaching this WARN_ON_ONCE if userspace manages to build a sufficiently long forward path. Remove it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix call trace with null VSI during VF reset During stress test with attaching and detaching VF from KVM and simultaneously changing VFs spoofcheck and trust there was a call trace in ice_reset_vf that VF's VSI is null. [145237.352797] WARNING: CPU: 46 PID: 840629 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c:508 ice_reset_vf+0x3d6/0x410 [ice] [145237.352851] Modules linked in: ice(E) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iavf dm_mod xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink tun bridge stp llc sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm iTCO_wdt iTC O_vendor_support irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl ipmi_si intel_cstate ipmi_devintf joydev intel_uncore m ei_me ipmi_msghandler i2c_i801 pcspkr mei lpc_ich ioatdma i2c_smbus acpi_pad acpi_power_meter ip_tables xfs libcrc32c i2c_algo_bit drm_sh mem_helper drm_kms_helper sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft syscopyarea crc64 sysfillrect sg sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm i40e ixgbe ahci libahci libata crc32c_intel mdio dca wmi fuse [last unloaded: ice] [145237.352917] CPU: 46 PID: 840629 Comm: kworker/46:2 Tainted: G S W I E 5.19.0-rc6+ #24 [145237.352921] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WTT/S2600WTT, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0008.021120151325 02/11/2015 [145237.352923] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [145237.352948] RIP: 0010:ice_reset_vf+0x3d6/0x410 [ice] [145237.352984] Code: 30 ec f3 cc e9 28 fd ff ff 0f b7 4b 50 48 c7 c2 48 19 9c c0 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 30 fe 9e c0 e8 d1 21 9d cc 31 c0 e9 a 9 fe ff ff <0f> 0b b8 ea ff ff ff e9 c1 fc ff ff 0f 0b b8 fb ff ff ff e9 91 fe [145237.352987] RSP: 0018:ffffb453e257fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [145237.352990] RAX: ffff8bd0040181c0 RBX: ffff8be68db8f800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [145237.352991] RDX: 000000000000ffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8be68db8f800 [145237.352993] RBP: ffff8bd0040181c0 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffff8bcfd520e000 [145237.352995] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00008417b5ab0bc0 R12: 0000000000000005 [145237.352996] R13: ffff8bcee061c0d0 R14: ffff8bd004019640 R15: 0000000000000000 [145237.352998] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8be5dfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [145237.353000] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [145237.353002] CR2: 00007fd81f651d68 CR3: 0000001a0fe10001 CR4: 00000000001726e0 [145237.353003] Call Trace: [145237.353008] <TASK> [145237.353011] ice_process_vflr_event+0x8d/0xb0 [ice] [145237.353049] ice_service_task+0x79f/0xef0 [ice] [145237.353074] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x390 [145237.353081] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [145237.353084] worker_thread+0x30/0x360 [145237.353087] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [145237.353090] kthread+0xe8/0x110 [145237.353094] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [145237.353097] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [145237.353103] </TASK> Remove WARN_ON() from check if VSI is null in ice_reset_vf. Add "VF is already removed\n" in dev_dbg(). This WARN_ON() is unnecessary and causes call trace, despite that call trace, driver still works. There is no need for this warn because this piece of code is responsible for disabling VF's Tx/Rx queues when VF is disabled, but when VF is already removed there is no need to do reset or disable queues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: support encoding fid from inode with no alias Dmitry Safonov reported that a WARN_ON() assertion can be trigered by userspace when calling inotify_show_fdinfo() for an overlayfs watched inode, whose dentry aliases were discarded with drop_caches. The WARN_ON() assertion in inotify_show_fdinfo() was removed, because it is possible for encoding file handle to fail for other reason, but the impact of failing to encode an overlayfs file handle goes beyond this assertion. As shown in the LTP test case mentioned in the link below, failure to encode an overlayfs file handle from a non-aliased inode also leads to failure to report an fid with FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events. As Dmitry notes in his analyzis of the problem, ovl_encode_fh() fails if it cannot find an alias for the inode, but this failure can be fixed. ovl_encode_fh() seldom uses the alias and in the case of non-decodable file handles, as is often the case with fanotify fid info, ovl_encode_fh() never needs to use the alias to encode a file handle. Defer finding an alias until it is actually needed so ovl_encode_fh() will not fail in the common case of FAN_DELETE_SELF fanotify events.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: reject root items with drop_progress and zero drop_level [BUG] When recovering relocation at mount time, merge_reloc_root() and btrfs_drop_snapshot() both use BUG_ON(level == 0) to guard against an impossible state: a non-zero drop_progress combined with a zero drop_level in a root_item, which can be triggered: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1545! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 283 ... Tainted: 6.18.0+ #16 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2, BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 RIP: 0010:merge_reloc_root+0x1266/0x1650 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1545 Code: ffff0000 00004589 d7e9acfa ffffe8a1 79bafebe 02000000 Call Trace: merge_reloc_roots+0x295/0x890 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1861 btrfs_recover_relocation+0xd6e/0x11d0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4195 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xa4d/0x1810 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3130 open_ctree+0x5824/0x5fe0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3640 btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:987 [inline] btrfs_get_tree_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1951 [inline] btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2094 [inline] btrfs_get_tree+0x111c/0x2190 fs/btrfs/super.c:2128 vfs_get_tree+0x9a/0x370 fs/super.c:1758 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1199 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3642 [inline] do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3718 [inline] path_mount+0x5b8/0x1ea0 fs/namespace.c:4028 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4041 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4229 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4206 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x320 fs/namespace.c:4206 ... RIP: 0033:0x7f969c9a8fde Code: 0f1f4000 48c7c2b0 fffffff7 d8648902 b8ffffff ffc3660f ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bug is reproducible on 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260310 with our dynamic metadata fuzzing tool that corrupts btrfs metadata at runtime. [CAUSE] A non-zero drop_progress.objectid means an interrupted btrfs_drop_snapshot() left a resume point on disk, and in that case drop_level must be greater than 0 because the checkpoint is only saved at internal node levels. Although this invariant is enforced when the kernel writes the root item, it is not validated when the root item is read back from disk. That allows on-disk corruption to provide an invalid state with drop_progress.objectid != 0 and drop_level == 0. When relocation recovery later processes such a root item, merge_reloc_root() reads drop_level and hits BUG_ON(level == 0). The same invalid metadata can also trigger the corresponding BUG_ON() in btrfs_drop_snapshot(). [FIX] Fix this by validating the root_item invariant in tree-checker when reading root items from disk: if drop_progress.objectid is non-zero, drop_level must also be non-zero. Reject such malformed metadata with -EUCLEAN before it reaches merge_reloc_root() or btrfs_drop_snapshot() and triggers the BUG_ON. After the fix, the same corruption is correctly rejected by tree-checker and the BUG_ON is no longer triggered.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix assertion failure when splitting ordered extent after transaction abort If while we are doing a direct IO write a transaction abort happens, we mark all existing ordered extents with the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag (done at btrfs_destroy_ordered_extents()), and then after that if we enter btrfs_split_ordered_extent() and the ordered extent has bytes left (meaning we have a bio that doesn't cover the whole ordered extent, see details at btrfs_extract_ordered_extent()), we will fail on the following assertion at btrfs_split_ordered_extent(): ASSERT(!(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS)); because the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag is set and the definition of BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS is just the union of all flags that identify the type of write (regular, nocow, prealloc, compressed, direct IO, encoded). Fix this by returning an error from btrfs_extract_ordered_extent() if we find the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag in the ordered extent. The error will be the error that resulted in the transaction abort or -EIO if no transaction abort happened. This was recently reported by syzbot with the following trace: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:53 [inline] should_fail_ex+0x3b0/0x4e0 lib/fault-inject.c:154 should_failslab+0xac/0x100 mm/failslab.c:46 slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4072 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4148 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0xdd/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4310 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline] btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item+0x244/0x1100 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5742 reserve_chunk_space+0x1ca/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4292 check_system_chunk fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4319 [inline] do_chunk_alloc fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3891 [inline] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x77b/0xf80 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4187 find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4166 [inline] find_free_extent+0x42d1/0x5810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4579 btrfs_reserve_extent+0x422/0x810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4672 btrfs_new_extent_direct fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:186 [inline] btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write+0x706/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:321 btrfs_dio_iomap_begin+0xbb7/0x1180 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:525 iomap_iter+0x697/0xf60 fs/iomap/iter.c:90 __iomap_dio_rw+0xeb9/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:702 btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline] btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397 do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880 vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050 do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline] __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline] __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29 RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328 </TASK> BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -12) BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs: Replace BUG_ON with error handling for CNID count checks In a06ec283e125 next_id, folder_count, and file_count in the super block info were expanded to 64 bits, and BUG_ONs were added to detect overflow. This triggered an error reported by syzbot: if the MDB is corrupted, the BUG_ON is triggered. This patch replaces this mechanism with proper error handling and resolves the syzbot reported bug. Singed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: ptp: don't WARN when controlling PF is unavailable In VFIO passthrough setups, it is possible to pass through only a PF which doesn't own the source timer. In that case the PTP controlling PF (adapter->ctrl_pf) is never initialized in the VM, so ice_get_ctrl_ptp() returns NULL and triggers WARN_ON() in ice_ptp_setup_pf(). Since this is an expected behavior in that configuration, replace WARN_ON() with an informational message and return -EOPNOTSUPP.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix die ID init and look up bugs In snbep_pci2phy_map_init(), in the nr_node_ids > 8 path, uncore_device_to_die() may return -1 when all CPUs associated with the UBOX device are offline. Remove the WARN_ON_ONCE(die_id == -1) check for two reasons: - The current code breaks out of the loop. This is incorrect because pci_get_device() does not guarantee iteration in domain or bus order, so additional UBOX devices may be skipped during the scan. - Returning -EINVAL is incorrect, since marking offline buses with die_id == -1 is expected and should not be treated as an error. Separately, when NUMA is disabled on a NUMA-capable platform, pcibus_to_node() returns NUMA_NO_NODE, causing uncore_device_to_die() to return -1 for all PCI devices. As a result, spr_update_device_location(), used on Intel SPR and EMR, ignores the corresponding PMON units and does not add them to the RB tree. Fix this by using uncore_pcibus_to_dieid(), which retrieves topology from the UBOX GIDNIDMAP register and works regardless of whether NUMA is enabled in Linux. This requires snbep_pci2phy_map_init() to be added in spr_uncore_pci_init(). Keep uncore_device_to_die() only for the nr_node_ids > 8 case, where NUMA is expected to be enabled.