In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: pcf85063: fix potential OOB write in PCF85063 NVMEM read The nvmem interface supports variable buffer sizes, while the regmap interface operates with fixed-size storage. If an nvmem client uses a buffer size less than 4 bytes, regmap_read will write out of bounds as it expects the buffer to point at an unsigned int. Fix this by using an intermediary unsigned int to hold the value.

There is heap-based buffer overflow in Linux kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: don't query the device logical block size multiple times Devices block sizes may change. One of these cases is a loop device by using ioctl LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE. While this may cause other issues like IO being rejected, in the case of hfsplus, it will allocate a block by using that size and potentially write out-of-bounds when hfsplus_read_wrapper calls hfsplus_submit_bio and the latter function reads a different io_size. Using a new min_io_size initally set to sb_min_blocksize works for the purposes of the original fix, since it will be set to the max between HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and the first seen logical block size. We still use the max between HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and min_io_size in case the latter is not initialized. Tested by mounting an hfsplus filesystem with loop block sizes 512, 1024 and 4096. The produced KASAN report before the fix looks like this: [ 419.944641] ================================================================== [ 419.945655] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.946703] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800721fc00 by task repro/10678 [ 419.947612] [ 419.947846] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10678 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-00008-gdf56e0f2f3ca #84 [ 419.949007] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 419.950035] Call Trace: [ 419.950384] <TASK> [ 419.950676] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x78 [ 419.951212] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.951830] print_report+0x14c/0x49e [ 419.952361] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x267/0x278 [ 419.952979] ? kmem_cache_debug_flags+0xc/0x1d [ 419.953561] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.954231] kasan_report+0x89/0xb0 [ 419.954748] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.955367] hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.955948] ? __pfx_hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x10/0x10 [ 419.956618] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x59/0x1a9 [ 419.957214] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x2e [ 419.957772] hfsplus_fill_super+0x348/0x1590 [ 419.958355] ? hlock_class+0x4c/0x109 [ 419.958867] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 419.959499] ? __pfx_string+0x10/0x10 [ 419.960006] ? lock_acquire+0x3e2/0x454 [ 419.960532] ? bdev_name.constprop.0+0xce/0x243 [ 419.961129] ? __pfx_bdev_name.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 419.961799] ? pointer+0x3f0/0x62f [ 419.962277] ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10 [ 419.962761] ? vsnprintf+0x6c4/0xfba [ 419.963178] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 419.963621] ? setup_bdev_super+0x376/0x3b3 [ 419.964029] ? snprintf+0x9d/0xd2 [ 419.964344] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 419.964675] ? lock_acquired+0x45c/0x5e9 [ 419.965016] ? set_blocksize+0x139/0x1c1 [ 419.965381] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6d/0xae [ 419.965742] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 419.966179] mount_bdev+0x12f/0x1bf [ 419.966512] ? __pfx_mount_bdev+0x10/0x10 [ 419.966886] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0xce/0x111 [ 419.967293] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10 [ 419.967702] ? __pfx_hfsplus_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.968073] legacy_get_tree+0x104/0x178 [ 419.968414] vfs_get_tree+0x86/0x296 [ 419.968751] path_mount+0xba3/0xd0b [ 419.969157] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.969594] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1e2/0x260 [ 419.970311] do_mount+0x99/0xe0 [ 419.970630] ? __pfx_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.971008] __do_sys_mount+0x199/0x1c9 [ 419.971397] do_syscall_64+0xd0/0x135 [ 419.971761] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 419.972233] RIP: 0033:0x7c3cb812972e [ 419.972564] Code: 48 8b 0d f5 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c2 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 419.974371] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30632548 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 419.975048] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe306328d8 RCX: 00007c3cb812972e [ 419.975701] RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000c80 RDI: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: smartpqi: Fix disable_managed_interrupts Correct blk-mq registration issue with module parameter disable_managed_interrupts enabled. When we turn off the default PCI_IRQ_AFFINITY flag, the driver needs to register with blk-mq using blk_mq_map_queues(). The driver is currently calling blk_mq_pci_map_queues() which results in a stack trace and possibly undefined behavior. Stack Trace: [ 7.860089] scsi host2: smartpqi [ 7.871934] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 238 at block/blk-mq-pci.c:52 blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0 [ 7.889231] Modules linked in: sd_mod t10_pi sg uas smartpqi(+) crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse [ 7.924755] CPU: 0 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-372.88.1.el8_6_smartpqi_test.x86_64 #1 [ 7.944336] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 03/08/2022 [ 7.963026] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 7.978275] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0 [ 7.978278] Code: 48 89 de 89 c7 e8 f6 0f 4f 00 3b 05 c4 b7 8e 01 72 e1 5b 31 c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7d df 73 00 31 c0 e9 76 df 73 00 <0f> 0b eb bc 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 [ 7.978280] RSP: 0018:ffffa95fc3707d50 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 7.978283] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010 [ 7.978284] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9190c32d4310 [ 7.978286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffa95fc3707d38 R09: ffff91929b81ac00 [ 7.978287] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa95fc3707ac0 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.978288] R13: ffff9190c32d4000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff9190c4c950a8 [ 7.978290] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9193efc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7.978292] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.172814] CR2: 000055d11166c000 CR3: 00000002dae10002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ 8.172816] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8.172817] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8.172818] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8.172819] Call Trace: [ 8.172823] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x12e/0x310 [ 8.264339] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.9+0x30/0x245 [ 8.279302] pqi_ctrl_init+0xacf/0xc8e [smartpqi] [ 8.294085] ? pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi] [ 8.309015] pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi] [ 8.323286] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80 [ 8.337855] work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20 [ 8.351193] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [ 8.364462] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 8.379252] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x390 [ 8.392623] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 8.406295] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [ 8.418428] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [ 8.431532] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [ 8.444137] ---[ end trace 1bf0173d39354506 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: add missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses Currently, it's possible to pass in a modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to a global function as an argument. The adverse effects of this is that BPF helpers can continue to make use of this modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR from within the context of the global function, which can unintentionally result in out-of-bounds memory accesses and therefore compromise overall system stability i.e. [ 244.157771] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140 [ 244.161345] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810914be68 by task test_progs/302 [ 244.167151] CPU: 0 PID: 302 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O E 6.10.0-rc3-00131-g66b586715063 #533 [ 244.174318] Call Trace: [ 244.175787] <TASK> [ 244.177356] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 [ 244.179531] print_report+0xce/0x670 [ 244.182314] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x200/0x3e0 [ 244.184908] kasan_report+0xd7/0x110 [ 244.187408] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140 [ 244.189714] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140 [ 244.192020] bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140 [ 244.194264] bpf_prog_b02a02fdd2bdc5fa_global_call_bpf_dynptr_data+0x22/0x26 [ 244.198044] bpf_prog_b0fe7b9d7dc3abde_callback_adjust_bpf_dynptr_reg_off+0x1f/0x23 [ 244.202136] bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x2c7/0x570 [ 244.204744] ? 0xffffffffc0009e58 [ 244.206593] ? __pfx_bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x10/0x10 [ 244.209795] bpf_prog_33ab33f6a804ba2d_user_ringbuf_callback_const_ptr_to_dynptr_reg_off+0x47/0x4b [ 244.215922] bpf_trampoline_6442502480+0x43/0xe3 [ 244.218691] __x64_sys_prlimit64+0x9/0xf0 [ 244.220912] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 [ 244.223043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 244.226458] RIP: 0033:0x7ffa3eb8f059 [ 244.228582] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8f 1d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 244.241307] RSP: 002b:00007ffa3e9c6eb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012e [ 244.246474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffa3e9c7cdc RCX: 00007ffa3eb8f059 [ 244.250478] RDX: 00007ffa3eb162b4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffa3e9c7fb0 [ 244.255396] RBP: 00007ffa3e9c6ed0 R08: 00007ffa3e9c76c0 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 244.260195] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffff80 [ 244.264201] R13: 000000000000001c R14: 00007ffc5d6b4260 R15: 00007ffa3e1c7000 [ 244.268303] </TASK> Add a check_func_arg_reg_off() to the path in which the BPF verifier verifies the arguments of global function arguments, specifically those which take an argument of type ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY. Also, process_dynptr_func() doesn't appear to perform any explicit and strict type matching on the supplied register type, so let's also enforce that a register either type PTR_TO_STACK or CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR is by the caller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Fix for possible memory corruption Init Control Block is dereferenced incorrectly. Correctly dereference ICB

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: fix memory overlapping when deleting chars in the buffer A memory overlapping copy occurs when deleting a long line. This memory overlapping copy can cause data corruption when scr_memcpyw is optimized to memcpy because memcpy does not ensure its behavior if the destination buffer overlaps with the source buffer. The line buffer is not always broken, because the memcpy utilizes the hardware acceleration, whose result is not deterministic. Fix this problem by using replacing the scr_memcpyw with scr_memmovew.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr Use the actual length of volume coherency data when setting the xattr to avoid the following KASAN report. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] Write of size 4 at addr ffff888101e02af4 by task kworker/6:0/1347 CPU: 6 PID: 1347 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-nfs-fscache-netfs+ #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events fscache_create_volume_work [fscache] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db ? __lock_text_start+0x8/0x8 ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] kasan_report+0xab/0x120 ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0 memcpy+0x39/0x60 cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles] cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles] ? __cachefiles_free_volume+0x90/0x90 [cachefiles] fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache] process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0 worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650 ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 kthread+0x16c/0x1a0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1347: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0x76/0x350 [cachefiles] cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles] fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache] process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0 worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650 kthread+0x16c/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888101e02af0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of 8-byte region [ffff888101e02af0, ffff888101e02af8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a2292d70 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x101e02 flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100042280 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080660066 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888101e02980: fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc ffff888101e02a00: 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 >ffff888101e02a80: fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 04 fc ^ ffff888101e02b00: fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc ffff888101e02b80: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc ==================================================================

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efistub: Use 1:1 file:memory mapping for PE/COFF .compat section The .compat section is a dummy PE section that contains the address of the 32-bit entrypoint of the 64-bit kernel image if it is bootable from 32-bit firmware (i.e., CONFIG_EFI_MIXED=y) This section is only 8 bytes in size and is only referenced from the loader, and so it is placed at the end of the memory view of the image, to avoid the need for padding it to 4k, which is required for sections appearing in the middle of the image. Unfortunately, this violates the PE/COFF spec, and even if most EFI loaders will work correctly (including the Tianocore reference implementation), PE loaders do exist that reject such images, on the basis that both the file and memory views of the file contents should be described by the section headers in a monotonically increasing manner without leaving any gaps. So reorganize the sections to avoid this issue. This results in a slight padding overhead (< 4k) which can be avoided if desired by disabling CONFIG_EFI_MIXED (which is only needed in rare cases these days)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Check bounds for second channel in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() The bounds checks in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() are only being applied to the first channel, meaning it is possible to write out of bounds values to the second channel in stereo controls. Add appropriate checks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: amd-xgbe: Fix skb data length underflow There will be BUG_ON() triggered in include/linux/skbuff.h leading to intermittent kernel panic, when the skb length underflow is detected. Fix this by dropping the packet if such length underflows are seen because of inconsistencies in the hardware descriptors.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/swap: fix race when skipping swapcache When skipping swapcache for SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO, if two or more threads swapin the same entry at the same time, they get different pages (A, B). Before one thread (T0) finishes the swapin and installs page (A) to the PTE, another thread (T1) could finish swapin of page (B), swap_free the entry, then swap out the possibly modified page reusing the same entry. It breaks the pte_same check in (T0) because PTE value is unchanged, causing ABA problem. Thread (T0) will install a stalled page (A) into the PTE and cause data corruption. One possible callstack is like this: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- do_swap_page() do_swap_page() with same entry <direct swapin path> <direct swapin path> <alloc page A> <alloc page B> swap_read_folio() <- read to page A swap_read_folio() <- read to page B <slow on later locks or interrupt> <finished swapin first> ... set_pte_at() swap_free() <- entry is free <write to page B, now page A stalled> <swap out page B to same swap entry> pte_same() <- Check pass, PTE seems unchanged, but page A is stalled! swap_free() <- page B content lost! set_pte_at() <- staled page A installed! And besides, for ZRAM, swap_free() allows the swap device to discard the entry content, so even if page (B) is not modified, if swap_read_folio() on CPU0 happens later than swap_free() on CPU1, it may also cause data loss. To fix this, reuse swapcache_prepare which will pin the swap entry using the cache flag, and allow only one thread to swap it in, also prevent any parallel code from putting the entry in the cache. Release the pin after PT unlocked. Racers just loop and wait since it's a rare and very short event. A schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) call is added to avoid repeated page faults wasting too much CPU, causing livelock or adding too much noise to perf statistics. A similar livelock issue was described in commit 029c4628b2eb ("mm: swap: get rid of livelock in swapin readahead") Reproducer: This race issue can be triggered easily using a well constructed reproducer and patched brd (with a delay in read path) [1]: With latest 6.8 mainline, race caused data loss can be observed easily: $ gcc -g -lpthread test-thread-swap-race.c && ./a.out Polulating 32MB of memory region... Keep swapping out... Starting round 0... Spawning 65536 workers... 32746 workers spawned, wait for done... Round 0: Error on 0x5aa00, expected 32746, got 32743, 3 data loss! Round 0: Error on 0x395200, expected 32746, got 32743, 3 data loss! Round 0: Error on 0x3fd000, expected 32746, got 32737, 9 data loss! Round 0 Failed, 15 data loss! This reproducer spawns multiple threads sharing the same memory region using a small swap device. Every two threads updates mapped pages one by one in opposite direction trying to create a race, with one dedicated thread keep swapping out the data out using madvise. The reproducer created a reproduce rate of about once every 5 minutes, so the race should be totally possible in production. After this patch, I ran the reproducer for over a few hundred rounds and no data loss observed. Performance overhead is minimal, microbenchmark swapin 10G from 32G zram: Before: 10934698 us After: 11157121 us Cached: 13155355 us (Dropping SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO flag) [kasong@tencent.com: v4]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get(). syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0] When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data. The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes. In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field, arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's not a problem. However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN), arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL) in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get(). To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy(). Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller. [0]: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6 RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000 R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010 FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261 inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981 sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204 sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix data corruption in dsync block recovery for small block sizes The helper function nilfs_recovery_copy_block() of nilfs_recovery_dsync_blocks(), which recovers data from logs created by data sync writes during a mount after an unclean shutdown, incorrectly calculates the on-page offset when copying repair data to the file's page cache. In environments where the block size is smaller than the page size, this flaw can cause data corruption and leak uninitialized memory bytes during the recovery process. Fix these issues by correcting this byte offset calculation on the page.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus trash whatever this register is used for. Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd(). To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not convert to an integer. This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach: We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word. In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction "or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler choosed for the error return code. In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register. Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT config option any longer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

An out-of-bounds(OOB) memory access vulnerability was found in vmwgfx driver in drivers/gpu/vmxgfx/vmxgfx_kms.c in GPU component in the Linux kernel with device file '/dev/dri/renderD128 (or Dxxx)'. This flaw allows a local attacker with a user account on the system to gain privilege, causing a denial of service(DoS).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload When a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the underlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the associated filter block using the 'FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND' command. The stack then continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for this driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the 'reoffload' operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the classifier in its 'reoffload' operation prepares and emits a 'FLOW_CLS_DESTROY' command for each filter. However, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the underlying driver never receives a 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY' command when a qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be reproduced using [2]. Fix by introducing a 'tmplt_reoffload' operation and have the stack invoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay. Implement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain templates (flower) by emitting the 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY}' command based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a filter block or being unbound from one. As far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which reordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains() in __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block is expected to be freed after flushing all the chains. [1] unreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff ..|......[...... 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [<ffffffff81ab374e>] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90 [<ffffffff832aec6d>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0 [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [<ffffffff8379d29a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff8379d50c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 [<ffffffff843b9ce0>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 unreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00 @.......W.8..... 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff ..,m......,m.... backtrace: [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [<ffffffff81ab36c1>] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90 [<ffffffff81a8ed96>] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0 [<ffffffff82827d03>] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460 [<ffffffff82828d2b>] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0 [<ffffffff832aed48>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0 [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [2] # tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact # tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32 # tc qdisc del dev ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix stack corruption When tc filters are first added to a net device, the corresponding local port gets bound to an ACL group in the device. The group contains a list of ACLs. In turn, each ACL points to a different TCAM region where the filters are stored. During forwarding, the ACLs are sequentially evaluated until a match is found. One reason to place filters in different regions is when they are added with decreasing priorities and in an alternating order so that two consecutive filters can never fit in the same region because of their key usage. In Spectrum-2 and newer ASICs the firmware started to report that the maximum number of ACLs in a group is more than 16, but the layout of the register that configures ACL groups (PAGT) was not updated to account for that. It is therefore possible to hit stack corruption [1] in the rare case where more than 16 ACLs in a group are required. Fix by limiting the maximum ACL group size to the minimum between what the firmware reports and the maximum ACLs that fit in the PAGT register. Add a test case to make sure the machine does not crash when this condition is hit. [1] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120 [...] dump_stack_lvl+0x36/0x50 panic+0x305/0x330 __stack_chk_fail+0x15/0x20 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_region_attach+0x69/0x110 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_get+0x492/0xa20 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_ventry_add+0x25/0xe0 mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_add+0x47/0x240 mlxsw_sp_flower_replace+0x1a9/0x1d0 tc_setup_cb_add+0xdc/0x1c0 fl_hw_replace_filter+0x146/0x1f0 fl_change+0xc17/0x1360 tc_new_tfilter+0x472/0xb90 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x313/0x3b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x244/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x440 ____sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x260 ___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0 __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: qcom: pmic_glink_altmode: fix port sanity check The PMIC GLINK altmode driver currently supports at most two ports. Fix the incomplete port sanity check on notifications to avoid accessing and corrupting memory beyond the port array if we ever get a notification for an unsupported port.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/srso: Add SRSO mitigation for Hygon processors Add mitigation for the speculative return stack overflow vulnerability which exists on Hygon processors too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_tunnel: fix geneve_opt type confusion addition When handling multiple NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE attributes, the parsing logic should place every geneve_opt structure one by one compactly. Hence, when deciding the next geneve_opt position, the pointer addition should be in units of char *. However, the current implementation erroneously does type conversion before the addition, which will lead to heap out-of-bounds write. [ 6.989857] ================================================================== [ 6.990293] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.990725] Write of size 124 at addr ffff888005f18974 by task poc/178 [ 6.991162] [ 6.991259] CPU: 0 PID: 178 Comm: poc-oob-write Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 6.991655] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 6.992281] Call Trace: [ 6.992423] <TASK> [ 6.992586] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 6.992801] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 6.993790] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 6.994252] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 6.994486] memcpy+0x38/0x60 [ 6.994692] nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.995677] nft_obj_init+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 6.995891] nf_tables_newobj+0x585/0x950 [ 6.996922] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xdf9/0x1020 [ 6.998997] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1df/0x220 [ 6.999537] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 7.000771] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 7.001462] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 7.001707] ____sys_sendmsg+0x409/0x450 [ 7.002391] ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x170 [ 7.003145] __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x170 [ 7.004359] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 7.005817] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 7.006127] RIP: 0033:0x7ec756d4e407 [ 7.006339] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 7.007364] RSP: 002b:00007ffed5d46760 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 7.007827] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ec756cc4740 RCX: 00007ec756d4e407 [ 7.008223] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed5d467f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 7.008620] RBP: 00007ffed5d468a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009039] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009429] R13: 00007ffed5d478b0 R14: 00007ec756ee5000 R15: 00005cbd4e655cb8 Fix this bug with correct pointer addition and conversion in parse and dump code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hns3: fixed hclge_fetch_pf_reg accesses bar space out of bounds issue The TQP BAR space is divided into two segments. TQPs 0-1023 and TQPs 1024-1279 are in different BAR space addresses. However, hclge_fetch_pf_reg does not distinguish the tqp space information when reading the tqp space information. When the number of TQPs is greater than 1024, access bar space overwriting occurs. The problem of different segments has been considered during the initialization of tqp.io_base. Therefore, tqp.io_base is directly used when the queue is read in hclge_fetch_pf_reg. The error message: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800037200000 pc : hclge_fetch_pf_reg+0x138/0x250 [hclge] lr : hclge_get_regs+0x84/0x1d0 [hclge] Call trace: hclge_fetch_pf_reg+0x138/0x250 [hclge] hclge_get_regs+0x84/0x1d0 [hclge] hns3_get_regs+0x2c/0x50 [hns3] ethtool_get_regs+0xf4/0x270 dev_ethtool+0x674/0x8a0 dev_ioctl+0x270/0x36c sock_do_ioctl+0x110/0x2a0 sock_ioctl+0x2ac/0x530 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0x100 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x124 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x140/0x15c do_el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0_svc+0x1c/0x2c el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4 el0_sync+0x168/0x180

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: cacheinfo: Avoid out-of-bounds write to cacheinfo array The loop that detects/populates cache information already has a bounds check on the array size but does not account for cache levels with separate data/instructions cache. Fix this by incrementing the index for any populated leaf (instead of any populated level).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix potential memory corruption in child_cfs_rq_on_list child_cfs_rq_on_list attempts to convert a 'prev' pointer to a cfs_rq. This 'prev' pointer can originate from struct rq's leaf_cfs_rq_list, making the conversion invalid and potentially leading to memory corruption. Depending on the relative positions of leaf_cfs_rq_list and the task group (tg) pointer within the struct, this can cause a memory fault or access garbage data. The issue arises in list_add_leaf_cfs_rq, where both cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list and rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list are added to the same leaf list. Also, rq->tmp_alone_branch can be set to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list. This adds a check `if (prev == &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list)` after the main conditional in child_cfs_rq_on_list. This ensures that the container_of operation will convert a correct cfs_rq struct. This check is sufficient because only cfs_rqs on the same CPU are added to the list, so verifying the 'prev' pointer against the current rq's list head is enough. Fixes a potential memory corruption issue that due to current struct layout might not be manifesting as a crash but could lead to unpredictable behavior when the layout changes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: fix potential memory corruption in nvme_tcp_recv_pdu() nvme_tcp_recv_pdu() doesn't check the validity of the header length. When header digests are enabled, a target might send a packet with an invalid header length (e.g. 255), causing nvme_tcp_verify_hdgst() to access memory outside the allocated area and cause memory corruptions by overwriting it with the calculated digest. Fix this by rejecting packets with an unexpected header length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-flakey: Fix memory corruption in optional corrupt_bio_byte feature Fix memory corruption due to incorrect parameter being passed to bio_init

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: Suppress list corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). Brad Spengler reported the list_del() corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). [0] Commit eb28fd76c0a0 ("gtp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns dismantle.") added the for_each_netdev() loop in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() to destroy devices in each netns as done in geneve and ip tunnels. However, this could trigger ->dellink() twice for the same device during ->exit_batch_rtnl(). Say we have two netns A & B and gtp device B that resides in netns B but whose UDP socket is in netns A. 1. cleanup_net() processes netns A and then B. 2. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating netns A's gn->gtp_dev_list and calls ->dellink(). [ device B is not yet unlinked from netns B as unregister_netdevice_many() has not been called. ] 3. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating netns B's for_each_netdev() and calls ->dellink(). gtp_dellink() cleans up the device's hash table, unlinks the dev from gn->gtp_dev_list, and calls unregister_netdevice_queue(). Basically, calling gtp_dellink() multiple times is fine unless CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled. Let's remove for_each_netdev() in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() and delegate the destruction to default_device_exit_batch() as done in bareudp. [0]: list_del corruption, ffff8880aaa62c00->next (autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]) is LIST_POISON1 (ffffffffffffff02) (prev is 0xffffffffffffff04) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1804 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G T 6.12.13-grsec-full-20250211091339 #1 Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84947381>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58 Code: c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 9f b1 f7 fc 0f 0b 4d 89 f0 48 c7 c1 02 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 7f b1 f7 fc <0f> 0b 4d 89 e8 48 c7 c1 04 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60 RSP: 0018:fffffe8040b4fbd0 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff818c4054 RDX: ffffffff84947381 RSI: ffffffff818d1512 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8880aaa62c00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd008169f32 R10: fffffe8040b4f997 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: a1988d84f24943e4 R13: ffffffffffffff02 R14: ffffffffffffff04 R15: ffff8880aaa62c08 RBX: kasan shadow of 0x0 RCX: __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x74/0xe0 kernel/printk/printk.c:4554 RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58 RSI: vprintk+0x72/0x100 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:71 RBP: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object] RSP: process kstack fffffe8040b4fbd0+0x7bd0/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe8040b4f990+0x7990/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R10: process kstack fffffe8040b4f997+0x7997/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R15: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc08/0x1000 [slab object] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888116000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000748f5372c000 CR3: 0000000015408000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 shadow CR4: 00000000003406f0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffffffff8a0c35e7 ffffffff8a0c3603 ffff8880aaa62c00 ffff8880aaa62c00 0000000000000004 ffff88811145311c 0000000000000005 0000000000000001 ffff8880aaa62000 fffffe8040b4fd40 ffffffff8a0c360d Call Trace: <TASK> [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:131 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:248 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] list_del include/linux/list.h:262 [inl ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/platform: check the bounds of read/write syscalls count and offset are passed from user space and not checked, only offset is capped to 40 bits, which can be used to read/write out of bounds of the device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: nci: Add bounds checking in nci_hci_create_pipe() The "pipe" variable is a u8 which comes from the network. If it's more than 127, then it results in memory corruption in the caller, nci_hci_connect_gate().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/a6xx: Allocate enough space for GMU registers In commit 142639a52a01 ("drm/msm/a6xx: fix crashstate capture for A650") we changed a6xx_get_gmu_registers() to read 3 sets of registers. Unfortunately, we didn't change the memory allocation for the array. That leads to a KASAN warning (this was on the chromeos-5.4 kernel, which has the problematic commit backported to it): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430 Write of size 8 at addr ffffff80c89432b0 by task A618-worker/209 CPU: 5 PID: 209 Comm: A618-worker Tainted: G W 5.4.156-lockdep #22 Hardware name: Google Lazor Limozeen without Touchscreen (rev5 - rev8) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x128/0x1ec print_address_description+0x88/0x4a0 __kasan_report+0xfc/0x120 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x24 _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430 a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x330/0x25d4 msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c recover_worker+0x328/0x838 kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574 kthread+0x2dc/0x39c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 209: __kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x1c4 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1f0/0x2a0 a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x164/0x25d4 msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c recover_worker+0x328/0x838 kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574 kthread+0x2dc/0x39c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mlxsw: thermal: Fix out-of-bounds memory accesses Currently, mlxsw allows cooling states to be set above the maximum cooling state supported by the driver: # cat /sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone2/cdev0/type mlxsw_fan # cat /sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone2/cdev0/max_state 10 # echo 18 > /sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone2/cdev0/cur_state # echo $? 0 This results in out-of-bounds memory accesses when thermal state transition statistics are enabled (CONFIG_THERMAL_STATISTICS=y), as the transition table is accessed with a too large index (state) [1]. According to the thermal maintainer, it is the responsibility of the driver to reject such operations [2]. Therefore, return an error when the state to be set exceeds the maximum cooling state supported by the driver. To avoid dead code, as suggested by the thermal maintainer [3], partially revert commit a421ce088ac8 ("mlxsw: core: Extend cooling device with cooling levels") that tried to interpret these invalid cooling states (above the maximum) in a special way. The cooling levels array is not removed in order to prevent the fans going below 20% PWM, which would cause them to get stuck at 0% PWM. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x271/0x290 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881052f7bf8 by task kworker/0:0/5 CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-custom-45935-gce1adf704b14 #122 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2410-CB2FO"/"SA000874", BIOS 4.6.5 03/08/2016 Workqueue: events_freezable_power_ thermal_zone_device_check Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x8b/0xb3 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x271/0x290 __thermal_cdev_update+0x15e/0x4e0 thermal_cdev_update+0x9f/0xe0 step_wise_throttle+0x770/0xee0 thermal_zone_device_update+0x3f6/0xdf0 process_one_work+0xa42/0x1770 worker_thread+0x62f/0x13e0 kthread+0x3ee/0x4e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Allocated by task 1: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs+0x153/0x2c0 __thermal_cooling_device_register.part.0+0x25b/0x9c0 thermal_cooling_device_register+0xb3/0x100 mlxsw_thermal_init+0x5c5/0x7e0 __mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0xcb3/0x19c0 mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0x56/0xb0 mlxsw_pci_probe+0x54f/0x710 local_pci_probe+0xc6/0x170 pci_device_probe+0x2b2/0x4d0 really_probe+0x293/0xd10 __driver_probe_device+0x2af/0x440 driver_probe_device+0x51/0x1e0 __driver_attach+0x21b/0x530 bus_for_each_dev+0x14c/0x1d0 bus_add_driver+0x3ac/0x650 driver_register+0x241/0x3d0 mlxsw_sp_module_init+0xa2/0x174 do_one_initcall+0xee/0x5f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x45a/0x4de kernel_init+0x1f/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881052f7800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 1016 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8881052f7800, ffff8881052f7c00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000052355272 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1052f0 head:0000000052355272 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea0005034800 0000000300000003 ffff888100041dc0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881052f7a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881052f7b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8881052f7b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8881052f7c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881052f7c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/9aca37cb-1629-5c67- ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: fix an incorrect limit in filelayout_decode_layout() The "sizeof(struct nfs_fh)" is two bytes too large and could lead to memory corruption. It should be NFS_MAXFHSIZE because that's the size of the ->data[] buffer. I reversed the size of the arguments to put the variable on the left.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sched: Avoid data corruptions Wait for all dependencies of a job to complete before killing it to avoid data corruptions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Fix list_add() corruption in lpfc_drain_txq() When parsing the txq list in lpfc_drain_txq(), the driver attempts to pass the requests to the adapter. If such an attempt fails, a local "fail_msg" string is set and a log message output. The job is then added to a completions list for cancellation. Processing of any further jobs from the txq list continues, but since "fail_msg" remains set, jobs are added to the completions list regardless of whether a wqe was passed to the adapter. If successfully added to txcmplq, jobs are added to both lists resulting in list corruption. Fix by clearing the fail_msg string after adding a job to the completions list. This stops the subsequent jobs from being added to the completions list unless they had an appropriate failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: fix a buffer overflow in otx2_set_rxfh_context() This function is called from ethtool_set_rxfh() and "*rss_context" comes from the user. Add some bounds checking to prevent memory corruption.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: Add validation for used length This adds validation for used length (might come from an untrusted device) to avoid data corruption or loss.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4: Fix an Oops in pnfs_mark_request_commit() when doing O_DIRECT Fix an Oopsable condition in pnfs_mark_request_commit() when we're putting a set of writes on the commit list to reschedule them after a failed pNFS attempt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Don't corrupt the value of pg_bytes_written in nfs_do_recoalesce() The value of mirror->pg_bytes_written should only be updated after a successful attempt to flush out the requests on the list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: Fix races between xattr_{set|get} and listxattr operations UBIFS may occur some problems with concurrent xattr_{set|get} and listxattr operations, such as assertion failure, memory corruption, stale xattr value[1]. Fix it by importing a new rw-lock in @ubifs_inode to serilize write operations on xattr, concurrent read operations are still effective, just like ext4. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200630130438.141649-1-houtao1@huawei.com

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxgb4: avoid accessing registers when clearing filters Hardware register having the server TID base can contain invalid values when adapter is in bad state (for example, due to AER fatal error). Reading these invalid values in the register can lead to out-of-bound memory access. So, fix by using the saved server TID base when clearing filters.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix type in min_t to avoid stack OOB Change min_t() to use type "u32" instead of type "int" to avoid stack out of bounds. With min_t() type "int" the values get sign extended and the larger value gets used causing stack out of bounds. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x1de/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:976 Read of size 127 at addr ffff888072607128 by task syz-executor.7/18707 CPU: 1 PID: 18707 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzk #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.9+0x28/0x160 mm/kasan/report.c:256 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7d/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:459 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x1a3/0x210 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 memcpy+0x23/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] sg_copy_buffer+0x1de/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:976 sg_copy_from_buffer+0x33/0x40 lib/scatterlist.c:1000 fill_from_dev_buffer.part.34+0x82/0x130 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1162 fill_from_dev_buffer drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1888 [inline] resp_readcap16+0x365/0x3b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1887 schedule_resp+0x4d8/0x1a70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5478 scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1ec0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7533 scsi_dispatch_cmd drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1520 [inline] scsi_queue_rq+0x16b0/0x2d40 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1699 blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1639 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1761 __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1838 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891 blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:62 sg_common_write.isra.18+0xeb3/0x2000 drivers/scsi/sg.c:836 sg_new_write.isra.19+0x570/0x8c0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:774 sg_ioctl_common+0x14d6/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:939 sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1165 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:860 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix corruption in reads at fpos 2G-4G from an OpenAFS server AFS-3 has two data fetch RPC variants, FS.FetchData and FS.FetchData64, and Linux's afs client switches between them when talking to a non-YFS server if the read size, the file position or the sum of the two have the upper 32 bits set of the 64-bit value. This is a problem, however, since the file position and length fields of FS.FetchData are *signed* 32-bit values. Fix this by capturing the capability bits obtained from the fileserver when it's sent an FS.GetCapabilities RPC, rather than just discarding them, and then picking out the VICED_CAPABILITY_64BITFILES flag. This can then be used to decide whether to use FS.FetchData or FS.FetchData64 - and also FS.StoreData or FS.StoreData64 - rather than using upper_32_bits() to switch on the parameter values. This capabilities flag could also be used to limit the maximum size of the file, but all servers must be checked for that. Note that the issue does not exist with FS.StoreData - that uses *unsigned* 32-bit values. It's also not a problem with Auristor servers as its YFS.FetchData64 op uses unsigned 64-bit values. This can be tested by cloning a git repo through an OpenAFS client to an OpenAFS server and then doing "git status" on it from a Linux afs client[1]. Provided the clone has a pack file that's in the 2G-4G range, the git status will show errors like: error: packfile .git/objects/pack/pack-5e813c51d12b6847bbc0fcd97c2bca66da50079c.pack does not match index error: packfile .git/objects/pack/pack-5e813c51d12b6847bbc0fcd97c2bca66da50079c.pack does not match index This can be observed in the server's FileLog with something like the following appearing: Sun Aug 29 19:31:39 2021 SRXAFS_FetchData, Fid = 2303380852.491776.3263114, Host 192.168.11.201:7001, Id 1001 Sun Aug 29 19:31:39 2021 CheckRights: len=0, for host=192.168.11.201:7001 Sun Aug 29 19:31:39 2021 FetchData_RXStyle: Pos 18446744071815340032, Len 3154 Sun Aug 29 19:31:39 2021 FetchData_RXStyle: file size 2400758866 ... Sun Aug 29 19:31:40 2021 SRXAFS_FetchData returns 5 Note the file position of 18446744071815340032. This is the requested file position sign-extended.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/kasan: Fix early region not updated correctly The shadow's page table is not updated when PTE_RPN_SHIFT is 24 and PAGE_SHIFT is 12. It not only causes false positives but also false negative as shown the following text. Fix it by bringing the logic of kasan_early_shadow_page_entry here. 1. False Positive: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in pcpu_alloc+0x508/0xa50 Write of size 16 at addr f57f3be0 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.0-12267-gdebe436e77c7 #1 Call Trace: [c80d1c20] [c07fe7b8] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x6c (unreliable) [c80d1c40] [c02ff668] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x300 [c80d1c70] [c02ff45c] kasan_report+0x1ec/0x200 [c80d1cb0] [c0300b20] kasan_check_range+0x160/0x2f0 [c80d1cc0] [c03018a4] memset+0x34/0x90 [c80d1ce0] [c0280108] pcpu_alloc+0x508/0xa50 [c80d1d40] [c02fd7bc] __kmem_cache_create+0xfc/0x570 [c80d1d70] [c0283d64] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x274/0x3e0 [c80d1db0] [c2036580] init_sd+0xc4/0x1d0 [c80d1de0] [c00044a0] do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x33c [c80d1eb0] [c2001624] kernel_init_freeable+0x2c8/0x384 [c80d1ef0] [c0004b14] kernel_init+0x24/0x170 [c80d1f10] [c001b26c] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Memory state around the buggy address: f57f3a80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f57f3b00: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 >f57f3b80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ^ f57f3c00: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f57f3c80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ================================================================== 2. False Negative (with KASAN tests): ================================================================== Before fix: ok 45 - kmalloc_double_kzfree # vmalloc_oob: EXPECTATION FAILED at lib/test_kasan.c:1039 KASAN failure expected in "((volatile char *)area)[3100]", but none occurred not ok 46 - vmalloc_oob not ok 1 - kasan ================================================================== After fix: ok 1 - kasan

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vduse: fix memory corruption in vduse_dev_ioctl() The "config.offset" comes from the user. There needs to a check to prevent it being out of bounds. The "config.offset" and "dev->config_size" variables are both type u32. So if the offset if out of bounds then the "dev->config_size - config.offset" subtraction results in a very high u32 value. The out of bounds offset can result in memory corruption.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watch_queue: Fix filter limit check In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8) which is fine, but the second does: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG) which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to a too-large type: (1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter (2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated. Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the number of types we actually know about. The bug may cause an oops looking something like: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611 ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 ... kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ... watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 ... __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Allocated by task 611: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: prevent copying too big compressed lzo segment Compressed length can be corrupted to be a lot larger than memory we have allocated for buffer. This will cause memcpy in copy_compressed_segment to write outside of allocated memory. This mostly results in stuck read syscall but sometimes when using btrfs send can get #GP kernel: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x841551d5c1000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI kernel: CPU: 17 PID: 264 Comm: kworker/u256:7 Tainted: P OE 5.17.0-rc2-1 #12 kernel: Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] kernel: RIP: 0010:lzo_decompress_bio (./include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 fs/btrfs/lzo.c:322 fs/btrfs/lzo.c:394) btrfs Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0:* 48 8b 06 mov (%rsi),%rax <-- trapping instruction 3: 48 8d 79 08 lea 0x8(%rcx),%rdi 7: 48 83 e7 f8 and $0xfffffffffffffff8,%rdi b: 48 89 01 mov %rax,(%rcx) e: 44 89 f0 mov %r14d,%eax 11: 48 8b 54 06 f8 mov -0x8(%rsi,%rax,1),%rdx kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb110812efd50 EFLAGS: 00010212 kernel: RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 000000009ca264c8 RCX: ffff98996e6d8ff8 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 000841551d5c1000 RDI: ffffffff9500435d kernel: RBP: ffff989a3be856c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff98996e6d8000 kernel: R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 000841551d5c1000 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98a09d640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 00001e9f984d9ea8 CR3: 000000014971a000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: end_compressed_bio_read (fs/btrfs/compression.c:104 fs/btrfs/compression.c:1363 fs/btrfs/compression.c:323) btrfs kernel: end_workqueue_fn (fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1923) btrfs kernel: btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:326) btrfs kernel: process_one_work (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:212 ./include/trace/events/workqueue.h:108 kernel/workqueue.c:2312) kernel: worker_thread (./include/linux/list.h:292 kernel/workqueue.c:2455) kernel: ? process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:2397) kernel: kthread (kernel/kthread.c:377) kernel: ? kthread_complete_and_exit (kernel/kthread.c:332) kernel: ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:301) kernel: </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix Out-of-Bounds Write in ksmbd_vfs_stream_write An offset from client could be a negative value, It could allows to write data outside the bounds of the allocated buffer. Note that this issue is coming when setting 'vfs objects = streams_xattr parameter' in ksmbd.conf.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mailbox: th1520: Fix memory corruption due to incorrect array size The functions th1520_mbox_suspend_noirq and th1520_mbox_resume_noirq are intended to save and restore the interrupt mask registers in the MBOX ICU0. However, the array used to store these registers was incorrectly sized, leading to memory corruption when accessing all four registers. This commit corrects the array size to accommodate all four interrupt mask registers, preventing memory corruption during suspend and resume operations.