In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: prevent division by zero in blk_rq_stat_sum() The expression dst->nr_samples + src->nr_samples may have zero value on overflow. It is necessary to add a check to avoid division by zero. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: usb-storage: Prevent divide-by-0 error in isd200_ata_command The isd200 sub-driver in usb-storage uses the HEADS and SECTORS values in the ATA ID information to calculate cylinder and head values when creating a CDB for READ or WRITE commands. The calculation involves division and modulus operations, which will cause a crash if either of these values is 0. While this never happens with a genuine device, it could happen with a flawed or subversive emulation, as reported by the syzbot fuzzer. Protect against this possibility by refusing to bind to the device if either the ATA_ID_HEADS or ATA_ID_SECTORS value in the device's ID information is 0. This requires isd200_Initialization() to return a negative error code when initialization fails; currently it always returns 0 (even when there is an error).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbmon: prevent division by zero in fb_videomode_from_videomode() The expression htotal * vtotal can have a zero value on overflow. It is necessary to prevent division by zero like in fb_var_to_videomode(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: padata: Fix possible divide-by-0 panic in padata_mt_helper() We are hit with a not easily reproducible divide-by-0 panic in padata.c at bootup time. [ 10.017908] Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 10.017908] CPU: 26 PID: 2627 Comm: kworker/u1666:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-15.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 10.017908] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR950 [7X12CTO1WW]/[7X12CTO1WW], BIOS [PSE140J-2.30] 07/20/2021 [ 10.017908] Workqueue: events_unbound padata_mt_helper [ 10.017908] RIP: 0010:padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 : [ 10.017963] Call Trace: [ 10.017968] <TASK> [ 10.018004] ? padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 [ 10.018084] process_one_work+0x174/0x330 [ 10.018093] worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0 [ 10.018111] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [ 10.018124] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 10.018138] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 10.018147] </TASK> Looking at the padata_mt_helper() function, the only way a divide-by-0 panic can happen is when ps->chunk_size is 0. The way that chunk_size is initialized in padata_do_multithreaded(), chunk_size can be 0 when the min_chunk in the passed-in padata_mt_job structure is 0. Fix this divide-by-0 panic by making sure that chunk_size will be at least 1 no matter what the input parameters are.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: core: check uartclk for zero to avoid divide by zero Calling ioctl TIOCSSERIAL with an invalid baud_base can result in uartclk being zero, which will result in a divide by zero error in uart_get_divisor(). The check for uartclk being zero in uart_set_info() needs to be done before other settings are made as subsequent calls to ioctl TIOCSSERIAL for the same port would be impacted if the uartclk check was done where uartclk gets set. Oops: divide error: 0000 PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI RIP: 0010:uart_get_divisor (drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:580) Call Trace: <TASK> serial8250_get_divisor (drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:2576 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:2589) serial8250_do_set_termios (drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:502 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:2741) serial8250_set_termios (drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:2862) uart_change_line_settings (./include/linux/spinlock.h:376 ./include/linux/serial_core.h:608 drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:222) uart_port_startup (drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:342) uart_startup (drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:368) uart_set_info (drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1034) uart_set_info_user (drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1059) tty_set_serial (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2637) tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2647 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2791) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:907 fs/ioctl.c:893 fs/ioctl.c:893) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Rule: add

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Avoid divide by zero by initializing dummy pitch to 1 [Why] If the dummy values in `populate_dummy_dml_surface_cfg()` aren't updated then they can lead to a divide by zero in downstream callers like CalculateVMAndRowBytes() [How] Initialize dummy value to a value to avoid divide by zero.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Initialize get_bytes_per_element's default to 1 Variables, used as denominators and maybe not assigned to other values, should not be 0. bytes_per_element_y & bytes_per_element_c are initialized by get_bytes_per_element() which should never return 0. This fixes 10 DIVIDE_BY_ZERO issues reported by Coverity.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Fix zero-division error when disabling tc cbs The commit b8c43360f6e4 ("net: stmmac: No need to calculate speed divider when offload is disabled") allows the "port_transmit_rate_kbps" to be set to a value of 0, which is then passed to the "div_s64" function when tc-cbs is disabled. This leads to a zero-division error. When tc-cbs is disabled, the idleslope, sendslope, and credit values the credit values are not required to be configured. Therefore, adding a return statement after setting the txQ mode to DCB when tc-cbs is disabled would prevent a zero-division error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon: fix divide by zero in damon_get_intervals_score() The current implementation allows having zero size regions with no special reasons, but damon_get_intervals_score() gets crashed by divide by zero when the region size is zero. [ 29.403950] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI This patch fixes the bug, but does not disallow zero size regions to keep the backward compatibility since disallowing zero size regions might be a breaking change for some users. In addition, the same crash can happen when intervals_goal.access_bp is zero so this should be fixed in stable trees as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: core: fbcvt: avoid division by 0 in fb_cvt_hperiod() In fb_find_mode_cvt(), iff mode->refresh somehow happens to be 0x80000000, cvt.f_refresh will become 0 when multiplying it by 2 due to overflow. It's then passed to fb_cvt_hperiod(), where it's used as a divider -- division by 0 will result in kernel oops. Add a sanity check for cvt.f_refresh to avoid such overflow... Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA: hfi1: fix possible divide-by-zero in find_hw_thread_mask() The function divides number of online CPUs by num_core_siblings, and later checks the divider by zero. This implies a possibility to get and divide-by-zero runtime error. Fix it by moving the check prior to division. This also helps to save one indentation level.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: savage: Handle err return when savagefb_check_var failed The commit 04e5eac8f3ab("fbdev: savage: Error out if pixclock equals zero") checks the value of pixclock to avoid divide-by-zero error. However the function savagefb_probe doesn't handle the error return of savagefb_check_var. When pixclock is 0, it will cause divide-by-zero error.

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-PLCSIM V5.4 (All versions). An attacker with local access to the system could cause a Denial-of-Service condition in the application when it is used to open a specially crafted file. As a consequence, a divide by zero operation could occur and cause the application to terminate unexpectedly and must be restarted to restore the service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Avoid potential division by zero in function_stat_show() Check whether denominator expression x * (x - 1) * 1000 mod {2^32, 2^64} produce zero and skip stddev computation in that case. For now don't care about rec->counter * rec->counter overflow because rec->time * rec->time overflow will likely happen earlier.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: sn-f-ospi: Fix division by zero When there is no dummy cycle in the spi-nor commands, both dummy bus cycle bytes and width are zero. Because of the cpu's warning when divided by zero, the warning should be avoided. Return just zero to avoid such calculations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: Avoid divide by zero in table status in Inline mode In Inline mode, the journal is unused, and journal_sectors is zero. Calculating the journal watermark requires dividing by journal_sectors, which should be done only if the journal is configured. Otherwise, a simple table query (dmsetup table) can cause OOPS. This bug did not show on some systems, perhaps only due to compiler optimization. On my 32-bit testing machine, this reliably crashes with the following: : Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP : CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2450 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #959 : EIP: dm_integrity_status+0x2f8/0xab0 [dm_integrity] ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix division by zero in setup_dsc_config When slice_height is 0, the division by slice_height in the calculation of the number of slices will cause a division by zero driver crash. This leaves the kernel in a state that requires a reboot. This patch adds a check to avoid the division by zero. The stack trace below is for the 6.8.4 Kernel. I reproduced the issue on a Z16 Gen 2 Lenovo Thinkpad with a Apple Studio Display monitor connected via Thunderbolt. The amdgpu driver crashed with this exception when I rebooted the system with the monitor connected. kernel: ? die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:447) kernel: ? do_trap (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:113 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:154) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? do_error_trap (./arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:58 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:175) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? exc_divide_error (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:194 (discriminator 2)) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? asm_exc_divide_error (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:548) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: dc_dsc_compute_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1109) amdgpu After applying this patch, the driver no longer crashes when the monitor is connected and the system is rebooted. I believe this is the same issue reported for 3113.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: linux/dim: Fix divide by 0 in RDMA DIM Fix a divide 0 error in rdma_dim_stats_compare() when prev->cpe_ratio == 0. CallTrace: Hardware name: H3C R4900 G3/RS33M2C9S, BIOS 2.00.37P21 03/12/2020 task: ffff880194b78000 task.stack: ffffc90006714000 RIP: 0010:backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: 0018:ffff880c10e83ec0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000002710 RBX: ffff88096cd7f780 RCX: 0000000000000064 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000001d7c6c09 R13: ffff88096cd7f780 R14: ffff880b174fe800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880c10e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000a0965b00 CR3: 000000000200a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ib_poll_handler+0x43/0x80 [ib_core] irq_poll_softirq+0xae/0x110 __do_softirq+0xd1/0x28c irq_exit+0xde/0xf0 do_IRQ+0x54/0xe0 common_interrupt+0x8f/0x8f </IRQ> ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd9/0x2a0 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xc7/0x2a0 ? do_idle+0x170/0x1d0 ? cpu_startup_entry+0x6f/0x80 ? start_secondary+0x1b9/0x210 ? secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0 Code: 0f 87 e1 00 00 00 8b 4c 24 14 44 8b 43 14 89 c8 4d 63 c8 44 29 c0 99 31 d0 29 d0 31 d2 48 98 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <49> f7 f1 48 83 f8 0a 0f 86 c1 00 00 00 44 39 c1 7f 10 48 89 df RIP: backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: ffff880c10e83ec0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: Prevent divide-by-zero error triggered by the user The user_entry_size is supplied by the user and later used as a denominator to calculate number of entries. The zero supplied by the user will trigger the following divide-by-zero error: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 4 PID: 497 Comm: c_repro Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ #281 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QUERY_GID_TABLE+0x1b1/0x510 Code: 87 59 03 00 00 e8 9f ab 1e ff 48 8d bd a8 00 00 00 e8 d3 70 41 ff 44 0f b7 b5 a8 00 00 00 e8 86 ab 1e ff 31 d2 4c 89 f0 31 ff <49> f7 f5 48 89 d6 48 89 54 24 10 48 89 04 24 e8 1b ad 1e ff 48 8b RSP: 0018:ffff88810416f828 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: 1ffff1102082df09 RCX: ffffffff82183f3d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888105f2da00 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88810416fa98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102082df5f R10: ffff88810416faf7 R11: ffffed102082df5e R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffff88810416faf0 FS: 00007f5715efa740(0000) GS:ffff88811a700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000840 CR3: 000000010c2e0001 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INFO_HANDLES+0x4b0/0x4b0 ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1546/0x1940 ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x186/0x240 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x38a/0x1220 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: netlink: af_netlink: Prevent empty skb by adding a check on len. Adding a check on len parameter to avoid empty skb. This prevents a division error in netem_enqueue function which is caused when skb->len=0 and skb->data_len=0 in the randomized corruption step as shown below. skb->data[prandom_u32() % skb_headlen(skb)] ^= 1<<(prandom_u32() % 8); Crash Report: [ 343.170349] netdevsim netdevsim0 netdevsim3: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0 [ 343.216110] netem: version 1.3 [ 343.235841] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 343.236680] CPU: 3 PID: 4288 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1+ [ 343.237569] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 [ 343.238707] RIP: 0010:netem_enqueue+0x1590/0x33c0 [sch_netem] [ 343.239499] Code: 89 85 58 ff ff ff e8 5f 5d e9 d3 48 8b b5 48 ff ff ff 8b 8d 50 ff ff ff 8b 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b bd 70 ff ff ff 31 d2 2b 4f 74 <f7> f1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 01 d5 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03 [ 343.241883] RSP: 0018:ffff88800bcd7368 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 343.242589] RAX: 00000000ba7c0a9c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 343.243542] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88800f8edb10 RDI: ffff88800f8eda40 [ 343.244474] RBP: ffff88800bcd7458 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff94fb8445 [ 343.245403] R10: ffffffff94fb8336 R11: ffffffff94fb8445 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 343.246355] R13: ffff88800a5a7000 R14: ffff88800a5b5800 R15: 0000000000000020 [ 343.247291] FS: 00007fdde2bd7700(0000) GS:ffff888109780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 343.248350] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 343.249120] CR2: 00000000200000c0 CR3: 000000000ef4c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 343.250076] Call Trace: [ 343.250423] <TASK> [ 343.250713] ? memcpy+0x4d/0x60 [ 343.251162] ? netem_init+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_netem] [ 343.251795] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60 [ 343.252443] netem_enqueue+0xe28/0x33c0 [sch_netem] [ 343.253102] ? stack_trace_save+0x87/0xb0 [ 343.253655] ? filter_irq_stacks+0xb0/0xb0 [ 343.254220] ? netem_init+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_netem] [ 343.254837] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 343.255418] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xd6 [ 343.255953] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x50/0x180 [ 343.256508] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1a7e/0x3090 [ 343.257083] ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x300/0x300 [ 343.257690] ? check_kcov_mode+0x10/0x40 [ 343.258219] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x29/0x40 [ 343.258899] ? __kasan_init_slab_obj+0x24/0x30 [ 343.259529] ? setup_object.isra.71+0x23/0x90 [ 343.260121] ? new_slab+0x26e/0x4b0 [ 343.260609] ? kasan_poison+0x3a/0x50 [ 343.261118] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x50 [ 343.261637] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x71/0x90 [ 343.262214] ? memcpy+0x4d/0x60 [ 343.262674] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90 [ 343.263209] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 343.263802] ? __skb_clone+0x5d6/0x840 [ 343.264329] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60 [ 343.264958] dev_queue_xmit+0x1c/0x20 [ 343.265470] netlink_deliver_tap+0x652/0x9c0 [ 343.266067] netlink_unicast+0x5a0/0x7f0 [ 343.266608] ? netlink_attachskb+0x860/0x860 [ 343.267183] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60 [ 343.267820] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90 [ 343.268367] netlink_sendmsg+0x922/0xe80 [ 343.268899] ? netlink_unicast+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 343.269472] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x21/0x60 [ 343.270099] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90 [ 343.270644] ? netlink_unicast+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 343.271210] sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190 [ 343.271721] ____sys_sendmsg+0x75f/0x8f0 [ 343.272262] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x60/0x60 [ 343.272788] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90 [ 343.273332] ? write_comp_data+0x2f/0x90 [ 343.273869] ___sys_sendmsg+0x10f/0x190 [ 343.274405] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x80/0x80 [ 343.274984] ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x70/0x230 [ 343.275597] ? futex_wait_setup+0x240/0x240 [ 343.276175] ? security_file_alloc+0x3e/0x170 [ 343.276779] ? write_comp_d ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PM: EM: Fix potential division-by-zero error in em_compute_costs() When the device is of a non-CPU type, table[i].performance won't be initialized in the previous em_init_performance(), resulting in division by zero when calculating costs in em_compute_costs(). Since the 'cost' algorithm is only used for EAS energy efficiency calculations and is currently not utilized by other device drivers, we should add the _is_cpu_device(dev) check to prevent this division-by-zero issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp: Fix divide-by-zero regression on DP MST unplug with nouveau Fix a regression when using nouveau and unplugging a StarTech MSTDP122DP DisplayPort 1.2 MST hub (the same regression does not appear when using a Cable Matters DisplayPort 1.4 MST hub). Trace: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 2962 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #744 Hardware name: Razer Blade/DANA_MB, BIOS 01.01 08/31/2018 RIP: 0010:drm_dp_bw_overhead+0xb4/0x110 [drm_display_helper] Code: c6 b8 01 00 00 00 75 61 01 c6 41 0f af f3 41 0f af f1 c1 e1 04 48 63 c7 31 d2 89 ff 48 8b 5d f8 c9 48 0f af f1 48 8d 44 06 ff <48> f7 f7 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 45 31 d2 45 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb2c5c211fa30 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffffffffffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000f59b00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb2c5c211fa48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000023b4a R13: ffff91d37d165800 R14: ffff91d36fac6d80 R15: ffff91d34a764010 FS: 00007f4a1ca3fa80(0000) GS:ffff91d6edbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559491d49000 CR3: 000000011d180002 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? die+0x37/0xa0 ? do_trap+0xd4/0xf0 ? do_error_trap+0x71/0xb0 ? drm_dp_bw_overhead+0xb4/0x110 [drm_display_helper] ? exc_divide_error+0x3a/0x70 ? drm_dp_bw_overhead+0xb4/0x110 [drm_display_helper] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1b/0x20 ? drm_dp_bw_overhead+0xb4/0x110 [drm_display_helper] ? drm_dp_calc_pbn_mode+0x2e/0x70 [drm_display_helper] nv50_msto_atomic_check+0xda/0x120 [nouveau] drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset+0xa87/0xdf0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_check+0x19/0xa0 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_disp_atomic_check+0x13f/0x2f0 [nouveau] drm_atomic_check_only+0x668/0xb20 [drm] ? drm_connector_list_iter_next+0x86/0xc0 [drm] drm_atomic_commit+0x58/0xd0 [drm] ? __pfx___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 [drm] drm_atomic_connector_commit_dpms+0xd7/0x100 [drm] drm_mode_obj_set_property_ioctl+0x1c5/0x450 [drm] ? __pfx_drm_connector_property_set_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] drm_connector_property_set_ioctl+0x3b/0x60 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb9/0x120 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2d0/0x550 [drm] ? __pfx_drm_connector_property_set_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x61/0xc0 [nouveau] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x76/0x140 ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x140 ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7f4a1cd1a94f Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffd2f1df520 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2f1df5b0 RCX: 00007f4a1cd1a94f RDX: 00007ffd2f1df5b0 RSI: 00000000c01064ab RDI: 000000000000000f RBP: 00000000c01064ab R08: 000056347932deb8 R09: 000056347a7d99c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000056347938a220 R13: 000000000000000f R14: 0000563479d9f3f0 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: rfcomm xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc ccm cmac algif_hash overlay algif_skcipher af_alg bnep binfmt_misc snd_sof_pci_intel_cnl snd_sof_intel_hda_common snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_sof_pci snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_sof_utils snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_core snd_compress snd_sof_intel_hda_mlink snd_hda_ext_core iwlmvm intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm snd_hda_ ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid dividing by 0 in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() when block bitmap corrupt Determine if bb_fragments is 0 instead of determining bb_free to eliminate the risk of dividing by zero when the block bitmap is corrupted.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: savage: Error out if pixclock equals zero The userspace program could pass any values to the driver through ioctl() interface. If the driver doesn't check the value of pixclock, it may cause divide-by-zero error. Although pixclock is checked in savagefb_decode_var(), but it is not checked properly in savagefb_probe(). Fix this by checking whether pixclock is zero in the function savagefb_check_var() before info->var.pixclock is used as the divisor. This is similar to CVE-2022-3061 in i740fb which was fixed by commit 15cf0b8.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: sis: Error out if pixclock equals zero The userspace program could pass any values to the driver through ioctl() interface. If the driver doesn't check the value of pixclock, it may cause divide-by-zero error. In sisfb_check_var(), var->pixclock is used as a divisor to caculate drate before it is checked against zero. Fix this by checking it at the beginning. This is similar to CVE-2022-3061 in i740fb which was fixed by commit 15cf0b8.

Found Linux Kernel flaw in the i740 driver. The Userspace program could pass any values to the driver through ioctl() interface. The driver doesn't check the value of 'pixclock', so it may cause a divide by zero error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: objtool, media: dib8000: Prevent divide-by-zero in dib8000_set_dds() If dib8000_set_dds()'s call to dib8000_read32() returns zero, the result is a divide-by-zero. Prevent that from happening. Fixes the following warning with an UBSAN kernel: drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib8000.o: warning: objtool: dib8000_tune() falls through to next function dib8096p_cfg_DibRx()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/lru_sort: avoid divide-by-zero in damon_lru_sort_apply_parameters() Patch series "mm/damon: avoid divide-by-zero in DAMON module's parameters application". DAMON's RECLAIM and LRU_SORT modules perform no validation on user-configured parameters during application, which may lead to division-by-zero errors. Avoid the divide-by-zero by adding validation checks when DAMON modules attempt to apply the parameters. This patch (of 2): During the calculation of 'hot_thres' and 'cold_thres', either 'sample_interval' or 'aggr_interval' is used as the divisor, which may lead to division-by-zero errors. Fix it by directly returning -EINVAL when such a case occurs. Additionally, since 'aggr_interval' is already required to be set no smaller than 'sample_interval' in damon_set_attrs(), only the case where 'sample_interval' is zero needs to be checked.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: sunxi-ng: mp: Fix dual-divider clock rate readback When dual-divider clock support was introduced, the P divider offset was left out of the .recalc_rate readback function. This causes the clock rate to become bogus or even zero (possibly due to the P divider being 1, leading to a divide-by-zero). Fix this by incorporating the P divider offset into the calculation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hibmcge: fix the division by zero issue When the network port is down, the queue is released, and ring->len is 0. In debugfs, hbg_get_queue_used_num() will be called, which may lead to a division by zero issue. This patch adds a check, if ring->len is 0, hbg_get_queue_used_num() directly returns 0.

An issue was discovered in drivers/mtd/ubi/cdev.c in the Linux kernel 6.2. There is a divide-by-zero error in do_div(sz,mtd->erasesize), used indirectly by ctrl_cdev_ioctl, when mtd->erasesize is 0.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: move tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to asynchronous work A state check was previously added to tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to prevent a deadlock where the DisplayPort Alt Mode driver would be executing work and attempting to grab the tcpm_lock while the TCPM was holding the lock and attempting to unregister the altmode, blocking on the altmode driver's cancel_work_sync call. Because the state check isn't protected, there is a small window where the Alt Mode driver could determine that the TCPM is in a ready state and attempt to grab the lock while the TCPM grabs the lock and changes the TCPM state to one that causes the deadlock. The callstack is provided below: [110121.667392][ C7] Call trace: [110121.667396][ C7] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [110121.667406][ C7] __schedule+0x608/0x9f0 [110121.667414][ C7] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [110121.667423][ C7] kernfs_drain+0xb0/0x114 [110121.667431][ C7] __kernfs_remove+0x16c/0x20c [110121.667436][ C7] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x74/0xe8 [110121.667442][ C7] sysfs_remove_group+0x84/0xe8 [110121.667450][ C7] sysfs_remove_groups+0x34/0x58 [110121.667458][ C7] device_remove_groups+0x10/0x20 [110121.667464][ C7] device_release_driver_internal+0x164/0x2e4 [110121.667475][ C7] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 [110121.667484][ C7] bus_remove_device+0xec/0x118 [110121.667491][ C7] device_del+0x1e8/0x4ac [110121.667498][ C7] device_unregister+0x18/0x38 [110121.667504][ C7] typec_unregister_altmode+0x30/0x44 [110121.667515][ C7] tcpm_reset_port+0xac/0x370 [110121.667523][ C7] tcpm_snk_detach+0x84/0xb8 [110121.667529][ C7] run_state_machine+0x4c0/0x1b68 [110121.667536][ C7] tcpm_state_machine_work+0x94/0xe4 [110121.667544][ C7] kthread_worker_fn+0x10c/0x244 [110121.667552][ C7] kthread+0x104/0x1d4 [110121.667557][ C7] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [110121.667689][ C7] Workqueue: events dp_altmode_work [110121.667697][ C7] Call trace: [110121.667701][ C7] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [110121.667710][ C7] __schedule+0x608/0x9f0 [110121.667717][ C7] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [110121.667725][ C7] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x24/0x40 [110121.667733][ C7] __mutex_lock+0x408/0xdac [110121.667741][ C7] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x14/0x24 [110121.667748][ C7] mutex_lock+0x40/0xec [110121.667757][ C7] tcpm_altmode_enter+0x78/0xb4 [110121.667764][ C7] typec_altmode_enter+0xdc/0x10c [110121.667769][ C7] dp_altmode_work+0x68/0x164 [110121.667775][ C7] process_one_work+0x1e4/0x43c [110121.667783][ C7] worker_thread+0x25c/0x430 [110121.667789][ C7] kthread+0x104/0x1d4 [110121.667794][ C7] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Change tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to queue for tcpm_queue_vdm_work, which can perform the state check while holding the TCPM lock while the Alt Mode lock is no longer held. This requires a new struct to hold the vdm data, altmode_vdm_event.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: Avoid memory leak while enabling statistics Driver uses monitor destination rings for extended statistics mode and standalone monitor mode. In extended statistics mode, TLVs are parsed from the buffer received from the monitor destination ring and assigned to the ppdu_info structure to update per-packet statistics. In standalone monitor mode, along with per-packet statistics, the packet data (payload) is captured, and the driver updates per MSDU to mac80211. When the AP interface is enabled, only extended statistics mode is activated. As part of enabling monitor rings for collecting statistics, the driver subscribes to HAL_RX_MPDU_START TLV in the filter configuration. This TLV is received from the monitor destination ring, and kzalloc for the mon_mpdu object occurs, which is not freed, leading to a memory leak. The kzalloc for the mon_mpdu object is only required while enabling the standalone monitor interface. This causes a memory leak while enabling extended statistics mode in the driver. Fix this memory leak by removing the kzalloc for the mon_mpdu object in the HAL_RX_MPDU_START TLV handling. Additionally, remove the standalone monitor mode handlings in the HAL_MON_BUF_ADDR and HAL_RX_MSDU_END TLVs. These TLV tags will be handled properly when enabling standalone monitor mode in the future. Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Balance device refcount when destroying devices Using device_find_child() to lookup the proper SCMI device to destroy causes an unbalance in device refcount, since device_find_child() calls an implicit get_device(): this, in turns, inhibits the call of the provided release methods upon devices destruction. As a consequence, one of the structures that is not freed properly upon destruction is the internal struct device_private dev->p populated by the drivers subsystem core. KMemleak detects this situation since loading/unloding some SCMI driver causes related devices to be created/destroyed without calling any device_release method. unreferenced object 0xffff00000f583800 (size 512): comm "insmod", pid 227, jiffies 4294912190 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N.......... ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 60 36 1d 8a 00 80 ff ff ........`6...... backtrace (crc 114e2eed): kmemleak_alloc+0xbc/0xd8 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2dc/0x398 device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_register+0x28/0x40 __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x1bc/0x380 scmi_device_create+0x2d0/0x390 scmi_create_protocol_devices+0x74/0xf8 scmi_device_request_notifier+0x1f8/0x2a8 notifier_call_chain+0x110/0x3b0 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xb0 scmi_driver_register+0x350/0x7f0 0xffff80000a3b3038 do_one_initcall+0x12c/0x730 do_init_module+0x1dc/0x640 load_module+0x4b20/0x5b70 init_module_from_file+0xec/0x158 $ ./scripts/faddr2line ./vmlinux device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_add+0x954/0x12d0: kmalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:901 (inlined by) kzalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:1037 (inlined by) device_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3510 (inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3561 Balance device refcount by issuing a put_device() on devices found via device_find_child().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Fix invalid pointer dereference in Etron workaround This check is performed before prepare_transfer() and prepare_ring(), so enqueue can already point at the final link TRB of a segment. And indeed it will, some 0.4% of times this code is called. Then enqueue + 1 is an invalid pointer. It will crash the kernel right away or load some junk which may look like a link TRB and cause the real link TRB to be replaced with a NOOP. This wouldn't end well. Use a functionally equivalent test which doesn't dereference the pointer and always gives correct result. Something has crashed my machine twice in recent days while playing with an Etron HC, and a control transfer stress test ran for confirmation has just crashed it again. The same test passes with this patch applied.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-bufio: fix sched in atomic context If "try_verify_in_tasklet" is set for dm-verity, DM_BUFIO_CLIENT_NO_SLEEP is enabled for dm-bufio. However, when bufio tries to evict buffers, there is a chance to trigger scheduling in spin_lock_bh, the following warning is hit: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2745 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 123, name: kworker/2:2 preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/2:2/123: #0: ffff88800a2d1548 ((wq_completion)dm_bufio_cache){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xe46/0x1970 #1: ffffc90000d97d20 ((work_completion)(&dm_bufio_replacement_work)){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x763/0x1970 #2: ffffffff8555b528 (dm_bufio_clients_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x1ce/0x710 #3: ffff88801d5820b8 (&c->spinlock){....}-{2:2}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x2a5/0x710 Preemption disabled at: [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 123 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-g90548c634bd0 #305 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache do_global_cleanup Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 __might_resched+0x360/0x4e0 do_global_cleanup+0x2f5/0x710 process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970 worker_thread+0x518/0xea0 kthread+0x359/0x690 ret_from_fork+0xf3/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> That can be reproduced by: veritysetup format --data-block-size=4096 --hash-block-size=4096 /dev/vda /dev/vdb SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz /dev/vda) dmsetup create myverity -r --table "0 $SIZE verity 1 /dev/vda /dev/vdb 4096 4096 <data_blocks> 1 sha256 <root_hash> <salt> 1 try_verify_in_tasklet" mount /dev/dm-0 /mnt -o ro echo 102400 > /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes [read files in /mnt]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPICA: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks ACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5 I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of South Korea. I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early abort cases. Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows: [ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10 [ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.361873] Call Trace: [ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and “Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same slab cache size. I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-parse_ext” cache were leaked using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function. Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows: [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.372000] Call Trace: [ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b [ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.392000] Call Trace: [ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x3 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery Why: The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this caused system hang. [ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume [ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled. [ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000 [ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset! [ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming... [ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset [ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!! [ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet... [ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter [ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations [ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered [ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!! ... [ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu [ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023 [ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu] [ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00 [ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0 [ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010 [ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08 [ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0 [ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554 [ 560.846480] Call Trace: [ 560.849225] <TASK> [ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29 [ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60 [ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410 [ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 [ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0 How: In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix WARN_ON in iommu probe path Commit 1a75cc710b95 ("iommu/vt-d: Use rbtree to track iommu probed devices") adds all devices probed by the iommu driver in a rbtree indexed by the source ID of each device. It assumes that each device has a unique source ID. This assumption is incorrect and the VT-d spec doesn't state this requirement either. The reason for using a rbtree to track devices is to look up the device with PCI bus and devfunc in the paths of handling ATS invalidation time out error and the PRI I/O page faults. Both are PCI ATS feature related. Only track the devices that have PCI ATS capabilities in the rbtree to avoid unnecessary WARN_ON in the iommu probe path. Otherwise, on some platforms below kernel splat will be displayed and the iommu probe results in failure. WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 166 at drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c:158 intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7e/0x180 ? intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90 ? debug_mutex_init+0x37/0x50 __iommu_probe_device+0xf2/0x4f0 iommu_probe_device+0x22/0x70 iommu_bus_notifier+0x1e/0x40 notifier_call_chain+0x46/0x150 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x42/0x60 bus_notify+0x2f/0x50 device_add+0x5ed/0x7e0 platform_device_add+0xf5/0x240 mfd_add_devices+0x3f9/0x500 ? preempt_count_add+0x4c/0xa0 ? up_write+0xa2/0x1b0 ? __debugfs_create_file+0xe3/0x150 intel_lpss_probe+0x49f/0x5b0 ? pci_conf1_write+0xa3/0xf0 intel_lpss_pci_probe+0xcf/0x110 [intel_lpss_pci] pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 really_probe+0xd9/0x370 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x73/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x19/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xb6/0x180 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_dev+0x77/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0x114/0x210 driver_register+0x5b/0x110 ? __pfx_intel_lpss_pci_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_lpss_pci] do_one_initcall+0x57/0x2b0 ? kmalloc_trace+0x21e/0x280 ? do_init_module+0x1e/0x210 do_init_module+0x5f/0x210 load_module+0x1d37/0x1fc0 ? init_module_from_file+0x86/0xd0 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xd0 idempotent_init_module+0x17c/0x230 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x56/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Convert spinlock to mutex to lock evl workqueue drain_workqueue() cannot be called safely in a spinlocked context due to possible task rescheduling. In the multi-task scenario, calling queue_work() while drain_workqueue() will lead to a Call Trace as pushing a work on a draining workqueue is not permitted in spinlocked context. Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7d/0x140 ? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440 queue_work_on+0x28/0x30 idxd_misc_thread+0x303/0x5a0 [idxd] ? __schedule+0x369/0xb40 ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 ? irq_thread+0xbc/0x1b0 irq_thread_fn+0x21/0x70 irq_thread+0x102/0x1b0 ? preempt_count_add+0x74/0xa0 ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x103/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> The current implementation uses a spinlock to protect event log workqueue and will lead to the Call Trace due to potential task rescheduling. To address the locking issue, convert the spinlock to mutex, allowing the drain_workqueue() to be called in a safe mutex-locked context. This change ensures proper synchronization when accessing the event log workqueue, preventing potential Call Trace and improving the overall robustness of the code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: Fix use of uninitialized data in insn_rw_emulate_bits() For Comedi `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE` instructions on "digital" subdevices (subdevice types `COMEDI_SUBD_DI`, `COMEDI_SUBD_DO`, and `COMEDI_SUBD_DIO`), it is common for the subdevice driver not to have `insn_read` and `insn_write` handler functions, but to have an `insn_bits` handler function for handling Comedi `INSN_BITS` instructions. In that case, the subdevice's `insn_read` and/or `insn_write` function handler pointers are set to point to the `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` function by `__comedi_device_postconfig()`. For `INSN_WRITE`, `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` currently assumes that the supplied `data[0]` value is a valid copy from user memory. It will at least exist because `do_insnlist_ioctl()` and `do_insn_ioctl()` in "comedi_fops.c" ensure at lease `MIN_SAMPLES` (16) elements are allocated. However, if `insn->n` is 0 (which is allowable for `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE` instructions, then `data[0]` may contain uninitialized data, and certainly contains invalid data, possibly from a different instruction in the array of instructions handled by `do_insnlist_ioctl()`. This will result in an incorrect value being written to the digital output channel (or to the digital input/output channel if configured as an output), and may be reflected in the internal saved state of the channel. Fix it by returning 0 early if `insn->n` is 0, before reaching the code that accesses `data[0]`. Previously, the function always returned 1 on success, but it is supposed to be the number of data samples actually read or written up to `insn->n`, which is 0 in this case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: padata: do not leak refcount in reorder_work A recent patch that addressed a UAF introduced a reference count leak: the parallel_data refcount is incremented unconditionally, regardless of the return value of queue_work(). If the work item is already queued, the incremented refcount is never decremented. Fix this by checking the return value of queue_work() and decrementing the refcount when necessary. Resolves: Unreferenced object 0xffff9d9f421e3d80 (size 192): comm "cryptomgr_probe", pid 157, jiffies 4294694003 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 80 8b cf 41 9f 9d ff ff b8 97 e0 89 ff ff ff ff ...A............ d0 97 e0 89 ff ff ff ff 19 00 00 00 1f 88 23 00 ..............#. backtrace (crc 838fb36): __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x284/0x320 padata_alloc_pd+0x20/0x1e0 padata_alloc_shell+0x3b/0xa0 0xffffffffc040a54d cryptomgr_probe+0x43/0xc0 kthread+0xf6/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: ncm: Fix handling of zero block length packets While connecting to a Linux host with CDC_NCM_NTB_DEF_SIZE_TX set to 65536, it has been observed that we receive short packets, which come at interval of 5-10 seconds sometimes and have block length zero but still contain 1-2 valid datagrams present. According to the NCM spec: "If wBlockLength = 0x0000, the block is terminated by a short packet. In this case, the USB transfer must still be shorter than dwNtbInMaxSize or dwNtbOutMaxSize. If exactly dwNtbInMaxSize or dwNtbOutMaxSize bytes are sent, and the size is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize for the given pipe, then no ZLP shall be sent. wBlockLength= 0x0000 must be used with extreme care, because of the possibility that the host and device may get out of sync, and because of test issues. wBlockLength = 0x0000 allows the sender to reduce latency by starting to send a very large NTB, and then shortening it when the sender discovers that there’s not sufficient data to justify sending a large NTB" However, there is a potential issue with the current implementation, as it checks for the occurrence of multiple NTBs in a single giveback by verifying if the leftover bytes to be processed is zero or not. If the block length reads zero, we would process the same NTB infintely because the leftover bytes is never zero and it leads to a crash. Fix this by bailing out if block length reads zero.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Fix deadlock in ivpu_ms_cleanup() Fix deadlock in ivpu_ms_cleanup() by preventing runtime resume after file_priv->ms_lock is acquired. During a failure in runtime resume, a cold boot is executed, which calls ivpu_ms_cleanup_all(). This function calls ivpu_ms_cleanup() that acquires file_priv->ms_lock and causes the deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: irqchip/qcom-mpm: Prevent crash when trying to handle non-wake GPIOs On Qualcomm chipsets not all GPIOs are wakeup capable. Those GPIOs do not have a corresponding MPM pin and should not be handled inside the MPM driver. The IRQ domain hierarchy is always applied, so it's required to explicitly disconnect the hierarchy for those. The pinctrl-msm driver marks these with GPIO_NO_WAKE_IRQ. qcom-pdc has a check for this, but irq-qcom-mpm is currently missing the check. This is causing crashes when setting up interrupts for non-wake GPIOs: root@rb1:~# gpiomon -c gpiochip1 10 irq: IRQ159: trimming hierarchy from :soc@0:interrupt-controller@f200000-1 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000a1dc3820 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB1 (DT) pc : mpm_set_type+0x80/0xcc lr : mpm_set_type+0x5c/0xcc Call trace: mpm_set_type+0x80/0xcc (P) qcom_mpm_set_type+0x64/0x158 irq_chip_set_type_parent+0x20/0x38 msm_gpio_irq_set_type+0x50/0x530 __irq_set_trigger+0x60/0x184 __setup_irq+0x304/0x6bc request_threaded_irq+0xc8/0x19c edge_detector_setup+0x260/0x364 linereq_create+0x420/0x5a8 gpio_ioctl+0x2d4/0x6c0 Fix this by copying the check for GPIO_NO_WAKE_IRQ from qcom-pdc.c, so that MPM is removed entirely from the hierarchy for non-wake GPIOs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: ensure the allocated report buffer can contain the reserved report ID When the report ID is not used, the low level transport drivers expect the first byte to be 0. However, currently the allocated buffer not account for that extra byte, meaning that instead of having 8 guaranteed bytes for implement to be working, we only have 7.