In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Always stop health timer during driver removal Currently, if teardown_hca fails to execute during driver removal, mlx5 does not stop the health timer. Afterwards, mlx5 continue with driver teardown. This may lead to a UAF bug, which results in page fault Oops[1], since the health timer invokes after resources were freed. Hence, stop the health monitor even if teardown_hca fails. [1] mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: cleanup mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: wait_func:1155:(pid 1967079): TEARDOWN_HCA(0x103) timeout. Will cause a leak of a command resource mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: mlx5_function_close:1288:(pid 1967079): tear_down_hca failed, skip cleanup BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa26487064230 PGD 100c00067 P4D 100c00067 PUD 100e5a067 PMD 105ed7067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.7.0-68.fc38.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 RIP: 0010:ioread32be+0x34/0x60 RSP: 0018:ffffa26480003e58 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: ffffa26487064200 RBX: ffff9042d08161a0 RCX: ffff904c108222c0 RDX: 000000010bbf1b80 RSI: ffffffffc055ddb0 RDI: ffffa26487064230 RBP: ffff9042d08161a0 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: ffff904c108222e8 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000441 R12: ffffffffc055ddb0 R13: ffffa26487064200 R14: ffffa26480003f00 R15: ffff904c108222c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff904c10800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa26487064230 CR3: 00000002c4420006 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x175/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] ? ioread32be+0x34/0x60 mlx5_health_check_fatal_sensors+0x20/0x100 [mlx5_core] ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] poll_health+0x42/0x230 [mlx5_core] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0xbc/0x110 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] call_timer_fn+0x21/0x130 ? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core] __run_timers+0x222/0x2c0 run_timer_softirq+0x1d/0x40 __do_softirq+0xc9/0x2c8 __irq_exit_rcu+0xa6/0xc0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xcc/0x440 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xbd/0x440 cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40 do_idle+0x20d/0x270 cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30 rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30 start_kernel+0x709/0xa90 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x96/0xa0 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails It is possible to trigger a use-after-free by: * attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the bpf_get_socket_cookie() helper * running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM A KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299 CPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1)) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488) ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603) ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189) __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) bpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092) bpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e bpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf __sock_release (net/socket.c:652) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1601) ... Allocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338) kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007) sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075) sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572) __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706) __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Freed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582) poison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572) __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706) __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Fix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover all protocol families create functions, which may already attached the reference to the sk object with sock_init_data().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net Syzkaller hit a warning: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0 Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1 RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4 R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040 FS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0 ? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0 ? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110 ? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140 ? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0 get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0 ? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10 open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130 __tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30 ? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10 tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160 x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7 Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0 R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730 R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... This is trigger as below: ns0 ns1 tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0 tun->dev = dev //ip link set tun0 netns ns1 put_net() //ref is 0 __tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS net = dev_net(tun->dev); open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1 get_net_ns() get_net() //addition on 0 Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix potential UAF in nfsd4_cb_getattr_release Once we drop the delegation reference, the fields embedded in it are no longer safe to access. Do that last.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: prevent UAF around preempt fence The fence lock is part of the queue, therefore in the current design anything locking the fence should then also hold a ref to the queue to prevent the queue from being freed. However, currently it looks like we signal the fence and then drop the queue ref, but if something is waiting on the fence, the waiter is kicked to wake up at some later point, where upon waking up it first grabs the lock before checking the fence state. But if we have already dropped the queue ref, then the lock might already be freed as part of the queue, leading to uaf. To prevent this, move the fence lock into the fence itself so we don't run into lifetime issues. Alternative might be to have device level lock, or only release the queue in the fence release callback, however that might require pushing to another worker to avoid locking issues. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2454 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2342 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2020 (cherry picked from commit 7116c35aacedc38be6d15bd21b2fc936eed0008b)

There is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux Kernel which can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. To reach the vulnerability kernel configuration flag CONFIG_TLS or CONFIG_XFRM_ESPINTCP has to be configured, but the operation does not require any privilege. There is a use-after-free bug of icsk_ulp_data of a struct inet_connection_sock. When CONFIG_TLS is enabled, user can install a tls context (struct tls_context) on a connected tcp socket. The context is not cleared if this socket is disconnected and reused as a listener. If a new socket is created from the listener, the context is inherited and vulnerable. The setsockopt TCP_ULP operation does not require any privilege. We recommend upgrading past commit 2c02d41d71f90a5168391b6a5f2954112ba2307c

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, test_run: Fix alignment problem in bpf_prog_test_run_skb() We got a syzkaller problem because of aarch64 alignment fault if KFENCE enabled. When the size from user bpf program is an odd number, like 399, 407, etc, it will cause the struct skb_shared_info's unaligned access. As seen below: BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in __skb_clone+0x23c/0x2a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1032 Use-after-free read at 0xffff6254fffac077 (in kfence-#213): __lse_atomic_add arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic_lse.h:26 [inline] arch_atomic_add arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic.h:28 [inline] arch_atomic_inc include/linux/atomic-arch-fallback.h:270 [inline] atomic_inc include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:241 [inline] __skb_clone+0x23c/0x2a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1032 skb_clone+0xf4/0x214 net/core/skbuff.c:1481 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2433 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x78/0x1c0 net/core/filter.c:2420 bpf_prog_d3839dd9068ceb51+0x80/0x330 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:728 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x3c0/0x6c0 net/bpf/test_run.c:53 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x638/0xa7c net/bpf/test_run.c:594 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3148 [inline] __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4441 [inline] __se_sys_bpf+0xad0/0x1634 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4381 kfence-#213: 0xffff6254fffac000-0xffff6254fffac196, size=407, cache=kmalloc-512 allocated by task 15074 on cpu 0 at 1342.585390s: kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:568 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:675 [inline] bpf_test_init.isra.0+0xac/0x290 net/bpf/test_run.c:191 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x11c/0xa7c net/bpf/test_run.c:512 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3148 [inline] __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4441 [inline] __se_sys_bpf+0xad0/0x1634 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4381 __arm64_sys_bpf+0x50/0x60 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4381 To fix the problem, we adjust @size so that (@size + @hearoom) is a multiple of SMP_CACHE_BYTES. So we make sure the struct skb_shared_info is aligned to a cache line.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igb: fix a use-after-free issue in igb_clean_tx_ring Fix the following use-after-free bug in igb_clean_tx_ring routine when the NIC is running in XDP mode. The issue can be triggered redirecting traffic into the igb NIC and then closing the device while the traffic is flowing. [ 73.322719] CPU: 1 PID: 487 Comm: xdp_redirect Not tainted 5.18.3-apu2 #9 [ 73.330639] Hardware name: PC Engines APU2/APU2, BIOS 4.0.7 02/28/2017 [ 73.337434] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa7/0xf0 [ 73.362283] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000081f798 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 73.367761] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000420f80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 73.375200] RDX: ffff88811ad22d00 RSI: ffff88811ad171e0 RDI: ffff88811ad171e0 [ 73.382590] RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: ffffffff82298f28 R09: 0000000000000058 [ 73.390008] R10: 0000000000000219 R11: ffffffff82280f40 R12: 0000000000000090 [ 73.397356] R13: ffff888102343a40 R14: ffff88810359e0e4 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 73.404806] FS: 00007ff38d31d740(0000) GS:ffff88811ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 73.413129] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 73.419096] CR2: 000055cff35f13f8 CR3: 0000000106391000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 73.426565] Call Trace: [ 73.429087] <TASK> [ 73.431314] igb_clean_tx_ring+0x43/0x140 [igb] [ 73.436002] igb_down+0x1d7/0x220 [igb] [ 73.439974] __igb_close+0x3c/0x120 [igb] [ 73.444118] igb_xdp+0x10c/0x150 [igb] [ 73.447983] ? igb_pci_sriov_configure+0x70/0x70 [igb] [ 73.453362] dev_xdp_install+0xda/0x110 [ 73.457371] dev_xdp_attach+0x1da/0x550 [ 73.461369] do_setlink+0xfd0/0x10f0 [ 73.465166] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x89/0xc70 [ 73.469714] rtnl_setlink+0x11a/0x1e0 [ 73.473547] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3d0 [ 73.477709] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130 [ 73.482258] netlink_rcv_skb+0x8d/0x110 [ 73.486229] netlink_unicast+0x230/0x340 [ 73.490317] netlink_sendmsg+0x215/0x470 [ 73.494395] __sys_sendto+0x179/0x190 [ 73.498268] ? move_addr_to_user+0x37/0x70 [ 73.502547] ? __sys_getsockname+0x84/0xe0 [ 73.506853] ? netlink_setsockopt+0x1c1/0x4a0 [ 73.511349] ? __sys_setsockopt+0xc8/0x1d0 [ 73.515636] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [ 73.519603] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 [ 73.523399] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 73.528712] RIP: 0033:0x7ff38d41f20c [ 73.551866] RSP: 002b:00007fff3b945a68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 73.559640] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff38d41f20c [ 73.567066] RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 00007fff3b945b30 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 73.574457] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 73.581852] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3b945ab0 [ 73.589179] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fff3b945b30 [ 73.596545] </TASK> [ 73.598842] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: avoid to reuse `hctx` not removed from cpuhp callback list If the 'hctx' isn't removed from cpuhp callback list, we can't reuse it, otherwise use-after-free may be triggered.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix use-after-free Read in tipc_named_reinit syzbot found the following issue on: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0 net/tipc/name_distr.c:413 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88805299a000 by task kworker/1:9/23764 CPU: 1 PID: 23764 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc4-syzkaller-00878-g17d49e6e8012 #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xeb/0x495 mm/kasan/report.c:313 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:429 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0xf4/0x1c6 mm/kasan/report.c:491 tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0 net/tipc/name_distr.c:413 tipc_net_finalize+0x234/0x3d0 net/tipc/net.c:138 process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298 </TASK> [...] ================================================================== In the commit d966ddcc3821 ("tipc: fix a deadlock when flushing scheduled work"), the cancel_work_sync() function just to make sure ONLY the work tipc_net_finalize_work() is executing/pending on any CPU completed before tipc namespace is destroyed through tipc_exit_net(). But this function is not guaranteed the work is the last queued. So, the destroyed instance may be accessed in the work which will try to enqueue later. In order to completely fix, we re-order the calling of cancel_work_sync() to make sure the work tipc_net_finalize_work() was last queued and it must be completed by calling cancel_work_sync().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: always report error in run_one_delayed_ref() Currently we have a btrfs_debug() for run_one_delayed_ref() failure, but if end users hit such problem, there will be no chance that btrfs_debug() is enabled. This can lead to very little useful info for debugging. This patch will: - Add extra info for error reporting Including: * logical bytenr * num_bytes * type * action * ref_mod - Replace the btrfs_debug() with btrfs_err() - Move the error reporting into run_one_delayed_ref() This is to avoid use-after-free, the @node can be freed in the caller. This error should only be triggered at most once. As if run_one_delayed_ref() failed, we trigger the error message, then causing the call chain to error out: btrfs_run_delayed_refs() `- btrfs_run_delayed_refs() `- btrfs_run_delayed_refs_for_head() `- run_one_delayed_ref() And we will abort the current transaction in btrfs_run_delayed_refs(). If we have to run delayed refs for the abort transaction, run_one_delayed_ref() will just cleanup the refs and do nothing, thus no new error messages would be output.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: fix memory leaks and crashes while performing a soft reset The second tagged commit introduced a UAF, as it removed restoring q_vector->vport pointers after reinitializating the structures. This is due to that all queue allocation functions are performed here with the new temporary vport structure and those functions rewrite the backpointers to the vport. Then, this new struct is freed and the pointers start leading to nowhere. But generally speaking, the current logic is very fragile. It claims to be more reliable when the system is low on memory, but in fact, it consumes two times more memory as at the moment of running this function, there are two vports allocated with their queues and vectors. Moreover, it claims to prevent the driver from running into "bad state", but in fact, any error during the rebuild leaves the old vport in the partially allocated state. Finally, if the interface is down when the function is called, it always allocates a new queue set, but when the user decides to enable the interface later on, vport_open() allocates them once again, IOW there's a clear memory leak here. Just don't allocate a new queue set when performing a reset, that solves crashes and memory leaks. Readd the old queue number and reopen the interface on rollback - that solves limbo states when the device is left disabled and/or without HW queues enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd() We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore command: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888109164a80 by task ondemand-04-dae/4962 CPU: 11 PID: 4962 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-dirty #542 Call Trace: kasan_report+0x94/0xc0 cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0 vfs_read+0x169/0xb50 ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0 Allocated by task 626: __kmalloc+0x1df/0x4b0 cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x24d/0x690 cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30 cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140 cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60 cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230 [...] Freed by task 626: kfree+0xf1/0x2c0 cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x568/0x690 cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30 cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140 cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60 cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230 [...] ================================================================== Following is the process that triggers the issue: mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2 ------------------------------------------------------------ cachefiles_ondemand_init_object cachefiles_ondemand_send_req REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len) wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done) cachefiles_daemon_read cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n) process_open_req(REQ_A) ------ restore ------ cachefiles_ondemand_restore xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX) xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW); cachefiles_daemon_read cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req write(devfd, ("copen %u,%llu", msg->msg_id, size)); cachefiles_ondemand_copen xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id) complete(&REQ_A->done) kfree(REQ_A) cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd(REQ_A) fd = get_unused_fd_flags file = anon_inode_getfile fd_install(fd, file) load = (void *)REQ_A->msg.data; load->fd = fd; // load UAF !!! This issue is caused by issuing a restore command when the daemon is still alive, which results in a request being processed multiple times thus triggering a UAF. So to avoid this problem, add an additional reference count to cachefiles_req, which is held while waiting and reading, and then released when the waiting and reading is over. Note that since there is only one reference count for waiting, we need to avoid the same request being completed multiple times, so we can only complete the request if it is successfully removed from the xarray.

There is a logic error in io_uring's implementation which can be used to trigger a use-after-free vulnerability leading to privilege escalation. In the io_prep_async_work function the assumption that the last io_grab_identity call cannot return false is not true, and in this case the function will use the init_cred or the previous linked requests identity to do operations instead of using the current identity. This can lead to reference counting issues causing use-after-free. We recommend upgrading past version 5.10.161.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Fix UAF in msi_capability_init KFENCE reports the following UAF: BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 Use-after-free read at 0x0000000024629571 (in kfence-#12): __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 kfence-#12: 0x0000000008614900-0x00000000e06c228d, size=104, cache=kmalloc-128 allocated by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.808142s: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1f0/0x2bc kmalloc_trace+0x44/0x138 msi_alloc_desc+0x3c/0x9c msi_domain_insert_msi_desc+0x30/0x78 msi_setup_msi_desc+0x13c/0x184 __pci_enable_msi_range+0x258/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 freed by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.811436s: msi_domain_free_descs+0xd4/0x10c msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0xc0/0x1d8 msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked+0xb4/0xbc pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x30/0x4c __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2a8/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 Descriptor allocation done in: __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init msi_setup_msi_desc msi_insert_msi_desc msi_domain_insert_msi_desc msi_alloc_desc ... Freed in case of failure in __msi_domain_alloc_locked() __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked msi_domain_alloc_locked __msi_domain_alloc_locked => fails msi_domain_free_locked ... That failure propagates back to pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() in msi_capability_init() which accesses the descriptor for unmasking in the error exit path. Cure it by copying the descriptor and using the copy for the error exit path unmask operation. [ tglx: Massaged change log ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free in bpf_link_free() After commit 1a80dbcb2dba, bpf_link can be freed by link->ops->dealloc_deferred, but the code still tests and uses link->ops->dealloc afterward, which leads to a use-after-free as reported by syzbot. Actually, one of them should be sufficient, so just call one of them instead of both. Also add a WARN_ON() in case of any problematic implementation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in fscache_withdraw_volume() We got the following issue in our fault injection stress test: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fscache_withdraw_volume+0x2e1/0x370 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810680be08 by task ondemand-04-dae/5798 CPU: 0 PID: 5798 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #565 Call Trace: kasan_check_range+0xf6/0x1b0 fscache_withdraw_volume+0x2e1/0x370 cachefiles_withdraw_volume+0x31/0x50 cachefiles_withdraw_cache+0x3ad/0x900 cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount+0x1f6/0x250 cachefiles_daemon_release+0x13b/0x290 __fput+0x204/0xa00 task_work_run+0x139/0x230 Allocated by task 5820: __kmalloc+0x1df/0x4b0 fscache_alloc_volume+0x70/0x600 __fscache_acquire_volume+0x1c/0x610 erofs_fscache_register_volume+0x96/0x1a0 erofs_fscache_register_fs+0x49a/0x690 erofs_fc_fill_super+0x6c0/0xcc0 vfs_get_super+0xa9/0x140 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 do_new_mount+0x28c/0x580 [...] Freed by task 5820: kfree+0xf1/0x2c0 fscache_put_volume.part.0+0x5cb/0x9e0 erofs_fscache_unregister_fs+0x157/0x1b0 erofs_kill_sb+0xd9/0x1c0 deactivate_locked_super+0xa3/0x100 vfs_get_super+0x105/0x140 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 do_new_mount+0x28c/0x580 [...] ================================================================== Following is the process that triggers the issue: mount failed | daemon exit ------------------------------------------------------------ deactivate_locked_super cachefiles_daemon_release erofs_kill_sb erofs_fscache_unregister_fs fscache_relinquish_volume __fscache_relinquish_volume fscache_put_volume(fscache_volume, fscache_volume_put_relinquish) zero = __refcount_dec_and_test(&fscache_volume->ref, &ref); cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount cachefiles_daemon_unbind cachefiles_withdraw_cache cachefiles_withdraw_volumes list_del_init(&volume->cache_link) fscache_free_volume(fscache_volume) cache->ops->free_volume cachefiles_free_volume list_del_init(&cachefiles_volume->cache_link); kfree(fscache_volume) cachefiles_withdraw_volume fscache_withdraw_volume fscache_volume->n_accesses // fscache_volume UAF !!! The fscache_volume in cache->volumes must not have been freed yet, but its reference count may be 0. So use the new fscache_try_get_volume() helper function try to get its reference count. If the reference count of fscache_volume is 0, fscache_put_volume() is freeing it, so wait for it to be removed from cache->volumes. If its reference count is not 0, call cachefiles_withdraw_volume() with reference count protection to avoid the above issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: srcu: Tighten cleanup_srcu_struct() GP checks Currently, cleanup_srcu_struct() checks for a grace period in progress, but it does not check for a grace period that has not yet started but which might start at any time. Such a situation could result in a use-after-free bug, so this commit adds a check for a grace period that is needed but not yet started to cleanup_srcu_struct().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bus: fsl-mc-bus: fix KASAN use-after-free in fsl_mc_bus_remove() In fsl_mc_bus_remove(), mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io is passed to fsl_destroy_mc_io(). However, mc->root_mc_bus_dev is already freed in fsl_mc_device_remove(). Then reference to mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io triggers KASAN use-after-free. To avoid the use-after-free, keep the reference to mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io in a local variable and pass to fsl_destroy_mc_io(). This patch needs rework to apply to kernels older than v5.15.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: mtk_wed: fix use-after-free panic in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb() When there are multiple ap interfaces on one band and with WED on, turning the interface down will cause a kernel panic on MT798X. Previously, cb_priv was freed in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block() without marking NULL,and mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb() didn't check the value, too. Assign NULL after free cb_priv in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block() and check NULL in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb(). ---------- Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0072460bca32b4f5 Call trace: mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb+0x4/0x38 0xffffffc0794084bc tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x70/0x1e8 tcf_block_unbind+0x6c/0xc8 ... ---------

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix race on unaccepted mptcp sockets When the listener socket owning the relevant request is closed, it frees the unaccepted subflows and that causes later deletion of the paired MPTCP sockets. The mptcp socket's worker can run in the time interval between such delete operations. When that happens, any access to msk->first will cause an UaF access, as the subflow cleanup did not cleared such field in the mptcp socket. Address the issue explicitly traversing the listener socket accept queue at close time and performing the needed cleanup on the pending msk. Note that the locking is a bit tricky, as we need to acquire the msk socket lock, while still owning the subflow socket one.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: core: Fix use-after-free in snd_soc_exit() KASAN reports a use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in device_del+0xb5b/0xc60 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888008655050 by task rmmod/387 CPU: 2 PID: 387 Comm: rmmod Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0x9a print_report+0x17f/0x47b kasan_report+0xbb/0xf0 device_del+0xb5b/0xc60 platform_device_del.part.0+0x24/0x200 platform_device_unregister+0x2e/0x40 snd_soc_exit+0xa/0x22 [snd_soc_core] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x34f/0x5b0 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... </TASK> It's bacause in snd_soc_init(), snd_soc_util_init() is possble to fail, but its ret is ignored, which makes soc_dummy_dev unregistered twice. snd_soc_init() snd_soc_util_init() platform_device_register_simple(soc_dummy_dev) platform_driver_register() # fail platform_device_unregister(soc_dummy_dev) platform_driver_register() # success ... snd_soc_exit() snd_soc_util_exit() # soc_dummy_dev will be unregistered for second time To fix it, handle error and stop snd_soc_init() when util_init() fail. Also clean debugfs when util_init() or driver_register() fail.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix use-after-free in l2cap_conn_del() When l2cap_recv_frame() is invoked to receive data, and the cid is L2CAP_CID_A2MP, if the channel does not exist, it will create a channel. However, after a channel is created, the hold operation of the channel is not performed. In this case, the value of channel reference counting is 1. As a result, after hci_error_reset() is triggered, l2cap_conn_del() invokes the close hook function of A2MP to release the channel. Then l2cap_chan_unlock(chan) will trigger UAF issue. The process is as follows: Receive data: l2cap_data_channel() a2mp_channel_create() --->channel ref is 2 l2cap_chan_put() --->channel ref is 1 Triger event: hci_error_reset() hci_dev_do_close() ... l2cap_disconn_cfm() l2cap_conn_del() l2cap_chan_hold() --->channel ref is 2 l2cap_chan_del() --->channel ref is 1 a2mp_chan_close_cb() --->channel ref is 0, release channel l2cap_chan_unlock() --->UAF of channel The detailed Call Trace is as follows: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa6/0x5e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880160664b8 by task kworker/u11:1/7593 Workqueue: hci0 hci_error_reset Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa6/0x5e0 l2cap_conn_del+0x404/0x7b0 l2cap_disconn_cfm+0x8c/0xc0 hci_conn_hash_flush+0x11f/0x260 hci_dev_close_sync+0x5f5/0x11f0 hci_dev_do_close+0x2d/0x70 hci_error_reset+0x9e/0x140 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 7593: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 l2cap_chan_create+0x40/0x930 amp_mgr_create+0x96/0x990 a2mp_channel_create+0x7d/0x150 l2cap_recv_frame+0x51b8/0x9a70 l2cap_recv_acldata+0xaa3/0xc00 hci_rx_work+0x702/0x1220 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 7593: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 ____kasan_slab_free+0x167/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0 kfree+0xe2/0x580 l2cap_chan_put+0x22a/0x2d0 l2cap_conn_del+0x3fc/0x7b0 l2cap_disconn_cfm+0x8c/0xc0 hci_conn_hash_flush+0x11f/0x260 hci_dev_close_sync+0x5f5/0x11f0 hci_dev_do_close+0x2d/0x70 hci_error_reset+0x9e/0x140 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 call_rcu+0x99/0x740 netlink_release+0xe6a/0x1cf0 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23c/0x250 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 call_rcu+0x99/0x740 netlink_release+0xe6a/0x1cf0 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23c/0x250 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bonding: fix use-after-free after 802.3ad slave unbind commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"), resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond. bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when __agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for, previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory. Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ), before ad_clear_agg(). The KASAN logs are as follows: [ 767.617392] ================================================================== [ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470 [ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767 [ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15 [ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT) [ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler [ 767.666468] Call trace: [ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 [ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8 [ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260 [ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0 [ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_qca: Fix driver shutdown on closed serdev The driver shutdown callback (which sends EDL_SOC_RESET to the device over serdev) should not be invoked when HCI device is not open (e.g. if hci_dev_open_sync() failed), because the serdev and its TTY are not open either. Also skip this step if device is powered off (qca_power_shutdown()). The shutdown callback causes use-after-free during system reboot with Qualcomm Atheros Bluetooth: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0072662f67726fd7 ... CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rt5-00325-g8a5f56bcfcca #8 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT) Call trace: tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x4/0x30 serdev_device_write_flush+0x24/0x34 qca_serdev_shutdown+0x80/0x130 [hci_uart] device_shutdown+0x15c/0x260 kernel_restart+0x48/0xac KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff16270c2e0018 by task systemd-shutdow/1 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 6.1.0-next-20221220-00014-gb85aaf97fb01-dirty #28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xdc/0xf0 show_stack+0x18/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0x188/0x488 kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0 __asan_load8+0x80/0xac tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50 ttyport_write_flush+0x34/0x44 serdev_device_write_flush+0x48/0x60 qca_serdev_shutdown+0x124/0x274 device_shutdown+0x1e8/0x350 kernel_restart+0x48/0xb0 __do_sys_reboot+0x244/0x2d0 __arm64_sys_reboot+0x54/0x70 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x160 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xf0 el0_svc+0x2c/0x6c el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mscc: ocelot: fix use-after-free in ocelot_vlan_del() ocelot_vlan_member_del() will free the struct ocelot_bridge_vlan, so if this is the same as the port's pvid_vlan which we access afterwards, what we're accessing is freed memory. Fix the bug by determining whether to clear ocelot_port->pvid_vlan prior to calling ocelot_vlan_member_del().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bfq: Avoid merging queues with different parents It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq) and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544 CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 ? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0 bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0 bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420 ? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0 ? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70 ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0 __bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270 bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160 ? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260 ? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0 ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280 ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10 ? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740 Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix use after free in hci_send_acl This fixes the following trace caused by receiving HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142 CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0 l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0 sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110 sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370 do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690 do_iter_write+0x132/0x640 vfs_writev+0x198/0x570 do_writev+0x202/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77 R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580 RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 </TASK> R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0 Allocated by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000 le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0 hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0 hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450 hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 kfree+0xac/0x350 hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0 hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0 hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120 hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address belongs to the page: 128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580) flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004 ffff8880078418c0 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc Memory state around the buggy address: >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and then attach it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots. After that we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump to 'fail' label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot: 1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots; 2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(). In both cases, we don't abort the transaction and we release our transaction handle. We jump to the 'fail' label and free the pending snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the transaction's list; 3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there's no error at all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free. This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the following warning: fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: '&pending_snapshot->list' not removed from list So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the pending snapshot to the transaction's list. Instead add the pending snapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction() we add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error returned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which case the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can access it anymore.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: Fix stale file descriptors on failed usercopy A failing usercopy of the fence_rep object will lead to a stale entry in the file descriptor table as put_unused_fd() won't release it. This enables userland to refer to a dangling 'file' object through that still valid file descriptor, leading to all kinds of use-after-free exploitation scenarios. Fix this by deferring the call to fd_install() until after the usercopy has succeeded.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (ibmpex) Fix possible UAF when ibmpex_register_bmc() fails Smatch report warning as follows: drivers/hwmon/ibmpex.c:509 ibmpex_register_bmc() warn: '&data->list' not removed from list If ibmpex_find_sensors() fails in ibmpex_register_bmc(), data will be freed, but data->list will not be removed from driver_data.bmc_data, then list traversal may cause UAF. Fix by removeing it from driver_data.bmc_data before free().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mt76: fix tx status related use-after-free race on station removal There is a small race window where ongoing tx activity can lead to a skb getting added to the status tracking idr after that idr has already been cleaned up, which will keep the wcid linked in the status poll list. Fix this by only adding status skbs if the wcid pointer is still assigned in dev->wcid, which gets cleared early by mt76_sta_pre_rcu_remove

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iwlwifi: fix use-after-free If no firmware was present at all (or, presumably, all of the firmware files failed to parse), we end up unbinding by calling device_release_driver(), which calls remove(), which then in iwlwifi calls iwl_drv_stop(), freeing the 'drv' struct. However the new code I added will still erroneously access it after it was freed. Set 'failure=false' in this case to avoid the access, all data was already freed anyway.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: fastrpc: Fix use-after-free and race in fastrpc_map_find Currently, there is a race window between the point when the mutex is unlocked in fastrpc_map_lookup and the reference count increasing (fastrpc_map_get) in fastrpc_map_find, which can also lead to use-after-free. So lets merge fastrpc_map_find into fastrpc_map_lookup which allows us to both protect the maps list by also taking the &fl->lock spinlock and the reference count, since the spinlock will be released only after. Add take_ref argument to make this suitable for all callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: arfs: fix use-after-free when freeing @rx_cpu_rmap The CI testing bots triggered the following splat: [ 718.203054] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.206349] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881bd127e00 by task sh/20834 [ 718.212852] CPU: 28 PID: 20834 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W IOE 5.17.0-rc8_nextqueue-devqueue-02643-g23f3121aca93 #1 [ 718.219695] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0012.070720200218 07/07/2020 [ 718.223418] Call Trace: [ 718.227139] [ 718.230783] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42 [ 718.234431] print_address_description.constprop.9+0x21/0x170 [ 718.238177] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.241885] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.245539] kasan_report.cold.18+0x7f/0x11b [ 718.249197] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.252852] free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.256471] ice_free_cpu_rx_rmap.part.11+0x37/0x50 [ice] [ 718.260174] ice_remove_arfs+0x5f/0x70 [ice] [ 718.263810] ice_rebuild_arfs+0x3b/0x70 [ice] [ 718.267419] ice_rebuild+0x39c/0xb60 [ice] [ 718.270974] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 718.274472] ? ice_init_phy_user_cfg+0x360/0x360 [ice] [ 718.278033] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xb0 [ 718.281513] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 718.284984] ? delay_tsc+0x8f/0xb0 [ 718.288463] ice_do_reset+0x92/0xf0 [ice] [ 718.292014] ice_pci_err_resume+0x91/0xf0 [ice] [ 718.295561] pci_reset_function+0x53/0x80 <...> [ 718.393035] Allocated by task 690: [ 718.433497] Freed by task 20834: [ 718.495688] Last potentially related work creation: [ 718.568966] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881bd127e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 718.574085] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 96-byte region [ffff8881bd127e00, ffff8881bd127e60) [ 718.579265] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 718.598905] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 718.601809] ffff8881bd127d00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 718.604796] ffff8881bd127d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 718.607794] >ffff8881bd127e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 718.610811] ^ [ 718.613819] ffff8881bd127e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 718.617107] ffff8881bd127f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc This is due to that free_irq_cpu_rmap() is always being called *after* (devm_)free_irq() and thus it tries to work with IRQ descs already freed. For example, on device reset the driver frees the rmap right before allocating a new one (the splat above). Make rmap creation and freeing function symmetrical with {request,free}_irq() calls i.e. do that on ifup/ifdown instead of device probe/remove/resume. These operations can be performed independently from the actual device aRFS configuration. Also, make sure ice_vsi_free_irq() clears IRQ affinity notifiers only when aRFS is disabled -- otherwise, CPU rmap sets and clears its own and they must not be touched manually.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: Fix potential use-after-free The skb is delivered to netif_rx() which may free it, after calling this, dereferencing skb may trigger use-after-free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bfq: fix use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing normal scsi-mq test [69832.239032] ================================================================== [69832.241810] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.243267] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802622ba88 by task kworker/3:1H/155 [69832.244656] [69832.245007] CPU: 3 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/3:1H Not tainted 5.10.0-10295-g576c6382529e #8 [69832.246626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [69832.249069] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn [69832.250022] Call Trace: [69832.250541] dump_stack+0x9b/0xce [69832.251232] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.252243] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60 [69832.253381] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5 [69832.254211] ? vprintk_func+0x6b/0x120 [69832.254994] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.255952] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.256914] kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a [69832.257753] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.258755] check_memory_region+0x1c1/0x1e0 [69832.260248] bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0 [69832.261181] ? bfq_bfqq_expire+0x2440/0x2440 [69832.262032] ? blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues+0xf9/0x170 [69832.263022] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830 [69832.264011] ? blk_mq_sched_request_inserted+0x100/0x100 [69832.265101] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0 [69832.266206] ? blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x570/0x570 [69832.267147] ? __switch_to+0x5f4/0xee0 [69832.267898] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140 [69832.268946] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270 [69832.269840] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60 [69832.278170] process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0 [69832.278984] worker_thread+0x91/0xc80 [69832.279726] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb0/0x110 [69832.280554] ? process_one_work+0xfe0/0xfe0 [69832.281414] kthread+0x32d/0x3f0 [69832.282082] ? kthread_park+0x170/0x170 [69832.282849] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [69832.283573] [69832.283886] Allocated by task 7725: [69832.284599] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 [69832.285385] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0 [69832.286350] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13f/0x460 [69832.287237] bfq_get_queue+0x3d4/0x1140 [69832.287993] bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x103/0x510 [69832.289015] bfq_init_rq+0x337/0x2d50 [69832.289749] bfq_insert_requests+0x304/0x4e10 [69832.290634] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x13e/0x390 [69832.291629] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760 [69832.292538] blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480 [69832.293392] io_schedule_prepare+0xb2/0xd0 [69832.294209] io_schedule_timeout+0x13/0x80 [69832.295014] wait_for_common_io.constprop.1+0x13c/0x270 [69832.296137] submit_bio_wait+0x103/0x1a0 [69832.296932] blkdev_issue_discard+0xe6/0x160 [69832.297794] blk_ioctl_discard+0x219/0x290 [69832.298614] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x50a/0x1750 [69832.304715] blkdev_ioctl+0x470/0x600 [69832.305474] block_ioctl+0xde/0x120 [69832.306232] vfs_ioctl+0x6c/0xc0 [69832.306877] __se_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xa0 [69832.307629] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [69832.308362] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [69832.309382] [69832.309701] Freed by task 155: [69832.310328] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 [69832.311121] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [69832.311868] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 [69832.312699] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160 [69832.313524] kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460 [69832.314367] bfq_put_queue+0x582/0x940 [69832.315112] __bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service+0x166/0x1d0 [69832.317275] bfq_bfqq_expire+0xb27/0x2440 [69832.318084] bfq_dispatch_request+0x697/0x44b0 [69832.318991] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830 [69832.319984] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0 [69832.321087] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140 [69832.322225] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270 [69832.323114] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x6 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not clean up repair bio if submit fails The submit helper will always run bio_endio() on the bio if it fails to submit, so cleaning up the bio just leads to a variety of use-after-free and NULL pointer dereference bugs because we race with the endio function that is cleaning up the bio. Instead just return BLK_STS_OK as the repair function has to continue to process the rest of the pages, and the endio for the repair bio will do the appropriate cleanup for the page that it was given.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Prevent use after free on completion memory On driver unload any pending descriptors are flushed at the time the interrupt is freed: idxd_dmaengine_drv_remove() -> drv_disable_wq() -> idxd_wq_free_irq() -> idxd_flush_pending_descs(). If there are any descriptors present that need to be flushed this flow triggers a "not present" page fault as below: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff391c97c70c9040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page The address that triggers the fault is the address of the descriptor that was freed moments earlier via: drv_disable_wq()->idxd_wq_free_resources() Fix the use after free by freeing the descriptors after any possible usage. This is done after idxd_wq_reset() to ensure that the memory remains accessible during possible completion writes by the device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubi: ubi_create_volume: Fix use-after-free when volume creation failed There is an use-after-free problem for 'eba_tbl' in ubi_create_volume()'s error handling path: ubi_eba_replace_table(vol, eba_tbl) vol->eba_tbl = tbl out_mapping: ubi_eba_destroy_table(eba_tbl) // Free 'eba_tbl' out_unlock: put_device(&vol->dev) vol_release kfree(tbl->entries) // UAF Fix it by removing redundant 'eba_tbl' releasing. Fetch a reproducer in [Link].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix queuing commands when HCI_UNREGISTER is set hci_cmd_sync_queue shall return an error if HCI_UNREGISTER flag has been set as that means hci_unregister_dev has been called so it will likely cause a uaf after the timeout as the hdev will be freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libfc: Fix use after free in fc_exch_abts_resp() fc_exch_release(ep) will decrease the ep's reference count. When the reference count reaches zero, it is freed. But ep is still used in the following code, which will lead to a use after free. Return after the fc_exch_release() call to avoid use after free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtnetlink: make sure to refresh master_dev/m_ops in __rtnl_newlink() While looking at one unrelated syzbot bug, I found the replay logic in __rtnl_newlink() to potentially trigger use-after-free. It is better to clear master_dev and m_ops inside the loop, in case we have to replay it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: fix UAFs when destroying the queues The second tagged commit started sometimes (very rarely, but possible) throwing WARNs from net/core/page_pool.c:page_pool_disable_direct_recycling(). Turned out idpf frees interrupt vectors with embedded NAPIs *before* freeing the queues making page_pools' NAPI pointers lead to freed memory before these pools are destroyed by libeth. It's not clear whether there are other accesses to the freed vectors when destroying the queues, but anyway, we usually free queue/interrupt vectors only when the queues are destroyed and the NAPIs are guaranteed to not be referenced anywhere. Invert the allocation and freeing logic making queue/interrupt vectors be allocated first and freed last. Vectors don't require queues to be present, so this is safe. Additionally, this change allows to remove that useless queue->q_vector pointer cleanup, as vectors are still valid when freeing the queues (+ both are freed within one function, so it's not clear why nullify the pointers at all).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda: Fix UAF of leds class devs at unbinding The LED class devices that are created by HD-audio codec drivers are registered via devm_led_classdev_register() and associated with the HD-audio codec device. Unfortunately, it turned out that the devres release doesn't work for this case; namely, since the codec resource release happens before the devm call chain, it triggers a NULL dereference or a UAF for a stale set_brightness_delay callback. For fixing the bug, this patch changes the LED class device register and unregister in a manual manner without devres, keeping the instances in hda_gen_spec.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: m_can: m_can_tx_handler(): fix use after free of skb can_put_echo_skb() will clone skb then free the skb. Move the can_put_echo_skb() for the m_can version 3.0.x directly before the start of the xmit in hardware, similar to the 3.1.x branch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pci: cx23885: Fix the error handling in cx23885_initdev() When the driver fails to call the dma_set_mask(), the driver will get the following splat: [ 55.853884] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.854486] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810de60408 by task modprobe/590 [ 55.856822] Call Trace: [ 55.860327] __process_removed_driver+0x3c/0x240 [ 55.861347] bus_for_each_dev+0x102/0x160 [ 55.861681] i2c_del_driver+0x2f/0x50 This is because the driver has initialized the i2c related resources in cx23885_dev_setup() but not released them in error handling, fix this bug by modifying the error path that jumps after failing to call the dma_set_mask().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ref_tracker: implement use-after-free detection Whenever ref_tracker_dir_init() is called, mark the struct ref_tracker_dir as dead. Test the dead status from ref_tracker_alloc() and ref_tracker_free() This should detect buggy dev_put()/dev_hold() happening too late in netdevice dismantle process.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccree - Fix use after free in cc_cipher_exit() kfree_sensitive(ctx_p->user.key) will free the ctx_p->user.key. But ctx_p->user.key is still used in the next line, which will lead to a use after free. We can call kfree_sensitive() after dev_dbg() to avoid the uaf.